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ABSTRACT
LIGHTWEIGHT MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVACY PRESERVATION
SCHEMES FOR IOT SYSTEMS
Samah Mansour
July 10, 2021

Internet of Things (IoT) presents a holistic and transformative approach for
providing services in different domains. IoT creates an atmosphere of interaction between
humans and the surrounding physical world through various technologies such as sensors,
actuators, and the cloud. Theoretically, when everything is connected, everything is at
risk. The rapid growth of IoT with the heterogeneous devices that are connected to the
Internet generates new challenges in protecting and preserving user’s privacy and
ensuring the security of our lives. IoT systems face considerable challenges in deploying
robust authentication protocols because some of the IoT devices are resource-constrained
with limited computation and storage capabilities to implement the currently available
authentication mechanism that employs computationally expensive functions. The
limited capabilities of IoT devices raise significant security and privacy concerns, such as
ensuring personal information confidentiality and integrity and establishing end-to-end
authentication and secret key generation between the communicating device to guarantee
secure communication among the communicating devices.
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The ubiquity nature of the IoT device provides adversaries more attack surfaces
which can lead to tragic consequences that can negatively impact our everyday connected
lives. According to [1], authentication and privacy protection are essential security
requirements. Therefore, there is a critical need to address these rising security and
privacy concerns to ensure IoT systems' safety. This dissertation identifies gaps in the
literature and presents new mutual authentication and privacy preservation schemes that
fit the needs of resource-constrained devices to improve IoT security and privacy against
common attacks. This research enhances IoT security and privacy by introducing
lightweight mutual authentication and privacy preservation schemes for IoT based on
hardware biometrics using PUF, Chained hash PUF, dynamic identities, and user’s static
and continuous biometrics. The communicating parties can anonymously communicate
and mutually authenticate each other and locally establish a session key using dynamic
identities to ensure the user’s unlinkability and untraceability. Furthermore, virtual
domain segregation is implemented to apply security policies between nodes. The
chained-hash PUF mechanism technique is implemented as a way to verify the sender’s
identity.
At first, this dissertation presents a framework called “A Lightweight Mutual
Authentication and Privacy-Preservation framework for IoT Systems” and this
framework is considered the foundation of all presented schemes. The proposed
framework integrates software and hardware-based security approaches that satisfy the
NIST IoT security requirements for data protection and device identification. Also, this
dissertation presents an architecture called “PUF Hierarchal Distributed Architecture”
(PHDA), which is used to perform the device name resolution.
vi

Based on the proposed framework and PUF architecture, three lightweight
privacy-preserving and mutual authentication schemes are presented. The Three different
schemes are introduced to accommodate both stationary and mobile IoT devices as well
as local and distributed nodes. The first scheme is designed for the smart homes domain,
where the IoT devices are stationary, and the controller node is local. In this scheme,
there is direct communication between the IoT nodes and the controller node.
Establishing mutual authentication does not require the cloud service's involvement to
reduce the system latency and offload the cloud traffic. The second scheme is designed
for the industrial IoT domain and used smart poultry farms as a use case of the Industrial
IoT (IIoT) domain. In the second scheme, the IoT devices are stationary, and the
controller nodes are hierarchical and distributed, supported by machine-to-machine
(M2M) communication. The third scheme is designed for smart cities and used IoV fleet
vehicles as a use case of the smart cities domain. During the roaming service, the mutual
authentication process between a vehicle and the distributed controller nodes represented
by the Roadside Units (RSUs) is completed through the cloud service that stores all
vehicle's security credentials. After that, when a vehicle moves to the proximity of a new
RSU under the same administrative authority of the most recently visited RSU, the two
RSUs can cooperate to verify the vehicle's legitimacy. Also, the third scheme supports
driver static and continuous authentication as a driver monitoring system for the sake of
both road and driver safety.
The security of the proposed schemes is evaluated and simulated using two
different methods: security analysis and performance analysis. The security analysis is
implemented through formal security analysis and informal security analysis. The formal
vii

analysis uses the Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic (BAN) and model-checking using the
automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA) toolkit.
The informal security analysis is completed by: (1) investigating the robustness of the
proposed schemes against the well-known security attacks and analyze its satisfaction
with the main security properties; and (2) comparing the proposed schemes with the other
existing authentication schemes considering their resistance to the well-known attacks
and their satisfaction with the main security requirements. Both the formal and informal
security analyses complement each other.
The performance evaluation is conducted by analyzing and comparing the
overhead and efficiency of the proposed schemes with other related schemes from the
literature. The results showed that the proposed schemes achieve all security goals and,
simultaneously, efficiently and satisfy the needs of the resource-constrained IoT devices.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND DISSERTATION OVERVIEW
The rapid increase in using the Internet means that more than 49% of the world
population is reachable at the click of a button, providing people with economic and
social opportunities. Internet of Things (IoT) is an old and new term at the same time.
Kevin Ashton mentioned this term in 1999 during a presentation at Proctor & Gamble to
link the idea of radio frequency identification (RFID) to the new topic of the Internet [1].
Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology that is experiencing continuous
growth. IoT creates a small and smart interconnected world that enables human-to-devise
communication and device-to-device communication. IoT established an intelligent
environment in which there is a constant exchange of data and services. It is expected
that more than 21 billion devices will be interconnected by 2025 [2]. The predicted
exponential growth of IoT depends partially on both Moore's law and Koomey's law.
Moore's law states that the number of transistors on a chip doubles approximately every
two years [3]. As a result, powerful computers can be developed on the same sized chip.
Koomey's law explains that the number of computations per kilowatt-hour
roughly doubles every one and a half years [4]. Kevin Ashton describes that these two
laws enabled us to create powerful and energy-efficient computers. Those two laws are
telling us that we can perform the same amount of computations on a smaller chip while
consuming less energy. This means that computers become more computationally
effective as they become more energy efficient. The output is a small, powerful, and
energy-efficient computer that allows us to provide more advanced services with less
chip size at lower energy consumption. [5].
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There is no universally accepted definition for IoT. The main idea of IoT is the
connection of many objects to communication and the exchange of data as well as
enabling people to communicate with these objects. IEEE's definition of IoT is: "Internet
of Things envisions a self-conﬁguring, adaptive, complex network that interconnects'
things' to the Internet through the use of standard communication protocols. The things
offer services, with or without human intervention, through the exploitation of unique
identiﬁcation, data capture and communication, and actuation capability. The service is
exploited through the use of intelligent interfaces and is made available anywhere,
anytime, and for anything taking security into consideration" [6].
According to the IEEE IoT deﬁnition [6], the IoT system consists of three main
layers: (1) a front layer that consists of the front-end devices such as sensors that sense
and gather data about the environment (2) a back layer that consists of back-end
computing and storage devices which provides analytics and intelligence, (3) a network
layer that provides the communication infrastructure which connects front-end sensors to
back end servers.
The Telecommunication Standardization Sector [7] defined IoT as "… a global
infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting
(physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information
and communication technologies".
According to the ITU, the physical world refers to anything in our physical world
that can be sensed, actuated, and connected. The virtual world refers to data and
information that can be collected, processed, stored, and accessed. By integrating both
the physical and virtual world, we can use a diverse collection of smart objects to collect,
2

process, and store data from any environment to make decisions and take actions at any
time.
In IoT, classical computing and communication devices as well as a wide range of
other gadgets that we use in our daily life, are connected in different domains such as
smart homes, health care, wearable devices, smart city, and others. Consequently, A large
number of devices will be connected. Those devices will have smart capabilities to
collect, analyze and even make decisions without any human interaction. Cisco forecasts
that the IoT market will be $14.4 trillion by 2022, with the majority invested in
improving customer experience. Other areas of investment are reducing the time-tomarket ($3T), cost reduction strategies ($2.5T), improving supply chain and logistics
($2.7T), and increasing employee productivity ($2.5T). Moreover, Cisco found that 50%
of IoT activity is in manufacturing, transformation, smart cities, and consumer markets
[8] as presented in figure 1.
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Figure 1: Cisco Forecast of the IoT Growth
Analysts at McKinsey institutes [9] estimate that the annual economic
impact of IoT will grow from $3.9 trillion to $11.1 trillion by 2025. The growth
will be in different domains such as manufacturing, smart cities, retail
environments, cars, and the human body, as shown in figure 2[9].
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Figure 2: McKensey Forecast to IoT Growth Per Domain
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IoT technology is deployed in different domains such as surveillance devices in
smart cities, patient monitoring devices in health care, connected cars in vehicular
networks, wearable devices, and smart homes. IoT systems have a heterogeneous mix of
diverse devices, networking and communication protocols, and design methodologies,
making them complex subjects for designing a security framework. Therefore, security is
an essential requirement in the IoT environment, especially authentication, which is of
high interest given the damage that could happen from a malicious unauthenticated
device in an IoT system.
1.1

Challenges
The communication among IoT devices over the Internet and on local networks

needs to be secured to gain user trust. The implementation of the security system in IoT
requires the building of a Root of Trust (ROT). ROT can be defined as an element of a
system that offers services to verify the achievement of security-related goals such as
confidentiality, messages integrity, and authentication of the sending and receiving
devices [10]
Security and privacy are key challenges to make the IoT ecosystem. Typically,
IoT devices are characterized by their constrained resources, consisting of a small amount
of memory and computational power, which are not architecturally designed to employ
robust security techniques [11]. Besides, IoT devices are often deployed in open and
public places, which may cause them to be vulnerable to physical and cloning attacks.
We cannot deal with IoT in an ad-hoc manner using reactive approaches and being on the
defensive side. Instead, a proactive approach is required by being on the offensive side.
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Also, any security solution designed for IoT devices must be computationally efficient
and able to detect any security violation of the IoT devices without sacrificing security.
The traditional security and protection techniques, including currently available
cryptographic solutions, secure protocols, and privacy preservation techniques, cannot be
re-implemented to secure resource-constrained devices. IoT systems must be used to ease
our lives and not harm our security and privacy. Therefore, any new solution must be
resource-efficient to fit devices with limited processing power, memory, and
communication bandwidth and to preserve user's privacy.
1.2

Problem Definition
IoT devices are pervasive in our everyday life. IoT spending is now forecast to

pass the $1 trillion projected market in 2022, reaching $1.1 trillion in 2023, for an annual
growth rate of 13%. Both smart homes and connected vehicles are estimated to be the
second-largest source of IoT spending [12]. Although there is a growth in the IoT market,
there are still concerns about the security and privacy of such systems. Because IoT
devices can monitor every aspect of people's lives, the user still has legitimate privacy
concerns. Moreover, companies worry about reputational damage from data getting into
the wrong hands, and governments fear security risks.
IoT security is different for several reasons. First, IoT devices are characterized
by their constrained resources consisting of a small amount of memory and
computational power, which are not architecturally designed to support robust security
techniques. Second, IoT systems have a heterogeneous mix of diverse devices and
networking protocols, which makes it complex to design a security framework given
6

raised scalability and interoperability issues. Third, IoT devices are connected to various
components, such as actuators or monitoring systems. The collected data by those devices
is vital for the functioning of the operation of the whole system. Fourth, IoT nodes store a
secret key in non-volatile memory (NVM), flash memory, or battery-operated static
random-access memory (SRAM). It has been proven that physical attacks such as
invasive, semi-invasive, or side-channel attacks and software attacks such as malware can
expose the key and lead to security breaches [13].
The IoT system can be subject to two main types of attacks: (i) attacks against the
IoT devices such as physical attacks on the device; (ii) attacks against the
communications such as a man in the middle attack that may lead to listening, modifying,
injecting, or re-routing the message. Also, the adversary can either compromise existing
IoT devices or inject malicious devices that can be used to launch different types of
attacks. Therefore, appropriate countermeasures must be taken to secure the IoT systems
from those attacks.
Traditional password-based or secret-key-based authentication schemes, in which
a shared secret is the only authentication factor, are not enough for addressing the security
problems, especially if the IoT devices are mobile devices. Many IoT devices have weak
passwords using manufacturer default passwords, making them vulnerable to botnets, such
as the Mirai IoT botnet [14]. Also, an adversary with physical access to an IoT device can
launch various physical or side-channel attacks to acquire the device's secret key, thus
compromising the device and the entire system. Moreover, hackers can connect rogue
devices to IoT networks using fake or multiple identities without being caught.
Furthermore, IoT devices may rely on user biometrics as another factor of authentication.
7

However, the biometric template affects the user's privacy if a hacking activity
compromises it. Therefore, protecting the user's privacy is a necessity for biometrics-based
authentication systems.
Privacy preservation is another major security component. The lack of privacy
preservation may allow the attacker to track and identify the user or the IoT device
identify, leading to a privacy breach. The lack of protecting users or IoT devices in smart
homes and health care will allow the adversary to identify the user's lifestyle and infer
sensitive information, which can potentially be life-threatening to the users. Therefore,
anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability, and pseudonymity are
important characteristics to ensure privacy preservation and prevent attackers from
obtaining the user's real identity or the IoT device [15].
Two of the core NIST requirements for securable IoT devices are device
identification and data protection. Security, privacy, and trust are three main elements
that must be satisfied in any IoT application [16]. Device’s authentication, data
confidentiality, data integrity, trust management, and privacy are key challenges in
designing a secure IoT.
Device authentication is the process of verifying the device's identity. Without
strong authentication, attackers can capture sensitive data and execute malicious actions.
Data integrity is the process of maintaining and ensuring the originality, accuracy, and
consistency of the data. Trust management guarantees trust in the devices and ensures
that data has been handled and processed in compliance with user needs and rights.
Privacy is essential to ensure that the user's data and credentials are preserved.
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Ensuring security and privacy in the IoT systems can be achieved using: (1)
encryption that makes sensitive data useless to the adversary and (2) authentication
techniques that reject malicious devices that can cause harmful attacks.
There is a need for new robust authentication techniques to avoid the problems
mentioned above and, at the same time, can work on resource constraint devices. In this
dissertation, diﬀerent IoT authentication architectures are presented that ensure security
and privacy preservation and present computational efficiency solutions to fit the nature of
the IoT devices.
1.3

Solution Approach
To address the aforementioned issues, authentication techniques that can deal

with a mix of diverse and resource constraint devices and protect users' security and
privacy should be developed. Unlike traditional Internet, a one-size-fits-all solution is not
applicable in the IoT ecosystem because the IoT domains and the use cases are different.
Consequently, the requirements are different. Therefore, more specialized solutions need
to be designed and developed.
The main goal of this dissertation is the design and development of new secure
mutual authentication and key exchange schemes for secure communication in the IoT
systems for both stationary and mobile IoT nodes. The proposed schemes are built on six
main foundations: (i) implementation of mutual authentication; (ii), the use of Physically
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) as the root of trust (iii) verification of hardware
counterfeiting; (iv) use of lightweight cryptosystem; (v) assurance of data integrity,
confidentiality and privacy preservation; and (vi) support system scalability.
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1.4

Main Contributions
Designing lightweight authentication schemes for different IoT domains is

necessary. Transmitting user's data in a secure environment is crucial to preserve the
user's privacy and security. Our proposed schemes depend on modern lightweight
cryptography, PUF hardware's intrinsic security primitive, and user biometric features.
Cryptography techniques are used to generate a shared key, establish an encrypted
and secure channel of communication between the devices with the IoT systems, and
authenticate the devices. PUF is used to create a secure and robust authentication scheme
for devices and protect devices from counterfeiting along with the different cryptographic
protocols. Furthermore, both static and dynamic user biometric features are used to
complete initial and ongoing user authentication.
The main contributions are as follows of this work are as follows:
•

The development of PUF Hierarchal Distributed Architecture (PHDA) for device
name resolution to support system scalability and protect the IoT systems from
being counterfeited.

•

Implement the Root of Trust (ROT) scheme in the IoT environment through the
utilization of PUF to ensure authenticity by using the challenge-response pair
protocol. Also, PUF is used to derive device-dependent security keys.

•

The development of a zero-knowledge crypto solution known as “ Chained Hash
PUF” to maintain node tracking. It is considered the first of its kind technique in
the IoT authentication research field.
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•

The development of a Lightweight Mutual Authentication and Privacy
Preservation Framework for IoT (LMAP2A). The framework is developed to be
domain-independent for generalized usage in IoT environments. LMAP2A
integrates both software and hardware-based security approaches. Also, LMAP2A
applies the "defense in depth" concept by using multiple layers of security
countermeasures through an IoT system to provide redundancy in case a security
countermeasure fails, or a vulnerability is successfully exploited.

•

Based on the proposed framework, three lightweight authentication schemes were
developed to support three different IoT systems. The three different schemes are
designed to support different node mobility and distribution requirements.

•

Detailed security and performance evaluation of the presented three schemes.

1.5

Dissertation Outlines

The dissertation is organized as follows:
•

Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of IoT security, authentication, and
hardware security. Also, the chapter discusses related work on authentication and
key agreement for IoT.

•

Chapter 3 presents the foundation framework that is called “Lightweight Mutual
Authentication and Privacy Preservation Architecture for IoT (LMAP2A)”. This
framework is considered the backbone and the road map of the schemes that are
presented in the following three chapters. This chapter also presents a PUF
Hierarchal Distributed Architecture (PHDA), which is used to perform the IoT
device name resolution.
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•

Chapter 4: presents the first authentication scheme titled “Lightweight Privacy
Preservation and Mutual Authentication Scheme for Smart Homes Using
Physical Unclonable Functions.” All devices in the proposed smart home use
case are stationary and within range.

•

Chapter 5: presents the second authentication scheme titled “M2M Distributed
Multi-Layer Lightweight Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme
Using Chained Hash PUF in Industrial IoT System”. The chapter presents the
concept of the chained hash PUF and how it is used to authenticate IoT devices.
The poultry farm network model is multi-layer in nature, and the devices are
distributed and heterogeneous.

•

Chapter 6: describes the third authentication scheme called “Three-Factor
Authentication and Privacy Preservation Scheme Using User and Device
Biometrics for IoV System.” All devices and users in the IoV network model are
mobile and require frequent authentication.

•

Chapter 7: concludes the dissertation by discussing the contributions of the
research and outlining future work.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
To better present the contribution of this dissertation, an in-depth analysis of IoT
and the available solutions of IoT security are discussed. This chapter provides
background information about the Internet of Things, integrity, conﬁdentiality,
authentication, privacy, and trust. Also, the use of a physical unclonable function (PUF)
as a hardware fingerprint is studied. Moreover, the use of fog computing as support to
IoT resource-constraint devices in data processing and information delivery is discussed.
2.1

Why IoT Security is Different
Internet of Things (IoT) is experiencing continuous growth. Not only classical

computing and communication devices are connected, but also a whole range of other
gadgets that are used in our daily life in different domains such as smart homes, health
care, wearable devices, smart city, and others. Consequently, tens and even hundreds of
billions of devices will be connected. In the IoT ecosystem, objects are connected via the
Internet without any human intervention. IoT enables the transfer and sharing of data
among living and nonliving objects to achieve specific goals. Those devices will have
smart capabilities to collect, analyze, and even make decisions without any human
interaction.
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As described in [7], five main characteristics differentiate the IoT devices from
any other device: (i) Interconnectivity that indicates that all IoT devices can be connected
to the global information and communication infrastructure. IoT is based on the idea of
being able to interconnect everything ;(ii) heterogeneity where IoT systems have a mix of
various devices and networking protocols but can still interact with each other through
different networks. This feature is considered one of the main challenges in the IoT
ecosystem. ;(iii) dynamic changes where the devices can be in different states such as
connected, disconnected, waking up, and sleeping. The devices may change their state
dynamically which will, in turn, change the number of devices;(iv) limited resources
where the IoT devices experience limited CPU capabilities, memory, and power
resources; (v) large scale where the number of IoT devices grows exponentially and will
be larger than the number of devices in the current Internet. Most of the communication
will be device-to-device instead of human-to-device, and (vi) IoT devices are often
deployed unattended in open and public places which may cause them to be vulnerable to
physical and cloning attacks
The exponential growth of IoT is challenging from both security and technical
perspectives due to the heterogeneous mix of devices and communication protocols. At
least two challenges need to be carefully tackled: (1) security and privacy preservation
requirements to ensure a safe IoT environment; (2) the heterogonous nature of IoT that
makes one-size-fits-all security schemes unfeasible and inapplicable. When everything is
connected, multiple security threats will arise and put confidentiality, integrity,
availability, authenticity, privacy, and trust in risk.
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2.2

Security Goals
Information Security refers to the processes and methodologies which are

designed and implemented to protect data, information, and systems. Information
security means protecting data, information, and systems from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the IETF defined security metrics as a tool to facilitate decisionmaking and improve the systems’ performance. Security metrics are used to measure the
security level because what we cannot measure, we cannot improve. Security metrics can
be used to identify the strength and weaknesses of the implemented security system.
NIST and IETF agree on a set of security goals that are necessary to achieve information
security. Those objectives are confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, availability, and
accountability of all messages [17]. The authors in [18] added auditability,
trustworthiness, non-repudiation, and privacy as additional security requirements.
•

Confidentiality: the process of ensuring that data will be disclosed only to
authorized users or systems. This applies to data in storage, during processing,
and while in transit. Confidentiality is crucial for IoT devices because they might
handle critical personal information. For example, unauthorized access to user’s
data may lead to life-threatening situations.

•

Integrity: is the process of ensuring that the data has not to be altered or
modified. The modification includes writing, changing the status, deleting,
creating, delaying, and replaying the messages. Integrity is important to provide a
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reliable service. If a modification has occurred, it must be detected. The
compromisation of integrity can lead to serious consequences.
•

Availability: A system should always be available to legitimate users and deliver
prompt and reliable service. Availability is essential to ensure that devices are
available for collecting data and prevents service interruptions.

•

Scalability: The IoT system must be able to accept and register new IoT devices.
The IoT scheme must be able to adapt to new technologies and incorporate the
needed modifications [19].

•

Privacy: It refers to the protection of sensitive data. Privacy implementation
requires securing end-to-end communication. Therefore, the transmission process
of the collected data should ensure that the data is not being tampered by an
adversary. Furthermore, the collected data must be stored in a secure
environment.

•

Authenticity: It is the process of verifying the device's or user's identity.
Through authentication, we can verify the origin of a message, the date of the
message, and message content. There are two classes of authentication: entity
authentication and data authentication. Data authentication implies data integrity.

•

Non-repudiation is the process that prevents both the sender and the receiver
from denying previous communication or actions.

2.3

Authentication
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Authentication can be viewed as the first line of defense by ensuring the
enforcement of security measures. Authentication requires a handshake process that can
be done before an authorization is granted. Device authentication is the process of
verifying the device identity. Without strong authentication, an attacker can capture
sensitive data and execute malicious actions. Deploying robust authentication protocols
becomes one of the first steps to ensure the security of the whole system.
Authentication needs to be established to build secure communication between
the IoT devices before transferring any data. Traditional authentication techniques
depend on using one of the well-known authentication factors to identify users, such as a
secret that a user knows or a token that a user has. On the other hand, modern
authentication techniques combine several authentication factors to authenticate users or
devices in different ways, such as two factors authentication and multi-factor
authentication that use two or more independent channels for authentication. Two or
more factor authentication processes aim to create a layered defense system that
combines two or more independent authentication factors to make it hard and even
impossible to gain access to a target. The two-factor authentication techniques have been
widely used in recent years to ensure secure authentication in systems well as providing
an extra layer of protection and increase user trust in the system. The authentication
process can take two different formats: machine-to-machine authentication and user-tomachine authentication.

2.4

Cryptographic Systems
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One of the main techniques to achieve security goals is the implementation of
cryptographic algorithms. There are two main cryptographic algorithms: (1) symmetric
cryptography; (2) asymmetric cryptography.
2.4.1

Symmetric Cryptography
In symmetric cryptography, both the sender and receiver share the same secret

key (K) to encrypt and decrypt data [20]. When the shared secret key encrypts the
message, it needs to be decrypted by the same key. A symmetric key cipher f is used to
encrypt a plaintext message m and generates a ciphertext c = fK (m) to be sent. At the
receiver side, an inverse cipher f −1 is used to retrieve the plaintext m = f −1 K (c), as
illustrated in figure 3.

Figure 3: Symmetric Encryption Process
One of the fast and secure symmetric cryptography algorithms is the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES). AES is a famous cipher that NIST has standardized to
replace DES and Triple DES [20]. AES supports key lengths of 128, 192, or 256 bits,
and the block length is 128 bits. AES does not require much memory, making it suitable
for resource constraint IoT devices [21].
One of the main properties of symmetric cryptography that can be viewed as a
drawback is the need to establish a secure channel of communication between the sender
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and the receiver before exchanging the shared secret key between the two sides of the
communication. This is known as the key distribution problem [20]. The storage of the
shared secret key can introduce vulnerabilities to the secure system. A compromised
device will reveal all stored secret keys, and consequently, all communication on this
device would be accessible.
Although the problems mentioned above are universal of symmetric
cryptography, it is still the best tool for encryption. Several techniques can be
implemented to overcome the shortcomings. One of the techniques is called Diffie
Hellman key exchange techniques. This technique will allow parties to establish a shared
secret key over an insecure channel of communication. Diffie Hellman can be used in
conjunction with asymmetric cryptography.
2.4.2

Asymmetric Cryptography
Unlike symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptography, or what is also called

public-key cryptography (PCKS), allows users to communicate securely without the need
for a shared secret key. PCKS is considered more computationally expensive compared
to symmetric key cryptography. Both the sender and the receiver each have two keys
called the public key and the private key. The private keys are kept secret, while the
public keys are public and widely distributed. The receiver's public key is used for
encryption by the sender, and the receiver's private key is used for decryption by the

19

receiver, as illustrated in figure 4. When a sender encrypts a message using the receiver's
public key, only the receiver can decrypt the message using his private key.

Figure 4: The Process of Asymmetric Encryption
Besides encryption, PKCS can be used for key establishment and authentication
and non-repudiation [20]. Key establishment features in PKCS can be used to overcome
the key establishment issue in symmetric cryptography, where the two parties need to
communicate through a secure channel to exchange the shared secret key. By using
PKCS, the two sides can securely establish a shared key. Non-repudiation is the
technique that prevents any party from denying its actions. Non-repudiation and
authentication can be achieved through the use of a digital signature that employs PKCS.
The sender encrypts a message with his private key, and the receiver decrypts the
message using the sender's public key; the receiver is assured that the sender generated
the message, provided the public key is verified and trusted or extremely signed by a
trusted certifying authority.
Because PKCS is more computationally expensive than symmetric cryptography,
it cannot be used for encrypting the ongoing communication during the session duration.
Instead, symmetric cryptography is used. PKC can be used for the key establishment
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stage, and then symmetric cryptography can be used to encrypt and decrypt all the
ongoing communication during the session. The key establishment can be divided into a
key transport protocol and a key agreement protocol [22]. One party creates the shared
secret key in the key transport mechanism and securely transfers it to the other party
using the receiver's public key to encrypt the shared secret key. An example of a key
transport mechanism is RSA.
On the other side, the shared secret key derivation process in the key agreement
mechanism is completed through the contribution of the two parties. This process causes
the two sides to influence the generated key and have the same key. An example of a key
agreement protocol is Diffie Hellman key exchange
2.4.2.1

Diffie Hellman Key Exchange

The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) was the first PKC protocol that is based
on the Discrete Log Problem (DLP) [20]. The definition of DLP, as given in [20], is
presented in figure 5. When we select large numbers, computing the discrete logarithm to
identify the x value becomes a very time-consuming and challenging task [20].
Given in the finite cyclic group Zp where p is the prime number
with a finite set of integers i = 0, 1, . . . , p − 1 and a primitive
element g ∈ Zp and another element h ∈ Zp . The DLP is the
problem of determining the integer 1 ≤ x ≤ p−1 such that:
g x ≡ h modp
Figure 5: Discrete Log Problem (DLP)
DHKE consists of two main phases: (a) an initialization phase and (b) a keyagreement phase. During the initialization phase, the two parties need to agree upon a set
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of parameters called domain parameters, as presented in figure 6. These domain
parameters are required to generate the secret key. By using the domain parameters, the
two sides can generate the same secret key over an insecure channel using the key
agreement phase.
Diffie Hellman Initialization Phase

1. Select a large prime number P
2. select a positive integer g, such that g is a generator modulo p
3. publish both P and g

Figure 6: Initialization Phase Diffie-Hellman protocol

Alice

Bob

Figure 7: Key Agreement Process Diffie-Hellman protocol
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Figure 8: Key Agreement Phase Diffie-Hellman protocol
During the key-agreement phase, both participants contribute to the key
establishment. Figures 7 and 8 show the key agreement process and phases of the Diffie
Hellman protocol. During the first step of the key agreement phase, Alice and Bob agree
on a large prime p and a nonzero integer g modulo p. Alice and Bob make the values of p
and g public knowledge. The next step is for Alice to pick a secret integer y that she does
not reveal to anyone, and Bob picks an integer x that he keeps secret. Bob and Alice use
their secret integers to compute their public keys. As a next step, both Alice and Bob
exchange their public keys. Alice sends R to Bob, and Bob sends G to Alice. Finally,
Bob and Alice use their secret integers to compute the secret key.
2.4.2.2

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public key algorithm that was introduced
in 1987 by [23]and by [24]. ECC is considered lightweight compared to RSA because it
can achieve the same level of security with much fewer arithmetic operations [20]. For
example, 1024-bit RSA corresponds to 160-bit in ECC. Therefore, ECC can be used in
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resource-constraint devices. The high security of ECC is based on the computation of the
ECC discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). Solving this problem cannot be done
effortlessly [22]. Also, the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol can be used
to generate the secret key in a secure environment.
ECC is based on the ECDLP, which is based on the DLP. This makes DHKE
suitable for ECC. As described in [20], the elliptic curve over Zp, p > 3, is the set of all
pairs (x, y) ∈ Zp which fulfill:
y 2 ≡ x 3 + ax + b mod p
together with an imaginary point of infinity θ, where a, b ∈ Zp and the condition 4a 3 +
27b 2 ≠ 0 mod p. ECDLP is defined by [19] as described in figure 9.

Given is an elliptic curve E. We consider a primitive element P and another element T.
The ECDLP problem is finding the integer d, where 1 ≤ d ≤ E, such that
P + P + ... + P = dP = T

d times
where E is the number of points on the curve

Figure 9: Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
ECDH key agreement protocol is based on the ECDLP. ECDH allows two parties
to establish a shared secret key over an insecure channel, where each of the parties has an
elliptic curve public-private key pair [19]. In the beginning, the two parties agree on the
ECC domain parameters that are presented in figure 10.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

p: Field that the curve defined over
G: the generator or the primitive root
a, b: values define the curve
n: prime order of G
h: cofactor

Figure 10: Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Domain Parameters
Domain Parameters
Alice

p,G,n,a,b,h
Bob

Figure 11: Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Key Agreement Protocol
Figure 11 describes the ECDH protocol. First, both Alice and Bob select a private
key that is a random integer d between {1,………n-1}. Second, each side will calculate
its public keys, which are QA for Alice and QB for Bob. Third, Alice and Bob exchange
their public keys over an insecure channel of communication. Last, each side calculates
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the secret key using its private key and the other side's public key. Once the two sides
have the same secret key, they can use symmetric encryption for all subsequent ongoing
communication.
Because one of the key features of the IoT ecosystem is handling resourceconstrained devices, ECC is preferred over RSA for the following reasons: (1) It uses a
shorter encryption key which in turn uses less memory, less storage, less power, and
fewer CPU resources; (2) ECC is based on the computation of the discrete logarithm
problem. Therefore, it is highly secured; (3) Zigbee Networking and Wi-Fi WPA 3
Standards specify ECDSA and ECDH as the algorithm of choice, and (4) The US
government publishes a set of standards algorithms approved for use in non-defense
applications called Suite B Cryptography. Currently, this standard includes only ECC for
authentication and key management. RSA has been completely removed.
Table 1 presents a comparison of RSA and ECC algorithms for the key size.
Column 1 shows the security level of that particular row. The security level is a measure
of the strength that a cryptographic algorithm achieves. The security level is usually
expressed in bits, where n-bit security means that the attacker would have to
perform 2n operations to break the cryptographic cipher. Column 2 shows the public key
size of RSA to achieve the corresponding security level. Column 3 shows the public key
size of ECC to accomplish the corresponding security level. Column 4 displays the key
size ratio between RSA ECC.
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Table 1: RSA Versus ECC Key size
Minimum Size of Public Keys
Security Level in

Key Size Ratio

RSA

ECC

ECC to RSA

80

1024

160-223

1:6

112

2048

224-255

1:9

128

3072

256-383

1:12

192

7680

384-511

1:20

256

15360

512+

1:30

bits

The current common security requirement is to achieve a 128-bit security level.
As stated in table 1, an ECC key size of 256 can accomplish a 128-bit security level
compared to the RSA key size of 3072. This indicated that the ECC key size is 12 times
smaller than the RSA key size. This means that RSA is more computationally expensive
than ECC, and it requires more storage, more power, and more CPU Resources.
Therefore, ECC is considered the potential algorithm for resource-constrained IoT
devices. Because the main focus of this dissertation is IoT constrained devices, we will
adopt ECC as the chosen Cryptographic algorithm.
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2.4.3

Message Authentication Code
A message authentication code (MAC) is a block of a few bytes that is used

to authenticate a message. The receiver can check this block and ensure that the message
is coming from the right sender and that an adversary hasn't modified it. A specific type of
MAC is called HMAC. HMAC stands for Hash-based MAC. HMAC is a special type of
message authentication code involving a cryptographic hash function and a secret
cryptographic key [25]. This scheme extends the error detection capability in verifying
data integrity as well as message authentication. HMAC can work with any cryptographic
hash function such as MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512, combined with a shared secret
key [26]. Once the HMAC hash is calculated, the message must be sent alongside the
HMAC hash. In HMAC, the presence of a shared secret helps to establish authenticity
because it is generated during a key exchange process that requires the participation of the
two communication parties. Only those two parties know what the secret key is. Then,
they can verify that the message is from a legitimate source when the hash matches.
Figure 12 describes how HMAC is working. First, the sender and the receiver share
a secret key. Second, the sender creates the message and calculates the HMAC hash for the
message where the message and the key will be used as inputs to the algorithm. Third, the
sender will send the message alongside the HMAC hash. Fourth, the receiver will calculate
the HMAC hash. Fifth, the receiver will verify the message's integrity and authenticity by
comparing the received HMAC hash with the computed HMAC hash. If the two values are
the same, the receiver ensures that the message has not been corrupted or modified.
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Message

Message
Message

SSK(K)
H((K ⊕ opad)|| H((K ⊕
ipad)||m))

MAC

MAC

SSK(K)
H((K ⊕ opad)|| H((K ⊕
ipad)||m))

MAC

=?

MAC

Figure 12 Hash-based MAC

2.4.4

Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) Technology

2.4.4.1

Concept of PUFs

With the quadratic growth of IoT devices, security and privacy become essential
requirements [27]. Most of the currently available security solutions depend on the
implementation of cryptography. The assumption is that the devices can securely store
the secret key and keep it away from an adversary. According to [28] and [29], this
assumption is not practical because physical attacks such as invasive, semi-invasive, or
side cha attacks can lead to key exposure and security breaches. Also, [29] highlighted
that some devices could be resource-constrained or do not have a nonvolatile memory to
store the secret key.
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An alternative solution is a hardware security primitive known as Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF). The PUF concept was first introduced by [30] in 2000. The
authors proposed the idea of the mismatch in silicon devices for integrated circuit (IC)
identification. The authors in [31] introduced Physical On-Way Functions. Then, [32]
proposed a Silicon Physical Random Functions and presented it as a PUF. PUF is new
hardware-based security primitive. A PUF is a function embedded in a physical device to
extract a secret from a complex physical system. The key idea behind PUF is the
exploitation of the “random physical disorder” or the “manufacturing variation” of the
silicon chips [33]. This manufacturing variation can not be controlled during the
fabrication process, and at the same time, it can not be refabricated intentionally. PUF
can be described as a function that returns a value called the response. This value can be
treated as a unique signature or a unique fingerprint of an integrated circuit for a given
challenge. Hence, we can define PUF as a Physical challenge-response procedure to
extract the signature of an integrated circuit. A PUF is similar to human fingerprints
because it produces a specific device signature to authenticate the device. PUF can be
used for device authentication and to protect from devices counterfeiting [34]. Also, the
unique secret key generated by the PUF can be used in different domains [35].
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Figure 13: PUF Challenge-Response Uniqueness
2.4.4.2

Properties and Parameters of PUFs

Based on the PUF definition, we can extract two main properties of a PUF:(1) It is
unpredictable. A PUF is unpredictable because an attacker who can use a limited and
fixed amount of resources can only extract a small amount of information from the PUF's
secret response. (2) It is unclonable. This means that it is hard to produce two identical
PUFs from two different IC as described in figures 13 and 14 . PUFs take advantage of
the circuit characteristics related to the uncontrollable random variation in the
manufacturing process. Therefore, the less control present during the circuit's
manufacturing process, the harder the reproduction of an identical PUF. The author in
[36] added four additional properties which have been identified from multiple proposed
PUF definitions. These properties are:
1. Low cost. This means that the measurement circuit should be easy to implement
and low cost. From a theoretical point of view, the PUF response should be easy
to evaluate/produce.
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2. Unique. The PUF response is extracted from the unique identity of the physical
entity. The set of challenge-response pairs should be sufficient to identify a PUF
among a given population uniquely.
3. Reproducible. This property distinguishes PUFs from True Random Number
Generators (TRNGs). The PUF response should be reproducible when introducing
the same challenge, even when it is under different environmental conditions.
4. Secure. When an invasive physical attack is performed, PUFs should produce an
error response when asked.

Figure 14: Main properties of PUF
The authors in [37] proposed the construction of PUF-FSM as a controlled strong
PUF without the need for error correction codes and helper data by only using error-free
responses, which are fed in a finite state machine. This type of PUF is implemented in
our proposed schemes.
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2.4.4.3

PUF Applications

There are four main applications that can use PUF.
2.4.4.3.1

Low-cost Device Authentication

The researcher in [38] proposed a low-cost device authentication based on a
challenge-response protocol. The proposed protocol can also be applied to IoT resourceconstrained devices. The authentication process ensures that an adversary cannot obtain
the PUF output that is used for authentication. PUFs are expected to have exponential
numbers of challenge-response pairs. This implies that the challenge can only be used for
only one time, which can overcome the man-in-the-middle attack.
2.4.4.3.2

Cryptographic Key Generation

The authors in [39] presented a PUF based process to generate a reliable
cryptographic key. The cryptographic key generation process is divided into two stages,
which are initialization and regeneration of the PUF response. Figure 15 described the
cryptographic key generation process using PUFs. The generated c key can be used with
different cryptographic algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Rivest
Shamir and Adleman (RSA) or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and others

Figure 15: Cryptographic key generation using PUFs
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2.4.4.3.3

Intellectual Property (IP) Protection

Counterfeit and Intellectual Property (IP) theft are two related key problems in the
IoT ecosystem. Most of the counterfeit products are made from stolen Intellectual
Property. While counterfeiting is the process of creating cloned fake copies of IoT
devices, Intellectual Property is the process of unauthorized use of software in a fake
device in violation of the law. Because PUF responses are unpredictable and unclonable,
the PUF can be used as a hardware fingerprint to protect the IoT devices against
counterfeiting.
2.4.4.4

PUF Classification

There are two PUF classifications from the security perspective. The two classes
are strong PUF and weak PUF. The distinction between the two types of PUF depends on
the number of challenge-response pairs. A PUF is called strong when its challenge is
large, such as the arbiter PUF. On the other hand, Weak PUFs structures have one
challenge, such as SRAM PUFs. According to [33], a weak PUF has two main features:
(1) few challenges: A Weak PUF has only a few and ﬁxed challenges; (2) Accessrestricted responses: the challenge-response interface needs to be restricted. In weak
PUF, it is assumed that the attacker cannot access PUF's responses. The authors of [40]
[41] defined the main features of strong PUF. The main features of strong PUF are (1)
Many challenges: Strong PUF has a large number of possible CRPs; (2) Unpredictability:
even if an adversary knows a large number of CRPs, he cannot predict unknown CRPs.
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2.4.4.4.1

Delay based PUFs – Arbiter PUF

The arbiter PUF is a delay-based silicon PUF. The arbiter PUF structure
comprises two parallel, identical, and controllable delay paths and an arbiter circuit at the
end. It is composed of a sequence of switch components. The simplest way to implement
them is with a pair of 2-to-1 multiplexers. Each one interconnects two input ports to two
output ports with diﬀerent conﬁgurations depending on the applied control bit (0 or 1). A
delay-based PUF exploits the random variations in delays of wires and gates on silicon.
Ideally, the delay between the red and blue lines should be 0 if they are symmetrically
laid out. In practice, the variation in the manufacturing process will introduce a random
delay between the two paths.

Figure 16: PUF Design
Figure 16 shows how the arbiter PUF works. The idea is to introduce an edge and
then make a race between the two paths and sample the top signal and the bottom one at
the end. Then, the arbiter circuit outputs a binary value to indicate which one of the two
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paths is faster or slower. Because the two parallel paths are identical, the delay diﬀerence
between them is minor. Hence, two scenarios are possible to get the arbiter circuit
decision:
1. Even when designed identically, the delays of the two paths may not be equal.
This is due to the random silicon process variation. This random diﬀerence
between the high and the low path will determine the output of the arbiter circuit
and then the PUF response. And, because the random silicon process variation is
device speciﬁc, the arbiter output will be device speciﬁc.
2. It is also possible that even with the random process variation between the two
designed paths, the delay diﬀerence cannot be detectable by the arbiter circuit.
Therefore, the introduced edge will simultaneously reach the two inputs, so the
arbiter circuit produces a metastable state. Then, after a short random time, the
arbiter will output a value that is independent of the paths' race.
The authors in [37] proposed the construction of PUF-FSM as a controlled
strong PUF without the need for error correction codes and helper data by only using
error-free responses, which are fed in a finite state machine. This type of arbiter PUF
is implemented in my proposed architecture.

2.5

Fog Computing
Cloud computing enables IoT devices to provide data storage, cost-effective, and

on-demand services. However, [42] and [43] stated that the cloud-based IoT services
have some issues such as latency, lack of mobility support and security, and location
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awareness. For example, sensor and actuators systems, and monitoring systems are too
latency-sensitive to be deployed on the cloud. Also, IoT devices produce a large amount
of conﬁdential and sensitive data. At the same time, most of the IoT devices are resourceconstrained. One way to overcome the latency issue and to ofﬂoad the security
operations from the IoT device is the use of a more resourceful entity such as a fog-based
node. Fog computing technology, also known as fog networking or fogging, was ﬁrst
introduced by Cisco in 2014 as an extension of cloud computing that would work on the
edge of the end-users network [43] [44]. Fog computing puts most of the communication,
storage, and management at the edge of a network rather than on the centralized cloud,
which in turn will improve the service and reduce the latency that will be interpreted as
better service to the user.
There is no standard architecture for fog computing [45]. According to [46], fog
computing can be divided into cloud-fog-edge-device architecture and fog-device
architecture, as shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 17: Fog computing architecture
2.5.1

Cloud-Fog- Edge-Device Architecture
As presented in figure 17, the Cloud-Fog-Edge-Device architecture has four

layers, which are the cloud layer, fog layer, edge layer, and device layer. By moving
down from the cloud layer to the other three layers, the storage and computing
capabilities decrease, and at the same time, the latency will decrease too. The cloud layer
consists of computing and permanent storage devices. The fog layer provides data
processing and temporary data storage near the IoT device. The use of the fog nodes can
support the mobility and the heterogeneity of the IoT device as well as reduce the latency
and provide service to a larger number of devices [47]. The edge layer provides local
gateways that can be used to process data locally instead of sending it to the fog or the
cloud. The device layer consists of both mobile and stationary IoT devices. These devices
can be anything equipped with different capacities of storage, communication,
processing, and computational capabilities.
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2.5.2

Cloud-Fog-Device Architecture
In cloud-fog-device architecture, the cloud layer consists of computing and

permanent storage devices. Fog nodes provide different services to the IoT devices
without the intervention of the cloud layer. The implementation of this architecture
depends on the IoT application. This, in turn, depends on the needs and requirements of
IoT applications.
In summary, the main goal of fog computing is to improve the quality of provided
service to users and reduce the traffic to the cloud. Data processing occurs in a gateway
to minimize the amount of the transmitted data to the cloud. According to [48], fog
computing performs short-term analytics at the edge while the cloud performs long-term
analytics.
2.6

Biometric Authentication
Biometric features have become a key tool to authenticate mobile IoT devices.

Biometric identification allows the user to use physical features instead of human made
features to be authenticated and access systems. According to a survey by Javelin
Strategy & Research, in 2014, $16 billion was stolen by 12.7 million people who were
victims of identity theft in the US only [49]. The verification and authentication are
performed based on three different techniques: (1) something we know, such as a
password; (2) something we have such as tokens; or (3) something we are such as
physiological and behavioral characteristics. The authentication process may employ one
or more of the techniques mentioned above. There are two types of biometric
identification, physiological and behavioral [50]. Physiological identification is based on
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direct human body features such as the face, ﬁngerprint, or iris. Behavioral features are
based on indirect human features that are measured through feature extraction and
machine learning. Examples of behavioral biometrics are signature, keystroke dynamics,
gait, and voice [51].
The authors of [52] presented the benefits of using biometric authentication in the
IoT applications as follows:
1.

Accurate information: the biometric features are more precise and secured
compared to password-based or token-based security. The use of biometric
features does not require the user to remember any security credentials.
Consequently, no adversary can steal or guess the security credential such as a
password or a token. Therefore, biometric authentication can be a long-term
security solution.

2.

Accountability: A user who is using a service and access it by using his
biometric features cannot deny using the service.

3. Time-saving: Biometric authentication is fast to execute compared to
traditional security techniques.
4. User-friendly systems: it is easy for users to install biometric systems into
their devices. By 2025 there will be 1200 million people aged 60, and above
and by 2050 they will reach 2000 million. Therefore, the use of biometric
authentication will be more suitable and user-friendly for those who will use
IoT devices.
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5. Convenience: It is a convenient security technique because users do not need
to remember a password or keep any identity cards for veriﬁcation.
According to [53], authentication mechanisms can be divided into static and
dynamic authentication methods. Static authentication techniques authenticate users but
do not monitor post-authentication sessions to detect if it is the same user accessing the
system or not [54]. Dynamic authentication techniques monitor a system during the
lifetime of a session to detect if it is the same user accessing the system or not [55]. The
third proposed architecture will employ both static and dynamic biometric authentication
to identify and verify users.
2.7

Summary
This chapter presents the basis for this work, and it influences every aspect of this

research. The chapter discusses why IoT security is different and presents the main
security goals. The chapter illustrates the different cryptographic techniques. Also, the
chapter introduces the PUF concept, including its properties, applications, and
classification. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the fog computing concept and its
different architecture. Finally, the chapter reviews biometric authentication and its main
advantages. In the subsequent chapters, it is assumed that readers have the necessary
background knowledge.
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CHAPTER III

A LIGHTWEIGHT MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND
PRIVACY-PRESERVATION FRAMEWORK FOR IOT SYSTEMS
This chapter introduces an approach to authenticate IoT devices. This chapter
presents how the proposed approach addresses the IoT security and privacy preservation
challenges through a Lightweight Mutual Authentication and Privacy Preservation
Framework for IoT (LMAP2A). This chapter also presents a PUF Hierarchal Distributed
Architecture (PHDA), which can be used to perform the IoT device name resolution.
Additionally, this chapter describes how the LMAP2A framework achieves both the
security and privacy goals. Finally, this chapter discusses the evaluation process to assess
the security and performance of the schemes that will be designed based on the proposed
framework.
3.1

Security Goals to Build an Effective Authentication scheme
To build a secure authentication schemes and evaluate other existing ones, a set of

security goals must be defined and used as metrics to measure the authentication
architecture's robustness. The following metrics should be taken into account when
developing the IoT:
1. Mutual authentication: This means that the two communicating parties should
authenticate each other. We must not assume a point of trust.
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2. Multiple authentication levels: Multiple levels of authentication are required, each with
diﬀerent credentials. This feature is vital to implement the defense-in-depth concept [56].
Defense-in-depth requires using multiple layers of security countermeasures through an
IoT system to provide redundancy if a security countermeasure fails or a vulnerability is
successfully exploited.
3. Protection against well-known attacks: Security countermeasures should be in place to
mitigate against well-known attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks,
eavesdropping, and brute force attacks.
4. Scalability: The architecture must be able to accommodate new devices and adapt and
incorporate new technologies. According to [19], IoT architecture should be able to
expand incrementally to support newly added devices or growing data volumes.
5. Anonymity: Anonymity is an essential feature to protect both a user's and device's
privacy. The IoT devices can communicate anonymously with either fog or the cloud
nodes without exchanging their real identities. It is essential to guarantee that the IoT
devices' IDs and messages can only be traced by a trusted fog node or the Cloud.
Anonymity ensures the IoT device's untraceability and unlinkability. The IoT device uses
a pseudonym when transmitting data. Consequently, the adversary cannot trace back the
device's identity from the pseudonym.
6. Counterfeiting resistance: The IoT devices should be secured from being cloned and
replaced with fake devices.
3.2

PUF Hierarchal Distributed Architecture (PHDA)
We present a PUF architecture that can support system scalability, protect the IoT

systems from the counterfeited devices and protect devices' privacy. To ensure system
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scalability and flexibility, we propose PHDA as a device name resolution to store and
retrieve the devices' Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs). The proposed architecture is
presented in figure 18. It stores the PUF data using a 3-tier architecture employing a
simple naming scheme. The first node at the top of the hierarchy is the centralized Grand
hub that maintains a reference to whom should be queried (Parent PUF Nodes) to obtain
a reference to who may know how to retrieve the PUF data for a certain IoT device in a
specific domain. The Parent PUF nodes maintain a reference to the service provider
container (Child PUF Node) that should be queried next to return the PUF CRPs for a
specific IoT device. The parent PUF nodes are organized based on different specific
categories of the IoT devices (e.g., medical equipment, home equipment, etc.) The Child
PUF nodes are organized based on different service providers. The Cloud or the fog
should communicate initially with the Grand PUF servers to retrieve the CRPs of the IoT
node. Moreover, the proposed architecture supports Over the Air (OTA) authentication
and assist in overcoming the counterfeiting problem.
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Figure 18: PUF Hierarchal Distributed Architecture
3.3
Lightweight Mutual Authentication and Privacy Preservation Framework
for IoT (LMAP2A)
With the exponential growth of the IoT field, IoT devices' lightweight nature
makes security a significant concern. It highlights the need for designing schemes that
can fit the resource-constrained nature of the IoT devices and satisfy new security and
privacy requirements. When an IoT device and controller node need to interact securely,
they need to authenticate each other. In some cases, both the IoT node and the controller
node may need the cloud service's involvement to facilitate the authentication process.
Furthermore, to support the mobility of the IoT device, there is a need to allow the
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controller nodes under the same administrative authority to interact with each other and
cooperate to verify the authenticity of the mobile IoT devices.
This work aims to present an frameework that can establish a secure connection
between a resource-constrained device and a resource-rich controller node. We propose a
secure, lightweight mutual authentication, key exchange, and privacy preservation
framework for the IoT systems. The proposed framework integrates software and
hardware-based security approaches that satisfy the NIST IoT security requirements for
data protection and device identification [16]. We call this framework A Lightweight
Mutual Authentication and Privacy Preservation Architecture for IoT (LMAP2A). The
proposed framework can authenticate both stationary and mobile IoT devices and
authenticate both local and distributed controller nodes. The controller nodes build and
manage trust relationships with other controller nodes. We assume that the granularity
and requirements of the IoT devices may vary depending on the IoT domain.
LMAP2A is developed to be domain independent for generalized usage in IoT
environments. Based on the proposed framework, three lightweight authentication
schemes are developed to support three different IoT systems. The three different
schemes are designed to support different node mobility and distribution requirements.
A use case scenario is designed to demonstrate each scheme. The first use case is
the smart home domain, where the IoT devices are stationary and the controller node is
local. In this use case, there is direct communication between the two parties.
Establishing mutual authentication does not require the cloud service's involvement to
reduce the system latency and offload the cloud traffic as the authentication data is stored
locally on the controller unit in a secure database. The second use case is smart poultry
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farms, an example of the Industrial IoT (IIoT) domain. In the second use case, the IoT
devices are stationary, and the controller nodes are hierarchical and distributed, supported
by machine-to-machine (M2M) communication. The third use case is the internet of
vehicles (IoV) fleet vehicles as part of the smart city domain. During the roaming service,
the mutual authentication process between a vehicle and the distributed controller nodes
that are represented by the Road Side Units (RSUs) will be completed through the cloud
service to accommodate the mobility of the vehicle as it is going to hand off from an
RSU coverage to a different one depending on its speed. To avoid the unnecessary
repetition of the authentication phase, the authentication process will be handled by the
cloud service that stores all vehicle's security credentials. After that, when a vehicle
moves to the proximity of a new RSU under the same administrative authority of the
most recently visited RSU, the two RSUs can cooperate to verify the vehicle's legitimacy.
Also, the third use case supports driver static and continuous authentication as a driver
monitoring system for the sake of both road and driver safety.
The proposed framework consists of four main phases: the enrollment phase, the
registration phase, the mutual authentication phase, and the key agreement phase.
3.3.1

LMAP2A Phases

3.3.1.1

Device Enrollment Phase

The enrollment phase is completed at the manufacturer's site before the devices
are shipped to the service provider or user. First, the manufacturer will load the devices
with a real device ID. The manufacturer will then load the device with information and a
list of the supported cryptosystem techniques. Second, a large number of Challenge47

Response Pairs (CRPs) associated with the device's PUF are stored in a database that is
hosted on the manufacturer's Cloud, as shown in figures 19 and 20. The manufacturer
sends random challenges to the device. Then the device processes the challenges using
PUF and replies with the corresponding responses. The CRPs and devices' real IDs are
stored in a highly secured environment. Lastly, the manufacturer stores the CRPs in the
database and the real ID of the device. The manufacturer can then repeat this procedure
as much as needed.

Figure 19: Device Enrollment Phase

Enrollment of a device
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Manufacturer

Device

1. Choose CID
CID ∈C {set of all possible challenges}
2. Challenge CID
3. PUF processing RID = f(CID)
4. Response RID
5. Store (CID, RID) pair to a database
6. Repeat Steps 1 to 5 N times
Figure 20: Device Enrollment Process
3.3.1.2

Registration Phase

During this phase, the communicating devices are assigned their Alias IDs,
getting the Alias ID and Real ID of the other party. The communicating parties will
communicate using their pseudonym IDs. Because the dynamic pseudonym IDs will be
changed every authentication session, they will offer the anonymity of the sender's ID,
receiver's ID, and the sender-receiver relationship, in addition to device untraceability
and end-to-end flow untraceability. Other authentication parameters will be calculated as
needed. All these data are loaded into the device's memory through a secured channel.
The controller node saves this data in its database and forwards it to the cloud service if
needed.
3.3.1.3

Mutual Authentication Phase
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During this phase, the communicating parties securely verify each other's
identities that will be sent as part of a hash function or an encrypted message. This phase
can be completed through direct communication in case the communicating parties are
stationary. Also, this phase can be achieved through the cloud service when the IoT
device is mobile and is trying to communicate with a distributed controller node.
Different lightweight cryptographic primitives such as ECDH, one-way hash function,
AES, PUF, chained hash PUF, and Exclusive-OR are utilized in this phase.
3.3.1.4

Key agreement phase

During this phase, the two parties agree on a symmetric session key to encrypt the
data exchanged. Once the mutual authentication is completed, the two sides will generate
the new shared secret key (ssk) that will be derived from the shared secret parameters as
well as the PUF challenges and their corresponding responses. AES will be used as a
symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt and decrypt all the subsequent data that will
be sent between the communicating parties.
3.3.2

Components of the Architecture
LMAP2A consists of four layers: the physical layer, edge layer, fog layer, and cloud

layer.
3.3.2.1

Physical layer

This layer consists of IoT devices that can be resource-constrained devices or
general-purpose computing devices. All IoT nodes are equipped with a PUF, and any
attempt to tamper with the PUF will change the device's behavior and render the device
useless.
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3.3.2.2

Edge Layer

The edge layer consists of devices that have more resources than the IoT devices.
The edge devices support different communication protocols and facilitate the
communication between the IoT devices and the fog nodes. The edge nodes are within
one/two-hop distance from the IoT nodes. Edge resources have varying ranges of
computational capabilities, from highly capable devices such as mini data centers to less
capable such as tablets or smartphones. Edge layer resources are assumed to have deviceto-device connectivity within the layer and reliable connectivity to fog layer.
3.3.2.3

Fog Layer

The Fog layer resides on top of the edge. It consists of networking devices such as
routers and switches with high computing capabilities. The fog layer acts as an
interconnecting link between the IoT devices or the edge layer on one side and the cloud
on the other side. The fog layer can perform protocol conversion and provides other
services such as data aggregation, filtering, and dimensionality reduction. The devices on
the fog layer can also act as a local repository to temporarily store sensors' generated
data, provide local processing capability, and perform data cleaning, aggregation,
analysis, and interpretation techniques because it has a local database.
3.3.2.4

Cloud Layer

The cloud layer resides on top of the fog layer. It is a consolidation of devices
such as servers with the highest computing and storage capabilities. The cloud layer in
the LMAP2A consists of the PUF cloud, where the PUF challenges and responses (CRPs)
of the devices are stored, and the service provider cloud.
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3.3.3

How LMAP2A Address Security Challenges
Identifying the security goals serves as a first step to ensure the implementation of

an efficient and lightweight mutual authentication security operation that can fit the IoT
devices' resource-constrained nature. The following section covers the main
characteristics of LMAP2A that satisfy the security goals. All the security characteristics
of LMAP2A will be inherited to the proposed schemes. LMAP2A employs different
cryptographic techniques, as presented in figure 21.

Figure 21: LMAP2A Security Approaches
1. Device authentication: device authentication is achieved using physical
identifier. The physical identifier is applied through Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) technology that acts as a hardware fingerprint. A delay-based
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arbiter PUF-is used for authentication and secret key generation. An arbiter
PUF is used as the root of trust in our architecture. From the security
perspective, the employment of PUF in the proposed framework is considered
one of the key assets.
2. Key-length Security Level: based on the current security needs, the
employed security level is AES 128-bits. Therefore, cryptographic algorithms
are chosen to satisfy this security level.
3. No storage of shared secret keys locally: the proposed framework requires
that the secret keys are not stored on the resource-constrained IoT devices.
4. No use of a trusted third party: The proposed framework does not require
the use of a digital certificate that requires the involvement of a third party
during the mutual authentication process between the IoT node and the fog
node.
5. No sharing of Shared Symmetric Key (SSK) over the network: the
proposed framework does not require an exchange of shared secret symmetric
keys over the network to be resistant against side-channel attacks. All shared
secret keys are generated locally on the devices.
6. Confidentiality: To ensure the confidentiality of the data and to be sure that
only authorized users access it, the communication is encrypted. Symmetric
cryptography can be used to achieve confidentiality. However, symmetric
cryptography requires the two parties to share the same key, and this can be
achieved by a key-establishment protocol. AES is used as a symmetric
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cryptography technique. Elliptic curve Diffie Hellman (ECHD) is used for
key establishment. ECDH is selected because it is lightweight and requires
less computation to fit the nature of the resource-constrained IoT devices.
ECDH is an acceptable standard and has low-overhead properties.
7. Data freshness: It is achieved using timestamp and nonce to ensure the
message's freshness.
8. Data integrity: It is achieved using either one-way function SHA-256 to
ensure the message has not been altered or modified.
9. Privacy and anonymity: The proposed framework uses both a real ID and an
Alias ID for each device. The nodes' real IDs will never be released in a
cleartext format. Also, the real IDs are transferred over the network in an
encrypted format. Furthermore, the IoT Alias ID is updated for every
authentication session. Accordingly, the adversary will not be able to monitor
the activities of the IoT devices.
10. Server Impersonation: to ensure the robustness of the proposed framework
against server impersonation attacks, the server authenticates itself to the IoT
node before conducting any further steps in the authentication process.
11. Defense in Depth: the proposed framework implements the defense in depth
concept by applying the multi-factor authentication technique.
12. Heterogeneity: LMAP2A supports different security configurations that can
be implemented in different circumstances to meet the diverse needs of the
IoT devices. The configuration options support both stationary and mobile IoT
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devices as well as local and distributed controller nodes. Also, the
configuration supports the integration of the user's static and continuous
biometrics as another authentication feature. The framework configuration
includes multiple alternatives for cryptography strength and key lifetime, the
number of authentication factors, and session keys usage. For instance, in a
high-risk environment, short-term keys can be employed to limit the damage
when an IoT node is compromised.
13. Scalability: The scalability here refers to the framework's ability to expand
incrementally to support the newly added devices and growing data volumes.
The proposed approach addresses the ﬁrst problem by introducing the PHDA
to store and retrieve the CRPs of the IoT devices, which can support Over the
Air (OTA) registration on the fly to accommodate new devices to be admitted
to the system. Also, the proposed framework allows the authenticated IoT
devices to move from one controller node to another and be authenticated to
the new controller node with the help of the most recently visited controller
node.
3.4

Evaluation Process
There is strong agreement among the IoT cybersecurity research community on

how to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of the authentication frameworks using
both security analysis and performance analysis [57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62] and [63].
We plan to use and extend this approach to measure the effectiveness of the proposed
schemes. Figure 22 provides a roadmap for the evaluation process as follows:
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Figure 22: Proposed Framework Evaluation Process
3.4.1

Phase 1: Security Analysis

The security analysis will be conducted using both formal and informal evaluations.
The formal security evaluation assesses the proposed schemes' resistance to some of the
well-known attacks using two approaches: Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic and a
well-known rule-based simulation called AVIPSA. To confirm and demonstrate the
results of the formal security evaluation, we will conduct informal security evaluation to
analyze in details the strength of the proposed scheme against well-known attacks using
the best practice approach. The informal security analysis will use Dolev–Yao's threat
model as a foundation. In addition, during the informal security evaluation, we compare
the proposed schemes with the other existing authentication schemes considering their
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resistance to the well-known attacks and their satisfaction with the main security
requirements.
3.4.1.1

Informal Security Analysis

Informal security analysis is completed to investigate the robustness of the
proposed framework against the well-known security attacks and analyze its satisfaction
with the main security properties. Dolev–Yao's threat model [64] is used to identify any
security issues in any of the presented protocols. It is a powerful adversarial model that is
widely accepted as the standard by which cryptographic protocols should be evaluated.
The threat model is based on the following two assumptions:
•

Cryptography is secure:
1. The adversary is not able to decrypt a message without the key.
2. The adversary can't solve the private key pairing of a public key.
3. The adversary is not able to compute HMAC without the key.
4. The adversary is not able to guess an encryption key.
5. The adversary cannot guess a random number that is chosen as part of a
security protocol or a random number.

•

The adversary can do the following:
1. Obtain any message passing through the network.
2. Act as a legitimate user of the network where he can initiate a conversation
with any other user.
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3. Construct and deconstruct messages.
4. Become the receiver to any sender and be able to read, store, and block every
message in transit.
5. Encrypt/decrypt if the encryption/decryption key is known.
6. Manipulate any message.
7. Send messages to any entity by impersonating any other entity.
To evaluate the security of the proposed schemes, we should assume that the
adversaries are everywhere in the network. Based on the Dolev-Yao threat model, those
adversaries may eavesdrop, manipulate, inject, alter, duplicate, or re-route messages.
Therefore, the following security attacks have been considered for examination:
1. Impersonation Attack: The adversary uses a trusted user's identity and
authentication credentials to get access and send malicious messages to other
entities [64].
2. Replay Attack: is a form of network attack in which a message is intercepted and
maliciously repeated or delayed. A malicious node may repeat the data
continuously, which will cause irregular and malicious behavior in the network
[65]
3. Man-in-the-Middle Attack: is a type of attack where the attacker inserts
him/herself into the conversation and tampers with the communication between
two parties. The attacker impersonates one or both parties and gains access to the
exchanged information between the two parties. This attack takes advantage of
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the authentication process's weakness and modifies the communication between
the communicating entities.
4. Eavesdropping Attack: This is a passive attack. The attacker successfully
accesses some secret or conﬁdential information by listening to the
communication between the entities [65].
5. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack: it is a type of attack where a malicious node
keeps sending messages to the receiver node and negatively consumes the
network's bandwidth to negatively impact service availability [65]. In summary,
the adversary overloads the system with too many requests causing it to crash
eventually.
6. Brute-force attack: An attacker performs an exhaustive search where he or she
uses a trial-and-error method to explore all possible passwords of the user [66].
7. Side-channel attack: This type of attack enables an adversary to extract secret
keys maintained in a security system. By observing the system's timer, the
amount of power consumed by the system to respond to various queries, the
adversary can ﬁgure out how the encryption algorithm is implemented [67].
8. Modeling attack: It is an attack where the adversary collects a large number PUF
CRPs and uses a regression algorithm to build a model and predict responses for
new challenges [68].
The next step in the informal security analysis is to compare the proposed
schemes with the other existing authentication schemes considering their resistance to the
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above-mentioned well-known attacks and their satisfaction with the main security
requirements.
3.4.1.2

Formal Security Analysis

The formal security analysis will use a theoretical analysis technique called
Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) and a simulation-based engine called AVISPA.
3.4.1.2.1

Burrows–Abadi–Needham Logic

BAN logic has been widely used for the formal evaluation and verification of
authentication protocols and to provide proof of the correctness of any authentication
protocol [69]. Therefore, this dissertation employs the widely accepted BAN logic to
prove that the proposed authentication protocols provide secure mutual authentication
between the IoT node and the fog node. The following paragraph presents a summarized
introduction about the essential symbols and rules of BAN logic.
3.4.1.2.1.1

BAN symbols and rules

BAN logic is based on a set of postulates and assumptions. BAN uses three
objects: principles, encryption keys, and logic formulas. The main notations used in BAN
are described as follows:
• P|≡X: P believes the statement X.
• #(X):X is fresh.
• P|⇒X: P has jurisdiction over the statement X.
• P ⊲ X: P sees the statement X.
•

P|∼X: P once said the statement X.

•

(X, Y): X or Y is one part of the formula (X, Y).
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•

{X}k: The formula X is encoded/encrypted using the key K.

•

<X>Y: X combined with the formula Y.

•

P

K

3.4.1.2.1.2

Q: K is a secret parameter shared between P and Q

BAN logic's rules

The following commonly used BAN logic rules are utilized to prove that the
authentication scheme ensures secure mutual authentication and key agreement:
•

Message-meaning rule: If P believes that the K is shared with Q and P sees X
combined with K, then P believes Q said X.
𝑃| ≡ P

•

K Q ,P ⊲ < X > y
𝑃| ≡ Q | ∼ X

Nonce-veriﬁcation rule: If P believes X is fresh, and P believes Q once said X, then P
believes Q believes X.
𝑃|≡#(X),P|≡Q~X
𝑃|≡Q|≡X

•

Freshness- Conjunction rule: If P believes that X is fresh, then P believes that (X, Y)
is fresh.
𝑃|≡#(X)
𝑃 |≡#(X,Y)

•

Jurisdiction rule: If P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X and P believes Q
believes X, then P believes X.
𝑃| ≡ Q ⇒ X, P| ≡ Q| ≡ X
𝑃|≡X

3.4.1.2.2

AVISPA Tool
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Authors in [70] introduced Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols
and Applications (AVISPA) to validate and assess the Internet Security Protocols and
Applications. AVISPA is widely accepted as a validation simulation in the research
community [71]. Also, the authors in [71] evaluated the speciﬁcations of several
industrial-scale security protocols that are currently being drafted or standardized. In
addition, the researchers in [57], [58], [62], and [63] used AVISPA to validate the
security features of their protocols. AVISPA is a role-oriented language where each agent
plays a distinct role during the execution of the given protocol. We will implement the
proposed framework using HLPSL (High-Level Protocols Specifications Language) and
then present the simulation results. HLPSL's semantics is based on Lamport's Temporal
Logic of Actions (TLA). HLPSL is used to verify security properties such as data secrecy
and authentication in message exchanges between agents. HLPSL provides a separate
section to deﬁne the security properties, called the goal section.
This tool uses a Dolev Yao attacker model presented in section 3.4.1.1, giving the
attacker complete control over the network. In general, it can be stated that this threat
model has full control over the network. AVISPA veriﬁes the conﬁdentiality, integrity,
authentication of communication and data origin, anonymity, non-repudiation, and keymanagement properties of a given protocol or communication exchange. This tool is a
web-based, platform-independent realization and is compatible with standard operating
systems.
The protocol is determined, whether SAFE or not, based on predeﬁned goals. The
safety of the protocol is evaluated based on the Dolev-Yao threat model. HLPSL
speciﬁcations are automatically translated into a lower language called the Intermediate
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Format (IF) using the HLPSL2IF translator. These translations' main goal and designing
the IF language is to oﬀer and serve as an adequate input to the various back-end of the
AVISPA toolkit.
AVISPA integrates diﬀerent back-ends implementing a variety of automatic
analysis techniques for protocol falsiﬁcation by ﬁnding an attack on the input protocol
and abstraction-based veriﬁcation methods both for ﬁnite and inﬁnite numbers of
sessions. AVISPA has the following four back-end tools:
• OFMC Model Checker: The On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC) incorporates
several symbolic techniques and algebraic properties to explore the state space in a
demand-driven way.
•

CL-AtSe Model Checker: The Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CLAtSe) translates any security protocol speciﬁcation written as a transition relation
in IF language into a set of constraints that are eﬀectively used to discover any
possible attack on the protocol.

•

SATMC Model Checker: SAT-based Model checker (SATMC) constructs a
propositional formula based on the Transitional state obtained from the IF
speciﬁcation. The propositional formula represents any violation of the security
properties, which can be translated into an attack.

•

TA4SPModelChecker: The Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations
for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP) identiﬁes the vulnerability of a
protocol or predicts the protocol correctness by accurate estimation of the
intruder's capabilities.
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The architecture of the AVISPA Tool is presented in figure 23. A user interacts
with the tool by specifying a security problem - a protocol paired with a security property
that the protocol is expected to achieve in the High-Level Protocol Speciﬁcation
Language (HLPSL). The HLPSL is an expressive, modular, role-based, formal language
for modeling communication and security protocols. HLPSL speciﬁcations are
automatically translated into the IF by the HLPSL2IF translator. The Intermediate Format
(IF) is a lower-level language at a lower abstraction level. These translations, in turn,
serve as input to the various back-ends that are analysis tools of the AVISPA toolset.

High-Level Protocol Speciﬁcation Language (HLPSL)
HLPSL2IF translator

Intermediate Format (IF)
On-the-Fly Model-Checker
(OFMC)

Constraint-Logic-based Attack
Searcher (CL-AtSe)

SAT-based Model checker
(SATMC)

Tree Automata based on
Automatic Approximations

Output Format (OF)

Figure 23 AVISPA Architecture
The entities involved in the communication process are modeled as roles with
their message exchanges. Apart from the initiator and the receiver, the environment and
the session of the protocol are also roles in HLPSL. The roles can be basic or composed
depending on if they are constituent of one agent or more. A session is created between
the roles to achieve the required message exchanges. The session also considers an
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intruder in the process. Finally, the environment is created for all the sessions
simultaneously.
3.4.2

Phase 2: Performance Analysis
The proposed framework implement the performance evalution to analyze the

proposed schemes and compare them with other related protocols regarding
computational complexity, communication cost and storage requirements. The
computational complexity accounts for the execution time of the crypto operations such
as one-way hash function SHA-256, xor function, HMAC, PUF response generation,
performing ECC, encryption, and decryption using ECC and AES. The communication
cost computes the size of the message in bits. The message size varies depending on the
message content. Finally, the storage requirements calculate the needed storage space on
the communicating parties.
3.5

Summary
This chapter presents the proposed framework and the proposed PUF distributed

architecture. The different phases of the proposed framework are described. The
evaluation process and the employed tools that will be implemented to evaluate the
proposed work are presented in detail. The next chapter presents a new secure,
lightweight mutual authentication scheme for stationary and mobile IoT nodes.
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CHAPTER IV
LIGHTWEIGHT PRIVACY PRESERVATION AND MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL FOR SMART HOMES USING
PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS

With the exponential growth of IoT technology, there is an increasing demand for
secure IoT authentication protocols. Most of the currently published protocols depend on
computationally expensive mechanisms such as public-key encryption. In contrast, most
IoT devices are resource-constrained, which may not handle such security approaches.
This chapter proposes a secure, lightweight mutual authentication, key exchange,
and a privacy preservation protocol for IoT smart homes and similar environments where
both the IoT device and the controller node are stationary and within range. The
presented protocol is called Lightweight Privacy Preservation and Mutual Authentication
Protocol for Smart Homes Using Physical Unclonable Functions. This protocol adopts
the cloud-fog-device architecture.
The IoT node communicates and establishes a session with the controller node
using dynamic anonymous identity, and the two sides agree on a symmetric key in an
unlinkable manner. The protocol also sets up virtual domain segregation based on the
IoT device's type to apply the same service agreement level and enforce the same security
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policies on similar devices. We also evaluate the proposed protocol by using different
measures, namely, security and performance evaluation. The security evaluation will be
both formal and informal. The formal analysis uses the Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic
(BAN), the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
(AVISPA) toolkit.
Furthermore, the protocol efficiency is evaluated and compared with other related
protocols. Through the informal analysis, we will assess the proposed protocol against
well-known security attacks. We also validate the efficiency of the proposed
authentication mechanism in terms of storage requirements, computational cost, and
communication overhead.
In Section 4.1, we first introduce the motivation of the work. Section 4.2 presents
the related work and the other existing protocols. Section 4.3 demonstrates the use of case
application and proceeds with defining the requirements that act as guidelines during the
proposed protocol design. In addition, the section discusses the IoT virtual domain
segregation process. Section 4.4 presents the proposed protocol. Section 4.5 illustrates the
protocol evaluation process, and finally, section 4.6 summarizes the chapter.
4.1

Motivation
There are two types of security threats, which are passive attacks and active attacks.

In passive attacks, the adversary tries to collect data and learn about the system without
affecting its resources. This type of attack can take the form of eavesdropping or traffic
analysis. Through eavesdropping, the adversary intercepts the ongoing communication
without consent from the authorized parties. Through traffic analysis, the adversary
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monitors traffic patterns to deduce helpful information for later use. Both attacks are hard
to detect, and therefore we focus on preventing them.
On the other hand, in active attacks, the adversary tries to alter system resources or
affect their operations. The attackers may try to modify the data stream or introduce fake
data to the system. The most common active attacks are man-in-the-middle attacks, replay
attacks, message modification, and denial of service. In a man-in-the-middle attack, the
adversary tries to be a trusted node to gain privileges. A replay attack allows the adversary
to passively capture the messages and retransmit them to produce an unauthorized effect.
The main goal of the denial-of-service attack is to interrupt the availability of the system
[72].
4.2

Related Work
In [73], the authors propose an efﬁcient IoT device authentication protocol that

employs the keyed hash algorithm. The proposed protocol avoids the use of a certificate
authority to fit the protocol to constrained applications. The proposed protocol increases
efﬁciency by minimizing the number of message exchanges. The results show that the
proposed authentication protocol improves the security level and reduces devices'
resource consumption.
The author of [74] presents PUF-based algorithms for resource-constrained IoT
devices. The author uses the PUF-based algorithm for device enrollment, authentication,
encryption, decryption, and digital signature generation. The author highlights the impact
of the environmental variations under which the IoT devices will be operating and
suggests using error correction codes to overcome PUF aging. The researcher concludes
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that the implementation of PUF based elliptic curve protocols over elliptic curves are
ideal in the IoT environment. Also, he states that elliptic curve cryptography provides
security with low computational and storage requirements. Finally, the author argues that
PUF provides low-cost tamper resistance for IoT devices.
The authors in [75] propose a lightweight mutual authentication scheme for IoT
devices. A block cipher algorithm is employed in this scheme to conduct the mutual
authentication between the IoT device and the server. The protocol requires a secret key
to be initially stored in both the IoT device and the server. A session key is dynamically
generated using this secret key. The authentication mechanism is a typical application of
encryption/decryption cryptography algorithms in authenticating IoT devices. This, in
turn, makes the IoT device vulnerable to being compromised by an adversary who has
remote access to the IoT device and uses a side-channel attack technique.
In [76], the authors present an IoT authentication protocol based on PUF. Initially,
the IoT device registers its credentials, including the device serial number and fingerprint
generated using a PUF. Then, the gateway proves the device's authenticity by matching
the device's PUF fingerprint with what is stored in the gateway's repository. The IoT
device and the gateway share an initial secret key; the IoT device stores the secret key in
its non-volatile memory. The gateway stores the secret key in its repository. The initial
secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt the initial message processes. The proposed
authentication protocol requires that the IoT device stores an initial cryptographic key in
its secure non-volatile memory to set up an initial connection with the gateway. This
proposed protocol suffers from the same vulnerability that is previously presented in [75],
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where storing an initial secret in IoT devices can be compromised by an intruder using a
firmware side-channel attack to retrieve the secret key.
The authors in [77] introduce a mutual authentication scheme for an IoT system.
In the proposed scheme, authentication occurs between the IoT device and the server.
The scheme is based on hashing feature extraction and asymmetric cryptography. The
authors improve IoT security and decreased computation and communication costs by
combining one-way hashing using SHA1 and feature extraction. This combination helps
avoid any collision attacks. The authors conduct a security analysis and conclude that the
proposed scheme is secure for application and consumes low computation and memory
resources.
The authors in [78] propose an IoT authentication scheme for a smart home
system. The presented protocol uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for authenticating
IoT devices. The proposed protocol uses a Wi-Fi gateway to complete the initial system
conﬁguration, authenticate IoT devices, and provide a means for the user to set up,
access, and control the system through an Android-based mobile device. The protocol
facilitates the authentication between a user and an IoT device via the home gateway. The
presented protocol does not support user traceability and user anonymity.
The authors of [79] propose a mutual authentication protocol using public-key
encryption and the IoT device's capability to calculate a predesigned functional operation.
The server and the IoT device store their private key and each others’ public key. The
proposed protocol has two main weaknesses. First, the IoT device and the server store their
long-term private key, which an adversary can extract by conducting firmware attack
techniques. Second, the proposed protocol employs public cryptography, which is
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considered computationally expensive and resource-consuming for resource-constrained
IoT devices.
The authors in [80] present a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)-based PUF.
The proposed protocol is based on generating a response to a challenge, then feeding the
response to another PUF as a challenge. The two PUF responses are connected using the
LFSR. The length of the response can be increased by increasing the number of states of
LFSR without any changes in the hardware. The proposed protocol's main weaknesses
are the complexity of the proposed design and the absence of security analysis.
The proposed protocol in [81] presents a secure authentication method using zeroknowledge proof for a smart home environment. The presented protocol does not require
any secret key during the authentication process between the IoT device and the home
gateway. Alternatively, the gateway provides the IoT node with a number to act as a
token during the authentication phase. This token can be used later by the IoT device to
prove its authenticity to the gateway.
The author of [82] proposes a two-factor one-time password (OTP) technique
based on a lightweight identity-based ECC scheme. The proposed protocol achieves both
efficiency and security because (1) the Key Distribution Center (KDC) does not require
any key storage, and (2) it does not store the private and public keys of the other devices.
This presented protocol consumed a small amount of resources.
In [83], the authors develop a secure and efficient architecture for authentication
and authorization of resource-constrained IoT devices. The proposed architecture aims to
maintain the security, privacy, and accuracy of patient data. The presented architecture
shifts the authentication task from the remote end-user to the distributed smart e-health to
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accommodate the medical sensors' resource-constrained nature. The proposed
architecture is based on a certiﬁcate-based DTLS handshake protocol. The architecture is
tested via a healthcare prototype structure based on Pandaboard, Texas Instruments (TI)
SmartRF06 board and WiSMotes. The CC2538 module integrated into the TI board acts
as a smart gateway, and the WiSMotes act as medical sensor nodes. The eﬀectiveness of
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks is mitigated through the distributed nature of the
proposed architecture. The results indicate that the proposed architecture minimized the
communication burden by 26% and reduced communications latency by 16% compared
to the delegation-based architecture.
Authors in [84] introduce a lightweight and secure session key establishment
scheme for smart home environments. Both the control unit and the sensors use a token to
establish trust and a secret session key. The short authentication token ensures mutual
authentication between the IoT resource-constrained device and the control unit. The
researchers use the AVISPA tool to verify the authentication and confidentiality
attributes. Also, the proposed scheme's security analysis proved that the proposed scheme
is secure against the Dolev-Yao attack model. The performance and efficiency of the
proposed scheme are evaluated using a testbed. The results indicated that the proposed
scheme achieved security goals as expected.
Authors in [85] present a machine-to-machine mutual authentication protocol that
relies on asymmetric cryptography for resource-constrained IoT nodes in the smart home
domain. The proposed protocol enables the IoT nodes to authenticate each other and
generate a dynamic shared secret using a pseudo-random generator in every session
without any human intervention. The researchers use SPAN/AVISPA toolkit as a security
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evaluation tool. The results indicate that the introduced protocol is resilient against wellknown attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, and eavesdropping
attacks. However, using the pseudo-random number generator to generate the shared
session key does not provide complete randomness to the key generation process.
Additionally, the use of asymmetric cryptography does not fit the resource-constrained
nature of smart home IoT devices.
In [86], the authors introduce a new authentication scheme to authenticate
resource-constrained IoT devices in smart homes. The proposed protocol uses PUF and
Physical Key Generation (PKG) as an alternative to public-key cryptography. The system
generates a secure key based on the PUF, producing unique physical parameters for each
IoT device. The presented protocol provides secrecy and authenticity against attackers.
The authors of [87] introduce a PUF based mutual authentication scheme between
the IoT devices and the gateway using the CRPs stored inside the gateway. The protocol
enables the users to authenticate themselves with the gateway to communicate with the
IoT device using a session key generated between them. Timestamp data are used to
ensure security against replay attacks.
The authors in [57] present a lightweight mutual authentication protocol for IoT.
The researchers use physically unclonable functions (PUFs) and XOR functions to
provide security. First, the proposed authentication protocol sends the same device ID in
a hash format for every authentication session. As a result, the adversary can trace the
activities of the IoT device. Therefore, this protocol does not protect the privacy of the
IoT device. Second, during the setup phase, the server retrieves the IoT CRP's from the
manufacturer’s cloud and stores them locally on its memory. This action may lead to
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different problems. First, the protocol is not resistant to the stolen-verifier attack [61],
where the adversary can obtain verification information stored in the server. Second, if an
adversary hacks the server, the adversary could access all the CRP's, leading to server
impersonation attacks. Third, the adversary can also use the retrieved CRP's to conduct
modeling attacks by using the available challenges and responses to build a model and
predict the responses of new challenges. Fourth, storing all the CRP's on the server's local
storage will not support system scalability because it will require vast storage space. On
another side, the presented protocol supports mutual authentication but does not support
multiple authentication sessions concurrently.
The authors in [59] propose a PUF based secure communication and key generation
protocol for IoT. The researchers use the PUF to generate the public key. The presented
protocol has multiple weaknesses. First, the protocol sends the device's real ID in cleartext,
which does not preserve its privacy. Also, it does not protect anonymity and untraceability
security features. Second, the protocol does not authenticate the server first, leading to
server impersonation attacks. Consequently, the IoT node will calculate the responses and
calculate its private and public keys without verifying the server's authenticity. Third, during
the enrollment phase, the server sends challenges to the IoT node that generates the
corresponding responses. Those CRPs are stored on the server. This technique does not
protect the system from enrolling fake devices. The protocol does not have any mechanism
to ensure that the IoT device is an authentic device and not a cloned or a fake device.
Therefore, this protocol does not protect the IoT system against counterfeiting. Fourth, the
presented protocol does not support IoT system scalability. The server stores all the CRPs
of the IoT nodes, which requires considerable storage space on the server. This, in turn, may
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hinder the system's scalability. Fifth, the protocol is not resilient against a stolen-verifier
attack where the adversary can obtain the CRPs that are stored on the server's storage. Sixth,
the protocol is not resistant to replay attacks because the time stamp has never been updated,
and therefore, there is no way to ensure the message's freshness.
The author in [60] proposes a mutual authentication protocol using PUF, ECC, and
simple XOR functions. The presented protocol has multiple weaknesses. The author in [60]
shares three weaknesses with [59]: (1) the protocol sends the device's real ID in clear text,
which does not preserve the device privacy and also does not protect anonymity and
untraceability security features; (2) the CRPs are generated and collected during the
enrollment phase. Those CRPs are stored on the server. This technique does not protect the
system from counterfeiting, and (3) the protocol is not resistant against the replay attack
because the timestamp is a constant value during the authentication process. Therefore, there
is no way to ensure the message's freshness.
Besides, the presented protocol is subject to a brute force attack. The adversary can
capture the IoT node's first message that contains the node ID and the TS in cleartext. The
server calculates a value called h11 = h (C1 ⊕ C2 ⊕ TS), a value called C'2 =
C2⊕h(R1⊕TS⊕D2), along the same C1 in cleartext. The adversary can brute force h11 to
get the value of C2. Once the adversary succeeds in getting the value of C2, he can XOR C2
with C'2 to get h (R1⊕ TS⊕D2). Because the adversary already has D2, and TS, he can
conduct a brute force attack to find R1. This significant weakness will corrupt the
authentication process and allow the adversary to collect enough CRPs to build a model that
can be used to predict responses for new challenges.
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The authors in [61] introduce a lightweight and privacy-preserving two-factor
authentication protocol for IoT devices. The authors use PUFs as one of the
authentication techniques and an XOR function for data encryption. The presented
protocol protects the device's privacy and ensures the anonymity of the devices. The
researchers use the reverse fuzzy extractor to eliminate the issue that occurred because of
noise during the operation of the PUF. During the setup phase, the server sends the IoT
device the PUF challenges, and the IoT device responds with the corresponding PUF
responses. Because this process is completed during the setup phase, there is no way to
verify the IoT device's originality, making this protocol vulnerable to IoT device
counterfeiting. Also, the proposed protocol stores a long-term secret key that is used as
the first authentication factor for proving the legitimacy of the IoT device on the device's
non-volatile memory. This makes the IoT device vulnerable to being compromised by an
adversary who can use firmware attack techniques to retrieve the secret key.
Authors in [62] present a mutual authentication protocol for IoT devices using
physically unclonable functions. The researchers use PUFs and message authentication
code (MAC) to build the authentication protocol. The presented protocol is a lightweight
protocol, but it uses the real identity of the IoT device while completing the
authentication phase. As a result, the adversary can monitor the activity pattern of the
IoT device. Therefore, the protocol does not protect the privacy of the IoT device.
In [63], the authors introduce a lightweight mutual two-factor authentication scheme
using PUF and hashing algorithms to secure authentication and session key agreement
between the IoT device and the server. The researchers conduct a formal analysis using
BAN logic to validate the protocol's security. They also conduct informal analysis and
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evaluate their proposed protocol against different types of attacks. The researchers
concluded that the proposed protocol fits the needs of resource-constrained IoT devices. The
presented protocol is a lightweight protocol, but it uses the IoT device's real identity during
the authentication phase, which does not protect the IoT device's anonymity and
untraceability.
Based on the work presented above, there are common limitations that are shared
among most of the presented schemes. First, in the schemes presented in [59,60,61], the
CRPs are generated and collected during the setup phase and outside the manufacturing
process. This does not allow the opportunity to discover counterfeited devices from original
devices. Second, using PUF generates considerable interest in terms of authentication. One
of the main drawbacks that is clear in many of the protocols mentioned above [57,59,60] is
storing challenge and response pairs on the server-side. Many of the presented protocols
store the CRPs on the server storage, which can be an obstacle to system scalability. This
is a significant problem with much of the literature regarding resource-constrained IoT
devices. Third, in some of the presented protocols [57, 59, 60,62,63], the researchers
overlook the IoT devices' privacy, which does not guarantee the anonymity and privacy of
the IoT device. Fourth, the proposed protocol [61] requires storing a secret key hash on the
IoT device's memory, which can be retrieved using side-channel attacks.

4.3

IoT Smart Home Network Model and Security Goals
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4.3.1

Smart Homes Network Model
The use case presented in this section is illustrated in figure 24. It presents a

resource-rich Intelligent Gateway (IG) node that communicates with resource-constrained
IoT devices (N) in an untrusted field. The IG is the central device and is aware of all the
nodes within its network. It is also responsible for managing the data about each node and
starting and maintaining the network. Both the IoT device and the fog node that is
represented by the controller node are stationary. The communication between the IoT
device and the controller node is subject to both active and passive attacks. In passive
attacks, the adversary can eavesdrop on the communication. In active attacks, the intruder

Fog Layer

Physical
Layer

Cloud
Layer

may replay, modify, or delete specific communication messages.

Figure 24: IoT Smart Home Network
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Establishing a secure communication between an IoT device (N) and an
intelligent gateway (IG) node requires a secure protocol. Authentication, key agreement,
and access control are the four critical components of the scheme that we present in this
chapter, as demonstrated in figure 25.

Figure 25: Key Components for Secure Communication
Figure 26 describes the proposed scheme. The protocol consists of four
participants: the IoT node (N), the Intelligent gateway node (IG), the service provider
cloud, and the manufacturer cloud. The local IoT network includes IoT nodes and an
intelligent gateway (IG) that acts as the central node. The IG node oversees starting and
maintaining the network, and it is aware of all the devices' alias identities and real identities.
IoT devices can be resource-constrained devices or general-purpose computing devices.
All IoT nodes and the IG are equipped with a PUF, and any attempt to tamper with the
PUF will change the device's behavior and render the device useless. The PUF hardware
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security primitive is used as the root-of-trust, which provides device authenticity. The IG
simply is a secured node with more resources than the IoT device.

Figure 26: The Proposed Protocol Overview

The IG supports different communication protocols and acts as a communication
point between the IoT nodes and the local Internet. It receives data from various sensors,
performs protocol conversion, and provides other services such as data aggregation,
filtering, and dimensionality reduction. The IG will support different wireless protocols
and facilitate inter-device communication. The IG also acts as a local repository to
temporarily store sensors' generated data, provides local processing capability, and
performs data cleaning, aggregation, analysis, and interpretation techniques because it has
a local database. The IoT nodes communicate directly with the IG. A trust relationship and
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a secure communication link exist between the IG and the service provider cloud
environment. The manufacturer assigns the IoT devices and the IGs real IDs that are stored
in the device's memory. Also, the service provider gives the IoT nodes and the IG alias
IDs.
The proposed scheme ensures data confidentiality by encrypting the exchanged
messages using the AES algorithm with a 128 bits key length as recommended by NIST
[16]. In addition, a one-way cryptographic hash function with a 256 bits length is used to
validate and ensure the integrity of the data transmitted between the two devices.
The IoT node will be given two different options for generating a shared secret
session key during the authentication process to add more flexibility to the proposed
protocol and accommodate IoT nodes with diverse computational resources. The IoT node
will select the option that is suitable to its resources and the security requirements.
The proposed protocol supports IoT devices' dynamic addition to the network
without causing any changes in the network's present security states. Adding a new IoT
device is controlled by the capabilities and the available resources of the IG, which is
assumed to be a powerful device because it stores separate information for each IoT device
in the network.
4.3.2

IoT Virtual Domain Segregation
To apply security policies that fit the needs of the different IoT devices, the

proposed protocol uses virtual segregation among the IoT devices. The IoT network is
virtually partitioned based on the type of the IoT device. The segregation process will
help the IG to control the communication process in the IoT network.
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Virtual segregation is an essential factor to secure the IoT network so that the
same policies and security rules can be applied on the IoT devices of the same type

regardless of

Figure 27: Virtual Domain Segregation Based on Device Type
where they are located. For example, as in figure 27, all motion sensors are in the same
virtual domain. The same is for the glass breaking sensors and lighting sensors. Each IoT
device is assigned a virtual domain ID(VID) and Type ID(TID) during the registration
phase.
4.4

Proposed Scheme: Lightweight Privacy Preservation and Mutual

Authentication Protocol for Smart Homes Using Physical Unclonable Functions

This section presents a lightweight mutual authentication and key agreement
protocol for stationary IoT devices. The abstract notations used to describe the
authentication protocol are listed in Table 2. The proposed protocol is based on LMAP2A
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architecture that is presented in chapter 3. An IoT node (N) and an Intelligent gateway (IG)
are responsible for ensuring secure, anonymous mutual authentication and key exchange
in the proposed protocol. The proposed protocol consists of four phases: the enrollment
phase, registration phase, mutual authentication phase, and the key generation phase.
Depending on how the IoT node will choose to generate the session key, the key generation
phase can be executed in two different ways.
The enrollment phase will be completed during manufacturing. The Authoritative
entity will be in charge of completing the registration phase. Both the mutual authentication
and the key generation phases will be conducted between the IoT device and the IG without
any human involvement. The two parties are responsible for ensuring secure, anonymous
mutual authentication and key generation. The relationship between the IoT devices and
the IG is based on the client-server topology. It is assumed that the two communication
parties can have direct communication with each other.
4.4.1

Enrollment Phase
The enrollment phase is completed during the manufacturing process. The

manufacturers will assign a real ID to every IoT device and every intelligent gateway. Also,
the manufacturers will collect a set of CRPs for each IoT device and each intelligent
gateway during the enrollment phase. The manufacturers will test all the CRPs under
different temperature and voltage conditions and consider the aging effects to keep only
the error-free CRPs [ [37]. Then, the manufacturers will load the CRPs of the IoT devices
and the intelligent gateways to the cloud of their service providers. The service provider
containers are part of the PUF architecture that is presented in Chapter 3.
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Table 2: Notations Used in the Proposed Scheme
Notation

Description

Authoritative Entity

AE

IoT node

N

Intelligent Gateway

IG

NIDR

IoT Node Real ID

NIDA

IoT node Alias ID

IGIDR

Intelligent Gateway Real ID

IGIDA

The intelligent Gateway Alias ID

OTP

One-time password

VDIDN

IoT node virtual domain ID

TIDN

IoT node Type ID

RVN

The random value generated by the IoT
node

RVIG

The random value generated by the IG

Auth1,Auth2, and Auth3

Authentication parameters

TSN

Timestamp generated by the IoT node

TSIG

Timestamp generated by the IG

PUF

Physical unclonable function

C

PUF Challenge

R

PUF Response

PubN

IoT device public key

PrivN

IoT device private key

PubIG

Intelligent gateway public key

PrivIG

Intelligent gateway private key

OTPnew

New OTP

NIDANew

N new alias ID
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SSK

Shared secret session key

{}_

Encryption

H

Hash function

⊕

Bitwise xor operation

4.4.2

Registration Phase
The main goal of this phase is to register the IoT device. Before operation in the

field, the Authoritative Entity (AE) will complete multiple tasks, as described in figure
28. First, The AE will assign the IoT node (N) an Alias identity (NIDA), virtual domain
ID(VDIDN), and type ID (TIDN). NIDA will be a fake ID that the IoT node will use to
communicate with the IG. NIDA will be dynamically changed in every authentication. The
goal of the NIDA is to protect and ensure the unlinkability and untraceability of the IoT
devices.
Additionally, the NIDA supports the anonymity of the node in each session. VDIDN
refers to the virtual domain that N belongs to, and the TIDN indicates the type of the IoT
device. Then the AE will use N's different ID's and the real ID of the IG to generate three
authentication parameters, which are Auth1 and Auth2, and Auth3 using a one-way hash
function and XOR operations.
Second, the AE will use a random number generator to generate a one-time
password (OTP) between N and the IG. Once N is registered, both N and IG will generate
the OTP during every authentication session without any human involvement.
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Third, the AE will retrieve CRP (CIG, RIG) of the IG from the PUF cloud. Fourth,
the AE will insert and store NIDR, NIDA, the VDIDN, the TIDN, and the OTP in the IG's
database and store Auth1, Auth2, Auth3, OTP, NIDA, RIG, and IGIDA in N's memory.
Step 1: The AE assigns an Alias ID to N
Step 2: The AE assigns N to its appropriate virtual domain and generates a VDIDN to the N.
Step 3: The AE generates and assigns a TIDN to each N based on its type
Step 4: AE communicates with the PUF cloud to retrieve a CRP (CIG, RIG of the IG.
Step 5: The AE calculates the three parameters using the VDIDN, TIDN, and the RIG: Auth1,
Auth2, and Auth3 as follows:
Auth1: H (NIDR || IGIDR||RIG)
Auth2: H(Auth1 ||IGIDR ||VDIDN)
Auth3: H (Auth2|| IGIDR ||TIDN)
The VDIDN, the TIDN, and the RIG are only used to create Auth1 Auth2 and Auth3. Both the
VDIDN and the TIDN are only stored on the IG database. The IoT node does not know anything
about those two IDs and the RIG. The CIG is only stored on the IG database, and RIG is
unknown to both the IoT node and the IG because the IG will generate it on every
authentication session. Using these two IDs to generate the authentication parameters makes it
almost impossible for an adversary to identify any IoT node's VDIDN and the TIDN. Also, using
the RIG makes it impossible for an adversary to impersonate the IG.
Step 6: The AE generates a one-time token (OTT) that will be used as part of a one-time
password (OTP) using a random number generator
Step 7: The AE stores the Auth1, Auth2, Auth3, NIDA, IGIDA, and OTP in the IoT device
database.
Step 8: The AE inserts the NIDR, NIDA, IGIDA, PubIG, VDIDN, OTP, CIG, and TIDN of the IoT node
in the IG database.

Figure 28: Registration Phase
The real identities of both the IoT node and the IG represent secure parameters
between the IoT node and the IG. The NIDR and the IGIDR will never be transmitted in a
plain text format and will be used during the authentication process between the IoT node
and the IG.
4.4.3

Mutual Authentication Phase
This phase includes implementing the two-factors authentication process and the

agreement on the technique of generating the secret session key (ssk) between the IoT
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node and the IG. The ssk will be generated either by employing a hash function or using
the Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Key exchange protocol.
This phase includes implementing the two-factor mutual authentication using the
PUF, one-way hash function, bitwise XOR operation, and symmetric encryption. The
security of exchanged messages in this phase is ensured by encrypting the messages
using the AES algorithm with a 128-bit key length. Besides, a one-way cryptographic
hash function with a length of 256 bits is used to validate and ensure the integrity of the
transmitted data between N and the IG.
During this phase, the two sides negotiate the session key generation technique.
The two sides will agree to either generate the session key by using a one-way hash
function or by using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Key Exchange Protocol (ECDH). The
ECDH Key Exchange is a key-agreement protocol that can be used for deriving a shared
secret key [20]. Figure 29 describes the ECDH key exchange process.
N

IG

Choose α = PriN, 1< α <n-1
Compute PubN ≡ αG mod p
PubN
Choose: β = PriIG, 1<β<n-1
Compute: PubIG ≡ βG mod p
PubIG
ssk = PubIG α

ssk = PubN β

Figure 29: Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Key Exchange Protocol
As presented in figure 30, this phase starts when N prepares the connection
request message that will be sent to the IG. The preparation process of this message
includes the following steps:
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1. N generates a new TSN1 to avoid replay attacks
2. N Computes NX1
a. NX1 = H (Auth3|| OTP)
3. N selects a random parameter RVN and then calculates NX2
a. NX2 = XOR (RVN1, NX1)
4. N computes SN = H (NIDR|| NX1 ||TSN1 || RVN 1)
5. N sends a connection request message.
The connection request includes NIDA, TSN1, X2, and SN, as shown in 4.1.
N

IG Conn-Req (NIDA, TSN1, NX2, SN)
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(4.1)

N

IG

Generate: TSN1, RVN1
Compute:
NX1 = H (Auth3|| OTP)
NX2 = XOR (RVN1, NX1)
SN = H (NIDR|| NX1 ||TSN1 || RVN 1)
M1: (NIDA, TSN1, NX2, SN)
Check:|TRec−TSN11 |< ∆T
Find: NIDA
Read: NIDR VDIDN, TIDN, CIG, and OTP
Compute:
RIG = PUF(CIG)
Auth1’ = H ((NIDR || IGIDR|| RIG)
Auth2’ = H (Auth’1 ||IGIDR || VDIDN)
Auth3’ = H (Auth2’|| IGIDR || TIDN)
X1’ = H (Auth2’ || Auth3’|| OTP)
RVN1’ = XOR (X2, X1’)
Verify: SN’ = H (NIDR|| X1’|| TSN1’ || RVN1’)
Generate: RVIG1, TSIG1, SID
Computes:
G1 = H (Auth1’|| OTP|| RVN1’)
CX = C1 ⊕ G1
G2 = H (IGIDR||C1 || RVIG1 || TSIG1|| G1)
M2: (IGIDA, SID, TSIG1, CX, {RVIG1, G2} _R1)
Check:|TRec−TSIG1 |< ∆T
Compute:
G1’ = H (Auth1|| OTP|| RVN1)
C1’ = G1’ ⊕ CX
R1’ = PUF(C1’)
Verify
G2’= H (IGIDR||C1’ || RVIG1 || TSIG1|| G1’)
Generate: RVN2, TSN2
Compute
OTPnew= H (OTP|| CNI|| TSN2)
NIDAnew = H (NIDA || RVIG1)
N3 = H (TSN2||RVN2||OTPnew || NIDAnew ||RVIG1)
M3: NIDA, SID. TSN2, {RVN2, N3}R1)
Check:|TRec−TSIG1 |< ∆T
Compute:
OTPnew= H (OTP|| CNI|| TSN2)
NIDAnew = H (NIDA || RVIG1)
Verify:
N3’ = H (TSN2||RVN2||OTPnew’ || NIDAnew’ ||RVIG1)
Store (OTPnew’, NIDAnew’)

Figure 30: The Proposed protocol authentication process between N and IG
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Once the IG receives the connection request, it will complete the following steps:
1. IG checks the validity of the received timestamp |TRec−TSN11 |< ∆T. TRec is
the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the timestamp
and the time when the message is received higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. IG retrieves from its database the NIDR that corresponds to its NIDA. If the IG
did not find the NIDA in its database, it will ignore and drop the connection
request.
3. Once the IG finds the NIDR, it will retrieve it along with the VDIDN, TIDN, CIG,
and OTP of N.
4. The IG passes the challenge CIG to its PUF function and generates a response
RIG
5. The IG uses the generated RIG to compute Auth1' by applying a one-way hash
function, as described in 4.2. Based on the calculated Auth1', the IG calculates
Auth2' as presented in 4.3. Also, the IG calculates Auth3' by using Auth2' as
presented in 4.4.
Auth1’ = H ((NIDR || IGIDR|| RIG)

(4.2)

Auth2’ = H (Auth’1 ||IGIDR || VDIDN)

(4.3)

Auth3’ = H (Auth2’|| IGIDR || TIDN)

(4.4)

6. The IG computes X1’ = H (Auth2’ || Auth3’|| OTP)
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7. The IG computes the RVN1’ = XOR (X2, X1’)
8. The IG uses the calculated X1’, TSN1', NIDR, and the RVN1' to generate SN',
which is a combination of NIDR, X1’, TSN1', the RVN1' using a one-way hash
function as shown in figure 31. If the computed value is equal to the received
value, the IG accepts the connection request; otherwise, it will drop it.
SN’ = H (NIDR|| X1’|| TSN1’ || RVN1’)
If SN = SN' Then
The IG will accept the connection request
Else
The IG will drop the connection request
Figure 31: IoT Node Message Verification
Once the IG verifies the IoT node, the IG communicates with the Grand PUF
node to retrieve the PUF challenge (CNI) and their corresponding PUF responses (RNI)
through a secure communication channel. The IG will generate a random value RVIG, a
session ID to distinguish one session from the rest of the running sessions
simultaneously, and a timestamp TSIG1. The preparation process of the connection
response message includes the following steps:
1. IG selects a random parameter (RVIG1)
2. IG generates a new timestamp (TSIG1)
3. IG generates a session ID(SID)
4. IG computers G1 = H (Auth1’|| OTP|| RVN1’)
5. IG calculates CX = CNI ⊕ G1
6. IG calculates G2 = H (IGIDR||CNI || RVIG1 || TSIG1|| G1)
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7. IG sends a connection response message
The connection response includes IGIDA, session ID(SID), TSIG1, RVIG1, CX, and G2, as
shown in 4.5. The message is encrypted by RNI because it is a secured parameter between
the N and the IG
IG

N Conn-Res (IGIDA, SID, TSIG1, CX, {RVIG1, G2}R1)

(4.5)

Once N receives the connection response, it completes the following steps:
1. N checks the validity of the received timestamp |TSRec−TSIG1 |< ∆T. TRec is
the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the timestamp and
the time when the message is received higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. N retrieves from its database IGIDR that corresponds to its IGIDA. If N did not
find the IGIDA in its database, it will ignore and drop the connection response
8. N computes G1’ = H (Auth1|| OTP|| RVN1)
3. N calculates CNI’ = G1’ ⊕ CX
4. N computes RNI’ = PUF(CNI’)
5. Then N will use RNI' to decrypt the message to retrieve RVIG1 and G2
6. As presented in figure 32, N calculates G2'using a one-way hash function and
compares the generated G2' with the received G2. If the two values are the
same, N will accept the connection response and authenticate the IG;
otherwise, it will drop it.
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G2’= H (IGIDR||CNI’ || RVIG1 || TSIG1|| G1’)
If G2 = G2’Then
Then N will accept the connection response.
Else
N will drop the connection response
Figure 32: Evaluating the IG Authentication Parameter
After ensuring the correctness of the G2' and verifying the integrity of the sent
message, N completes the following steps:
1. N generates the TSN2
2. N generates the RVN2
3. N computes new OTP(OTPnew) = H (OTP|| CNI|| TSN2)
4. N computes a new alias ID(NIDAnew) = H (NIDA || RVIG1)
5. N computes N3 = H (TSN2||RVN2||OTPnew || NIDAnew ||RVIG1)
6. N selects its technique to generate the session key. N will send either T1 or T2.
a. If N decides to use a hash function to generate the session key, it will
send to the IG the hash function that it will use.
b. If N decides to use ECDH to generate the session key, N derives its
private and public keys using the ECC public domain parameters. N
selects a random secret key and calculates the corresponding public key
as Gα .
7. N sends to the IG a message containing RVN2, TSN2, and Nthree. Also, N will
send either the hash function as shown in 4.6a or the public key as shown in
4.6b that will be used to generate the session key. The message will be
encrypted by the RNI
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N

IG NIDA, SID. TSN2, {RVN2, N3, SHA256} R1)

(4.6.a)

N

IG NIDA, SID, TSN2, {RVN2, N3, Gα} R1)

(4.6.b)

Upon receiving N's message, IG completes the steps involved in this process, as
listed below.
1. IG verifies the TSN2. . IG checks the validity of the received timestamp
|TSRec−TSN2 |< ∆T. TSRec is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is
the maximum transmission delay. The message is dropped if the difference
between the timestamp and the time when the message is received higher than
the expected maximum transmission delay.
2. IG decrypts the message using the R1.
3. IG computes new OTP(OTPnew) = H (OTP|| CNI|| TSN2’)
4. IG computes a new alias ID(NIDAnew) = H (NIDA || RVIG1)
5. IG computes the N3, which combines TSN2, RVN2, OTPnew, NIDAnew, and
RVIG1. If the calculated N3 equals the received N3, the IG will accept the
message and authenticate N; otherwise, it will end the session as presented in
figure 33. Also, the IG will store OTPnew and NIDAnew in its memory for the
next authentication session.
N3’ = H (TSN2’||RVN2’||ssk’|| OTPnew’ || NIDAnew’ ||RVIG1)
If N3' = N3 Then
Integrity and authenticity are proved, and The IoT node will be
authenticated

Else
The IG node will end the session
Figure 33: IoT Node Authentication Process
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4.4.4

Key Generation Phase
Once the mutual authentication is completed, the two sides will generate a shared

secret session key (ssk) using the technique they agreed upon during the authentication
phase.
Suppose the two sides agreed on using the hash function to generate the ssk. In
that case, the two sides will generate the ssk locally by hashing a combination of the PUF
responses and the generated random values as presented in 4.9. and figure 34 The
uniqueness of the PUF responses ensures the uniqueness of the generated ssk.
ssk = H (RNI’ || CNI|| RVN1’||RVIG1|| RVN2’)

(4.9)

If the two sides decided to use ECHD to generate the ssk, the two sides would
generate the ssk as presented in figure 35. AES will be used as a symmetric encryption
algorithm to encrypt and decrypt all the subsequent data that will be sent between N and
the IG.
If the key generation phase gets disrupted and the connection gets terminated for
any reason, the IoT device and the IG will have to repeat the entire mutual authentication
steps.

Figure 34: The Process of Generating ssk Using Hash Function and CRPs
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Figure 35: The Process of Generating ssk Using ECDH
The algorithm for the proposed mutual authentication mechanism is shown in detailed
steps in figure 36.
Algorithm 1 The mutual authentication between IoT device and the IG
Input:
An IoT device with real identity (NIDR), alias identity (NIDA), IG real identity (IGIDR), IG
alias identity (IGIDR), Authentication parameters (Auth1, Auth2, and Auth3), G, and one
time password (OTP).
IG with with real identity (NIDR), alias identity (NIDA), IG real identity (IGIDR), IG alias
identity (IGIDR), the virtual domain ID(VIDA) and type ID (TID) of the IoT node, G, PUF
challenge (CIG), and one time password (OTP).
Output:
Mutual authentication between the IoT device(N) and the IG.
Begin
1.

The IoT device generates a random nonce RVN1, a timestamp TSN1, computes the
(XN1) H (Auth3, OTP), NX2 , xor(RVN1,NX1), and (SN) H(XN1,TSN1,RVN1,NIDR).

2. IoT device sends (NIDA, TSN1, XN2, SN) message to the server.
3.
4.

If (the IG finds NIDA in its repository) then
The IG retrieves NIDR, OTP, VIDA, CIG, and TIDA that belongs to the NIDA from
its repository to its memory.IG passes the challenge CIG to its PUF function and
generates a RIG.

5.

The IG calculates Auth1’, Auth2’, and Auth3’. Then the IG computes NX1,
retrieves the RVN1 from XORing NX1 and NX2 and finally calculates SN’
H (NX1, TSN1, RVN1, NIDR) message.
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6.

If (the calculated hash message in step 6 matches the hash message that was
In step 2) then

7.

The IG communicates with the Grand PUF node to a CRP,
generates a timestamp TSIG1, generates a random nonce RVIG1, calculates the
hash value (G1) H (Auth1, OTP, RVN1) , computes (CX) xor(C1,G1) and
generates (G2) H (G1C1TSIG1, RVIG1, IGIDR);

8.

The IG sends IGIDA, SID, TSIG1, CX, {RVIG1, G2}R1 message encrypted by R1
to N;

9.

else
Go to step 24;

end if
10. else

Go to step 24;
11. end if
12. N verifies the time stamp, calculates G1’ to retrieves C1 from CX. N applies the
PUF function to calculate R1 for C1. .N uses R1 to decrypt the received message
and retrieves RVIG1 and G2. N generates G2’ H (G1, C1, TSIG1, RVIG1, IGIDR);
13. If (the calculated hash message in step 12 matches the hash message that was sent
in step 9) then

The authenticity of the IG is verified
14.

N generates a timestamp TSN2, a random nonce RVN2, a private key(PRIVN) and
calculates its corresponding public key(PubN) using the ECC algorithm.

15.

N computes new OTP(OTPnew) = H (OTP|| CNI|| TSN2)

16.

N computes a new alias ID(NIDAnew) = H (NIDA || RVIG1)

17.

N computes N3 = H (TSN2||RVN2||OTPnew || NIDAnew ||RVIG1)

18.

N sends NIDA, SID, TSN2, {RVN2, PubN, N3}R1 message encrypted by R1 to
IG;

19. else

Go to step 24.
end if
20. The IG verifies the TSN2, decrypts the message using R1 and generates (N3’) H
(TSN2’||RVN2’||ssk’|| OTPnew’ || NIDAnew’ ||RVIG1)
21. If (the calculated hash message in step 20 matches the hash message that was sent
in step 18 then
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The authenticity of the IoT device is verified.
22. Mutual authentication between the IoT device and the server is established.
23. else

Go to step 24.
End if
24. Stop (terminates the connection).

End

Figure 36: Algorithm 1 The mutual authentication between IoT device and the IG
4.5

Evaluation Process
The following section presents a detailed security and performance analysis of the

proposed protocol and compares the analysis results with other related schemes presented
in the literature.
4.5.1

Security Validation of the Proposed Protocol
In this section, we conducted both formal and informal security analysis. The

formal evaluation uses two different approaches. The first formal evaluation approach is
simulation-based by using the AVISPA tool to ensure that the proposed scheme is secure
against active and passive attacks such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.
The second evaluation approach theorem proving-based uses Burrows, Abadi, and
Needham (BAN) belief logic of authentication to confirm that the authenticated
participants share the session key and the generated one-time password (OTP) securely in
the proposed scheme. The BAN logic can be used as an illustrative method of the
essential concepts of an authentication protocol and as a basic verification tool for a
security protocol. After completing the formal evaluation, we conduct an informal
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security evaluation by examining the proposed protocol against the well-known attacks
and prove that the proposed protocol satisfies the main security properties.
4.5.1.1

Formal Security Evaluation

4.5.1.1.1

Simulation-based Security Verification Using AVISPA

The proposed protocol is simulated and tested using the AVISPA software, a
widely accepted tool for automatically validating the protocols' security features. The
messages involved in the cryptography and security of the authentication process are
taken into consideration.
4.5.1.1.1.1

Simulation Overview

The abstract notations used to describe the authentication protocol and the
corresponding AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions are presented in table 3.
Also, table 4 shows the symbols that are used in AVISPA HLPSL scripting.
Table 3: Abstract Notation and AVISPA HLPSL Scripting Variables/Functions for
Protocol Specification
Notation

Description

AE

AE

N

N

IG

G

SID

SIDNIG

NIDR

NIDR
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NIDA

NIDA

IGIDR

IGIDR

IGIDA

IGIDA

Auth1, Auth2,Auth3

T,X,Y

TSIG

TSoneIG,TstwoIG

TSN

TsoneN,TstwoN

RVN1

Na

RVN2

Naa

RVIG1

Nb

TIDN

TIDN

VDIDN

VDIDN

R1, R2

Rone,Rtwo

RIG

RG

C1, C2

Cone,Ctwo

CX

CX

N1, N2, N3

None,Ntwo,Nthree

G1, G2

Gone,Gtwo
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PubN

Exp (GX,Pn)

PubIG

IG_pub

NIDAnew

NnewIDA

OTPNew

NOTP

⊕

XOR

H

H

Table 4: Symbols for Protocol Specification
Symbol

Meaning

‘

The variable is locally computed by the
agent.

/\

Logical AND

{}

Encryption

The main goals of the simulation are as follows:
1. Goal 1: The secrecy_of secNIDR represents that the NIDR is permanently
kept secret, known to only (N and IG).
2. Goal 2: The secrecy_of secOTP represents that OTP is kept secret to (N, IG)
only.
3. Goal 3: The secrecy_of secNa represents that Na is kept secret to (N, IG) only.
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4. Goal 4: The secrecy_of secNb represents that Nb is kept secret to (N, IG)
only.
5. Goal 5: The secrecy_of secIGIDR represents that the IGIDR is permanently
kept secret, known to only (N and IG).
6. Goal 6: The secrecy_of secRone represents that Rone is kept secret to (N, IG)
only.
7. Goal 7: The secrecy_of secCone represents that Cone is kept secret to (N, IG)
only.
8. Goal 8: The secrecy_of secNaa represents that the secret key Naa is
permanently kept secret, known to only (N and IG).
9. Goal 9: The secrecy_of secNOPT represents that NOPT is permanently kept
secret, known to only (N and IG).
10. Goal 10: The secrecy_of secRG represents that RG is permanently kept secret,
known to only (N and IG).
11. Authentication Property 1: The authentication_on Nb represents that IG
generates Nb. If N securely receives Nb through a message, it authenticates
IG.
12. Authentication Property 2: The authentication_on Na represents that N
generates Na. If IG securely receives Na through a message, it authenticates
N.
To achieve the goals mentioned above, we wrote the HLPSL script for the
protocol. The entities involved in the communication process are modeled as roles with
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their message exchanges. There are four defined roles: that are: (1) role_N that is played
by the IoT node; (2) role _IG that is played by the Intelligent gateway; (3) session, where
the session role and all its declarations are deﬁned, and (4) environment, which
instantiates all agents, variables, and functions. When the agent locally computes the
variable, it is marked as primed (’). Also, the symbol /\ presents the conjunction (logical
AND). Notice that { }_denotes the encryption where the encryption key is identified
following a _ .
Figure A_1 in Appendix A shows the role of the Node N played by N. N is aware
of the N and IG agents in the protocol, and its alias identity and the IG alias identity.
Also, it is aware of its own real identity and the IG real identity that should be kept
secured. Furthermore, N is aware of the authentication parameters T, X, Y, the OTP
generated by the AE, the hash function H (·), and the send/receive channels Snd/Rcv. The
(dy) notation indicates that the channels are following the Dolev-Yao model.
At the first state, “state 2,” N receives a start message “Rcv(start)” as a signal to
begin the protocol run. All local variables are declared under the local section. N
generates new random values (TSoneN and Na) and computes None, Ntwo, and SN. The
computation process of the None, Ntwo, and SN follows the presented protocol
description. N sends (NIDA, TSoneN, Ntwo, SN) to the IG.
At the second transition, “State 4”, N receives the (IGIDA, SIDNIG, TSoneIG,
{CX, Gtwo} R1) message from the IG encrypted by R1. The computation TG, Gone,
Cone, and Gtwo follows the description of our protocol. At this transition, if the Gtwo
appears as expected by N, N authenticates the IG. After authenticating the IG, N
generates TStwoN and Naa. Also, N computes NOTP, NnewIDA and Nthree. The
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computation process of Nthree follows the presented protocol description. Based on the
negotiation agreement regarding the algorithm that will be used to generate the session
key, N will generate its public key and send it to the IG as part of the message. The “end
role” at the end of the N role denotes the end of the role Node played by N.
Figure A_2 in Appendix A shows the role of the Intelligent Gateway played by
IG. The IG is aware of all agents in the protocol N and IG, its alias and real identities
(IGIDA, IGIDR), the alias and real identities (NIDA, NIDR) of the N node. IG knows its
public key (IG_pub), the OTP, the virtual domain of the IoT device VDIDN, the type of
the IoT device TIDN, the challenge (CG), the hash function H (·), and the send/receive
channels Snd/RcvAll local variables are defined under the local section.
At the first transition, “State 1”, IG receives the (NIDA, TSoneN, Ntwo, SNG)
message which is sent by N. IG uses the N’ alias ID to retrieve its NIDR, VDIDN,
TIDN, OTP, and CG. Once the IG verifies SNG, it will generate a fresh value Nb and a
TSoneIG. IG will compute TG, Gone, CX, and Gtwo according to the description of the
introduced scheme. Then the IG will send to N (IGIDA, SIDNID, TSoneIG, CX, {Nb,
Gtwo} R1) encrypted by R1. At the second transition, IG receives (SIDNIG.TStwoN'
{Naa'.exp(GX,Pn').Nthree'}_R1. The IG decrypts the message using R1. Then it will
compute NnewIDA and NOPT and verify Nthree in accordance with the description of
the presented protocol. The “end role” at the end of the IG role denotes the end of the role
Node played by IG.
Figure A_3 in Appendix A shows the session role where the two agents’ roles are
invoked, and all the session parameters are defined. First, all known constant parameters
and their declarations are presented. The predefined constants are T, X, Y, NIDA, NIDR,
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IGIDA, IGIDR, GX, CG, OTP, VDIDN, and TIDN. IG_pub is defined as a public key,
and H is defined as the hash function. In the composition section, each agent's role is
invoked along with its constant values and functions. For example, The G role is invoked
with N and G as agents, NIDA, NIDR, IGIDA, IGIDR, VDIDN, TIDN, GX, CG, and
OTP and as predefined constants, IG_pub as a public key, H as the hash function, and
SND2 and RCV2 as the send and receive channels for G. Similarly, N role is invoked in
the same manner. The “end role” at the end of the session role indicates the end of this
role.
Figure A_4 in Appendix A shows the environment role. In this role, one or more
sessions are instantiated. First, all constants are instantiated and defined. The constants n,
and g are instantiated as agents representing agents N, and G. The ig_pub instantiates the
public key IG_pub. The constants t,x,y, nida, nidr , igida , igidr, vdidn, tidn,otp, gx and
cg instantiates T, X, Y, NIDA, NIDR, IGIDA, IGIDR, VDIDN, TIDN, OTP, GX and
CG, respectively. The function h instantiates the hash function H. The protocol identifiers
secNIDR,secOTP, secNa,secIGIDR, secNb, secRone, secCone ,secNaa,secNOTP,secRG,
na, and nb are also instantiated and defined. In the intruder knowledge section, all
relevant values that the intruder is assumed to know before the execution are provided.
The attacker is assumed to know n and g. He/ she is also assumed to know ig_pub, gx,
and the hash h. The session is instantiated with n, g, n,g,t,x,y, nida, igida, nidr, igidr, gx,
otp, cg,ig_pub, and h instances in the composition section. The “end role” at the end of
the environment role denotes the end of this role.
Figure A_5 in Appendix A shows the simulation goals which are declared under
the “goal” keyword using the protocol identifiers declared as ‘protocol_id’. The simulator
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is dictated to check the secrecy NIDR, IGIDR, T, X,Na,Nb,Rone,Cone, Naa, RG and
NOTP at different states using ‘secrecy_of secNIDR’, ‘secrecy_of secOTP’, ‘secrecy_of
secNa’, ‘secrecy_of secNb, ‘secrecy_of secIGIDR’, ‘secrecy_of secRone’, ‘secrecy_of
secCone’, ‘secrecy_of secNaa’, ‘secrecy_of secNOTP’, and ‘secrecy_of secRG’. The
authentication is checked using ‘authentication_on na and ‘authentication_on nb’. The
“end role” at the end of the goal section denotes the end of this role.
4.5.1.1.1.2

Simulation results

The simulation results of the proposed scheme are based on OFMC and CL-AtSe,
which are considered two widely accepted backend model checkers to check and verify
that the protocol meets the specified security goals [71]. These backends help in the
automatic execution analysis of the security protocols. OFMC and CL-AtSe were used
because they support the bitwise XOR operation. OFMC and CL-Atse are multipurpose
automatic model analyzers for testing how efficient the security of the cryptographic
protocols. OFMC and CL-Atse receive an input a protocol described by a set of rules
generated by the AVISPA compiler and decide If an attack exists based on the DolevYao intruder threat model [88]. A security protocol animator (SPAN) is used to build a
Message Sequence Chart (MSC) of the protocol execution from the outlined HLPSL
specification. Moreover, SPAN automatically creates attacks on HLPSL specifications
using the well-known “Dolev-Yao” intruder model. The SPAN protocol simulation’s
MSC corresponding to our HLPSL specification is shown in Figure 37.
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Figure 37: Snapshot of the protocol simulation in AVISPA

In AVISPA tool, the security properties such as authentication, integrity, and
secrecy are specified in a separate section. Therefore, when SPAN is executed, it verifies
if the protocol satisfies the specified properties. SPAN generates an attack trace if an
attack is found, and it will consider the protocol unsafe. The presented protocol's
simulation results are achieved by the OFMC back-end checker and the CL-AtSe backend checker. Figure 38 shows the CL-AtSe back-end checker report, which guarantees
that the protocol is SAFE and satisfies all the specified security goals. Figure 39 presents
the OFMC back-end checker report shows that the protocol is SAFE, thus meeting the
defined security goals. In summary, we can conclude that the proposed protocol is secure.
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Figure 38: CL-AtSe Summary Report

4.5.1.1.2

Figure 39: OFMC Summary Report
Formal Proof Based on BAN Logic
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This section uses BAN logic to verify the legitimacy of the shared secret session
key (ssk) and the new OTP (OTPnew) shared between N and IG. To ensure the security
of the proposed protocol under BAN logic, it needs to satisfy a set of security goals. The
following section defines the main goals of the analysis of the presented authentication
scheme.
4.5.1.1.2.1

Goals Identification

Goal 1: The N and the IG want to establish a secret shared session key (ssk) that is
believed by both, respectively.
G 1_1: N believes that the IG believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter between
N and IG.
ssk

N| ≡ IG | ≡ (N

IG)

G1_2: N believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between N and IG.
ssk

N| (N

IG)

G1_3: IG believes that the N believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter between
N and IG.
ssk

IG| ≡ N | ≡ (N

IG)

G1_4: IG believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between N and IG.
ssk

IG| ≡ (N

IG)
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Goal 2: OTPnew is well protected and believed by N.
G2_1: N believes that the IG believes that the OTPnew is a securely shared parameter
between N and IG.

OTPnew

N| ≡ IG | ≡ (N

IG)

G2_2: N believes that OTPnew is a securely shared parameter between N and IG.
OTPnew

N| ≡ (N

IG)

G2_3: IG believes that the N believes that the OTPnew is a securely shared parameter
between N and IG.

OTPnew

IG| ≡ N | ≡ (N

IG)

G2_4: IG believes that OTPnew is a securely shared parameter between N and IG.
OTPnew

IG| ≡ (N
4.5.1.1.2.2

IG)

Messages Idealization

First, we transfer all transmitted messages into idealized form as follows:
M1: N
M2: IG
M3: N

IG:<NIDR, NX1, TSN1, RVN1> N

OTP

N: {IGIDR, C1, C2 G1, RVIG1, TSIG1} R1
IG: {NIDR, TSN2, RVN2, Gα } R1
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IG

4.5.1.1.2.3

Main Assumptions

The second step to be completed is to define some assumptions as initiative
promises. The fundamental assumptions of the presented authentication scheme are as
follows:
P1: IG believes that OTP is a securely shared parameter between N and IG
IG| ≡ (N

OTP

IG)

P2: IG believes N believes that OTP is a securely shared parameter between N and IG
OTP

IG | ≡ N| ≡ (N

IG)

P3: N believes that OTP is a secure shared parameter between N and IG
OTP

N| ≡ (N

IG)

P4: N believes IG believes that OTP is a securely shared parameter between N and IG
OTP

N | ≡ IG| ≡ (N

IG)

P5: IG believes that R1 is a securely shared parameter between N and IG
IG| ≡ (N

R1

IG)

P6: IG believes N believes that R1 is a securely shared parameter between N and IG
R1

IG | ≡ N| ≡ (N

IG)

P7: N believes that R1 is a securely shared parameter between N and IG
R1

N| ≡ (N

IG)
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P8: N believes IG believes that R1 is a securely shared parameter between N and IG
R1

N | ≡ IG| ≡ (N

IG)

P9: IG believes TSN1 is fresh.
IG| ≡ #(TSN1)
P10: IG believes TSN2 is fresh.
IG| ≡ #(TSN2)
P11: IG believes RVN1 is fresh.
IG| ≡ #(RVN1)
P12: IG believes that N believes RVN1.
IG | ≡ N| ≡ RVN1
P13: IG believes that N has jurisdiction over RVN1. That is, N is an authority and believes
RVN1.
IG | ≡ N ⇒ RVN1
P14: IG believes RVN2 is fresh.
IG| ≡ #(RVN2)
P15: IG believes that N believes RVN2.
IG | ≡ N| ≡ RVN2
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P16: IG believes that N has jurisdiction over RVN2. That is, N is an authority and believes
RVN2.
IG | ≡ N ⇒ RVN2
P17: N believes TSIG1 is fresh.
N| ≡ #(TSIG1)
P18: N believes RVIG1 is fresh.
N| ≡ #(RVIG1)
P19: N believes that IG believes RVIG1.
N | ≡ IG| ≡ RVIG1
P20: N believes that N has jurisdiction over RVIG1. That is, IG is an authority and
believes RVIG1.
N | ≡ IG ⇒ RVIG1
P21: IG believes NIDR is a securely shared parameter between N and IG.

NIDR

IG | ≡ (N

IG)

P22: IG believes N believes that NIDR is a securely shared parameter between N and IG.

NIDR

IG | ≡ N| ≡ (N

IG)

P23: N believes IGIDR is a securely shared parameter between N and IG.
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IGIDR

N | ≡ (N

IG)

P24: N believes IG believes that IGIDR is a securely shared parameter between N and IG.

IGIDR

N | ≡ IG| ≡ (N

IG)

P 25: IG believes α is fresh
IG ≡ #(α)
P26: IG believes that N believes α.
IG| ≡ N | ≡ α
P 27: IG believes that N has jurisdiction over α. That is, N is an authority and believes α.
IG| ≡ N ⇒ α
P28: N believes that IG believes C1
N| ≡ IG | ≡ C1
P29: N believes that IG has jurisdiction over C1
N| ≡ IG ⇒ C1
P30: IG believes N believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between N and IG
ssk

IG | ≡ N| ≡ (N

IG)

P31: N believes IG believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between N and IG
ssk
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N | ≡ IG| ≡ (N

IG)

P32: N believes that IG believes OPTnew
N| ≡ IG | ≡ OTPnew
P33: IG believes that N believes OPTnew
IG| ≡ N | ≡ OTPnew
4.5.1.1.2.4

Analysis of the Authentication Protocol

We then prove that the proposed protocol achieves the security goals based on the
idealized form of the messages, assumptions, and BAN logic rules. The proposed
authentication scheme analysis is shown below to prove that the protocol achieves mutual
authentication between N and IG.
According to M1:
V1: IG ◃:<NIDR,NX1,TSN1,RVN1> N

OTP

IG

According to P1, P21, and Rule 1, we derive the following
𝐼𝐺|≡N OTP IG,IG ⊲(N𝐼𝑅𝐷 ,NX1 ,TS𝑁1 ,RV𝑁1 ) 𝑁 𝑂𝑇𝑃 𝐼𝐺
𝐼𝐺| ≡N|∼(N𝐼𝑅𝐷 ,NX1 ,TS𝑁1 ,RV𝑁1 )

V2:

According to P9, P11, and rule 3, we derive the following

V3:

𝐼𝐺|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑁1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝑁1 )
𝐼𝐺 |≡#(N𝐼𝑅𝐷 ,NX1 ,TS𝑁1 ,RV𝑁1 )|

According to P2, P22, V2, V3, and rule 2, we derive the following
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V4:

𝐼𝐺|≡#(N𝐼𝑅𝐷 ,NX1 ,TS𝑁1 ,RV𝑁1 ),IG|≡N~(N𝐼𝑅𝐷 ,NX1 ,TS𝑁1 ,RV𝑁1 )
𝐼𝐺 |≡N|≡(N𝐼𝑅𝐷 ,NX1 ,TS𝑁1 ,RV𝑁1 )
According to V4, P12, P13, and rule 4, we derive the following:
IG |≡N| ⇒ ,RV𝑁1 ,IG |≡ N |≡ ,RV𝑁1
IG|≡ ,RV𝑁1

V5:

According to M2:

V6: N ◃{IGIDR, C1,G1,RVIG1,TSIG1}R1
According to P7, P23, and Rule 1, we derive the following
V7:

𝑁|≡IG R1 N,IG ⊲(IG𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,C1 ,G1 ,RV𝐼𝐺1 ,TS𝐼𝐺1 ) 𝑁 𝑅1 𝐼𝐺
𝑁|≡IG |∼ ( IG𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,C1 ,G1 ,RV𝐼𝐺1 ,TS𝐼𝐺1 )
According to P17, P18, and rule 3, we derive the following

V8:

𝑁|≡#(RV𝐼𝐺1 ,TS𝐼𝐺1 )
𝑁|≡#(IG𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,C1 ,G1 ,RV𝐼𝐺1 ,TS𝐼𝐺1 )|

According to P8, P24, V7, V8, and rule 2, we derive the following
V9:

𝑁|≡#(IG𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,C1 ,G1 ,RV𝐼𝐺1 ,TS𝐼𝐺1 ),N|≡IG~(IG𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,C1 ,G1 ,RV𝐼𝐺1 ,TS𝐼𝐺1 )
𝑁|≡IG|≡(IG𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,C1 ,G1 ,RV𝐼𝐺1 ,TS𝐼𝐺1 )
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According to P19, P20, P28, P29, V9, and rule 4, we derive the following:
𝑁 |≡IG|⇒RV𝐼𝐺1 ,C1 , N |≡ IG |≡ RV𝐼𝐺1 ,C1 ,C2 ,

V10:

N|≡ RV𝐼𝐺1 ,C1 ,C2 ,

According to M3, we get
V11: IG ◃ {NIDR, TSN2, RVN2, Gα} R1
According to P5, P21, and Rule 1, we derive the following
V12:

IG|≡N R1 IG ,IG ⊲(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,TS𝑁2 ,RV𝑁2 ,Gα ) 𝑁 𝑅1 𝐼𝐺
𝐼𝐺|≡N |∼( 𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,TS𝑁2 ,RV𝑁2 ,Gα )
According to P10, P14, P25, and rule 3, we derive the following
𝐼𝐺|≡#(TS𝑁2 ,RV𝑁2 ,α)

V13:

𝐼𝐺|≡#(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,TS𝑁2 ,RV𝑁2 ,Gα)

According to P6, P22, V12, V13, and rule 2, we derive the following
V14:
𝐼𝐺|≡#(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,TS𝑁2 ,RV𝑁2 ,Gα),IG|≡N~(I𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,TS𝑁2 ,RV𝑁2 ,Gα)
𝐼𝐺|≡N|≡(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,TS𝑁2 ,RV𝑁2 ,Gα)

According to P15, P16, P26, P27, V14, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V15:

𝐼𝐺 |≡N| ⇒ RV𝑁2 ,α ,IG |≡ N |≡ RV𝑁2 ,R2 ,α
𝑁|≡ RV𝑁2 ,α

If both N and the IG agreed on generating the ssk using the hash function:
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By combining V9 and Rule 2, we get
ssk

V16: N | ≡ IG|(N

IG)

(Goal 1_1)

From assumption P31, V10, V16, and Rule 4, we get:
ssk

V17: N| ≡ (N

IG)

( Goal 1_2)

By combining V4, V14, and Rule 2, we get
ssk

V18: IG | ≡ N| ≡ (N

IG)

(Goal 1_3)

From assumption P30, V5, V15, V18, and Rule 4, we get:
ssk

V19: IG| ≡ (N

IG)

(Goal 1_4)

By combining V9 and Rule 2, we can derive
OTPnew

V20: N|≡IG|≡ (N

IG)

(Goal 2 _1)

From assumptions P4, P32, V10, V20, and Rule 4, we derive
V21: N|≡ (N

OTPnew

IG)

(Goal 2_2)

By combining V14 and Rule 2, we can derive
OTPnew

V22: IG|≡N|≡ (N

IG)

(Goal 2 _3)

From assumptions P2, P33, V15, V22, and Rule 4, we derive
V23: IG|≡ (N

OTPnew

IG)

(Goal 2_4)

Thus, by achieving all the goals mentioned above, we demonstrate the validity of the
proposed scheme. we formally prove our protocol correctness as a secure mechanism to
achieve mutual authentication and key agreement between the IoT node and the IG.
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4.5.1.2 Informal Security Analysis
This section examines the security of the proposed protocol against well-known
security attacks and satisfies the main security properties. The security of the protocol is
explored against various known attacks. This section will provide brief descriptions of
different types of attacks against IoT systems. A description of how the proposed
protocol successfully resisted the well-known attacks and achieved the proposed security
properties is presented.
4.5.1.2.1

Security attack Scenarios

Table 5 presents a short definition of the well-known threats that an attacker can
launch on an IoT system and the main security properties that can ensure the systems’
security
Table 5: A Summary of the Well-known Attacks
Attack name

Attack definition

Man-in-the-middle

An attack where an adversary can intercept the traffic
between two communication parties and possibly modifies
the communicated information.

Forward/forward

This is a security feature to ensure that even if the most

secrecy

recent key is hacked, a minimal amount of sensitive data is
exposed, and no future keys will not be affected

Anonymity and

Anonymity: is a feature to ensure the privacy of the device

Unlinkability
properties
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Unlinkability: is a property that does not enable an
adversary to determine whether two events occurring in the
system are related or not.
A brute-force attack

It is an attack where the adversary can try every possible
combination of letters, numbers, and symbols to guess a
secret key or a password.

Replay attack

A network attack where legitimate data transmission is
maliciously repeated or delayed to disrupt communications.

Eavesdropping attack

A type of passive attack where the adversary sniffs
sensitive data from insecure communication networks.

Impersonating/spoofing An attack where an adversary pretends to be a trusted node
attacks

in an IoT system.

Modeling attack

An attack that employs machine learning prediction
algorithms to predict unknown CRPs from the known ones.

Physical attack

A hardware attack where an adversary physically accesses
the hardware’s semiconductor to read the stored secrets on
it or discover its structure [89]

IoT device

Imitating real IoT devices with the intent to steal, destroy,

counterfeiting

or replace the original devices.

4.5.1.2.2

Security Properties Assessment

The following section presents a detailed security analysis of the security
properties of the proposed protocol. It demonstrates how the proposed protocol satisfies
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the security requirements for mutual authentication, session key agreement and resists
various kinds of known attacks. Then, a comparison with other related protocols is
presented.
4.5.1.2.2.1

Mutual Authentication

Before sending the first message, N chooses a random number (RVN1) and
computes NX1, NX2, and SN. For the IG to retrieve RVN1 and compute Auth2 and Auth3,
the IG needs to compute Auth1. The computation of Auth1 requires that the IG passes the
stored PUF challenge to the PUF function to compute the PUF response (RIG). An
adversary can’t generate Auth1 = H ((NIDR || IGIDR || RIG) without knowing the NIDR of N
and the IGIDR of the IG and the PUF response (RIG). Also, the adversary cannot verify
Auth2 = H (Auth1 ||IGIDR|| VDIDN) and Auth3 = H (Auth2|| IGIDR||TIDN) without having the
VDIDN and TIDN that are securely stored and known only by the IG.
N and IG authenticate each other by verifying the correctness of G2 = H
(IGIDR||C1’ ||RVIG1 || TSIG1|| G1’) and N3 = H (R2 || RVN2|| TSN2 || RVIG1’). The adversary
cannot generate G2 without having G1 = H (Auth1|| OTP|| RVN1). Due to the PUF nature
that is resilient to prediction and replication, the adversary cannot guess or generate RIG
to construct Auth1 that is an element of G1. Also, the adversary does not know the OTP
that is considered a secured shared parameter between N and the IG. Additionally, the
adversary cannot generate N3 without having R2, which can be generated only by N. In
summary, the adversary cannot generate either G2 or N3 without knowing RIG. As a
result, the proposed scheme can achieve mutual authentication between N and IG.
4.5.1.2.2.2

Session key agreement and forward/backward security
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According to the proposed scheme, N and the IG can agree on generating the
session key in one of two different ways. The selection of the key generation technique
will depend on the IoT node’s capabilities and what it can support. During the session
key agreement phase, both N and the IG locally generate the session key ssk in one of the
following two ways.
By using the first technique, the session key ssk = (Gα)β is established between N
and the IG using the ECDH algorithm to protect future communication. The secrecy of
the ssk depends on the secrecy of β and α. The D-H key agreement scheme is based on
ECDH; therefore, the disclosed session key will not cause the compromise of any future
session key. The forward/backward security property's objective is to ensure that any past
or future session keys will not be affected when any session key ssk is exposed. Even if
an adversary obtains ssk of a session, he/she cannot compute any of the past and future
session keys by using the disclosed ssk because the ssk is protected by the randomization
of the β and α and the discrete logarithm problem of the Elliptic curve algorithm. As a
result, the proposed scheme achieves session key security.
By using the second technique, the session key ssk = h (R1||C1|| RVN1|| RVN2
||RVIG1) is established between N and the IG to protect future communication. In the
proposed scheme, ssk is generated locally. The secrecy of the ssk depends on the secrecy
of RVN1, RVN2, RVIG1, C1 and R1. Because RVN1, RVN2 and RVIG1 are randomly selected
for every new authentication session and R1 cannot be replicated or predicted because it
is unique for each N due to the nature of the PUF, the disclosed ssk will not cause the
compromise of any future ssk. The forward/backward security property's objective is to
ensure that any past or future shared secret keys will not be affected when any ssk is
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exposed. Even if an adversary obtains ssk of a session, he/she cannot compute any of the
past and future shared secret keys by using the disclosed ssk because the ssk is protected
by the randomization of R1|| C1|| RVN1|| RVN2 ||RVIG1. As a result, the proposed scheme
achieves the security of ssk.
4.5.1.2.2.3

Anonymity Unlinkability, and Untraceability Properties

For fully protected N privacy, strong anonymity with unlinkability is required. In
the proposed protocol, the N’s real identity NIDR is not transmitted during all phases in
clear text format. Therefore, even if the adversary eavesdrops on all communication
messages, it is impossible to obtain the IoT node's real ID. In addition, the new alias ID
of the IoT node NIDANew = H (NIDA || R1||C1). Because C1 and R1 are fresh in each
session, the attacker cannot link any two different NIDA’s to the same N and cannot trace
a given IoT device to N’s messages. By using a new NIDA for each authentication session,
the adversary will not be able to decide whether these authentication messages are from
the same N or not. This means that device N cannot be linked to different sessions.
Consequently, the proposed protocol provides anonymity and unlinkability, and the
adversary cannot trace the devices by intercepting messages.
4.5.1.2.2.4

Stolen database attack

On the IoT node side, if any IoT node is compromised and the adversary is able to
steal Auth1, Auth2, Auth3, NIDR, and the OTP from the IoT node’s database to
impersonate the IoT node, the fake node will fail the CRP verification process. On the IG
side, if the IG is compromised and the adversary is able to steal NIDR, IG IDR, VDIDN,
TIDN, and OTP from the IG database to impersonate the IG, the fake IG will fail to
calculate the RIG.
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4.5.1.2.2.5

Brute Force Attack

The first optional technique to generate the session key ssk is done locally by both
the IoT node and the IG using the ECDH algorithm. Due to the discrete logarithm
problem of the ECDH, guessing the session key is a time-consuming and challenging
task. The probability of guessing is so negligible that the attacker will fail to guess the
correct session key, given that this session key changes in every session.
The optional technique to generate the session key ssk is generated locally by both
the IoT node and the IG using RVN2 and the generated nonce values from the two sides.
All the ssk components are transferred in an encrypted format either by using a bitwise
XOR function or by using R1. Also, the session key's secrecy depends on the security of
the communication between the IoT node and the IG and the response's uniqueness.
Because no other IoT node can duplicate the responses, the adversary cannot obtain it
from the protocol. The probability of guessing the session key is so negligible that the
adversary will fail to guess the correct parameters given that this session key changes in
every session.

4.5.1.2.2.6

Replay attack

The proposed protocol overcame the replay attack by using timestamps. The
timestamp TS is generated by the sender node and then inserted in a hash function to
ensure the adversary cannot replace it. Furthermore, Each CRP is used only one time to
provide security against replay attacks. Hence, the protocol protects against replay
attacks.
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4.5.1.2.2.7

Eavesdropping attack

During the authentication phase, the adversary can intercept messages transmitted
between N and the IG. All the intercepted messages will be useless because they are sent
in an encrypted format using a one-way hash function and symmetric encryption. For the
attacker to decrypt the messages, he/she needs to know R1 that can only be generated by
N. The only two parameters that are sent in clear text are the Alias identities and session
ID. The Alias identities and the session ID do not pose any threat because this
information is constructed from random parameters that change in every session. The
adversary will not be able to link the message to a particular device because the proposed
protocol uses alias identities that vary in every session. Therefore, the proposed protocol
protects against eavesdropping attacks.
4.5.1.2.2.8

Impersonation attack

In this attack, when the intruder eavesdrops on the messages transmitted from N
to IG or vice versa, he/she can use the intercepted information for malicious actions, such
as impersonating the IoT device or the IG and sending fabricated messages.

4.5.1.2.2.8.1

IG impersonation

This attack will not succeed for several reasons. First, each IG has an Alias ID
and Real ID. The real ID is known only for IoT devices. The real ID of the IG will never
be released in clear text format. Also, for the IG to compute Auth1, it needs to compute
the PUF response (RIG), which is one of the Auth1 parameters. Due to the PUF nature,
RIG cannot be predicted or replicated by another device. The IoT device will verify the
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IG's real ID and G2= H (IGIDR||C1 || RVIG1 || TSIG1|| G1) before proceeding with the
authentication process.
4.5.1.2.2.8.2

IoT Node Impersonation

To impersonate the IoT node, an adversary should intercept the messages
exchanged in the previous sessions. However, in the proposed scheme, the adversary
cannot produce valid messages without having R1 that is used to encrypt the second,
third, and fourth authentication messages. Also, this attack will fail for numerous reasons.
First, the alias ID of the IoT node changes every authentication session. Second, the fake
IoT node will not be able to generate legitimate responses because the PUF responses are
unique for each device.
From another perspective, even if the adversary succeeded in compromising an
IoT node, the adversary’s further attacks using the compromised node only affect the
communication related to that node. Because each IoT node has its own secret keys, the
adversary cannot derive other non-compromised IoT nodes’ keys without knowing those
nodes' random information. Therefore, further attacks will not affect other
communications. As a result, the proposed scheme is resistant to IoT node impersonation
attacks.
4.5.1.2.2.9

Data Modification attack

As discussed in the replay attack, eavesdropping, and impersonation attacks, the
data modification attack is defeated because the real identity of IoT node NIDR, the
timestamp TS, the symmetric key, the one-way hash function, the nonce values RVN1,
RVN2, and RVIG1, and the CRPs are unknown to the attacker. Therefore, the man-in-themiddle attack is prevented. The IoT device and the IG do not exchange sensitive data
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such as real identities, nonce values, PUF responses R in plaintext over the insecure
communication channel. This supports data confidentiality. The only exchanged data in
plaintext during authentication are the alias identities, the timestamps (TSN1, TSN2,
TSIG1), and hashed messages. In such a setting, a data modification attack will not benefit
from any captured data. Furthermore, if an adversary modifies the transferred data, the
intended receiver will detect the data modification by matching the hashed messages and
drop the connection.
4.5.1.2.2.10

Modeling Attacks

This is an attack where the adversary collects a large number PUF CRPs and uses
a regression algorithm to build a model and predict responses for new challenges. All the
PUF challenges and the responses are transferred in an encrypted format. Therefore, the
adversary will not be able to collect enough useful CRPs to build a model and predict
responses to new challenges.

4.5.1.2.2.11

Physical Attack

Any attempt to tamper with the IoT device will change the PUF embedded chip's
behavior and, consequently, renders the PUF useless.
4.5.1.2.2.12

IoT Device Counterfeit/Cloning

Both the IG and the IoT device are authenticated using the PUF. PUF responses
are treated as hardware fingerprints that cannot be duplicated or cloned. Therefore, by
the use of the PUF, the IoT devices and the IG cannot be cloned.
4.5.1.2.3

Comparison of Security Features
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We compare the proposed protocol's security features with other related
authentication and key agreement schemes [57,59,60,61,62,63]. Table 6 shows the
comparison results. The table indicates that the proposed protocol is secure against all the
imperative security threats and accomplishes diverse security features.
Two of the proposed protocols [57,59] require secret key storage, which may
compromise the secret key. Consequently, the adversary can exploit the compromised
key to conduct different types of attacks and possibly reconstruct the secret key. Also,
many of the proposed schemes, such as [57] and [ 60-63], used the IoT node's real
identity to exchange messages with the server, which is against protecting the anonymity
and unlinkability of the IoT devices. Furthermore, several proposed schemes such as
[61], [60],[59], and [62] did not protect their schemes against replay attack.
Table 6: Security feature comparison of the proposed scheme with other related Mutual
authentication and key agreement schemes.
Security
Property

[57]

[61]

[60]

[59]

[62]

[63]

Proposed
Protocol

Resilience to IG
the
Impersonation
Attack

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Resilience to
IoT the
Impersonation
Attack

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Resilience to
Replay Attack

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Resilience to
Device
Counterfeit

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

128

Resilience to
Modeling
Attack

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Resilience to
the Data
Modification
Attack

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Anonymity and
Untraceability

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Requires Key
Storage

yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Resilience to
brute force
attack

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Resilience to
Physical attacks

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mutual
Authentication

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Two-factor
authentication

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

On the other hand, the proposed protocol supports multiple essential security
features: First, the proposed protocol does not require any secret key storage or secret key
sharing over the network. Second, each IoT device maintains two authentication factors
by using OTP and PUF to prove its legitimacy to the IG. Third, all secret keys are
computed locally on both the IoT node and the IG. Fourth, the proposed protocol does
not store any CRPs on the IG, but they are frequently retrieved from the PUF cloud.
Fifth, the IoT devices use a one-time alias identity for each authentication session in the
proposed protocol. Therefore, it will be difficult for an outside adversary to comprehend
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the activities of the IoT devices. Sixth, the proposed protocol overcomes the noise issue
in PUF operation by using error-free CRPs [ [37] and [90]. From table 6, we can
conclude that the proposed protocol can support all the desired security properties, which
are essential for IoT devices' security.
4.5.2

Performance Analysis
In this section, we present a performance analysis of the proposed protocol. The

performance analysis evaluates the storage requirements. Also, we analyze the preset
protocol's overhead and efficiency in terms of computational complexity and
communication overhead, and storage constraints. We then compare our mutual
authentication mechanism to the most relevant protocols in the literature proposed by
[57], [59], [60],[61], [62], and [63].
4.5.2.1 Storage requirements
Table 7: Storage Cost of the Proposed Scheme
Node

Storage cost (in bits)

N

128 + 256 * 3 + 8* 3 + 256 = 1024 + 64 =
1176 bits

IG

128 + 8 * 5 +256 + 128 = 552 bits
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In the proposed protocol, each IoT node must store its real identity NIDR alias
identity NIDA, the real identity of the IGIDR, alias identity IGIDA, authentication parameters
Auth1, Auth2 and Auth3, one-time password OTP. We use SHA-256 as an example of
hash function. By applying these settings, we obtain |NIDA | =128 bits, |Auth1 | = |Auth2 |
= |Auth3 | = 256 bits, while |NIDR | = |IGIDR| = |IGIDA| =8 bits and |OTP| = 256 bits. On the
other hand, IG is required to store the tuple NIDA, NIDR, IGIDA, IGIDR, VDIDN, TIDN, OTP
and CIG. By applying these settings, we obtain |NIDA | = 128 bits, while |NIDR | = |IGIDA| =
|IGIDR| = |VDIDN | = |TIDN |= 8 bits |OTP| = 256 bits and the CIG =128 bits. Table 7
summarizes the storge cost of the proposed scheme.
4.5.2.2

Computational Complexity Analysis
We compare the computational complexity of the proposed protocol with other

related protocols [57,59–63]. We only focus on comparing the authentication phase
because the key generation phase is executed differently from one protocol to another.
Because the time for executing a bitwise XOR operation is negligible, we do not consider
XOR operations for computational cost analysis. To analyze the performance of the
proposed protocol with respect to other presented protocols in the literature, we conduct
simulations of the cryptographic operations using Dell Inspiron Laptop with Intel Core
i7, dual-core 2.7 GHz CPU, and 8 GB RAM to act as the IG. We use a Raspberry Pi 4
Model B with 64-bit quad-core cortex A-72 processor and 1 GB RAM to simulate an IoT
device. The simulations used PyCryptodome cryptographic and Fastecdsa libraries in
Python. For these results, we considered the 128-bit arbiter PUF for PUF operation. The
fuzzy extraction's execution time is almost the same as the ECC point multiplication and
the execution time for modular exponentiation is double the time of the execution of the
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ECC point multiplication [58]. Table 8 presents the used notation and the execution time
of each operation.
Table 8: Execution Time of the Cryptographic Operations
Operation

Computation Time on IoT

Computation Time on
IG

H: time for executing a one-way

0.002 ms

.001 ms

5 ms

4 ms

5 ms

4 ms

10

8

2.7 ms

1.5 ms

MAC

2.9 ms

1.23 ms

ENC: Time for Executing (AES 128

0.18 ms

.14 ms

0.18 ms

.14 ms

hash function
FE: time for executing a fuzzy
extractor
EM: time for executing an ECC
point multiplication
EXP: time for a modular
exponentiation
HMAC: time for executing the
HMAC

Encryption)
DEC: Time for executing (AESCBC Decryption)
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PUF: Time for executing PUF (128-

.12 ms

.12 ms

bit Arbiter)

Table 9 and figures 40, 41, and 42 summarize the computational complexity
comparison between the proposed protocol and the other related protocols presented in
the literature. Table 9 lists the number of cryptographic operations of each type for each
protocol. Figure 40 displays the number of cryptographic operations of each type that are
completed on the IoT side. Figure 41 depicts the number of cryptographic operations of
each type that are completed on the IG side. Figure 42 demonstrates the total number of
cryptographic operations of each type that are complete for each protocol. As depicted
from the table and the figures, the proposed protocol used more hash functions than most
of the other schemes and used AES 128 symmetric encryption to avoid computationally
expensive cryptographic operations such as MAC and HMAC while achieving the same
security goals. On the IoT side, all the protocols used the same number of PUF. Our
proposed protocol is the only one that used PUF on the IG side to protect the protocol
from IG impersonation
Table 9: Comparison of computational costs for the authentication phase of the proposed
scheme and other related protocols.
Entity

IoT

[57]

8TH+
2TPUF

[59]

3TH+
2TPUF+
2TEM

[60]

5TH+
2TPUF+
3TEM+
1TENC

[61]

3TH+
2TPUF+
1T FE Gen
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[62]

2TH +
3TMAC+
1TENC +
1TDEC +
2TPUF+

[63]

2TPUF +
3HMAC

Proposed
Scheme
Using a
hash
function

Proposed
Scheme
Using
ECC

7TH
+1TPUF+1
TENC +
1TDEC

7TH +
1TPUF+1
TENC +
1TDEC +
1TEM

IoT Cost

.26 ms

11.20 ms

16.39 ms

5.25ms

9.3ms

8.34 ms

.49ms

5.49 ms

IG

9TH+
2TEXP

6TH+

5TH
+2TEM+

5TH+
1TFE Rec

2TH +
3TMAC+
1TENC +

3HMAC

10TH
+1TPUF+
1TENC +
1TDEC

10TH
+1TPUF+1
TENC +
1TDEC

1 DEC

IG Cost

16.01 ms

.006 ms

8.16 ms

4.01ms

3.83ms

4.5ms

.41ms

.41ms

Total

16.27 ms

11.21 ms

24.55 ms

9.26ms

13.13ms

12.84ms

.90ms

5.9 ms

NUMBER OF OPERATION

Cost

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

[57]

[59]

[60]

[61]

[62]

[63]

IOT USED CRYPTO OPERATIONS

Hash

MAC

HMAC

ENC

DEC

EM

PUF

Proposed
Proposed
Scheme Using Scheme Using
a hash
ECC
function

FEGen

Figure 40: Comparison of the number of the IoT crypto operations across the protocols
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EXP

Figure 41: Comparison of the number of IG crypto operations across the protocols
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Figure 42: Comparison of the total number of crypto operations across the protocols
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16.39
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14
11.2
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9.3
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8.34

8
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6
4
2
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0.24

0
[57]
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[62]

[63]

Proposed Proposed
Scheme
Scheme
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Figure 43: The IoT computational time across the different protocols
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8.16

4.01
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4.5

0.41

0.006
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Figure 44: IG computational time across the different protocols
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Total computational complexity in ms

30
24.55

25
20

16.27

15

11.21

10

13.13

12.84

9.26
5.9

5

0.9

0
Total Cost
[57]

[59]

[60]

[61]

[62]

[63]

Proposed Scheme Using a hash function

Proposed Scheme Using ECC

Figure 45: Total computational time across the different protocols

Table 9 and figures 43,44, and 45 demonstrate the cost comparison of the
presented protocol with other similar protocols from the literature. Table 9 and figure 45
present the computational cost of each protocol. Figure 43 displays the computation cost
of each protocol for the IoT side, and figure 44 depicts the computational cost of each
scheme for the IG side. The results indicate that the proposed protocol has the lowest
computational cost for the IoT side compared to [59,60,62, and 63]. These results prove
that our proposed protocol is suitable for IoT resource-constrained devices. Although our
proposed protocol has a higher computational cost on the IoT side than [57] and [61], the
presented protocol ensured data confidentiality and user anonymity which are essential
security goals.
From table 9 and figure 45, it is observed that while [57], [59],[60],[61],[62] and
[63] take approximately 16.27, 11.21, 24.55, 9.26, 13.13, and 12.840, the proposed
protocol takes only either .90 or 5.9. The protocol in [60] performs the worst due to the
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higher number of ECC point operations involved. Also, the protocol in [57] has a bad
performance due to the use of modular exponentiation. Furthermore, both protocols [62
and 63] have high computational cost due to using many MAC and HMAC functions that
are computationally heavy. In summary, our proposed protocol is more efficient than
other related protocols and has a higher security level than the rest of the protocols. The
proposed protocol achieved the main security goals of confidentiality, integrity, and
authenticity besides accommodating IoT devices that are diverse in their capabilities.
4.5.2.3

Communicational Cost
The following section analyzes the communication cost of the proposed protocol.

To reduce network congestion and to provide fast message transmission, the
communication costs of the protocol should be as low as possible. For the communication
cost analysis, we evaluate the communication cost in terms of the size of the message in
bits. Then, we compare the proposed protocol to the other related protocols. Table 10
presents a summary of the sizes of the message parameters. Table 11 lists the message
parameters that are communicated between the server and the IoT device along with their
sizes.
Table 10: Size of the Message Parameters
Message Parameters

Size in Bits

ID of N [ [57], [62], [63]

128

ID of server [63]

8

SID [57], [62]

8
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Nonces [61], [63]

128

CRP (C, R) [61], [62]

128

HMAC [63]

256

Hash Function [57], [62]

256

Timestamp (TS) [63]

48

ECC [60], [59]

256

MAC [62]

256

•

Message 1: In the transmission (N → IG), N sends the tuple, NIDA, TSN1, NX2, SN
Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128 + 48 + 128+256 = 560. bits.

•

Message 2: In the transmission (IG → N), IG sends the tuple, IGIDA, SID, TSIG1,
CX {RVIG1, G2} R1. Therefore, the size of this tuple is 8 +8 + 48 + 128+128+256 =
576 bits.

•

Message 3_1: In case the two parties decided to use the hash function to generate
the session key. In the transmission (N → IG), N sends the tuple, NIDA, SID.
TSN2{RVN2, N3, SHA256} R1) Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128 + 8 + 48+128
+256 = 568. bits.

•

Message 3_2: In case the two parties decided to use ECC to generate the session
key. In the transmission (N → IG), N sends the tuple, NIDA, SID. TSN2,{RVN2, N3,
Gα }R1) Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128 + 8 + 48+128 +256 = 824 bits.

Table 11: Communication Cost Comparison (bits)
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Message

[57]

[59]

[60]

[61]

[62]

[63]

Number

Proposed

Proposed

scheme_

scheme_

hash

ECC

M1: N→ S

256 bits

128 bits

176 bits

256 bits

256 bits

432 bits

560 bits

560 bits

M2: S→ N

512 bits

304 bits

640 bits

512 bits

768 bits

432 bits

576 bits

576 bits

M3: N→S

688 bits

1024 bits

512 bits

640 bits

768 bits

304 bits

568 bits

824 bits

M4: S→ N

384 bits

1024 bits

1024 bits

----

----

480 bits

---

---

M5: N→S

640

------

----

---

Total

2480

2480

2352

1408

1792

1648

1704

1960

bits

bits

bits

bits

bits

bits

Bits

bits

The total communication costs of [57], [59], [60], [61], [62], and [63] are
2480,2480,2352,1408,1792, and 1648 bits, respectively. If the proposed protocol uses a
hash function to generate a session key, the total communication cost is 1704. Still, if the
two communicating sides decide to use ECC to generate the session key, the total
communication cost is 1960 bits. Compared to the other presented protocols that used
ECC to generate the session key [59 and 60], our proposed protocol has a lower
communication cost and, at the same time, achieved all the required security goals. While
if the two communicating parties decided to use the hash function, the communication
cost of my proposed protocol is less than [57 and 62], while it is higher than [61 and 63].
As given in table 6, protocols in [57], [61], [62], and [63] are incapable of achieving all
the security goals.
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4.6

Summary
This chapter presents a two-factor mutual authentication protocol for IoT systems

between an IG and an IoT device. The proposed protocol introduces a mechanism for
secure session key establishment. The protocol provides confidentiality, integrity,
anonymity, unlinkability, and untraceability capabilities while achieving mutual
authentication between the IoT and the IG devices. The proposed protocol is assessed
using both security and performance analysis. The security analysis used both formal and
informal techniques. The formal evaluation employed used the BAN logic and AVISPA
simulation to verify the proposed protocol's security. The results showed that the
proposed scheme is safe. The informal security analysis also showed that the presented
protocol is resistant to common attacks and satisfies the main security properties.
Furthermore, we evaluated the protocol's efficiency in terms of storage requirements,
communication, and computational cost and compared it with other related protocols.
The presented protocol achieves the required low computational complexity for resourceconstrained IoT devices.
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CHAPTER V
M2M DISTRIBUTED MULTI-LAYER LIGHTWEIGHT MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT SCHEME USING
CHAINED HASH PUF IN INDUSTRIAL IOT SYSTEM
The emergence of Industry 4.0 and the Internet revolution changed the
manufacturing atmosphere and created an integrated environment between the virtual
world and the physical world. Although the Internet made the world smaller, there is still
a gap between the physical and cyber worlds. With the rise of the IoT, all objects in the
cyber world and the physical world have become interconnected. This integration can be
viewed as a physical–digital-physical information chain that happens through three
simple steps: physical to digital, digital to digital, and digital to physical. During the first
step, data is collected from the surrounding environment through IoT sensors. In the
second step, the collected data is processed and analyzed. The third stage consists of
transmitting the decisions to the physical world through actuators.
With the emergence of Industrial IoT(IIoT), machine-to-machine (M2M)
communication is essential to build IIoT environments that enable heterogeneous devices
such as sensors, actuators, and gateways to communicate without any human intervention
through a wireless or wired link. [91]. These IoT devices have a connection to the Internet
either directly or through another device. Their connection to the Internet makes them
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Figure 46: M2M Networks in the IoT Environment
available any time and from everywhere in the world to their users. M2M communication
is a network where smart devices communicate through wireless and wired technologies.
According to [92], the M2M communication system consists of three interconnected
layers as presented in figure 46: (1) a M2M area layer that includes a M2M area network
with M2M gateways; (2) a communication network layer that includes wired/wireless
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networks; and (3) an application services layer consisting of the end-users and required
applications. However, this connectivity makes them accessible to adversaries who can
attack a device to access sensitive data or use actuators to perform harmful actions that
can damage the system [93] and [94]. IIoT devices produce a massive amount of
confidential and sensitive data. Several cryptographic mechanisms can be applied to
protect the IoT devices from cyber-attacks, but they are not suitable for the resource
constraint nature of the IoT devices. One way to solve this problem is to offload some
security-related operations from resource-constrained IoT devices to more resource-rich
IoT devices. In IIoT, devices' authentication is crucial to achieving a trusted
communication among the communicating devices. However, most of the currently
employed M2M authentication protocols in the IIoT domain are based on asymmetric
cryptography with a high computational cost. Consequently, those authentication
schemes are not the best suitable solution for resource-constrained IoT devices, leading to
many security issues in the IIoT environment.
This chapter introduces lightweight privacy-preserving M2M mutual
authentication and key agreement scheme. The presented protocol is called M2M
Distributed Multi-Layer Lightweight Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme
Using Chained Hash PUF in Industrial IoT System. The proposed scheme enables the
devices to verify each others' identities and perform secure, anonymous authentication
while the real identities stay secret. It will also allow the devices to locally generate
shared secret keys to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged data. The
proposed scheme utilizes PUF as a hardware security approach and the chained hash
concept. The scheme also employs an access control method and implements virtual
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domain segregation to protect the IoT devices from any arbitrary access by other
unauthorized devices. The proposed scheme employs lightweight operations of XOR and
a one-way hash function; thus, the scheme does not have a high impact on the device's
computational and battery resources. It only requires between 3 and 4 messages to be
exchanged between the communicating parties for the mutual authentication and key
agreement. We evaluate the proposed scheme by using different measures, namely,
security and performance evaluation. The security evaluation will be both a formal and
informal security evaluation. The formal analysis used the Burrows–Abadi–Needham
logic (BAN) as a formal validation of the proposed authentication scheme and the
automated validation of the internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA)
toolkit.
Furthermore, the scheme efficiency is evaluated and compared with other related
schemes. Through the informal analysis, we will assess the proposed scheme against
well-known security attacks. Furthermore, we also validate the efficiency of the
proposed scheme and compares its performance in terms of computational cost and
communication overhead with other related schemes.
In Section 5.1, we first introduce the motivation of the work. Section 5.2 discusses
the security and functional requirements for M2M communication. Section 5.3 presents
the security vulnerabilities and potential threats in M2M communication. Section 5.4
presents the related work and the other existing protocols. Section 5.5 demonstrates the
network model and the security goals. Section 5.6 presents the proposed protocol. Section
5.7 illustrates the protocol evaluation process, and finally, section 5.8 summarizes the
chapter.
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5.1

Motivation
The implementation of IIoT can lead to many benefits to the industry, such as

monitoring and optimizing the supply chains. Also, the use of IIoT can lead to early
detection of machine failure, which can prevent production delay, equipment damage, or
injuries to workers [95]. IIoT showed a significant interest in implementing M2M
communication in wireless networks. Some characteristics of M2M communication
within the IoT ecosystem are as follows: [96]
1. Heterogeneity of devices: IoT devices are different due to their
functionalities and applications.
2. Device coexistence and collaboration: the different IoT devices
communicate with each other anytime.
3. Diverse networks and networking standards: Because the IoT ecosystem
consists of heterogeneous devices, they can use various communication
standards such as cellular systems, WiFi, Bluetooth, Zigbee, or others to
facilitate communication between devices.
4. Device limitations: Most IoT devices are resource-constrained with limited
capabilities in terms of battery life, memory, and processing power.
5. Multihop communication: Most IoT devices are equipped with limited
transceiver systems. Therefore, they will only be capable of short-range
transmissions and will need to route information over multiple hops.
The emergence of M2M significantly impacts peer-to-peer networks and is
expected to influence the IoT. Most of the current IoT domains require higher data rates,
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low latency, and better quality of service (QoS) from the wireless networks [91] and [97].
With the exponential increase in IoT devices, the implementation of M2M technology
becomes necessary to provide better services. M2M communication can improve wireless
networks' performance by eliminating the need for a central node, reducing the overall
communication latency, and offloading central node traffic [98]. Furthermore, M2M
communication provides autonomous and energy-efficient systems.
In M2M communication, IoT devices can take different forms of communication.
The communication can be through a single hup or multiple hops. Also, communication
can be intra-domain or inter-domain. Single-hop communication is where there is direct
communication between source and destination without any other device involvement.
On the other hand, multi-hop communication is where an intermediate device exists as a
relay or an access point between the source and the destination devices. Intra-domain
communication is where the interaction will be among the devices within the same
network. In contrast, inter-domain is referring to communication among the devices of
different networks.
The communication systems employ nonstandard hard-wired communication
technologies among communication and industrial devices [99]. On the other hand, the
evolution of the IIoT, the industrial environment saw changes where the heterogeneous
communication technologies employ wireless standards to assure communication,
compatibility, and remote operation and control of the different devices through the
Internet. Given that IIoT sensors are designed to be resource-constrained, these sensors
tend to have some security drawbacks.
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To meet the industrial requirements, smarter sensors capable of more complex
operations are developed. However, there are still several challenges facing IoT sensors.
First, there is still a gap between the security requirements and the currently implemented
security solutions. According to [100], few of the currently available solutions adopt the
security by design approach, which provides a new attack surface for the attackers. The
attacker can cause physical damage, threaten human life, manipulate the final product by
compromising the production processes or increasing the used resources. Second,
machines operating on a production floor typically last for several decades, and it is not
always economically feasible to replace the old equipment with the latest technology.
Therefore, finding solutions that can ensure security to modern manufacturing technology
and the old systems is essential. Third, another major issue is the authenticity of the IIoT
device and identifying the counterfeited devices.
One of the main challenges in M2M communication is security because of such
systems' dynamic nature [101]. While designing M2M systems, we should keep in mind
how to prevent threats and vulnerabilities rather than curing them. Unfortunately, most
M2M research focuses on other topics such as interference management, route discovery,
and resource optimization rather than security. Security also is an essential issue in
wireless networks because of the exchanged information over the network that can be
eavesdropped on, modified, or corrupted by an adversary. M2M communications face
several security threats that can affect privacy, authentication, confidentiality, integrity,
network availability, and QoS.
Most of the currently employed cryptographic primitives are not suitable for the
resource-constrained nature of IIoT devices, which negatively impacts the ability to
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conduct authentication, identification, integrity, and verification of those devices. Most of
the proposed authentication protocols employ public-key cryptography [102], [103],
[104], [105], [106]. The long key length and the computational complexity of such
cryptosystems make them hard to be implemented in resource-constrained devices due to
their limited memory and limited power supply [107], [108]. Because identification and
authentication are the cornerstones of providing security, new lightweight authentication
approaches and securing those resource-constrained devices are necessary.
5.2

Security and functional requirements for M2M communications
To ensure the effectiveness of the M2M communication, there are security and

functional requirements that need to be satisfied.
5.2.1

Security requirements
The communication channels between two IoT nodes (M2M) or an IoT node and

a gateway are subject to several attacks. Because most IoT domains require a high level
of security, several security measures need to be addressed and satisfied. Table 12
presents the main security requirements in the M2M communication
Table 12: Main security requirements in the M2M communication
Security Requirement
Confidentiality

Description
This requirement prevents an adversary from disclosing
transmitted data and ensures that only the authorized
entities can read the exchanged data in a M2M
communications system.
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Integrity

This requirement ensures that the data has not been
modified or altered by an adversary. Data integrity
requirement is crucial in M2M communication systems
because unauthorized data modification can lead to severe
consequences.

Availability

The availability requirement ensures that the M2M
application systems can access the service anytime and is
always available.

Authentication

Authentication is one of the main requirements to ensure
the security of the M2M communication. Through
authentication, the device can verify each other's identity
and authenticity before exchanging sensitive information.

Anonymity

It is essential to secure the device's anonymity and
unlinkability to ensure data privacy when an attacker
illegally exposes sensitive information.

Access control

It is vital to limit data access and communicate with other
devices to the authorized devices.

Non-repudiation

This requirement ensures that no device can deny sending
a message that it originated.

Data freshness

This feature implies that received messages are fresh and
are not a replayed old messages sent by an adversary.
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5.2.2

Functional requirements
Besides the security requirements, there are functional requirements that can

ensure the quality and applicability of the authentication protocols. Table 13 presents the
main functional requirements of M2M authentication protocols
Table 13: Main functional requirements of M2M authentication protocols
Feature
Scalability

Description
This feature ensures the ability of the
system to add new nodes easily

Efficiency

This feature ensures communication
efficiency by minimizing the number of
the exchanged messages between the
communicating parties.

Low computational cost

The M2M systems need to employ
lightweight cryptographic primitives to
support the resource-constrained nature of
the IoT devices.

Storage needs

The authentication protocols must request
minimum storage on the IoT nodes.

A distributed scheme

IoT nodes should communicate, if
applicable, directly and not require a
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central server's support to execute the
authentication phase.

5.3

Security vulnerabilities and potential threats in M2M communication
M2M networks consist of a heterogeneous mix of devices ranges from resource-

constrained devices to resource-rich devices. Most of the resource-constraint devices are
IoT nodes. The resource-rich devices are gateways in charge of managing the connection
among the IoT devices on one side and between the internal and external networks on the
other side. M2M networks consist of many IoT nodes and one or more gateways. IoT
nodes are simple devices equipped with some specific sensing technology to collect realtime data and transmit the collected data to the gateway in a single-hop or multi-hop
format. Once the gateways receive the IoT node data, they can either process the received
data or send it to a back-end server for processing and storage [95],[98], [105], [106].
Table 14 presents a description of the main security threats in M2M networks,
the potential consequences, and the possible countermeasure.

Table 14: Main security threats in M2M networks, the potential consequences, and the
possible countermeasure
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Security Threat

Potential Consequence

Countermeasure

Eavesdropping: is a

1. They are exposing

1. Using secure

type of attack where the

sensitive and private data.

communication links

adversary listens to the

that implement modern

exchanged messages

cryptographic

between the

primitives.

communicating parties

2. Establish security

to learn things about the

association between

network and try to find a

the communicating

way to be inside it.

parties after
performing mutual
authentication between
them.

Hacking the long term

1. device impersonation

1. Store the long-term

key of the IoT

keys in a Hardware

node/gateway

Security Module
(HSM) located inside
the devices and is
tamper-resistance. This
makes it impossible for
attackers to discover
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the values of long-term
keys.
2. Limiting the lifetime of

the session key.
Modifying/replacing

DoS attack

1. Store the long-term

long term keys in

keys in a HSM located

IoT/gateway

inside the devices and
is tamper-resistance.
2. Allowing the
modification of stored
sensitive data and longterm key after
completing strong
mutual authentication.

Modifying messages

Loss of message integrity

between entities

1. Use of modern
cryptographic
primitives to secure
message's
confidentiality and
integrity
2. Limiting the lifetime of
the session keys
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3. Establish a security
association between
the communicating
entities.
Replaying sniffed
message to entities

1. Unauthorized access to the 1. Use of a timestamp or
system

sequence number to

2. Impersonating the IoT
node/gateway

Physical attack where
the attacker tries to
take control of a device

1. Impersonating the
legitimate devices

ensure message
freshness

1. The use of hardwarebased security provides

2. Gain root-level access

robustness because it

and then extract any

on the device and

makes it hard for the

information from it,

compromise the

attacker to alter or

instead of destroying it

device, which allows

replicate the device's

the attacker to move

physical features.

freely and attack other
devices to bring the
whole system down.

5.4

Related Work
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The following section introduces an analysis of some of the presented
authentication protocols in the literature. The authors in [109] propose a user
authentication and key agreement protocol for heterogeneous ad hoc wireless sensor
networks for achieving energy efficiency, user anonymity, and mutual authentication.
The researchers used hash functions and XOR operations to implement the authentication
process. They present a heterogeneous environment with two or more types of nodes:
resource-constrained sensor nodes and more powerful gateways. The researchers state
that their proposed protocol ensures high security and performance features. However,
the presented protocol has multiple weaknesses. First, both the user and the sensor are
using fixed masked IDs, which can lead to a lack of user anonymity and linkability and
traceability attacks. Second, the authentication process does not require any user input;
therefore, stealing the smart card can lead to a user impersonation attack. Third, the
proposed protocol does not support two-factor authentication. Fourth, suppose a sensor
node became compromised; in that case, an attacker can monitor this sensor node and
obtain the session key shared between another sensor node and the user who has ever
connected to this compromised sensor node.
Authors in [110] present a modified version of the protocol presented by [109].
The researchers propose a remote user authentication and key agreement protocol to
access IoT nodes that are part of the wireless sensor networks where the network consists
of multiple gateway nodes. The proposed protocol has multiple phases: the system setup
phase, user registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, password update phase,
and dynamic node addition phase. The researchers assume that each sensor node is
assigned to the nearest gateway based on minimum distance. The proposed protocol used
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the one-way hash and the XOR as lightweight cryptographic functions. The proposed
protocol used a long-time session key, which can make it subject to session key
disclosure. Also, the protocol transmits the sensors' real identities in clear text, which
does not support the anonymity and unlinkability security features.
Authors in [111] present a lightweight authentication protocol that relies on
digital signatures. The proposed authentication protocol presents a lightweight signature
solution using Hierarchical Identity Based Signature (HIBS). It consists of five phases;
two setup phases, extraction phase, signing phase, and verification phase. The presented
protocol uses an identity-based signature to generate signing and verification keys. The
identity-based signature uses the user's identity to generate the signing and verification
keys. The protocol consists of three layers. The first layer is called the Root Private Key
Generator (Root PKG) and is located in the cloud. The second layer is called sub-PKGs,
which act as agents and are located in the fog. The third layer is users' layer, which
consists of end-users. Each sub-PKG is responsible for the public and private keys
generation of its registered mobile users. The use of the sub PKG reduces the overheads
on the Root PKG. The researchers compared their work to other related protocols in light
of the key distribution method, key generation method, and security attack model. The
results indicate that the presented protocol is resilient to multiple attacks such as linking
signature, replay attack, key eavesdropping attack, and signature forgery attack.
The authors in [91] introduce a proxy-based key establishment protocol for IoT
using the Diffie Hellman (D.H.) algorithm. The proposed protocol allows any two
unknown, resource-constrained devices to initiate secure end-to-end (E2E)
communication. The constrained devices should maintain secured connections with the
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neighbor nodes that are less resource-constrained devices in the local networks in which
they are deployed. The less constrained devices act as proxies and are performing
expensive cryptographic operations on behalf of the resource-constrained node. The
proposed protocol aims to allow two resource-constrained devices located into two
different networks to generate a shared secret key. The proxies into the two different
networks will support the resource-constrained devices in computing the shared secret
key. The researchers assumed that the proxies of the two different networks could
securely communicate with each other. The researchers also assumed that the resourceconstrained IoT nodes have a list of the neighbor proxies and their corresponding preshared keys for authentication. Although the proposed protocol is proposed for resourceconstrained devices, it requires the resource-constrained devices to store multiple preshared keys of the different proxies. Also, the protocol requires storing the pre-shared key
and reusing them for each authentication session which may lead to a side-channel attack.
The authors in [93] introduce a lightweight authentication and key agreement
scheme for heterogeneous ad hoc wireless sensor networks. The proposal relies on XOR
and hash functions. The researcher put in their consideration five main factors: (1)
ensuring user anonymity, (2) requiring no complex computations, (3) performing mutual
authentication, (4) providing a user-friendly scheme, and (5) ensuring the correctness of
the session key. The proposed protocol consists of six phases: predeployment phase,
registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, password-change phase, and
dynamic node addition phase. The proposed protocol requires lots of computations, and it
is subject to node capture attacks.
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The authors in [94] propose a group authentication and key agreement (GROUPAKA) protocol designed for M2M communication. The authors successfully prevent the
DoS attack, but the protocol does not handle the privacy preservation problem.
Furthermore, the proposed protocol is computationally expensive because it employs a
public cryptology approach.
In [97], the authors proposed a lightweight mutual authentication and key
agreement protocol for M2M communications in IIoT environment between resourceconstrained sensors and a router, including a trusted platform module (TPM). The
protocol is based on hash and XOR operations. The authors assume that the proposed
protocol is characterized by low computational cost, low communication cost, and low
storage overhead. The authors in [98] demonstrate that the proposed protocol by [97] is
vulnerable against DoS, and router impersonation attacks. Also, they prove that the
adversary could trace the smart sensor by eavesdropping on only one session.
Furthermore, the researchers present how an untrusted smart sensor can obtain the
router's secret key and the session key that another sensor established with the router.
The authors in [100] present a smart card-based authentication scheme for
heterogeneous ad hoc wireless sensor networks. They introduce two versions of the
proposed protocol. The first version of the protocol is called P1. P1 has four phases:
predeployment phase, registration phase, authentication phase, and password changing
phase. The researchers claimed that P1 is lightweight but does not provide perfect
forward secrecy. Therefore, they introduce the second version of the protocol called P2.
The researchers mentioned that P2 could guarantee perfect forward secrecy. They explain
that P2 is an advanced version of P1 and shares with P1 the same procedures in the
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predeployment, registration, and password changing phases. P1 is lightweight because it
mainly uses XOR and one-way hash function, but P2 uses public-key cryptography to
make it more computationally intensive. The two versions of the proposed protocol do
not achieve a proper mutual authentication as the user's identity is not verified by the
sensor. Therefore, the protocol is executed even if the user's inputs are wrong. The
proposed protocol does not support the unlinkability security feature where the sensor
I.D. (SID) is static and sent over the network in clear text format. Finally, the validity of
the user's identity is not checked by any party. Therefore, the authentication phase will
still be executed even if the user inputs a wrong identity.
The authors in [102] introduce an authentication, authorization, and accounting
(AAA) system for IIoT. The proposed protocol is based on the Next Generation Access
Control (NGAC) standard that provides access control in different environments. The
proposed system provides access control and security to heterogeneous IIoT devices in a
local cloud. The proposed authentication mechanism employs X.509 certificates. The use
of the digital certificate makes the proposed solution not suitable for resource-constrained
devices. According to [103], using the X.509 certificate and the public-key certificate
management causes performance bottlenecks and makes the proposed scheme not
applicable to resource-constrained IoT devices.
Authors in [104] present a mutual authentication protocol between an IoT node
and a fog node using the HMAC and XOR function. The two sides have a fixed shared
secret key. The proposed protocols used challenge-response negotiation. The presented
protocol is vulnerable to various types of security attacks and violates security
requirements. First, the protocol exchanges messages between the IoT node and the fog
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node using their real identities, which do not preserve the user's privacy. Consequently,
the proposed protocol does not provide anonymity and unlinkability, and the adversary
can trace the devices by intercepting messages. The first message that the fog node sent
to the IoT node contains K ⊕ CA ⊕ CB where the K is the fixed share secret key, C.A. is
the nonce value that is generated by the IoT node and was sent to the fog node in clear
text format. C.B. is the nonce value that was generated by the fog node. Once the IoT node
receives the message from the fog node, it increments the timestamp by one and
calculates a new HMAC using the K, the ID of the IoT node, and CB. The adversary can
intercept the messages and conduct a brute force attack by guessing the CB and the K.
Then, the adversary can verify his guess by recomputing the XOR values using the
guessed CB. and K. Also, the adversary can intercept the last message that was sent from
the IoT node to the fog node and recompute the HMAC by using the guessed K and CB.
If the recalculated HMAC value is equal to the intercepted HMAC value, this will ensure
that the guessed K and CB. are correct. Then the adversary can use the guessed key to
decrypt all subsequent messages.
The authors in [105] introduce an efficient authentication scheme for M2M
networks in IoT-enabled cyber-physical systems. The researchers present four different
protocols to achieve four different authentication tasks. The four main elements of the
presented protocol are gateways, mobile users, IoT devices connected to the gateway, and
IoT devices that are not connected to the gateways but connected to the IoT devices that
are connected to the gateway. The authentication protocols are achieved used symmetric
cryptography and a one-way hash function. The first protocol enables the mobile user to
authenticate with any gateway mutually. The second protocol enables the mobile user to
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mutually authenticate with any of the IoT nodes that are within the domain of this
gateway the user is authenticated to in protocol 1. The third protocol allows the IoT nodes
to mutually authenticate each other, given the condition that at least one of the IoT nodes
is connected to the gateway. The fourth protocol allows IoT nodes that are not connected
to the gateway to mutually authenticate each other with the IoT node connected to the
gateway. Although the four protocols are lightweight, all of them require the storage of
long-term shared secret keys, which can make the system vulnerable to several attacks,
such as side-channel attacks, to obtain the secret key. Second, the different devices
exchange messages using their real identities that make the protocols violate privacy
preservation and do not satisfy the untracability and unlikability security features.
Finally, the proposed protocols have unnecessary steps that can be avoided to reduce the
computational complexity and the computational cost. For example, the mobile user can
send a message directly to the gateway requesting to perform mutual authentication with
one of the IoT devices instead of sending the message to the IoT node. Then the node
forwards the message to the gateway.
The authors in [106] propose three new lightweight, efficient authentication
protocols for IoT-based healthcare applications. The first protocol is an improvement of
the protocol proposed by [105]. The second protocol is the M2C (machine to the cloud)
mutual authentication protocol that is based on a one-way hash function. The third
protocol is M2M mutual authentication protocol using Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECC.
Although the researcher claimed that the M2M authentication protocol is efficient and
suitable for resource-constrained devices, it does not fit the resource-constrained devices.
The third protocol used digital signatures and ECC, which are computationally expensive
162

and consume a lot of power from IoT devices. Also, the exchanged messages did not
include any IDs. Therefore, it is not clear how the recipient can identify the sender and
verify each other's identities. The protocols cannot mitigate against a replay attack.
The authors in [107] propose an Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) without KeyEscrow (AIBCwKE) authentication scheme. The scheme covers most known attacks;
however, the scheme requires IoT devices and mobile devices to perform
computationally expensive cryptographic operations. The IoT nodes perform multiple
bilinear pairing operations on elliptic curves in addition to several point multiplications
and exponentiations. These computational requirements are not suitable for resourceconstrained devices.
Authors in [112] propose a new Token-Based Lightweight User Authentication
(TBLUA) for IoT devices. The presented protocol consists of the following phases: (i)
Offline smart device and gateway registration, (ii) User reservation, (iii) Token
distribution between the gateway and smart devices, and (iv) Login and Authentication.
The proposed protocol is secure against replay attacks, user impersonation attacks, and
password guessing attacks. Also, it satisfies the user anonymity as well as perfect
forward secrecy features. On the other hand, similar to many other authentication
schemes, it requires storing long-time security keys and does not ensure against devices
counterfeiting.
The authors in [95] introduce an authentication protocol for resource-constrained
IIoT devices. The proposed protocol is based on simple operations such as XOR,
addition, subtraction, and a hash function. The protocol consists of two phases: (1) the
registration phase, where IoT node and gateway exchange secrets that they will later use
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to prove their identities, and (2) the mutual authentication phase, where the authentication
and session key generation process is completed. The protocol is resilient against replay,
impersonation, tracking, man-in-the-middle attacks, and identity guessing attacks. Also,
it satisfies multiple security requirements such as perfect forward secrecy, device
anonymity, mutual authentication, and data integrity. The only limitation of this protocol
is storing several long-term secret keys on the IoT node.
Based on the work presented above, there are common limitations that are shared
among most of them. First, many suggested protocols used computationally expensive
cryptographic operations that do not fit the IoT devices' resource-constrained nature.
Second, most of the proposed protocols did not focus on ensuring the originality of the IoT
devices and secure the system from integrating counterfeited devices. However, this is
considered a major concern in the IIoT domain. Third, many of the proposed protocols do
not implement multiple authentication levels, which is the core of the defense-in-depth
concept. Fourth, in some of the presented protocols, the researchers overlooked the IoT
devices' privacy, which does not guarantee the IoT device's anonymity and privacy. Fifth,
many of the proposed protocols require storing long-term secret keys on the IoT device's
memory, which can be retrieved using side-channel attacks. Sixth, most of the proposed
protocols did not account for gateways load, leading to slowing down the system response
and not responding to authentication requests promptly. This will, in turn, negatively impact
the system's scalability. Seventh, most of the presented protocols may suffer from losing the
authentication service entirely due to the design's single point failure.
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5.5

Industrial IoT (IIoT) network model and security goals

This section will present a smart poultry farm network model and introduce the
proposed authentication scheme's security mechanisms and components. Then, the threat
model and the involved attack surface will be discussed.
5.5.1

Smart poultry farm network model
One of the industries that can make good use of IoT technology is poultry farms.

In such an environment, it is essential to monitor the environmental quality to ensure the
healthy growth of the chicken and, at the same time, to reduce chicken loss. Therefore,
there is a need for a smart monitoring system. The environmental parameters can be
measured by using wireless sensors. Collected data can be transmitted through a gateway
to the employer's control station to monitor the farm's operation and production. The use
of IoT sensors can be a solution to build a smart poultry farm. The implementation of an
automated real-time monitoring system of the environmental parameters can: (1) increase
productivity and at the same time reduce cost and time; and (2) facilitate the data analysis
process that can help in making faster and better decisions. However, IoT and smart
communication technologies introduce a vast exposure to cybersecurity threats and
vulnerabilities in smart poultry farming environments. Such threats can disturb the
operation and the production of the farm. This chapter introduces a distributed
lightweight mutual authentication and key generation protocol that fits the poultry farms'
dynamic and distributed cyber-physical nature to ensure the system's security.
In the proposed scheme, an IoT node (N) mini gateways (MG), Intermediate
gateway (IG), and central gateway (CG) are responsible for ensuring secure, anonymous
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mutual authentication and key generation. The proposed scheme is based on a challengeresponse technique and is developed as a secure and efficient mutual authentication
scheme without requiring high computational and communication costs. The use of
symmetric cryptography may generate security issues due to key exchanges over public
channels. To solve this issue, the proposed scheme does not exchange keys over the
network and does not use the devices' real identities, and consequently, it is not affected
by these problems. The proposed scheme enables a M2M communication, which
provides the chance for devices inside the IIoT network to do data offloading and allows
the IoT devices that are away from their gateways to get authenticated and communicate
with them through other IoT devices.
Figure 47 illustrates the network model of the farm. The cage is divided into three
levels (Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3). The three levels are identical. Each level has a
dedicated gateway called the Intermediate gateway (IG). The three IGs are connected to a
central gateway that is in charge of the whole cage. Each level is divided into three zones
(Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C). The three zones are identical. Each zone is controlled by
a mini-gateway (MG). All MGs can communicate with each other to exchange data. Each
zone is divided into multiple virtual domains where the IoT devices are located. Each virtual
domain has the more powerful IoT nodes closer to the MG. There are four main players: the
central gateway (CG), the intermediate gateways, the mini-gateways, and IoT nodes(N).
•

The central gateway (CG): CG is a central device for starting and maintaining the
network. It is aware of all the devices' real identities. The CG achieves multiple
tasks: (1) it is in charge of authenticating the intermediate gateways; (2) it supports
the mini-gateways while authenticating the IoT devices; and (3) it is in charge of
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sending the collected data from the intermediate gateways to the cloud. The CG also
acts as a local repository to temporarily store the data generated from the whole cage
and provides a local processing capability, and performs data cleaning, aggregation,
analysis, and interpretation techniques because it has a local database. Then it will
send the collected data to the cloud.
•

Intermediate Gateways (IG): the intermediate gateway controls starting and
maintaining the level-based network. The IGs achieve multiple tasks: (1) they are
in charge of authenticating the mini-gateways; (2) The IG also acts as a local
repository to temporarily store the data generated from its level and provides a local
processing capability and performs data cleaning, aggregation, analysis, and
interpretation techniques because it has a local database. The IGs store the received
data in buffers and forward them to the central gateway.

•

Mini-gateways (MGs): MGs are less powerful than IGs. Each MG is in charge of
a zone and acts as a connection point between the IG and the IoT devices. MGs are
used to offload the IG and distribute the authentication process among multiple MGs
under the authority of the IG. The MGs will be in charge of authenticating all the
IoT nodes. Each MG acts as a local repository to temporarily store the data generated
from its zone and provides a local processing capability, and performs data cleaning,
aggregation, analysis, and interpretation techniques because it has a local database.
The MGs store the received data in buffers and forward them to their IGs., which
aggregate the information of different MGs and redirect it to the central gateway.

•

IoT nodes: Those are the limited resources devices that are used to collect and send
data to its MG. The IoT nodes are not allowed to communicate directly with the IG
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or the CG. If either the CG or the MG receives any message from any IoT node, it
will drop it. Some IoT nodes are connected directly to the MG, while others are
connected indirectly through other connected IoT nodes to MG. The IoT devices
include temperature sensors, water sensors, CO2 sensors, NH2 sensors, static pressure
sensors, and actuators.
The presented scheme consists of four main layers: the physical, edge, fog, and
cloud layers. The bottom layer is the physical layer consisting of sensors and actuators
distributed in the cage. These devices include different types of sensors such as temperature
sensors and water sensors, and actuators to take actions. The sensors are responsible for
sensing and collecting data from the surrounding environment. The collected data helps in
actuating other devices such as the ventilation system. The sensors collect real-time data
about water, temperature, CO2 level, or NH2 level, which can be sent to the edge, fog, or
cloud systems to provide recommendations and enable automation. For example, data
collected by the temperature sensors are processed at the edge to determine the amount of
air or heat that is needed in the cage, optimize the airing or the heating schedule, and
support the farm operation.
The next layer up is the edge layer that consists of the mini gateways. Each virtual
domain has its own mini gateway that provides communication among smart objects and
acts as the link between the smart device and the intermediate gateway. The MG in the
edge layer oversees conducting real-time data cleaning, aggregation, analysis, and
making decisions within its virtual domain.
The third layer up is the fog layer that consists of the intermediate gateways and
the central gateway. The fog layer oversees local real-time data cleaning, aggregation,
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analysis, and making decisions. This layer's integration reduces the computation and data
analysis load off the centralized cloud layer. The fog layer consists of two sub-layers. The
bottom sublayer consists of the intermediate gateways.

Each Intermediate gateway

oversees the cleaning, aggregating, and analyzing the data of its level. The top sublayer
consists of the central gateway. The central gateway aggregate and analyze the data of the
whole cage. Security monitoring, device failure prediction, and anomaly detection systems
can be deployed for real-time monitoring of abnormal events and classifying these events
as malicious or benign.
The cloud layer is generally virtualized in data centers and communicates with the
other layers using the Internet. The network model presented in figure 47 has two clouds.
The first one is the cloud of the service provider, where the collected data that has been
sent through the edge layer will be stored on Distributed File System (DFS). This stored
data will be used to conduct further analysis and to mine knowledge. The second cloud is
the PUF cloud, where the manufacturers store the CRPs of their produced devices. The
CRPs will be used to authenticate the devices and ensure the originality of the devices to
protect the farms from integrating counterfeited devices.
The IoT nodes such as sensors and actuators represent the sensing layer that is used
to sense/control the industrial world and acquire data. The MGs, IGs, and the CG represent
the aggregation layer responsible for collecting and processing the data and then sending
information to the cloud. All MGs can communicate directly with each other. Each IoT
node can communicate directly with its MG but can't communicate with either the IG or
the CG. A trust relationship and a secure communication link exist between the CG. and
the service provider cloud environment.
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Figure 47: Smart poultry farm network model
The manufacturer assigns the IoT nodes real IDs that are stored on their memory.
The service provider gives the IoT nodes Alias IDs. The Alias ID will be changed every
authentication session. The goal of the alias ID is to protect the device's anonymity and
ensure the device's untraceability.
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All devices are stationary. The communication between any two devices is subject
to both active and passive attacks. In passive attacks, the adversary can eavesdrop on the
communication. In active attacks, the intruder may replay, modify, or delete specific
communication messages. Moreover, IoT devices can be destroyed or stolen. The
message header containing the device Alias ID is sent in a clear text while the payload is
encrypted and authenticated. A one-way cryptographic hash function with a 256 bits
length is used to validate and ensure the integrity of the data transmitted between the two
devices.
The number of IoT devices can vary throughout the lifetime of the network.
Moreover, because the addition of new IoT devices to the network is highly likely, the
proposed scheme accommodates system scalability. The proposed scheme supports the
dynamic addition of IoT devices to the network without changing the network's security
states. The dynamic addition of new IoT devices is a shared responsibility between the
CG and the MG., which are assumed to be powerful devices.
5.5.2

Automated access control and privacy
The nature of the multi-layered architecture of the poultry farms highlights the

chances of cyber threats challenges. Therefore, an access control solution needs to be
integrated to support smart poultry farms' dynamic nature. Efficient access control and
privacy protection are necessary to protect sensitive data [113], [114]. Therefore, an
automated access control model based on virtual domain segregation of IoT network and
device type is introduced.
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5.5.2.1

IoT virtual domains segregation
The proposed scheme creates virtual segregation among the IoT devices. Virtual

segregation's primary goals are to (1) improve security through applying security policies
that fit the different IoT devices' needs and increase the data's confidentiality;(2) improve
the network performance through eliminating the unnecessary traffic; and (3) improve
and ease the management of the network.
The IoT network is virtually partitioned based on the type of IoT device. Each
virtual domain is connected to its MG to manage and control that virtual domain. If an
MG of a specific virtual domain goes down, its neighbor gateway that is located at the
same level would temporarily take over the connection management. At the same time, it
will notify the IG that its neighbor MG is out of service. All MGs within the same level
periodically exchange heartbeats signals to ensure their availability over time and share a
common database that lists those sensors under the authority of each MG. The IoT
devices are organized in a multi-tier architecture where the top layer (L1) houses the most
powerful IoT nodes within the MG range. The lower layer (L2) includes the IoT nodes
that are distant and out of range from the MG but within their peers' range sitting at the
top layer. The L1 IoT nodes will be used as a relay between the L2 IoT nodes and the
MG. Each virtual domain has a unique virtual Domain ID (VDID) and a unique Group
address (GAD). The GAD will equal the hardware address of the MG. Each device has a
typeID (TID) that is shared among all devices with the same type.
5.5.3

Challenge-response mechanism based on PUF and chained hash PUF
The proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication by implementing a PUF

challenge-response and chained hash PUF value authentication mechanism. The idea
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behind using the chained hash PUF value is to create a type of tracking system that stores
a value related to interaction over time between the IoT node and the MG. The chained
hash PUF value is utilized to present a historical factor for authenticating the IoT node.
Employing both the PUF and the chained hash PUF mechanisms to generate a cumulative
value from all previous authentication sessions ensures mutual authentication. The twoway challenge/response authentication technique allows the MG to check the authenticity
of the IoT node, and at the same time, enables the IoT node to ensure that it is not
communicating with a malicious MG. The use of the PUF proves the originality of the
devices and protects the IoT ecosystem from impersonation attacks. The use of the
cumulative chained hash PUF value depends on the ability of the IoT node and MG to
show proof of knowledge of past chained hash PUF values.
In the proposed scheme, during the registration phase, both the sending IoT node
and the MG hash the first PUF response RH1 along with the real ID of the IoT node and
produce a hashed value named CHX. Then, for all subsequent authentication sessions, the
IoT node hashes the previously-stored chained CHX along with the new PUF response
(Rx) to generate a new chained hash CHxN. On the other side, the MG will apply the
same technique to ensure the authenticity of the received hashed value upon receiving the
data. First, the MG retrieves the Rx value from its database. Second, the MG hashes the
retrieved Rx with the previously stored chained CHx-1. Then, the MG compares the
computed value CHXN' = h (RX, CHx-1) with the one that was received CHXN from the IoT
node. If it matches, it will authenticate the sender IoT node N. Once the authentication is
completed; the two sides will store the CHXN in their databases and use the CHx-1 along
with the exchanged random values to generate the shared session key(ssk).
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The proposed mechanism chains the blocks of hashed response values together by
hashing the new hash value with previously generated hash values and the realID of the
IoT node. Thus, the mechanism looks like a blockchain technology at first glance, but it
does not utilize blockchains with its overheads. Because the RX values cannot be
predicted or replicated due to the nature of the PUF, the adversary can't predict the
chained hash value.
5.5.4

Security Design Goals
To ensure the security and efficiency of communication in the IIoT domain, the

security goals that are presented in figure 48 need to be achieved in the proposed
protocol.

Security Goals

Confidentiality

Symmetric
encryption

Integrity

SHA- 256

Unlinkability
and
Anonymity

Message
Freshness
Time Stamp
and nonce

Alias IDs

Figure 48: Security Design Goals
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•

Confidentiality: This is achieved through symmetric encryption.

•

Resistance to data modification attack: An adversary cannot tamper with the
communication data to break its integrality: This is achieved by using a strong
hash function such as SHA-256.

•

Anonymity and unlinkability: The sensors’ identity information cannot be
exposed to anyone outside its level. This is achieved through using an Alias ID/
pseudonym that will be changed for every authentication session. The adversary
cannot trace back the device's real ID from the pseudonym. Using pseudonyms
also ensures that when an IoT device uses network resources multiple times, it
will be hard to link these uses together by an adversary.

•

Resistance to the Replay Attack: An adversary cannot reuse the previously
exchanged valid information to steal sensitive data. This attack can be avoided by
ensuring the message's freshness by using timestamps and nonce values.

•

Forward/backward security: This is satisfied by ensuring the confidentiality of
all messages.

•

Counterfeiting and hardware security: This is achieved through using the PUF

•

Mutual Authentication: Each communicating pair should authenticate each other
to avoid potential malicious attacks.

•

Resistance to the Impersonation Attack: An adversary pretends to be a
registered entity. The implementation of the PUF concept can avoid this attack.

175

•

High Efficiency: To encounter the communication demands of the resourceconstrained IoT devices in industrial systems, the proposed schems should have
low-computation cost and communication overhead.

5.5.5

Threat Model
The Dolev–Yao (DY) threat model [64] is applied in the presented protocol. In

the DY threat model, any two communicating parties (in the context, IoT node and MG,
MG and IG, and IG and CG) communicate with each other via insecure public channels.
During the interaction process, an adversary can eavesdrop, intercept, and modify the
transmitted data of both parties. The service provider cloud and the PUF cloud are
assumed to be fully trusted in the presented scheme.
The following assumptions about security properties and adversary abilities are made.
1. The used communication channel during the registration process is secure.
2. The one-way hash function is collision-resistant.
3. The gateways and IoT nodes have protection against tampering.
4. Replay attack: An adversary can capture messages from old authentication sessions
and replay them in the current session.
5.Message modification attack: the adversary can tamper with intercepted messages.
7. Injection attack: the adversary can send fake messages.
6. Impersonation attack: The adversary can pretend to be a legitimate gateway or sensor
node.
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5.6
Proposed Scheme: M2M Distributed Multi-Layer Lightweight Mutual
Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme Using Chained Hash PUF in Industrial
IoT System
This work focuses on resource-constrained IoT devices that are not suitable for
traditional security methods to protect communication with the gateway and IoT devices.
Deploying a massive number of IoT devices in the IIoT environment may consume a
considerable amount of energy. Therefore, there is a need to optimize the communication
tasks among the IoT devices to reduce the consumed energy [115]. The proposed scheme
aims to achieve low computing-resource usage by reducing computational complexity
and the computational cost of IoT devices, which will reduce the energy cost of the IIoT
system and extend the battery life of the IoT devices.
Because most IoT devices are resource-constrained, we use lightweight
cryptographic operations during exchanged authentication messages. To achieve this
goal, a lightweight mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for M2M
communication between a CG and IG, IG and MG, and finally between N and MG are
proposed in this section.
The proposed scheme consists of four main phases: the enrollment phase,
registration phase, mutual authentication phase, and key agreement phase. The enrollment
phase will be completed during manufacturing. The Authoritative entity (AE) will oversee
completing the registration phase. Both the mutual authentication and the key generation
phases will be completed between CG and IG, IG and MG, and N and the MG without any
human involvement. Every two parties are responsible for ensuring a secure, anonymous
mutual authentication and key generation process. The relationship between CG and IG,
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IG and MG, and N and MG is based on infrastructure communication mode. The
relationship among the different MGs and the relationship among the IoT nodes within the
same virtual domain is based on peer-to-peer topology. The mutual authentication and the
key generation phases are broken down as follows:
1. Mutual authentication and key agreement between CG and IG.
2. Mutual authentication and key agreement between IG and MG.
3. Mutual authentication and key agreement between two different MGs.
4. Mutual authentication between MG and N.
The proposed scheme allows any two devices in the M2M network to authenticate
each other and exchange data mutually. Moreover, the IoT nodes are not necessarily
required to be directly connected to their mini gateway at the time of authentication. It is
important to highlight that the authenticated devices must be within the same virtual
domain. Any communication between any two IoT nodes from two different virtual
domains must be through the mini gateway of each of them. The proposed scheme
utilizes a one-way hash function, PUF, chained hash PUF and simple XOR function
between any two mutually authenticated devices.
Furthermore, IoT nodes use Alias IDs (pseudonyms) instead of their real IDs
during the communication process. Alias IDs support the anonymity of senders' IDs,
receivers' IDs, and the sender-receiver relationship. The abstract notations used to
describe the proposed authentication scheme are listed in table 15. The scheme phases are
presented below.
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5.6.1

Enrollment Phase
The enrollment phase is completed during the manufacturing process. The

manufacturer will assign a real ID to every IoT device and gateways. All devices are
equipped with a PUF, and any attempt to tamper with the PUF will change the device's
behavior and render the device useless and must be replaced. The PUF hardware security
primitive is used as the root-of-trust, which provides device authenticity.
The manufacturer will also collect a set of CRPs for each device during the
enrollment phase. The manufacturer will test all the CRPs under different temperature
and voltage conditions and consider the aging effects to keep only the error-free CRPs
[37]. Then, the manufacturer will load the CRPs of the devices to the cloud of their
service provider. The service provider container is part of the PUF architecture that is
presented in chapter 2. The main goals of PUF are to protect the devices from
counterfeiting and generate a relevant, unique key for the device. The uniqueness of the
generated key in the network would be guaranteed based on the diversity and the
manufacturing variations that generate the PUF. The generated PUF responses will be
used to generate the symmetric keys.
Table 15: Notations used in the scheme
Notation

Description

Authoritative Entity

AE

IoT node

N

Mini-Gateway

MG

Intermediate Gateway

IG

Central Gateway

CG
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NIDR

IoT Node Real ID

NIDA

IoT node Alias ID

MGIDR

Mini-Gateway Real ID

MGIDA

Mini-Gateway Alias ID

IGIDR

Intermediate Gateway Real ID

IGIDA

Intermediate Gateway Alias ID

CGIDR

Central Gateway Real ID

CGIDA

Central Gateway Alias ID

OTP

One-time password

Token

TK

MSK

Master secret key

GID

Group ID

TIDN

IoT node Type ID

RV

Random values

S1, S2, and S3

Authentication parameters

TS

Timestamp generated by the IoT node

PUF

Physical unclonable function

C

Challenges

R

Response

H

Hash function

5.6.2

Registration Phase
In this phase, the Authoritative Entity (AE) securely registers CG, IG, MG, and N.

Before operation in the field, the AE will complete multiple tasks, as described in figure
49. First, the AE will assign alias IDs to the CG, IGs, MGs, and N nodes. The alias IDs
will be fake IDs that devices will use to communicate with each other. Alias IDs will act
as pseudonym IDs and will be dynamically changed in every authentication session. The
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goal of the Alias ID goal is to protect and ensure the unlinkability and untraceability of
the device and support the anonymity of each device in each session. Second, the AE will
retrieve CRPs (CCG, RCG, CIG, RIG, CCMG, RMG) of the CG, IG, and MG, respectively, from
the PUF cloud
Third, AE will use a random number generator to generate three random values
to be used as for one-time passwords (OTP) between CG and each IG. There will be a
unique OTP between the CG and each IG. Also, the AE will generate a master secret key
(MSKCI) to be only known to the CG and the three IGs. Once the IG is registered, IG and
CG will generate the OTP during every authentication session without any human
involvement. Then, the AE will insert and store CGIDR, CGIDA, IGIDR, IGIDA, MSKCI, and
OTPCI in the IG's database and store CGIDR, CGIDA, IGIDR, IGIDA, MSKCI, and OTP CI of
each IG in CG’ memory.
Fourth, AE will use a random number generator to generate three random values
to be used as one-time passwords (OTP) between the IG of each level and its MGs. There
will be a unique OTP between the IG and each MG within the same level. Also, The AE
will generate a master secret key (MSKIM) to be only known to the IG and the MGs
inside the same level. Once MGs are registered, both IG and MG will generate the OTP
during every authentication session without any human involvement. The AE will insert
and store MGIDR, MGIDA, MSKIM, and OTPIM in the MG's database and store IGIDR,
IGIDA, MGIDR, MGIDA, MSKIM, and OTPIM of each MG in IG’ memory.
Fifth, AE will assign the IoT node Group ID(GIDN), and type ID (TIDN). The GIDN
refers to the virtual domain that N belongs to, and the TIDN indicates the type of the IoT
device. Second, the AE will use a random number generator to generate a one-time
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token (OTT) to be used as part of a one-time password (OTP) between N and the MG.
Once N is registered, both N and MG will generate the OTT during every authentication
session without any human involvement. Then the AE will use N’s different IDs and the

CG-IG Registration
Step1: AE uses a random number generator to generate a random value to be used as a
one-time password (OTPCi) between CG and each IGi.
Step 2: AE generates a master secret key (MSKCI) only known to the CG and its IGs.
Step 3: AE communicates with the PUF cloud to retrieve a CRP (CCG, RCG) of the CG
and CRP (CIGi, RIGi) of the IGi
Step 4: The AE calculates the authentication parameters as follows:
CGA = H (CGIDR || IGiIDR|| RCG)
CIAi = H (H (CGIDR || IGiIDR|| RIGi)
Step 5: AE inserts and stores CGIDR, CGIDA, IGIDR, IGIDA, MSKCI, CGA, CIGi, and
OTPCi in the IG's database. The MSKCI is stored in an encrypted format using the RIGi.
The IGi only knows the CIGi. RIGi is unknown to the IGi. To calculate CIAi and decrypt
the OTPCi and the MSKCI, the IGi needs to feed the CIGi to the PUF function to
compute the RIGi.
Step 6: The AE inserts and stores CGIDR, CGIDA, IGiIDR, IGiIDA, MSKCI, CIAi, CCG, and
OTPCi in CG’ memory. The MSKCI is stored in an encrypted format using the RCG. The
CG only knows the CCG. RCG is unknown to the CG. To calculate CGA and decrypt the
OTPCi and the MSKCI, the CG needs to feed the CCG to the PUF function to compute
the RCG.
IG-MG Registration
Step1: AE uses a random number generator to generate a random value to be used as a
one-time password (OTPIM) between IG and the MGi.
Step 2: AE generates a master secret key (MSKIM) to be only known to the IG and the
three MGs that are within the same level.
Step 3: AE communicates with the PUF cloud to retrieve a CRP (CMGi, RMGi ) of the
MGi.
Step 4: The AE calculates the following authentication parameter as follows:
MGAi = H (IGiIDR || MGiIDR|| RMGi)
IMAi = H (IGiIDR || MGiIDR|| RIGi)
Step 5: AE inserts and stores MGIDR, MGIDA, MSKIM, MGAi, and OTPIM in the IG's
database. The MSKIM is stored in an encrypted format using the RIGi. The IGi only
knows the CIGi. RIGi is unknown to the IGi. To calculate IMAi, and decrypt the MSKIM
and OTPIM, the IGi needs to feed the CIGi to the PUF function to compute the RIGi.
Step 6: AE inserts and stores IGIDR, IGIDA, MGIDR, MGIDA, MSKIM, IMAi,CMGi, and
OTPIM in the MGi’s memory. The MSKIM is stored in an encrypted format using the
RMGi. The MGi only knows the CMGi. RMGi is unknown to the MGi. To calculate MGAi
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and decrypt the MSKIM and OTPIM, the MGi needs to feed the CMGi to the PUF
function to compute the RMGi.
MG-N Registration
Step 1: The AE assigns N to its appropriate virtual domain and generates a GIDN to the
N.
Step 3: The AE generates and assign a TIDN to each N based on its type
Step 4: The AE calculates the three parameters: S1, S2, and S3 as follows:
S1: h (NIDR || MGIDR ||RMGi)
S2: h (S1 ||MGIDR || GIDN)
S3: h (S2|| MGIDR ||TIDN)
GIDN, TIDN and RMGi are only used to create S1, S2, and S3. Both the GIDN and the TIDN
are only stored on the MGi. The IoT node does not know anything about those two IDs
and the RMGi. The CMGi is only stored on the MGi database. RMGi is unknown to both
the IoT node and the MGi because the MGi will compute RMGi on every authentication
session. Using GIDN and TIDN to generate the authentication parameters makes it almost
impossible for an adversary to be able to identify the GIDN and the TIDN of any IoT
node. Also, using the RMGi makes is impossible for an adversary to impersonate the
MGi.
Step 5: AE generates a one-time token (OTT) that will be used as part of a one-time
password (OTP) using a random number generator
Step 6: AE stores the S1, S2, S3, NIDA, MGIDA, MGIDR, and OTT in the IoT device
database.
Step 7: AE inserts the NIDR, NIDA, GIDN, TIDN, and OTT of the IoT node in the MG
database.
Figure 49: Registration Phase
MG's real ID to generate three different authentication parameters, which are S1
and S2, and S3, using a one-way hash function and XOR operations. Then, the AE will
insert and store NIDR, NIDA, the MGIDA, GIDN, TIDN, and the OTT in the MG's database and
store S1, S2, S3, OTT, NIDA, MGIDR, and MGIDA in N’ memory.
The real identities of the devices represent a secure parameter between the devices
within the network. The real IDs will never be transmitted in a plain text format and will
be used during the authentication process between every two devices.
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5.6.3

Mutual authentication and key generation phases
This phase will cover three different protocols. The protocol depends on the

relationship between every two nodes. Figure 50 presents the different types of
relationships that we have in the poultry farm IoT network. We have a parent-child
relationship, and this is presented as the relationship between a gateway and the other
gateway that is above it. The two examples of the parent-child relationship are the CG-IG
relationship and the IG-MG relationship. The second type of relationship is the childchild relationship. This type of relationship is between two gateways at the same level.
The two examples in the presented network are IG-IG relationship and MG-MG
relationship. The third type of relationship is between a gateway and IoT.

Figure 50: Different types of relationships in the poultry farm network
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5.6.3.1
generation

Protocol 1: parent gateway-child gateway authentication and key

This protocol presents the mutual authentication process between parent gateway
(PG) and child gateway (ChG) and establishes a session key for data transfer. As
presented in figure 51, this process starts when ChG prepares the authentication request
message that will be sent to the PG. Also, the algorithm for the proposed parent gatewaychild gateway mutual authentication mechanism is shown in detailed steps in figure 52.
The steps involved in this process are listed below.
Child Gateway (ChG)

Parent Gateway (PG)

Generate: TSChG1, RVChG1
Compute:
X1 = H (OTP || AuthP)
X2 = X1 ⊕ (RVChG1)
X3 = H (ChGIDR || TS ChG1 || RVChG1 || X1)
M1: (ChGIDA,

TSChG1, X2, X3)
Check:|TRec− TS ChG1 |< ∆T
Find: ChGIDA
Read: ChGIDR Cp, OTP
Compute:
RP = PUF(CP)
AuthP’ = H (PGIDR || ChGIDR || RP)
X1’ = H (OTP || AuthP’)
RV’ChG1 = X2 ⊕ X’1
Verify: X3’ = H (ChGIDR || TS ChG1 || RVChG1’ || X1’)
Generate: TSPG1, RVPG1, SID
Computes:
Yx = H (OTP || Authc)
Y1 = RVPG1 ⊕ H (Yx || RVChG1)
Y2 = H (PGIDR || TSPG1 || RVPG1 || RVChG1 || Yx )

M2: (PGIDA, SID, TSPG1Y1, Y2)
Check:|TRec− TSPG1 |< ∆T
Read: CC, OTP
Compute:
RC = PUF(CC)
AuthC’ = H (PGIDR || ChGIDR || RC)
YX’ = H (OTP || AuthC’)
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RVPG1’ = H (Yx’ ⊕ RVChG1) ⊕ Y1
Verify
Y2’ = = H (ChGIDR || TS’PG1 || RV’PG1 || RVChG1 Yx)
Generate: TSChG2, RVChG2
Compute
Xcc = H (RV’PG1|| OTP)
X4 = H(Xcc)⊕ RVChG2
X5 = H (ChGIDR || TSChG2 || RVChG2|| (RV’PG1 || Xcc)
M3:

ChGIDA, SID, TSChG2, X4, X5)
Check:|TS’Rec− TSChG2 |< ∆T
Compute:
Xcc’ = H (OTP|| RV’PG1)
RV’ChG2 = H(Xcc’) ⊕ X4
Verify:
H (ChGIDR || TS’ChG2 || RV’ChG2|| RVPG1|| Xcc)
Generate: TSPG2, TK12 and Tk13
Compute
Y3= H(OTP) ⊕ TK12
Y4 = TK12⊕ TK13
OTPx = H (OTPx-1 || RVChG1)
ChGIDAx = H (OTP|| ChGIDA)
H5 = H (ChGIDR || TSPG2 || TK12|| TK13
||OTPX|| ChGIDAx|)

M4: (PGIDA, SID, TSPG2, Y3, Y4, Y5)
Check: |TS’Rec− TSCG2 |< ∆T
Compute:
TK12’= H(OTP) ⊕ Y3
TK13’ = TK12’⊕ Y4
OTP’x = H (OTPx-1 || RVChG1)
ChG’IDAx = H (OTP|| ChGIDA )
Verify
Y5’ = H ( ChGIDR || TS’PG2 || TK’12|| TK’13 || OTP’X || ChG’IDAx )
Store (OTP’x ’, ChG’IDAx ’)

Figure 51: The authentication process between PG and CG
5.6.3.1.1

Step 1: Interaction Request

1. ChG generates a new TSChG1 to avoid replay attacks
2. ChG computes X1
a. X1 = H (OTP || AuthP)
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3. ChG selects a random parameter RVChG1 and then calculates X2
a. X2 = X1 ⊕ (RVChG1)
4. ChG computes X3 = H (ChGIDR || TS ChG1 || RVChG1 || X1)
5. ChG sends the message to the PG.
The message includes ChG IDA, TSChG1, X2, and X3, as shown in 5.1.
ChG

PG M1(ChGIDA, TSChG1, X2, X3)

(5.1)

Algorithm 2 The mutual authentication between PG device and the ChG

Input:
Child gateway (ChG) device with real identity (PGIDR), alias identity (PGIDA), IG real
identity (ChGIDR), IG alias identity (ChGIDR), master secret key (MSK), PUF
Challenge (CChG), the Authp authentication parameter, and one time password (OTP)
PG device with real identity of the PG (PGIDR), alias identity of the PG (PGIDA), ChG
real identity (ChGIDR), IG alias identity (ChGIDR), master secret key (MSK), one-time
password (OTP), PUF challenge (Cp), and the authentication parameter Authc
Output:
Mutual authentication between the CG and the IG
Begin
1. The ChG device generates a random nonce RVChG1, a timestamp TSChG1, X1 =
H (OTP || AuthP) X2 = X1 ⊕ (RVChG1), and X3 = H (ChGIDR || TS ChG1 || RVChG1 || X1)

2. ChG device sends <ChGIDA, TSChG1, X2, X3 > message to the PG.
3.

If (the PG finds ChGIDA in its repository) then

4.

The PG retrieves ChGIDR, OTP, and Cp from its repository to its memory;

5.

The PG passes the challenge Cp to its PUF function and generates a
response RPG

6.

The PG calculates Authp’. Then the PG computes X1’, retrieves the
RV’ChG1 from XORing
ChG1 || RVChG1 || X1)

X1 and X2 and finally calculates X3’ = H (ChGIDR || TS
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7.

If (the calculated hash message in step 6 matches the hash message that
was sent in step 2) then

8.

The PG generates a timestamp TSP1, generates a random nonce
RVP1, calculates the hash value Yx = H (OTP || Authc), Y1 = RVPG1 ⊕ H
(Yx || RVChG1), and Y2 = H (PGIDR || TSPG1 || RVPG1 || RVChG1 || Yx)

9. The PG sends PGIDA, SID, TSP1, TSPG1Y1, and Y2 message ChG.
10.

else

11.
12.

Go to step 42.
end if

13. else
14.

Go to step 42.

15. end if
16. ChG verifies the time stamp and retrieves CC, OTP. ChG computes RC =
PUF(CC), AuthC’ = H (PGIDR || ChGIDR || RC), and retrieves RVChG1. ChG generates
Y2’ = = H (ChGIDR || TS’PG1 || RV’PG1 || RVChG1, Yx)

17. If (the calculated hash message in step 16 matches the hash message that
was sent in step 9)
18. then
19.

The authenticity of the PG is verified

20. ChG generates a timestamp TSChG2 and a random nonce RVChG2, ChG Xcc = H
(RV’PG1|| OTP), X4 = H(Xcc)⊕ RVChG2, and X5 = H (ChGIDR || TSChG2 || RVChG2|| (RV’PG1 ||
Xcc)

21. ChG sends <ChGIDA, SID, TSChG2, X4, X5> message to PG.
22. else
23.

Go to step 42.

24. end if
25. The PG verifies the TSChG2, PG computes Xcc’ = H (OTP|| RV’PG1) and retrieving
RV’ChG2 by xoring = H(Xcc’) and X4. Also, PG generates X5’ = H (ChGIDR || TSChG2 ||
RVChG2|| (RV’PG1 || Xcc)

26. If (the calculated hash message in step 25 matches the hash message that
was sent in step 21
27. then
28.

The authenticity of the IG device is verified.

29. PG generates a timestamp TSPG2 TK12 and Tk13. Also, PG computes
Y3= H(OTP) ⊕ TK12, Y4 = TK12⊕ TK13, OTPx = H (OTPx-1 || RVChG1),
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ChGIDAx = H (OTP|| ChGIDA ), and Y5 = H (ChGIDR || TSPG2 || TK12|| TK13 ||OTPX||
ChGIDAx| )

30. PG sends < PGIDA, SID, TSPG2, Y3, Y4, Y5> message to ChG.
31. , ChG Xcc = H (RV’PG1|| OTP), X4 = H(Xcc)⊕ RVChG2, and X5 = H (ChGIDR || TSChG2 ||
RVChG2|| (RV’PG1 || Xcc)

32. ChG <ChGIDA, SID, TSChG2, X4, X5> message to PG.
33. else
34.

Go to step 42.

35. end if
36. ChG verifies the TSPG2. Also, ChG computes TK12’= H(OTP) ⊕ Y3, TK13’ = TK12’⊕
Y4, OTP’x = H (OTPx-1 || RVChG1), ChG’IDAx = H (OTP|| ChGIDA). Finally, ChG generates
Y5’ = H (ChGIDR || TS’PG2 || TK’12|| TK’13 || OTP’X || ChG’IDAx)

37. If (the calculated hash message in step 36 matches the hash message that
was sent in step 32
38. then
39.

ChG stores OTP’x’, ChG’IDAx in its database

40. else
41.

Go to step 42.

End if
42. Stop (terminates the connection)
End
Figure 52: Algorithm 1 The mutual authentication between PG device and the ChG

5.6.3.1.2

Step 2: Parent Gateway Response

Once the PG receives the connection request, it will complete the following steps:
1. PG checks the validity of the received timestamp | TS’Rec− TSChG1 |< ∆T.
TS’Rec is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum
transmission delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the
timestamp and the time when the message is received higher than the expected
maximum transmission delay.
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2. PG retrieves from its database the ChGIDR that corresponds to its ChGGIDA. If
the PG did not find the IGIDA in its database, it will ignore and drop the
received message.
3. PG will retrieve the Cp and pass it to the PUF function to compute the RP
a. RP = PUF(Cp)
4. PG computes AuthP’ = H (PGIDR || ChGIDR || RP)
5. PG computes the X1’ = H (OTP || AuthP’)
6. PG computes the RV’ChG1 = X2 ⊕ X’1
7. The PG uses the calculated X1’, TSChG1', ChGIDR, and the RV’ChG1 to verify
X3', which is a combination of ChGIDR, X1’, TSChG1', and RV’ChG1 using a oneway hash function as shown in figure 53. If the computed value is equal to the
received value, the PG accepts the connection request; otherwise, it will drop
it.
X3’ = H (ChGIDR || TS ChG1 || RVChG1’ || X1’)
If X3 = X3’ Then
The PG will accept the interaction request
Else
The PG will drop the interaction request
Figure 53: Verify the interaction request parameters
Once the PG accepts the interaction request, it generates a random value RVPG1
and time stamp TSPG1. Also, the PG generates a session ID. The session ID aims to
distinguish one session from the rest of the running sessions simultaneously. The PG
prepares and sends an interaction response to the ChG. The preparation process of the
connection response message includes the following steps:
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1. PG generates a new TSPG1
2. PG Calculates Yx
a. Yx = H (OTP || Authc)
3. PG selects a random parameter RVPG1 and then calculates Y1
a. Y1 = RVPG1 ⊕ H (Yx || RVChG1)
4. PG generates a session ID(SID)
5. PG calculates Y2 = H (PGIDR || TSPG1 || RVPG1 || RVChG1 || Yx)
6. PG sends an interaction response message
The interaction response includes PGIDA, session ID(SID), TSPG1, Y1, and Y2, as shown in
5.2.
PG
5.6.3.1.3

ChG Conn-Res (PGIDA, SID, TSPG1, Y1, Y2)

(5.2)

Step 3: Parent Gateway Authentication

Once ChG receives the connection response, it completes the following steps:
1. ChG checks the validity of the received timestamp | TS’Rec- TSPG1 |< ∆T.
TS’Rec is when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the timestamp and
the time when the message is received higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. ChG will retrieve the CC and pass it to the PUF function to compute the RC
a. RC = PUF(CC)
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3. ChG computes AuthC’ = H (PGIDR || ChGIDR || RC)
4. ChG computes the YX’ = H (OTP || AuthC’)
5. ChG calculates the RVPG1’ = H (Yx’ ⊕ RVChG1) ⊕ Y1
6. As presented in figure 54, ChG calculates Y2’ using a one-way hash function
and compares the generated Y2’ to the received Y2. If the two values are the
same, ChG will accept the interaction response and authenticate the PG.;
otherwise, it will drop it.
Y2’ = = H (ChGIDR || TS’PG1 || RV’PG1 || RVChG1. Yx)
If Y2 = Y2’ Then
Then ChG will accept the connection response.
Else
ChG will drop the connection response
Figure 54: Evaluate the PG authentication parameter
Once the ChG authenticates the PG, it generates a random value RVChG2 and time
stamp TSCHG2. The ChG prepares and sends another message to the PG. The preparation
process of the message includes the following steps:
1. ChG generates a new TSChG2
2. ChG computers Xcc
a. Xcc = H (RV’PG1|| OTP)
3. ChG selects a random parameter RVChG2 and then calculates X4
a. X4 = H(Xcc)⊕ RVChG2
4. ChG calculates X5
a. X5 = H (ChGIDR || TSChG2 || RVChG2|| (RV’PG1 || Xcc)
5. ChG sends the message to the PG
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The message includes ChGIDA, session ID, TSChG2, X4, and X5, as shown in 5.3.
ChG
5.6.3.1.4

PG (ChGIDA,SID, TSChG2, X4 ,X5)

(5.3)

Step 4: Child Gateway Authentication

Once the PG receives the message, it will complete the following steps:
1. PG checks the validity of the received timestamp | TS’Rec− TSChG2 |< ∆T.
TS’Rec is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum
transmission delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the
timestamp and the time when the message is received higher than the expected
maximum transmission delay.
2. PG computes Xcc’ = H (OTP|| RV’PG1)
3. PG computers RV’ChG2 = H(Xcc’) ⊕ X4

4. The PG uses the TS’ChG2, Xcc’, RVPG1 and, RV’ChG2 to generate X5’ using a
one-way hash function as shown in figure 55. If the computed value is equal
to the received value, the PG accepts the message and authenticates the ChG;
otherwise, it will drop the connection.
X5’ = H (ChGIDR || TS’ChG2 || RV’ChG2|| RVPG1|| Xcc)
If X5 = X5’ Then
The PG will accept the message
Else
The PG will drop the connection
Figure 55: Evaluate the ChG Authentication Parameter
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Once the PG accepts the message, it will generate a new timestamp TSPG2. Also,
the PG will generate two news tokens that the ChG can use to complete a mutual
authentication with the other two ChGs. The PG will also compute a new OTP and a new
alias ID for the ChG to be used for the next authentication session. The PG prepares and
sends a message to the ChG. The preparation process of the message includes the
following steps:
1. PG generates a new TSPG2
2. PG generates two new tokens TK12 and Tk13, and then calculates and then
calculates Y3 and Y4
a. Y3= H(OTP) ⊕ TK12
b. Y4 = TK12⊕ TK13
3. PG calculate a new OTP
a.

OTPx = H (OTPx-1 || RVChG1)

4. PG calculate a new Alias ID for the ChG
a.

ChGIDAx = H (OTP|| ChGIDA)

5. PG calculates Y5 = H (ChGIDR || TSPG2 || TK12|| TK13 ||OTPX|| ChGIDAx|)
6. PG sends the message to the ChG
The message includes PGIDA, SID, TSPG2, Y3, Y4, and Y5, as shown in 5.4.
PG

ChG M4 (PGIDA, SID, TSPG2, Y3, Y4, Y5)

(5.4)

Once the ChG receives the message, it will complete the following steps:
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1. ChG checks the validity of the received timestamp | TS’Rec− TSCG2 |< ∆T.
TS’Rec is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum
transmission delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the
timestamp and the time when the message is received higher than the expected
maximum transmission delay.
2. ChG computes the TK12 and TK13
a. TK12’= H(OTP) ⊕ Y3
b. TK13’ = TK12’⊕ Y4
3. ChG computes the OTP’x = H (OTPx-1 || RVChG1)
4. ChG computes the ChG’IDAx = H (OTP|| ChGIDA)
5. The ChG uses TS’PG2, TK’12, TK’13, OTP’x and ChG’IDAx to generate Y5’
using a one-way hash function as shown in figure 56. If the computed value is
equal to the received value, the ChG accepts the message, saves the tokens in
its database, and updates its database with the new OTP and the new Alias ID.
Y5’ = H (ChGIDR || TS’PG2 || TK’12|| TK’13 || OTP’X || ChG’IDAx )
If Y5 = Y8’ Then
The ChG will accept the message and update its database
Else
The ChG will drop the connection
Figure 56: Evaluate the PG received message
5.6.3.1.5

Key generation phase between PG and ChG

Once the mutual authentication is completed, the two sides will generate a shared
secret session key (ssk) that will be used to encrypt all the subsequent communication
between the PG and the ChG. The ssk will be a combination of the generated random
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values as presented in 5.5. SHA 256 will be used to generate the ssk. AES 128 bits will
be used to encrypt and decrypt the messages.
ssk = H (RVChG1|| RVChG2|| RVPG1 || OTP)

(5.5)

5.6.3.2 Protocol 2: child gateway-child gateway authentication and key generation
This protocol presents the mutual authentication process between any two nodes
that inherit the child-child relationship. The two-child gateways will complete mutual
authentication and establishes a session key for data transfer. As presented in figure 57,
this process starts when ChG_1 prepares the interaction request message that will be sent
to the ChG_2. In the case the MG-MG mutual authentication, the two gateways must be
inside the same level. Each child node knows the MSK. In the case of the intermediate
gateways, all the IGs share the same MSK with their parent gateway, which is the CG. In
the case of the mini gateways. The mini gateways within the same level share the MSK
with their parent gateways, the IG. Also, each child gateway knows the tokens that it
received from its parent gateway to use during the mutual authentication with another
child gateway. Furthermore, each child gateway knows its real and alias IDs and the other
child gateways' real and alias IDs that they are eligible to authenticate with them
mutually. The algorithm for the proposed Child Gateway -Child Gateway mutual
authentication mechanism is shown in detailed steps in figure 59. The steps involved in
this process are listed below.
5.6.3.2.1

Step 1: Interaction Request

1. ChG_1 generates a new TSChG_11
2. ChG_1 calcilates Rj
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a. Rj = H (TK|| ChG_2IDR)
3. ChG_1 selects a random parameter RVChG_11 and then calculates T1
a. T1 = RVChG_11 ⊕ Rj
4. ChG_1 computes T2 = H (ChG_1IDR || TS ChG_11 || RVChG_11 ||Rj)
5. ChG_1 sends an interaction request message.
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Child Gateway_1 (ChG_1)

Child Gateway_2 (ChG_2)

Generate: TSChG_11, RVChG_11
Compute:
Rj = H (TK|| ChG_2IDR)
T1 = RVChG_11 ⊕ Rj
T2 = H (ChG_1IDR || TS ChG_11 || RVChG_11 ||Rj)
M1: (ChGIDA1, TSChG_11, T1, T2)
Check| TSRec_11Rec− TS’ChG_11 |< ∆T
Find: ChGIDA1
Read: ChG_1IDR, TK, CC_2
Compute:
Rj’ = H (TK || ChG_2IDR)
RV’ChG_11 = Rj’ ⊕ T1
Verify: T2’ = H (ChG_1IDR || TS’ChG_11 ||
RV’ChG_11 ||Rj’)
Generate: TS ChG_21, RVChG_21, SID
Computes:
RC_2 = PUF(CC_2)
Decrypt:
MSK ={MSK} RC_2
Computes:
D1 = H (RVChG_11 ||MSK || TK)
D2 = RVChG_21 ⊕ D1
D3 = H (ChG_2IDR || TS ChG_21 || RVChG_21|| D1)
M2: (ChG_2IDA, SID, TS ChG_21, D2, D3)
Check: | TS Rec- TS’ ChG21 |< ∆T
Read: CC_1
Compute:
RC_1 = PUF(CC_1)
Decrypt:
MSK ={MSK} RC_2
Compute:
D1’ = H (RVChG_11 ||MSK || TK)
RVChG_21 = D1’ ⊕ D2
Verify
D3’ = = H (ChG_2IDR || TS’ ChG_21 || RV’ ChG_21 ||D1)
Generate: TSChG12, RVChG12
Compute
T3 = H (TK|| RVChG_21|| MSK)
T4 = T3 ⊕ RVChG_12
T5 = H (ChG_1IDR || TSCHG_12 || RVChG_12 || T3)
M3: (ChG_1IDA, SID, TSCHG_12, T4, T5)
Check: TSRec - TS’ChG_12 |< ∆T
Compute:
T3’ = H (TK|| RVChG_21|| MSK)
RV’ChG12 = T3’ ⊕ T4
Verify:
T5’ = H ((ChG_1IDR || TSCHG_12 || RVChG_12 || T3)

Figure 57: The authentication process between ChG_1 and ChG_2

The connection request includes ChG_1IDA, TSChG_11, T1, and T2, as shown in 5.7.
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ChG_1

ChG_2 Conn-Req (ChGIDA, TSChG_11, T1, T2)

(5.7)

Once the ChG_2 receives the interaction request, it will complete the following
steps:
1. ChG_2 checks the validity of the received timestamp | TSRec_11Rec− TS’ChG_11 |<
∆T. TSRec_ is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum
transmission delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the
timestamp and the time when the message is received higher than the expected
maximum transmission delay.
2. ChG_2 retrieves from its database the ChG_1IDR that corresponds to its
ChG_1IDA. If the ChG_2 did not find the ChG_1IDA in its database, it will ignore
and drop the interaction request.
3. Once the ChG_2 finds the ChG_1IDR, it will retrieve it along with the token (TK)
of ChG_1.
4. ChG_2 computes Rj’ = H (TK || ChG_2IDR)
5. ChG_2 computes the RV’ChG_11 = Rj’ ⊕ T1
6. The ChG_2 uses ChGIDR, TS’ChG_11, Rj’, and the RVChG_11 using a one-way hash
function as shown in figure 58 to verify T2’. If the computed value is equal to the
received value, the ChG_2 accepts the interaction request; otherwise, it will drop
it.
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T2’ = H (ChG_1IDR || TS’ChG_11 || RV’ChG_11 ||Rj’)
If T2 = T2’ Then
The ChG_2 will accept the interaction request
Else
The ChG_2 will drop the interaction request
Figure 58: Evaluate the ChG interaction request parameters
Algorithm 3 The mutual authentication between IG device and the MG
Input:
First Child gateway (ChG1) device with real identity (ChGIDR1), alias identity
(ChGIDA1), ChG_2 real identity (ChGIDR2), IG alias identity (ChGIDR2), master secret
key (MSK), PUF Challenge (CChG1), and the TK.
Second Child gateway (ChG2) with real identity (ChGIDR1), alias identity (ChGIDA1),
ChG_2 real identity (ChGIDR2), IG alias identity (ChGIDR2), master secret key (MSK),
PUF Challenge (CChG2), and the TK.
Output:
Mutual authentication between the ChG1 and the ChG2
Begin
1. The ChG1 device generates a random nonce RVChG_11 and a timestamp
TSChG_11. ChG1 computes Rj = H (TK|| ChG_2IDR), T1 = RVChG_11 ⊕ Rj, and
T2 = H (ChG_1IDR || TS ChG_11 || RVChG_11 ||Rj)
2. ChG1 device sends < ChGIDA1, TSChG_11, T1, T2 > message to the ChG2.
3.

If (the ChG2 finds ChGIDA1 in its repository)

4. then
5. The ChG2 verifies the timestamp TSChG_11 and retrieves ChG_1IDR, TK, CC_2
from its repository to its memory.
6. The ChG2 computes Rj’ = H (TK || ChG_2IDR) and retrieves RV’ChG_11 from
xoring Rj’ and T1. Then ChG2 generates T2’ = H (ChG_1IDR || TS’ChG_11 ||
RV’ChG_11 ||Rj’)
7. If (the calculated hash message in step 6 matches the hash message that was in
step 2) then
8.

The ChG2 generates TS ChG_21 and RVChG_21, SID

9.

The ChG2 passes the challenge CC_2 to its PUF function and generates a
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response RC_2. Then the ChG2 decrypts the MSK using RC_2.
The ChG2 computes D1 = H (RVChG_11 ||MSK || TK), D2 = RVChG_21 ⊕

10.

D1, D3 = H (ChG_2IDR || TS ChG_21 || RVChG_21|| D1)
11.

ChG2 device sends < ChG_2IDA, SID, TS ChG_21, D2, D3> message to the
ChG1.

12.

else

13.
14.

Go to step 34.
end if

15. else
16.

Go to step 34.

17. end if
18. ChG1 verifies the timestamp and retrieves CC_1. The ChG1 passes the
challenge CC_1 to its PUF function and generates a response RC_1. ChG1
computes D1’ = H (RVChG_11 ||MSK || TK) and retrieves RVChG_21 from xoring
D2 and D1. Then ChG1 generates D3’ = = H (ChG_2IDR || TS’ ChG_21 || RV’
ChG_21 ||D1)
19. If (the calculated hash message in step 18 matches the hash message that was
sent in step 11)
then
20. The authenticity of the ChG2 device is verified.
21. ChG1 generates a time stamp TSChG12 and a nonce value RVChG12
22. ChG1 computes T3 = H (TK|| RVChG_21|| MSK), T4 = T3 ⊕ RVChG_12, and T5 =
H (ChG_1IDR || TSCHG_12 || RVChG_12 || T3)
23. ChG1 device sends < ChG_1IDA, SID, TSCHG_12, T4, T5> message to the ChG2
24. else
25.
26.

Go to step 34.
end if

27. The ChG2 verifies the timestamp TSCHG_12. It computes T3’ = H (TK||
RVChG_21|| MSK) and retrieves RVChG_12 by XORing = T3 and T4. Also, ChG2
generates T5’ = H ((ChG_1IDR || TSCHG_12 || RVChG_12 || T3)
28. If (the calculated hash message in step 27 matches the hash message that was
sent in step 23
29. then
30.

The authenticity of the ChG1 device is verified.
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31. else
32.

Go to step 34.

33. end if
34. Stop (terminates the connection)
End
Figure 59: Algorithm 3 The mutual authentication between ChG1 device and the ChG2
5.6.3.2.2

Step 2: ChG_2 Response

Once the ChG_2 accepts the interaction request, it will retrieve its stored PUF
challenge (CC_2) and feed it to the PUF function to calculate the PUF response (RC_2).
Then ChG_2 will use RC_2 to decrypt the stored MSK. Also, it generates a random value
RVChG_21 and time stamp TS ChG_21. Furthermore, the ChG_2 generates a session ID. The
session ID aims to distinguish one session from the rest of the running sessions
simultaneously. The ChG_2 prepares and sends a connection response to the ChG_1. The
preparation process of the connection response message includes the following steps:
1. ChG_2 retrieves its CC_2 from its database and computes RC_2
a. RC_2 = PUF(CC_2)
2. ChG_2 decrypt the MSK using RC_2
3. ChG_2 calculates D1
a. D1 = H (RVChG_11 ||MSK || TK)
4. ChG_2 generates a new TSChG-21
5. ChG_2 selects a random parameter RVChG_21 and then calculates D2
a. D2 = RVChG_21 ⊕ D1
6. ChG_2 generates a session ID (SID)
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7. ChG_2 calculates D3 = H (ChG_2IDR || TS ChG_21 || RVChG_21|| D1)
8. ChG_2 sends the message to ChG_1
The message includes ChG_2IDA, session ID (SID), D2, and D3, as shown in 5.6. The
timestamps present information about when an event occurred, which makes this value
important.
ChG_2
5.6.3.2.3

ChG_1 (ChG_2IDA, SID, D2, D3)

(5.8)

Step 3: ChG_2 Authentication

Once ChG_1 receives the connection response, it completes the following steps:
1. ChG_1 checks the validity of the received timestamp | TS Rec- TS’ ChG21 |< ∆T. TS
Rec

is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission

delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the timestamp and the
time when the message is received higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. ChG_1 retrieves its CC_1 from its database and computes RC_1
a. RC_1 = PUF(CC_1)
3. ChG_1 decrypt the MSK using RC_1
4. ChG_1 computes D1’ = H(RVChG_11 ||MSK || TK)
5. ChG_1 calculates the RVChG_21 = D1’ ⊕ D2
6. As presented in figure 60, ChG calculates D3’ using a one-way hash function and
compares the generated D3’with the received D3. If the two values are the same,
ChG_1 will authenticate ChG_2; otherwise, it will drop the message.
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D3’ = = H (ChG_2IDR || TS’ ChG_21 || RV’ ChG_21 ||D1)
If D3 = D3’ Then
Then ChG_1 will Authenticate ChG_2
Else
ChG will drop the message
Figure 60: Evaluate the ChG_2 authentication parameter
Once the ChG_1 authenticate ChG_2, it generates a random value RVChG_12 and
time stamp TSChG_12. The ChG_1 prepares and sends another message to the ChG_2. The
preparation process of the message includes the following steps:
1. ChG_1 generates a new TSChG_12
2.

ChG_1 calculates T3
a. T3 = H (TK|| RVChG_21|| MSK)

3. ChG_1 generate a new random value RVChG_12 and computers T4
a. T4 = T3 ⊕ RVChG_12
4. ChG_1 calculates T5
a. T5 = H (ChG_1IDR || TSCHG_12 || RVChG_12 || T3)
5. ChG_1 sends the message to the ChG_2
The message includes ChG_1IDA, SID, TSChG_21, T4, and T5, as shown in 5.9.
ChG_1

5.6.3.2.4

ChG_2 (ChG_1IDA, SID, TSCHG_12 T4, T5)

Step 4: ChG_1 Authentication

Once the ChG_2 receives the message, it will complete the following steps:
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(5.9)

1. ChG_2 checks the validity of the received timestamp TSRec - TS’ChG_12 |< ∆T.
TS’ChG_12 is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum
transmission delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the
timestamp and the time when the message is received higher than the expected
maximum transmission delay.
2. ChG_2 computesT3’ = H (TK|| RVChG_21|| MSK)
3. ChG_2 computers RV’ChG12 = T3’ ⊕ T4
4. The ChG_2 uses TS’CHG_12, the RV’ChG12, and T3’ to generate T5’ using a oneway hash function and XOR function as shown in figure 61. If the computed
value is equal to the received value, the ChG_2 accepts the message and
authenticate ChG_1; otherwise, it will drop the connection.
T5’ = H (ChG_1IDR || TSCHG_12 || RVChG_12 || T3)
If T5= T5’ Then
The ChG_2 will accept the message and authenticate ChG_1
Else
The ChG_2 will drop the connection
Figure 61: Evaluate the ChG_1 authentication parameter
5.6.3.2.5

Key Generation Phase

Once the mutual authentication is completed, the two sides will generate a shared
secret session key (ssk) that will be used to encrypt all the subsequent communication
between ChG_1 and ChG_2. The ssk will be a combination of the generated random
values and the TK as presented in 5.10. SHA 256 will be used to generate the ssk. AES
128 bits will be used to encrypt and decrypt the messages.
ssk = H (RVChG_11 ||RVChG_21 || RVChG_12 || TK)
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(5.10)

5.6.3.3

Protocol 3: mini gateway–IoT node authentication and key generation
This protocol presents the mutual authentication process between a mini-gateway

(MG) and an IoT node(N). The two devices will complete mutual authentication and
establish a session key for data communication. As presented in figure 62, this process
starts when Ni prepares the connection request message that will be sent to the MG. All
IoT nodes inside the same virtual domain share a group ID (GID). Also, all IoT nodes
with the same type share a typeID (TID). Each IoT node stores three authentication
parameters that will be used during the authentication process. Each IoT node knows its
real and alias IDs, its MG's real and alias IDs, the OTT, the three authentication
parameters, and the chained hash PUF value. The steps involved in this process are listed
below.
As presented in figure 62, this phase starts when NW prepares the connection
request message that will be sent to the MG. The steps involved in this process are listed
below.
5.6.3.3.1

Step 1: Interaction Request

1. N generates a new TSN1 to avoid replay attacks
2. N computes X1
a. X1 = H (S2 ||S3)
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IoT(N)

Mini Gateway (MG)

Generate: TSN1, RVN1
Compute:
X1 = H (S2 ||S3)
X2 = RVN1 ⊕ OTT
SN = H (NIDR||TSN1 || RVN1|| X1)
M1: (NIDA, TSN1, X2, SN)
Check:|TSRec− TS’N1 |< ∆T
Find: NIDR
Read: GIDN, TIDN, CMG, and OTT
Compute:
RMG = PUF(CMG)
S’1 = H ((NIDR || MGIDR || RMG)
S’2 = H (S’1 || MGIDR || GIDN)
S’3 = H (S2’|| MGIDR || TIDN)
X1’ = H (S2’ ||S3’)
RV’N1 = OTT’ ⊕ X2
Verify: SN’ = H (NIDR|| TS’N1, || RV’N1 || X1)
Generate: TSMG1, RV1MG, SID
Computes:
Y1 = H (S’1|| S’2)
Y2 = RVMG1 ⊕OTT
C’ = C ⊕ H(RVMG1)
Y3 = H (MGIDR || TSMG1 || RVN1 || RVMG1 ||C||Y1)
M2: (MGIDA, SID, TSMG1, Y2, C’, Y3)
Check: |TS’Rec−TS’MG1 |< ∆T
Compute:
Y1’ = H (S’1|| S’2)
RV’MG1 = Y2 ⊕ OTT
CX = C’ ⊕ H(RV’MG1)
Verify
Y3’ = H (MGIDR || TSMG1 || RVN1 || RVMG1 ||C||Y1)
Generate: TSN2, RVN2
Read: CHXi
Compute
Ri = PUF(C’)
CHXi+1 = H (Ri || CHXi)
Ci+1 = H (RV’MG1 || RVN1)
Ri+1 = PUF (Ci+1)
X3 = RVN2 ⊕ CHXi+1
Rx = H (RVN2|| CHXi+1) ⊕ Ri+1
OTTnew = H (OTPnew-1|| C’ || Ri)
NIDAnew = H (RVMG1|| NWIDAnew-1)
X4 = H (NIDR|| TSN2|| RVN2 || CHXi+1 || Ri+1 || Ci+1 || OTTnew || NIDAnew)
M3: (NIDA, TSN2, X3, Rx, X4)

Check: |TS’Rec− TS’N2 |< ∆T
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Read: R’i and the CHX’i
Compute:
CHX’i+1 = H (R’i || CHX’i)
C’i+1 = H (RVMG1 || RV’N1)
RV’N2 = X3 ⊕ CHXi+1
Ri+1’ = Rx ⊕ H (RV’N2|| CHXi+1)
OTTnew = H (OTPnew-1|| C’ || Ri)
NIDAnew = H (RVMG1|| NWIDAnew-1)
Verify:
X4’ = X4 = H (NIDR|| TS’N2|| RV’N2 || CHX’i+1
|| R’x || C’i+1|| OTTnew || NIDAnew )
Store: CHXi+1, OTTnew, NIDAnew, C’i+1, Ri+1

Figure 62: MG-N mutual authentication process
3. N selects a random parameter RVN1 and then calculates X2
4. X2 = RVN1 ⊕ OTT
5. N computes SN = H (NIDR||TSN1 || RVN1|| X1)
6. N sends a connection request message.
The connection request includes NIDA, TSN1, X2, and SN, as shown in 5.11.
N
5.6.3.3.2

MG (NIDA, TSN1, X2, SN)

(5.11)

Step 2: mini-gateway response

Once the MG receives the connection request, it will complete the following steps:
1. MG checks the validity of the received timestamp |TSRec− TS’N1 |< ∆T. TSRec is
the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the timestamp and
the time when the message is received is higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. MG retrieves from its database the NIDR that corresponds to its NIDA. If the MG
did not find the NIDA in its database, it will ignore and drop the connection
request.
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3. Once the MG finds the NIDR, it will retrieve it along with the GIDN, TIDN, CMG, and
OTT of N.
4. MG passes the challenge CMG to its PUF function and generates a response RMG
a. RMG = PUF(CMG)
5. MG uses the generated RMG to compute S1' by applying a one-way hash function.
Based on the calculated Auth1', the IG calculates Auth2' as presented in 5.12.
Also, the MG calculates S2’ and S3’as presented in 5.13 and 5.14.
S’1 = H ((NIDR || MGIDR || RMG)

(5.12)

S’2 = H (S’1 || MGIDR || GIDN)

(5.13)

S’3 = H (S2’|| MGIDR || TIDN)

(5.14)

6. MG computes X1’ = H (S2’ ||S3’)
7. MG computes the RV’N1 = OTT ⊕ X2

8. The MG uses NIDR, TSN1, RVN1, and X1 to generate using a one-way hash
function, as shown in figure 63. If the computed value is equal to the received
value, the MG accepts the connection request; otherwise, it will drop it.
SN’ = H (NIDR|| TS’N1, || RV’N1 || X1)
If SN = SN” Then
The MG will accept the connection request
Else
The MG will drop the connection request
Figure 63: Evaluate the IoT node interaction request parameter
Once the MG accepts the message, it generates a timestamp and a random value
RVMG. Also, the MG generates a session ID. The session ID aims to distinguish one
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session from the rest of the running sessions simultaneously. Furthermore, the MG will
retrieve a challenge(C) from its database. The MG prepares and sends a connection
response to the IoT node. The preparation process of the connection response message
includes the following steps:
1. MG calculates Y1
a. Y1 = H (S’1|| S’2)
2. MG selects a random parameter RV1MG and then calculates Y2
a. Y2 = RVMG1 ⊕ OTT
3. MG generates a new TSMG1
4. MG generates a session ID(SID)
5. C’ = C ⊕ H(RVMG1)
6. MG calculates Y3
Y3 = H (MGIDR || TSMG1 || RVN1 || RVMG1 ||C||Y1)
7. MG sends a connection response message
The connection response includes MGIDA, session ID(SID), TSMG1, Y2, C’, and Y3, as
shown in 5.15.
MG
5.6.3.3.3

NW Conn-Res (MGIDA, SID TSMG1, Y2, C’, Y3)

Step 3: mini-gateway authentication

Once N receives the connection response, it completes the following steps:
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(5.15)

1. N checks the validity of the received timestamp |TS’Rec−TS’MG1 |< ∆T.
S’MGRec is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum
transmission delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the
timestamp and when the message is received is higher than the expected
maximum transmission delay.
2. N calculates Y1’ = H (S’1|| S’2)
3. N calculates the RV’MG1 = Y2 ⊕ OTT
4. N calculates the CX = C’ ⊕ H(RV’MG1)
5. As presented in figure 64, N calculates Y3’ using a one-way hash function and
compares the generated Y3’ with the received Y3. If the two values are the
same, N will authenticate MG; otherwise, it will drop it.

Y3’ = H (MGIDR || TSMG1 || RVN1 || RVMG1 ||C||Y1)
If Y3’ = Y3 Then
Then N will accept the connection response and authenticate MG
Else
N will drop the connection response
Figure 64: Evaluate the MG authentication parameter
Once N accepts the received message and authenticates MG, it will complete the
following steps
1. N will input the received challenge Cx to its PUF and obtains the response Ri.
a. Ri = PUF(C’)
2. N will retrieve the chained hash response s(CHXi) from its memory and calculate
the new value of the chained has responses (CHXi+1) as follows
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a. CHXi+1 = H (Ri || CHXi)
b. N will compute a new challenge (Ci+1). Then N will input the Ci+1 into a
PUF function to obtains a new CRP for the next authentication session
where:
•

Ci+1 = H (RV’MG1 || RVN1)

•

Ri+1 = PUF (Ci+1)

3. N generates a new TSN2 to avoid replay attacks
4. N selects a random parameter RVN2 and then calculates X3
a. X3 = RVN2 ⊕ CHXi+1
5. N calculates Rx = H (RVN2|| CHXi+1) ⊕ Ri+1
6. N generate a new OTTnew
a. OTTnew = H (OTTnew-1|| C’ || Ri)
7. N calculate a new Alias ID for the N
a.

NIDAnew = H (RVMG1|| NWIDAnew-1)

8. N calculate X4
a. X4 = H (NIDR|| TSN2|| RVN2 || CHXi+1 || Ri+1 || Ci+1 || OTTnew || NIDAnew)
9. N sends the message to the MG
The message includes NIDA, SID, TS’N2, RV’N2, X3, Rx, and X4, as shown in 5.16.
N
5.6.3.3.4

MG (NIDA, TSN2, X3, Rx, X4)

Step 4: IoT node authentication
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(5.16)

Once MG receives the message, it completes the following steps:
1. MG checks the validity of the received timestamp |TS’Rec− TS’N2 |< ∆T. TS’Rec is
the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the timestamp and the
time when the message is received is higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. MG will retrieve the R’i and the CHX’i from its databased and computes CHX’i+1
a. CHX’i+1 = H (R’i || CHX’i)
3. MG calculates the new challenge C’i+1 = H (RVMG1|| RV’N1)
4. MG calculates the RV’N2 = X3 ⊕ CHXi+1
5. MG computes the Ri+1’ = Rx ⊕ H (RV’N2|| CHXi+1)
6. MG computes OTTnew = H (OTTnew-1|| C’ || Ri)
7. MG computes NIDAnew = H (RVMG1|| NWIDAnew-1)
As presented in figure 65, MG calculates X4’ using a one-way hash function and
compares the generated X4’ with the received X4. MG will authenticate N; otherwise,
it will drop it if the two values are the same.
X4’ = X4 = H (NIDR|| TS’N2|| RV’N2 || CHX’i+1 || R’x || C’i+1|| OTTnew || NIDAnew)
If X4’ = X4
Then
Then MG will authenticate the N.
Else
MG will drop the connection response
Figure 65: Evaluate the IG authentication parameter
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After authenticating the N, the MG will store the new CRP (C’i+1, R’i+1) in its
database for the next authentication session. Also, The MG will override the old CHXi
with the new chained hash response value CHXi+1. Then the MG will store the new OTT
and the new alias ID for the N. The algorithm for the proposed IoT- mini gateway mutual
authentication mechanism is shown in detailed steps in figure 66.
Algorithm 4 The mutual authentication between IoT device and the MG
Input:
An IoT device with real identity (NIDR), alias identity (NIDA), MG real identity
(MGIDR), MG alias identity (IGIDR), Authentication parameters (S1, S2, and S3), and
one-time token (OTT)
MG with real identity (NIDR), alias identity (NIDA), MG real identity (MGIDR), MG
alias identity (MGIDR), the virtual domain Group ID(GID) and type ID (TID) of the IoT
node, PUF challenge (CMG), and one-time token (OTT)
Output:
Mutual authentication between the IoT device(N) and the MG
Begin
1. The IoT device generates a random nonce RVN1, a timestamp TSN1, computes the
X1 = H (S2 ||S3), X2 = RVN1 ⊕ OTT, and SN = H (NIDR||TSN1 || RVN1|| X1)
2. IoT device sends (NIDA, TSN1, X2, SN) message to the MG.
3.

If (the MG finds NIDA in its repository)

4. then
5.

MG verifies the timestamp TSN1 and retrieves NIDR, OTT, GID, CMG, and
TID that belongs to the NIDA from its repository to its memory.

6.

The MG passes the challenge CMG to its PUF function and generates a
response MG. The MG calculates S1’, S2’, and S3’. Then the MG computes
X1’, retrieves the RVN1 from XORing OTT and NX2 and finally calculates
SN’ =H (NIDR||TSN1 || RVN1|| X1) message

7.

If (the calculated hash message in step 7 matches the hash message that was
214

sent in step 2)
8.

then

9.

MG generates a timestamp TSMG1, generates a random nonce RVMG1,

10.

retrieves the challenge (Ci) from its database. Then, MG calculates
Y1 = H (S’1|| S’2), Y2 = RVMG1 ⊕OTT, C’ = C ⊕ H(RVMG1) and
Y3 = H (MGIDR || TSMG1 || RVN1 || RVMG1 ||C||Y1)
The MG sends < MGIDA, SID, TSMG1, Y2, C’, Y3> message to N.

11.
12.

else

13.

Go to step 34.

14.

end if

15. else
16.

Go to step 34.

17. end if
18. N verifies the time stamp, calculates Y1’ = H (S’1|| S’2) and retrieves RVMG1 from
xoring OTT and Y2 and C from xoring C’ and H(RVMG1). Then, N generates Y3’ =
H (MGIDR || TSMG1 || RVN1 || RVMG1 ||C||Y1).
Also, N computes C1 from CX. N applies the PUF function to calculate R1 for
C1.
19. If (the calculated hash message in step 18 matches the hash message that was sent
in step 11)
20. then
21.

The authenticity of the MG is verified

22. N generates a timestamp TSN2, a random nonce RVN2, and retrieves CHXi. N
computes Ri = PUF(C’), CHXi+1 = H(Ri || CHXi ), Ci+1 = H (RV’MG1 || RVN1), Ri+1
= PUF (Ci+1 ), X3 = RVN2 ⊕ CHXi+1 , Rx = H (RVN2|| CHXi+1 ) ⊕ Ri+1, OTTnew =
H (OTPnew-1|| C’ || Ri ), NIDAnew = H (RVMG1|| NWIDAnew-1 ), and X4 = H(NIDR||
TSN2|| RVN2 || CHXi+1 || Ri+1 || Ci+1 || OTTnew || NIDAnew)
23. N sends < NIDA, TSN2, X3, Rx, X4 > message to MG.
24. else
25.

Go to step 34.

26. end if
27. The MG verifies the TSN2 and retrieves R’i and the CHX’i. N computes CHX’i+1 =
H (R’i || CHX’i), C’i+1 = H (RVMG1 || RV’N1), RV’N2 = X3 ⊕ CHXi+1, Ri+1’ = Rx ⊕
H (RV’N2|| CHXi+1), OTTnew = H (OTPnew-1|| C’ || Ri, NIDAnew = H (RVMG1||
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NWIDAnew-1). Then N generates X4’ = X4 = H (NIDR|| TS’N2|| RV’N2 || CHX’i+1 || R’x
|| C’i+1|| OTTnew ||NIDAnew)
28. If (the calculated hash message in step 27 matches the hash message that was sent
in step 23)
29. then
30.

The authenticity of the IoT device is verified.

31. else
32.

Go to step 34.

33. End if
34. Stop (terminates the connection)
35. End
Figure 66: Algorithm 4 the mutual authentication between IoT device and the MG
5.6.3.3.5

Key generation phase

Once the mutual authentication is completed, the two sides will generate a shared
secret session key (SK) that will be used to encrypt all the subsequent communication
between N and MG. The two sides will generate the ssk locally by hashing a combination
of the PUF responses and the generated random values, as presented in 5.17. The
uniqueness of the PUF responses ensures the uniqueness of the generated ssk.
ssk = H (RVN1 || Ri || RVN2 || RV’MG1)
5.7

(5.17)

Evaluation Process
The following section presents a detailed security and performance analysis of the

proposed scheme and compares the analysis results with other related schemes presented
in the literature.
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5.7.1

Security validation of the proposed scheme
In this section, we conduct both formal and informal security analysis. The formal

evaluation uses two different approaches. The first formal evaluation approach is
simulation-based using AVISPA tool to ensure that the proposed scheme is secure against
active and passive attacks such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. The
second evaluation approach theorem proving-based to perform the logical verification
using BAN logic to confirm that the authenticated participants share the secret parameters
securely in the proposed protocols. The BAN logic is used as an illustrative method of the
essential concepts of an authentication protocol and as a basic verification tool for a
security protocol. After completing the formal evaluation, we examine the proposed
protocols against the well-known attacks and prove that the proposed protocols satisfy the
main security properties.
5.7.1.1

Formal Security Evaluation

5.7.1.1.1

Security Verification Using AVISPA

5.7.1.1.1.1

Protocol 1: parent gateway-child gateway mutual authentication

The abstract notations used to describe the authentication protocol and the
corresponding AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions are presented in table 16.
Table 16: Abstract notation and AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions for
protocol specification
Notation

Description

PG

Parent gateway

ChG

Child gatetway
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ChGIDR

CIDR

ChGIDA

CIDA

PGIDR

PIDR

PGIDA

PIDA

MSK

MSK

OTP

OTP

Xc

Xc

RVChG1

RVCone

X1

Xone

X2

Xtwo

Yx

Yx

Y1

Yone

Y2

Ytwo

RVPG1

RVPone

Xcc

Xcc

X3

Xthree

X4

Xfour
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RVChG2

RVCtwo

TK11, TK12

TKone, TKtwo

YxP

YxP

Y3

Ythree

Y4

Yfour

YP

YP

OTPx

OTPnew

ChGIDAx

CIDAnew

Sk

SK

TSPG

TSoneP,TstwoP

TSChG

TsoneC,TstwoC

⊕

XOR

H

H

The main goals of the simulation are as follows:
13. Goal 1: The secrecy_of secRVCone represents that RVCone is kept secret to
(C, P) only.
14. Goal 2: The secrecy_of secRVCtwo represents that RVCtwo is kept secret to
(C, P) only.
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15. Goal 3: The secrecy_of secRVPone represents that RVPone is kept secret to
(C, P) only
16. Goal 4: The secrecy_of secOTP represents that OTP is kept secret to (C, P)
only
17. Goal 5: The secrecy_of secTKone represents that TKone is kept secret to (C,
P) only.
18. Goal 6: The secrecy_of secTKtwo represents that TKtwo is kept secret to (C,
P) only.
19. Goal 7: The secrecy_of secOTPnew represents that the secret key secOTPnew
is permanently kept secret, known to only (C and P).
20. Goal 8: The secrecy_of secCIDR represents that the NIDR is permanently
kept secret, known to only (C and P).
21. Goal 9: The secrecy_of secPIDR represents that the IGIDR is permanently
kept secret, known to only (C and P).
22. Goal 10: The secrecy_of secCIDAnew represents that CIDAnew is
permanently kept secret, known to only (C and P).
23. Authentication Property 1: The authentication_on RVPone represents that P
generates RVPone. If N securely receives RVPone through a message, it
authenticates P.
24. Authentication Property 2: The authentication_on rvcone represents that C
generates RVCone. If P securely receives rvpone through a message, it
authenticates C.
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To achieve the goals mentioned above, we wrote the HLPSL script for the
protocol. The entities involved in the communication process are modeled as roles with
their message exchanges. There are four defined roles: that are: (1) role_C that is played
by the child gateway; (2) role _P that is played by the parent gateway; (3) session, where
the session role and all its declarations are deﬁned, (4) and environment, which
instantiates all agents, variables, and functions.
Figure B_1 in Appendix B presents the role of the child gateway that is played by
C. C is aware of the C and P agents in the protocol, its alias identity (CIDA), and the P
alias identity (PIDA). Also, it is aware of its own real identity (CIDR) and P real identity
(PIDR) that should be kept secured. Furthermore, C is aware of MSK and OTP that are
generated by the parent gateway, its PUF challenge (CPC), the parent gateway
authentication parameter (PAU), the hash function H (·), and the send/receive channels
Snd/Rcv. The (dy) notation indicates that the channels are following the Dolev-Yao
model. At the first state “state 2,” C receives a start message “Rcv(start)” as a signal to
begin the protocol run. The keyword ‘Played_by C’ denotes that the role of the child
gateway is played by agent C. All employed local variables in this role are defined under
the local section. C generates new random values (TSoneC and RVCone) and computes
Xc, Xone, and Xtwo. The computation process of the Xc, Xone, and Xtwo follows the
presented protocol description. C sends CIDA, TSoneC, Xone, Xtwo to P.
At the second transition, “State 4”, C receives the (PIDA, SIDNIG, TSoneP,
Yone, Ytwo) message from the P. The computation of Yx, Yone, and Ytwo follows the
description of the protocol. At this transition, if the Ytwo appears as expected by C and C
correctly verified RVPone, then C authenticates P. Then C generates new random values
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(TStwoC and RVCtwo) and computes Xcc, Xthree, and Xfour. The computation process
of the Xcc, Xthree, and Xfour follows the presented protocol description. C sends CIDA,
TStwoC, Xthree, Xfour to P.
At the third transition, “State 6”, C received the (PIDA, SIDNIG, TStwoP,
Ythree, Yfour, YPx) from P. C calculates and verifies the received Tokens, new OTP,
and New Alias ID. After completing the verification process, C will store the tokens, its
new alias ID and the new NOTP on its own memory. C will use the new NOPT during
the next authentication session. The “end role” at the end of the C role denotes the end of
the role Node played by C.
Figure B_2 in Appendix B shows the role of the Parent Gateway played by P. is
aware of all agents in the protocol (C and P), its alias and real identities (PIDA, PIDR),
the Alias and real identities (CIDA, CIDR) of the C node. P knows the OTP, the MSK, its
PUF challenge (CPP), C authentication parameter (CAU), the hash function H(·), and the
send/receive channels Snd/Rcv.
At the first transition, “State 1”, P receives the (CNIDA, TSoneC, Xone, Xtwo)
message which was sent by C. The extraction and computation of RVCone, Xc, Xone,
and Xtwo follow the presented scheme's description. Once the P verifies Xtwo, it
generates a fresh value RVPone and a TSoneP and computes Yx, Yone, and Ytwo. Then
the P sends to C (PIDA, SIDNID, TSoneP, Yone, Ytwo). The computation of Yone and
Ytwo follows the description of the introduced scheme.
At the second transition, “State 3”, P received the (CIDA, SIDNIG,
TStwoC,Xthree, Xfour) from the C. The computation of the Xthree and Xfour followed
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the description of the presented protocol. At this transition, if the Xfour is proved to be
valid by P, P will authenticate C. Consequently, P will generate a new alias ID for C and
a new OTP. The computations of NnewIDA and OPTnew follows the description of the
presented protocol. Also, the P generates two tokens that act as a one-time secret code
that C can use to authenticate its peer Cs. P will then send to C (PIDA, SIDNIG,
TStwoP, Ythree, Yfour, and YP). The “end role” at the end of the P role denotes the end
of the role Node played by P.
Figure B_3 in Appendix B demonstrates the session role where all the two agents’
roles are invoked and all the session parameters are defined. Both the parent gateway and
the child gateway roles are invoked with C and P as agents. CIDA, PIDA, CIDR, PIDR,
OTP, MSK, CPC, PAU, CPP, CAU are predefined as constants. H is defined as the hash
function. SND1, RCV1, SND2, and RCV2 are defined as send and receive channels for
C and P. The “end role” at the end of the session role indicates the end of this role.
Figure B_4 in Appendix B shows the environment role. In this role, one or more
sessions are instantiated. First, all constants are instantiated and defined. The constants, c,
and p are instantiated as agents representing agents C and P. The constants cida, pida,
cidr, pidr, otp, msk, cpp,cau,cpc, and pau instantiates CIDA, PIDA, CIDR, PIDR, OTP,
MSK, CPP,CAU,CPC,and PAU respectively. The function h instantiates the hash
function H. The protocol identifiers are secNIDR, secPIDR, secOTP, secMSK,
secRVoneC, secRVtwoC, secRVoneP, secTKone, secTKtwo, secOTPnew,secCIDAnew,
secYxP, rvcone and rvpone are also instantiated and defined. In the intruder knowledge
section, all relevant values that the intruder is assumed to know before the execution are
provided. The attacker is assumed to know c and p. He/ she is also assumed to know the
223

hash h. The session is instantiated with c, p, cida, cidr, pida,pidr,otp, msk,
cpp,cau,cpc,pau and h instances in the composition section. The “end role” at the end of
the environment role denotes the end of this role.
Figure B_5 in Appendix B presents the simulation goals which are declared under
the “goal” keyword using the protocol identifiers declared as ‘protocol_id’. The simulator
is dictated to check the secrecy CIDR, PIDR, OTP,MSK,RVoneC,RvtwoC, RVoneP,
TKone, TKtwo, OTPnew, and CIDAnew at different states using secrecy_of secCIDR’,
‘secrecy_of secPIDR’, ‘secrecy_of secRVoneC’, ‘secrecy_of secRVtwoC’, ‘secrecy_of
secRVoneP’, ‘secrecy_of secOTP’, ‘secrecy_of secTKone, secrecy_of secTKtwo,
‘secrecy_of secOTPnew, and ‘secrecy_of secCIDAnew’. The authentication is checked
using ‘authentication_on rvonec and ‘authentication_on rvonep’. The “end role” at the
end of the goal section denotes the end of this role.
5.7.1.1.1.1.1 Protocol 1: parent gateway-child gateway simulation results
A security protocol animator (SPAN) is used to build a Message Sequence Chart
(MSC) of the protocol execution from the outlined HLPSL specification. Moreover,
SPAN automatically creates attacks on HLPSL specifications using the well-known
“Dolev-Yao” intruder model. The SPAN protocol simulation’s MSC corresponding to the
HLPSL specification is shown in figure 67.
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Figure 67: Snapshot of the protocol simulation in AVISPA

In the AVISPA tool, the security properties such as authentication, integrity, and
secrecy are specified in a separate section. Therefore, when SPAN is executed, it verifies
if the protocol satisfies the specified properties. SPAN generates the attack trace if any
attack is found, and it will consider the protocol unsafe. The presented protocol's
simulation results are achieved by the OFMC back-end checker and the CL-AtSe backend checker. Figure 68 shows the CL-AtSe back-end checker report, which guarantees
that the protocol is SAFE and satisfies all the specified security goals. Figure 69 presents
the OFMC back-end checker report shows that the protocol is SAFE, thus meeting the
defined security goals. In summary, we can conclude that the proposed protocol is secure.
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Figure 68: CL-AtSe summary report

Figure 69: OFMC summary report
5.7.1.1.1.2

Protocol 2: child gateway-child gateway mutual authentication

The abstract notations used to describe the authentication protocol and the
corresponding AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions are presented in table 17.
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Table 17: Abstract notation and AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions for
protocol specification
Notation

Description

Cone

First child gateway

Ctwo

Second child gateway

ChG_1IDR

ConeIDR

ChG_1IDA

ConeIDA

ChG_2IDR

CtwoIDR

ChG_2IDA

CtwoIDA

MSK

MSK

TK

TK

Rj

Rj

RVChG11

RCone

T1

Tone

T2

Ttwo

T3

Tthree

D1

Done

D2

Dtwo
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D3

Dthree

RVChG21

RCCone

T4

Tfour

T5

Tfive

RVChG21

RCCone

TK

TK

TSChG11, TSChG12

TSoCone,TStCone

TSChG21

TSoCtwo

⊕

XOR

H

H

The main goals of the simulation are as follows:
1. Goal 1: The secrecy_of secRCone represents that RCone is kept secret to
(Cone, Ctwo) only.
2. Goal 2: The secrecy_of secRCCone represents that RCCone is kept secret to
(Cone, Ctwo) only.
3. Goal 3: The secrecy_of secRCtwo represents that RCtwo is kept secret to
((Cone, Ctwo) only
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4. Goal 4: The secrecy_of secTK represents that TK is kept secret to ((Cone,
Ctwo) only
5. Goal 5: The secrecy_of secMSK represents that MSK is kept secret to ((Cone,
Ctwo) only.
6. Goal 6: The secrecy_of secConeIDR represents that the secConeIDR is
permanently kept secret, known to only (Cone and Ctwo).
7. Goal 7: The secrecy_of secCtwoIDR represents that the secCtwoIDR is
permanently kept secret, known to only (Cone and Ctwo).
8. Authentication Property 1: The authentication_on RCone represents that
ChG_1 generates RCone. If ChG_2 proves that it securely receives and
successfully verifies RCone, ChG_1 authenticate ChG_2.
9. Authentication Property 2: The authentication_on RCCone represents that
ChG_2 generates RCCone. If ChG_1 proves that it securely receives and
successfully verifies RCone, ChG_2 authenticate ChG_1
To achieve the goals mentioned above, we wrote the HLPSL script for the
protocol. The entities involved in the communication process are modeled as roles with
their message exchanges. There are four defined roles: that are: (1) role_Cone that is
played by the first child gateway; (2) role_Ctwo that is played by the second child
gateway; (3) session, where the session role and all its declarations are deﬁned, (4) and
environment, which instantiates all agents, variables, and functions.
As presented figure B_6 in Appendix B, the role of the first child gateway is
played by Cone. Cone is aware of the Cone and Ctwo agents in the protocol, and its alias
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identity (ConeIDA), and the Ctwo alias identity (CtwoIDA). Also, it is aware of its own
real identity (ConeIDR) and the Ctwo real identity (ConeIDR) that should be kept secured.
Furthermore, Cone is aware of the master secret key (MSK) and one-time token (TK) that
are generated by the parent gateway, the hash function H (·), and the send/receive
channels Snd/Rcv. The (dy) notation indicates that the channels are following the DolevYao model.
At the first state “state 2,” Cone receives a start message “Rcv(start)” as a signal to
begin the protocol run. The keyword ‘Played_by Cone’ denotes that agent Cone plays the
role of the child gateway. All employed local variables in this role are defined under the
local section. Cone generates new random values (TSoCone and RCone) and computes Rj,
Tone, and Ttwo. The computation process of the Rj, Tone, and Ttwo follows the presented
protocol description. Cone sends (ConeIDA, Tone, Ttwo) to the Ctwo.
At the second transition, “State 4”, Cone receives the (CtwoIDA, SIDNIG, Dtwo,
Dthree) message from the Ctwo. At this transition, if the Dtwo appears as expected by Cone
and Cone correctly verified Dtwo and RCone, then Cone authenticates Ctwo. Then Cone
generates new random values (TStCone and RCtwo) and computes Tthree, Tfour, and
Tfive. The computation process of the Tthree, Tfour, and Tfive follows the presented
protocol description. Cone sends (ConeIDA, Tfour, Tfive) to the Ctwo. The “end role” at
the end of the Cone role denotes the end of the role Node played by Cone.
Figure B_7 in Appendix B shows the role of the second child Gateway played by
Ctwo. Ctwo is aware of all agents in the protocol (Cone and Ctwo), its alias and real identities
(CtwoIDA, CtwoIDR), the Alias and real identities (ConeIDA, ConeIDR) of the Cone
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node. Ctwo knows the TK, the MSK, the hash function H (·), and the send/receive
channels Snd/Rcv.
At the first transition, “State 1”, Ctwo receives the (ConeIDA, Tone, Ttwo)
message which was sent by Cone. Once the Ctwo verifies Ttwo, it generates a fresh value
RCCone and a TSoCtwo and computes Done, Dtwo, and Dthree. Then the Ctwo will send
to Cone (CtwoIDA, SIDNID, Dtwo, Dthree). At this transition, if the Tfive appears as
expected by Ctwo and Ctwo correctly verified Tfive and RCCone, then Ctwo authenticates
Cone. The “end role” at the end of the Ctwo role denotes the end of the role Node played
by Ctwo
Figure B_8 in Appendix B shows the session role where the two agents’ roles are
invoked, and all the session parameters are defined. First, all known constant parameters
and their declarations are presented. The predefined constants are ConeIDR, CtwoIDA,
CtwoIDR, ConeIDA, TK, and MSK as predefined constants, and H as the hash function.
A send and receive channel is assigned to each agent under the local section. The “end
role” at the end of the session role indicates the end of this role.
Figure B_9 in Appendix B shows the environment role. In this role, one or more
sessions are instantiated. First, all constants are instantiated and defined. The constants,
cone, and ctwo are instantiated as agents representing agents Cone and Ctwo. The
constants coneida, coneidr, ctwoida, ctwoidr, tk and msk instantiates ConeIDA,
ConeCIDR, CtwoIDA, CtwoIDR, TK, and MSK, respectively. The function h instantiates
the hash function H. The protocol identifiers are secConeIDR, secCtwoIDR, secTK,
secMSK, secRCone, secRCCone, secRCtwo, rcone and rccone are also instantiated and
defined. In the intruder knowledge section, all relevant values that the intruder is assumed
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to know before the execution are provided. The attacker is assumed to know cone and
ctwo. He/ she is also assumed to know the hash h. The session is instantiated with cone,
ctwo, coneida, coneidr, ctwoida, ctwoidr,tk, msk, and h instances in the composition
section. The “end role” at the end of the environment role denotes the end of this role.
Figure B_10 in Appendix B shows the simulation goals which are declared under
the “goal” keyword using the protocol identifiers declared as ‘protocol_id’. The simulator
is dictated to check the secrecy ConeIDR, CtwoIDR, TK, MSK, RCCone, RCtwo, and
RCCone, at different states using secrecy_of secConeIDR’, ‘secrecy_of secCtwoIDR’,
‘secrecy_of secRCone’, ‘secrecy_of secRCtwo’, ‘secrecy_of secRCCone’, ‘secrecy_of
secMSK’, and ‘secrecy_of secTK. The authentication is checked using
‘authentication_on rcone’ and ‘authentication_on rccone’. The “end role” at the end of
the goal section denotes the end of this role.
5.7.1.1.1.2.1

Simulation results

The SPAN protocol simulation’s MSC corresponding to our HLPSL specification
is shown in Figure 70. In the AVISPA tool, security properties such as authentication,
integrity, and secrecy are specified in a separate section. Therefore, when SPAN is
executed, it verifies if the protocol satisfies the specified properties. SPAN generates the
attack trace if an attack is found, and it considers the protocol unsafe. The presented
protocol's simulation results are achieved by the OFMC back-end checker and the CLAtSe back-end checker. Figure 71 shows the CL-AtSe back-end checker report, which
guarantees that the protocol is SAFE and satisfies all the specified security goals. Figure.
72 presents the OFMC back-end checker report shows that the protocol is SAFE, thus

232

meeting the defined security goals. In summary, we can conclude that the proposed
protocol is secure.

Figure 70: Snapshot of the protocol simulation in AVISPA

Figure 71: CL-AtSe summary report
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Figure 72: OFMC summary report
5.7.1.1.1.3

Protocol 3: mini-gateway-IoT node mutual authentication

The abstract notations used to describe the authentication protocol and the
corresponding AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions are presented in table 18.
Table 18: Abstract notation and AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions for
protocol specification
Notation

Description

N

N

MG

MG

SID

SIDNIG

NIDR

NIDR
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NIDA

NIDA

MGIDR

MGIDR

MGIDA

MGIDA

S1, S2, S3

T, X, Y

X1

Xone

X2

Xtwo

X3

Xthree

X4

Xfour

Y1

Yone

Y2

Ytwo

Y3

Ythree

Y4

Yfour

RX

RX

Sk

Skk

TSMG1

TSoneMG

TSN1, TSN2

TsoneN,TstwoN,

RVN1

Na
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RVN2

Naa

RVMG

Nb

Ri

Rone

Ri+1

Rtwo

C

Cone

Ci+1

Ctwo

C’

CMG

CHX

CHX

CHXi+1

CHXnew

⊕

XOR

H

H

NIDAnew

NnewIDA

OTPN

NOTP

The main goals of the simulation are as follows:
1. Goal 1: The secrecy_of secNa represents that Na is kept secret to (N, MG)
only.
2. Goal 2: The secrecy_of secNb represents that Nb is kept secret to (N, MG)
only
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3. Goal 3: The secrecy_of secNaa represents that Naa is kept secret to (N, MG)
only
4. Goal 4: The secrecy_of secOTT represents that OTP is kept secret to (N, MG)
only
5. Goal 5: The secrecy_of secNIDR represents that the NIDR is permanently
kept secret, known to only (N and MG).
6. Goal 6: The secrecy_of secMGIDR represents that the MGIDR is
permanently kept secret, known to only (N and MG).
7. Goal 7: The secrecy_of secX represents that X is permanently kept secret,
known to only (N and MG).
8. Goal 8: The secrecy_of secY represents that Y is permanently kept secret,
known to only (N and MG).
9. Goal 9: The secrecy_of secCone represents that Cone is permanently kept
secret, known to only (N and MG).
10. Goal 10: The secrecy_of secRone represents that Rone is permanently kept
secret, known to only (N and MG).
11. Goal 11: The secrecy_of secCHXnew represents that CHXnew is
permanently kept secret, known to only (N and MG).
12. Goal 12: The secrecy_of secRtwo represents that Rtwo is permanently kept
secret, known to only (N and MG).
13. Goal 13: The secrecy_of secNOTT represents that NOTP is permanently kept
secret, known to only (N and MG).
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14. Goal 14: The secrecy_of secNnewIDA represents that NnewIDA is
permanently kept secret, known to only (N and MG).
15. Authentication Property 1: The authentication_on na represents that N
generates Na. If MG securely receives Na through a message, it authenticates
N.
16. Authentication Property 2: The authentication_on Nb represents that MG
generates Nb. If N securely receives Nb through a message, it authenticates
MG.
To achieve the goals mentioned above, we wrote the HLPSL script for the
protocol. The entities involved in the communication process are modeled as roles with
their message exchanges. There are four defined roles: that are: (1) role_N that is played
by the IoT node; (2) role _MG that is played by the mini-gateway gateway; (3) session,
where the session role and all its declarations are deﬁned, (4) and environment, which
instantiates all agents, variables, and functions.
Figure B_11 in Appendix B presents the role of node N. Node N is aware of the N
and MG agents in the protocol, its alias identity (NIDA), and the MG alias identity
(MGIDA). Also, it is aware of its own real identity (NIDR) and the MG real identity
(MGIDR) that should be kept secured. Furthermore, N is aware of the three
authentication parameters (S1, S2, S3), one-time token (OTP), the hash function H (·), and
the send/receive channels Snd/Rcv. The (dy) notation indicates that the channels are
following the Dolev-Yao model. At the first state “state 2,” N receives a start message
“Rcv(start)” as a signal to begin the protocol run. All local variables are declared under
the local section. At the first transition, “State 2”, N generates new random values
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(TSoneN and Na) and computes Xone, Xtwo, and SN. The computation process of the
Xone,Xtwo, and SN follows the presented protocol description. N sends (NIDA,
TSoneN, Xtwo, SN) to the MG.
At the second transition, “State 4”, N receives the (MGIDA, SIDNIG, TSoneMG,
Ytwo, CMG, Ythree) message from the MG. At this transition, if the Ythree appears as
expected by N, then N authenticates the MG. After authenticating the MG, N generates a
new challenge CTwo and calculates the corresponding response Rtwo. Also, N generates
a new OTT (NOTT) and a new Alias ID (NnewIDA) to be used in the next authentication
session. Then N will store its new NnewIDA, and the new NOTT on its own memory.
The “end role” at the end of the N role denotes the end of the role Node played by N.
Figure B_12 in Appendix B shows the role of the mini gateway played by MG.
The MG is aware of all agents in the protocol (N and MG), its alias and real identities
(MGIDA, MGIDR), the Alias and real identities (NIDA, NIDR) of the N node. MG
knows the OTT, the virtual domain ID of N(GID), the typeID of N(TID), and the hash
function H (·), and the send/receive channels Snd/Rcv. The MG does not know S1, S2, or
S3 parameters that will be locally computed later using N's received authentication
parameters. All local variables are defined under the local section. At the first transition,
“State 1”, MG receives the (NIDA, TSoneN, Xtwo, SNG) message which was sent by N
in role node played by N. MG uses the N’ alias ID to retrieve its real ID, GID, TID, and
its OTT. MG verify the received SNG’. Once the MG verifies SNG, MG generates a
fresh value Nb and a TSoneMG. Also, MG retrieved N’s PUF challenge (Cone) from its
memory. Then, MG computes Yone, Ytwo, Ythree, and CMG. Then the MG will send to
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N (MGIDA, SIDNID, TSoneMG, Ytwo, CMG, Ythree). The computation for Ythree
follows the description of the introduced scheme.
At the second transition, “State 3”, MG received the (NIDA, SIDNIG, TSTwoN,
Xthree, RX, Xfour) from N. The computation of the Xfour followed the description of
the presented protocol. At this transition, if the Xfour is proved to be valid by MG, IG
will authenticate the N. Consequently, the MG stores the new C, new R, new alias ID for
N, and a new OTT in its database for the next authentication session. The computation of
NnewIDA and NOTT follows the description of the presented protocol. The “end role” at
the end of the IG role denotes the end of the role Node played by IG.
Figure B_13 in Appendix B shows the session role where the two agents’ roles
are invoked, and all the session parameters are defined. First, all known constant
parameters and their declarations are presented. The predefined constants are NIDR,
MGIDA, MGIDR, NIDA, OTT, T, X, Y, and CHX as predefined constants, and H as the
hash function. A send and receive channel is assigned to each agent under the local
section. The “end role” at the end of the session role indicates the end of this role.
Figure B_14 in Appendix B shows the environment role. In this role, one or more
sessions are instantiated. First, all constants are instantiated and defined. The constants n
and mg are instantiated as agents representing agents N and MG. The constants t,x,y,
nida, nidr , mgida , mgidr, ott,and chx instantiates T, X, Y, NIDA, NIDR, IGIDA,
IGIDR, OTT, and CHX, respectively. The function h instantiates the hash function H.
The protocol identifiers are secNIDR, secMGIDR, secOTT, secCHXnew, secNnewIDA,
secNOTP, secX,secY,secRtwo, secNa, secNb, secRtwo, secNaa, secRone, secCone, na,
and nb are also instantiated and defined. In the intruder knowledge section, all relevant
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values that the intruder is assumed to know before the execution are provided. The
attacker is assumed to know n and mg. He/ she is also assumed to know the hash h. The
session is instantiated with n, mg, nida, nidr, mgida,mgidr,t,x,y, ott,chx, and h instances
in the composition section. The “end role” at the end of the environment role
denotes the end of this role.
Figure B_15 in Appendix B shows the simulation goals which are declared under
the “goal” keyword using the protocol identifiers declared as ‘protocol_id’. The simulator
is dictated to check the secrecy NIDR, MGIDR, X,Y,Na,Nb,Naa,OTT,
Rone,Rtwo,Cone,CHXnew,NOTP,NnewIDA, and OTT at different states using
secrecy_of secNIDR’, ‘secrecy_of secMGIDR’, ‘secrecy_of secX’, ‘secrecy_of secY’,
‘secrecy_of secCone’ ,‘secrecy_of secRone’, ‘secrecy_of secRtwo’, ‘secrecy_of secNa’,
‘secrecy_of secNb’, ‘secrecy_of secNaa’, ‘secrecy_of secOTT’, ‘secrecy_of
secChXnew’, ‘secrecy_of secNnewIDA’ and ‘secrecy_of secNOTT’. The authentication
is checked using ‘authentication_on na’ and ‘authentication_on nb’. The “end role” at the
end of the goal section denotes the end of this role.
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5.7.1.1.1.3.1

Simulation results

The SPAN protocol simulation’s MSC corresponding to the HLPSL specification
is shown in figure 73. Figure 74 shows the CL-AtSe back-end checker report, which
guarantees that the protocol is SAFE and satisfies all the specified security goals. Figure.
75 presents the OFMC back-end checker report shows that the protocol is SAFE, thus
meeting the defined security goals. In summary, we can conclude that the proposed
SMART protocol is secure.

Figure 73: Snapshot of the protocol simulation in AVISPA
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Figure 74: CL-AtSe summary report

Figure 75: OFMC summary report
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5.7.1.1.2

Formal proof Based on BAN logic

5.7.1.1.2.1

Protocol 1: Parent gateway-child gateway mutual authentication

In this section, we use BAN logic to verify the legitimacy of the session key (ssk), the
TK12, TK13, and OTPx that are shared between the communicating entities C and P. To
ensure the security of the proposed protocol under BAN logic, it needs to satisfy a set of
security goals. The following section defines the main goals of the analysis of the
presented authentication scheme.
5.7.1.1.2.1.1

Protocol 1 Goals Identification

Goal 1: The C and the P want to establish a shared secret key (ssk) key that is
believed by each other.
G1_1: P believes that the C believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter between
C and P.
ssk

P| ≡ C|≡ (C

P)

G1_2: P believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between C and P.
P|≡ (C

ssk

P)

G1_3: C believes that the P believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter between
C and P.
ssk

C| ≡ P | ≡ (C

P)
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G1_4: C believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between C and P.

ssk

C| ≡ (C

P)

Goal 2: TK12 and TK13 are well protected and believed by C.
G2_1: C believes that the P believes that the TK12 and TK13 are securely shared
parameters between C and P.

TK12 and TK13

C| ≡ P | ≡ (C

P)

G2_2: C believes that TK12 and TK13 are securely shared parameters between C and P.

C| ≡ (C

TK12 and TK13

P)

Goal 3: P and C want to generate a secret one-time password (OTPx) that is
believed by each other.
G3_1: P believes that C believes that the OTPx is a securely shared parameter between P
and C.

OTPx

P| ≡ C|≡ (C

P)

G3_2: P believes that OTPx is a securely shared parameter between C and P.
OTPx

P|≡ (C

P)
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G3_3: C believes that the P believes that the OTPx is a securely shared parameter
between C and P.
OTPx

C| ≡ P | ≡ (C

P)

G3_4: C believes that OTPx is a securely shared parameter between C and P.

OTPx

C| ≡ (C
5.7.1.1.2.1.2

P)

Protocol 1 messages idealization

First, we transfer all transmitted messages into idealized form as follows:
M1: C

P:(ChGIDR, TSCHG1, RVCHG1) X1

M2: P

C:(PGIDR, TSPG1, RVPG1) YX

M3: C

P:(ChGIDR, TSCHG2, RVCHG2) XCC

M4: P

C:(PGIDR, TSPG2, TK12, TK13) OTP

5.7.1.1.2.1.3

Protocol 1 main assumptions

The second step to be completed is to define some assumptions as the initiative
promises. The fundamental assumptions of the presented authentication scheme are as
follows:
P1: P believes that X1 is a secure shared parameter between C and P
P| ≡ (C

X1

P)
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P2: P believes C believes that that X1 is a secure shared parameter between C and P
P | ≡ C| ≡ (C

X1

P)

P3: C believes that Yx is a secure shared parameter between C and P
Yx

C| ≡ (C

P)

P4: C believes P believes that Yx is a secure shared parameter between C and P
Yx

C | ≡ P| ≡ (C

P)

P5: P believes that Xcc is a secure shared parameter between C and P
P| ≡ (C

Xcc

P)

P6: P believes C believes that Xcc is a secure shared parameter between C and P
P | ≡ C| ≡ (C

Xcc

P)

P7: C believes that OTP is a secure shared parameter between C and P
OTP

C| ≡ (C

P)

P8: C believes P believes that OTP is a secure shared parameter between C and P
OTP

C | ≡ P| ≡ (C

P)

P9: P believes that OTP is a secure shared parameter between C and P
OTP

P| ≡ (C

P)

P10: P believes P believes that OTP is a secure shared parameter between C and P
OTP

P | ≡ C| ≡ (C

P)
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P 11: P believes ChGIDR is a secure shared parameter between C and P.

ChGIDR

P | ≡ (C

P)

P 12: P believes C believes that ChGIDR is a secure shared parameter between C and P.

ChGIDR

P | ≡ C| ≡ (C

P)

P13: C believes PGIDR is a secure shared parameter between C and P.

PGIDR

C | ≡ (C

P)

P14: C believes P believes that PGIDR is a secure shared parameter between C and P.

PGIDR

C | ≡ P| ≡ (C

P)

P 15: P believes TSChG1 is fresh.
P| ≡ #(TSChG1)
P 16: P believes TSChG2 is fresh.
P| ≡ #(TSChG2)
P 17: C believes TSPG1 is fresh.
C| ≡ #(TSPG1)
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P 18: C believes TSPG2 is fresh.
C| ≡ #(TSPG2)
P 19: P believes RVChG1 is fresh.
P| ≡ #(RVChG1)
P20: P believes that C believes RVChG1.
P| ≡ C | ≡ RVChG1
P21: P believes that C has jurisdiction over RVChG1. That is, C is an authority and
believes RVChG1.
P| ≡ C ⇒ RVChG1
P 22: P believes RVChG2 is fresh.
P| ≡ #(RVChG2)
P23: P believes that C believes RVChG2.
P| ≡ C | ≡ RVChG2
P24: P believes that C has jurisdiction over RVChG2. That is, C is an authority and
believes RVChG2.
P| ≡ C ⇒ RVChG2
P 25: C believes RVPG1 is fresh.
C| ≡ #(RVPG1)
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P26: C believes that P believes RVPG1.
C| ≡ P | ≡ RVPG1
P27: C believes that P has jurisdiction over RVPG1. That is, P is an authority and believes
RVPG1.
C| ≡ P ⇒ RVPG1
P28: P believes C believes that SK is a secure shared parameter between C and P.
ssk

P | ≡ C| ≡ (C

P)

P 29: C believes P believes that SK is a secure shared parameter between C and P.
ssk

C | ≡ P| ≡ (C

P)

P 30: C believes that P believes TK12.
C| ≡ P | ≡ TK12
P31: C believes that P has jurisdiction over TK12, which is securely shared parameter
between C and P. That is, P is an authority and believes TK12.
C| ≡ P ⇒ (C

TK12

P)

P 32: C believes that P believes TK13.
C| ≡ P | ≡ TK13
P33: C believes that P has jurisdiction over TK13, which is securely shared parameter
between C and P. That is, P is an authority and believes TK13.
C| ≡ P ⇒ (C

TK13
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P)

P34: C believes that P believes OPTx.
C| ≡ P | ≡ OTPx
P35: P believes that C believes OPTx.
P| ≡ C | ≡ OTPx
5.7.1.1.2.1.4

Analysis of the authentication protocol

We then prove that the proposed protocol achieves the security goals based on the
idealized form of the messages, assumptions, and BAN logic rules. The proposed
authentication scheme analysis is shown below to prove that the protocol achieves mutual
authentication between C and P.
According to M1:
V1: P◃(ChGIDR, TSChG1, RVChG1 )X1
According to P1, P11, and Rule 1, we derive the following:

V2:

P ,P ⊲(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ) 𝐶 𝑋1 𝑃
𝑃|≡C |∼ (𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1 )

𝑃|≡C X1

According to P15, P19, and rule 3, we derive the following:

V3:

𝑃|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1 )
𝑃|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1 )|
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According to P2, P12, V2, V3, and rule 2, we derive the following:
V4:

𝑃|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ),P|≡C~(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1 )
𝑃|≡C|≡(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1 )
According to V4, P20, P21, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V5:

P |≡C| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ,P |≡ C |≡𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1
P|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1

According to M2:
V6: C (PIDR, TSPG1, RVPG1) Yx
According to P3, P13 and Rule 1, we derive the following:

V7:

𝐶|≡P Yx C ,P ⊲(P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1 ) 𝐶 𝑌𝑥 𝑝
𝐶|≡P |∼ ( P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1 )

According to P17, P25, and rule 3, we derive the following:

V8:

𝐶 |≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺1 and 𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1 )
𝐶|≡#(P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1 )|

According to P4, P14, V7, V8 and rule 2, we derive the following:

V9:

𝐶 |≡#(P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1 ),C|≡P~(P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1 )
𝐶 |≡P|≡(P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1 )

According to P26, P27, V9, and rule 4, we derive the following:
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V10:

𝐶 |≡P|⇒𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1 ,C |≡ P |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1
C|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐺1

According to M3:

V11: P (ChGIDR, TSChG2, RVChG2) Xcc
According to P5, P11, and Rule 1, we derive the following:

V12:

P ,P ⊲(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺2 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2 ) 𝐶 𝑋𝐶𝐶 𝑃
𝑃|≡C |∼ (𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺2 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2 )

𝑃|≡C XCC

According to P16, P22, and rule 3, we derive the following:

V13:

𝑃|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2 )
𝑃|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺2 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2 )|

According to P6, P12, V12, V13, and rule 2, we derive the following:
V14:

𝑃|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺2 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2 ),P|≡C~(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺2 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2 )
𝑃|≡C|≡(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺2 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2 )
According to V14, P23, P24, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V15:

P |≡C| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2 ,P |≡ C |≡𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2
P|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺2

According to M4:
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V16: C (PIDR, TSPG2, TK12, TK13) OTP
According to P7, P13, V16 and Rule 1, we derive the following:

V17:

𝐶|≡P OTP C ,P ⊲(P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺2 ,𝑇𝐾1 ,𝑇𝐾2, ) 𝐶 𝑂𝑇𝑃 𝑃
𝐶|≡P |∼ ( P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺2 , 𝑇𝐾12 ,𝑇𝐾13 )

According to P18 and rule 3, we derive the following:

V18:

𝐶 |≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺2 )
𝐶|≡#( P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺2 ,𝑇𝐾1 ,𝑇𝐾2 )|

According to P8, P14, V17, V18 and rule 2, we derive the following:

V19:

𝐶|≡#(P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺2 , 𝑇𝐾12 ,𝑇𝐾13 ),C|≡P~(P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺2 , 𝑇𝐾12 ,𝑇𝐾13 )
𝐶 |≡P|≡(P𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐺2 , 𝑇𝐾12 ,𝑇𝐾13 )

According to P30, P31, P32, P33, V19, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V20:

𝐶 |≡P|⇒ 𝑇𝐾12 ,𝑇𝐾13 ,C |≡ P |≡ 𝑇𝐾12 ,𝑇𝐾13
C|≡ 𝑇𝐾12 ,𝑇𝐾13

As ssk = H (RVChG1|| RVChG2 || RVPG1 || OTP) and in combination with P9, V4, V14 we
can derive
ssk

V21: P| ≡C|≡ (C

P)

(Goal 1_1)

As ssk = H (RVChG1|| RVChG2 || RVPG1 || OTP) and in combination with P10, P28, V5,
V15 and V21
ssk

V22: P|≡ (C

P)
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(Goal 1_2)

As ssk = H (RVChG1|| RVChG2 || RVPG1 || OTP) and in combination with P7, V9, we can
derive
ssk

V23: C| ≡P|≡ (C

P)

(Goal 1_3)

As ssk = H (RVChG1|| RVChG2 || RVPG1 || OTP) and combining with P8, P29, V10, and
V23
ssk

V24: C|≡ (C

P)

(Goal 1_4)

Based on V20, we can derive
NOTP, TK1, TK2

V25: C| ≡ P| ≡ (C

P)

(Goal 2_1)

Based on P30, P32, V20, and V25, we derive the following
V26: C|≡ (C

NOTP, TK1, TK2

P)

(Goal 2_2)

As OTPx = H (OTP || RVChG1) and in combination with P9 and V4 we can derive
OTPx

V27: P| ≡C|≡ (C

P)

(Goal 3_1)

As OTPx = H (OTP || RVChG1) and in combination with P10, P35, V5, V15 and V27
OTPx

V28: P|≡ (C

P)

(Goal 3_2)

As OTPx = H (OTP || RVChG1) and in combination with P7 we can derive

OTPx

V29: C| ≡P|≡ (C

P)
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(Goal 3_3)

As OTPx = H (OTP || RVChG1) and combining with P8, P34, and V29
OTPx

V30: C|≡ (C

P)

(Goal 3_4)

Therefore, the above logic proves that the proposed protocol achieves the goals
1_1 to 1_4, goals 2-1 to 2-2, and goals 3_1 to 3_4 successfully. Thus, we prove that the
shared secret key ssk, OTPx, TK12, and TK13 are trusted by both C and the P. Based on
the above results, the achievement of goals 1_1 to 1_4, 2_1 to 2_2, and 3_1 to 3_4 proves
that the proposed protocol achieves the mutual authentication and the ssk, OTPx, TK12,
and TK13 are securely shared between C and P.
5.7.1.1.2.2

Protocol 2: Child gateway-child gateway mutual authentication

5.7.1.1.2.2.1

Protocol 2: Goals identification

Goal 1: The ChG_1 and the ChG_2 want to establish a shared secret key (ssk) key
that is believed by each other.
G1_1: ChG_2 believes that the ChG_1 believes that the ssk is a securely shared
parameter between ChG_1 and ChG_2.
ssk

ChG_2|≡ChG_1|≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)

G1_2: ChG_2 believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between ChG_1 and
ChG_2.
ssk

ChG_2|≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)
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G1_3: ChG_1 believes that the ChG_2 believes that the ssk is a securely shared
parameter between ChG_1 and ChG_2.
ssk

ChG_1|≡ChG_2|≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)

G1_4: ChG_1 believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between ChG_1 and
ChG_2.
ssk

ChG_1|≡ (ChG_1
5.7.1.1.2.2.2

ChG_2)

Protocol 2: message idealization

First, we transferred all transmitted messages into idealized form as follows.
M1: ChG_1

ChG_2:(ChGIDR_1, TK, TSChG11, RVChG11) Rj

M2: ChG_2

ChG_1:( ChGIDR_2, TK, MSK, TSChG21, RVChG21) D1

M3: ChG_1

ChG_2:(ChGIDR_1, TK, MSK, TSChG12, RVChG12) T3

5.7.1.1.2.2.3

Protocol 2 main assumptions

The second step to be completed is to define some assumptions as of the initiative
promises. The fundamental assumptions of the presented authentication protocol are as
follows:

P1: ChG_2 believes that Rj is a secure shared parameter between ChG_2 and ChG_1
ChG_2| ≡ (ChG_1

Rj

ChG_2)

P2: ChG_2 believes ChG_1 believes that Rj is a secure shared parameter between ChG_1
and ChG_2

Rj
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ChG_2 | ≡ ChG_1| ≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)

P3: ChG_1 believes that D1 is a secure shared parameter between ChG_1 and ChG_2
D1

ChG_1| ≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)

P4: ChG_1 believes ChG_2 believes that D1 is a secure shared parameter between
ChG_1 and ChG_2
D1

ChG_1 | ≡ ChG_2| ≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)

P5: ChG_2 believes that T3 is a secure shared parameter between ChG_1 and ChG_2
ChG_2| ≡ (ChG_1

T3

ChG_2)

P6: ChG_2 believes ChG_1 believes that T3 is a secure shared parameter between ChG_1
and ChG_2
T3

ChG_2 | ≡ ChG_1| ≡ (ChG_1
P 7: ChG_2 believes TSChG11 is fresh.
ChG_2| ≡ #(TSChG11)
P 8: ChG_2 believes TSChG12 is fresh.
ChG_2 | ≡ #(TSChG12)
P 9: ChG_1 believes TSChG21 is fresh.
ChG_1| ≡ #(TSChG21)
P 10: ChG_2 believes RVChG11 is fresh.
ChG_2 | ≡ #(RVChG11)
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ChG_2)

P11: ChG_2 believes that ChG_1 believes RVChG11.
ChG_2 | ≡ ChG_1 | ≡ RVChG11
P12: ChG_2 believes that ChG_1 has jurisdiction over RVChG11. That is, ChG_1 is an
authority and believes RVChG11.
ChG_2 | ≡ ChG_1 ⇒ RVChG11
P 13: ChG_2 believes RVChG12 is fresh.
ChG_2 | ≡ #(RVChG12)
P14: ChG_2 believes that ChG_1 believes RVChG12.
ChG_2 | ≡ ChG_1 | ≡ RVChG12
P15: ChG_2 believes that ChG_1 has jurisdiction over RVChG12. That is, ChG_1 is an
authority and believes RVChG12.
ChG_2 | ≡ ChG_1 ⇒ RVChG12
P 16: ChG_1 believes RVChG21 is fresh.
ChG_1 | ≡ #(RVChG21)

P17: ChG_1 believes that ChG_2 believes RVChG21.
ChG_1| ≡ ChG_2 | ≡ RVChG21
P18: ChG_1 believes that ChG_2 has jurisdiction over RVPG1. That is, ChG_2 is an
authority and believes RVChG21.
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ChG_1 | ≡ ChG_2

⇒ RVChG21

P19: ChG_1 believes that TK is a secure shared parameter between ChG_1 and ChG_2
TK

ChG_1 | ≡ ChG_1

ChG_2)

P20: ChG_1 believes ChG_2 believes that TK is a secure shared parameter between
ChG_1 and ChG_2
TK

ChG_1 | ≡ ChG_2| ≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)

P21: ChG_2 believes that TK is a secure shared parameter between ChG_1 and ChG_2
TK

ChG_2 | ≡ ChG_1

ChG_2)

P22: ChG_2 believes ChG_1 believes that TK is a secure shared parameter between
ChG_1 and ChG_2
TK

ChG_2 | ≡ ChG_1| ≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)

P 23: ChG_2 believes ChG_1 believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between
ChG_2 and ChG_1
ssk

ChG_2 | ≡ ChG_1| ≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)

P 24: ChG_1 believes ChG_2 believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between
ChG_1and ChG_2
ChG_1 | ≡ ChG_2 | ≡ (ChG_1
5.7.1.1.2.2.4

ssk

ChG_2)

Protocol 2 Analysis of the authentication protocol
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We then prove that the proposed protocol achieves the security goals based on the
idealized form of the messages, assumptions, and BAN logic rules. The proposed
authentication protocol analysis is shown below to prove that the protocol achieves
mutual authentication between ChG_1 and ChG_2.
According to M1:
V1: ChG_2◃(ChGIDR_1, TK, TSChG11, RVChG11 )
According to P1 and Rule 1, we derive the following
V2:
ChG_2 ,ChG_2 ⊲(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺1 ) ChG_1 𝑅𝑗 ChG_2
ChG_2|≡ChG_1 |∼ (𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_1 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 1,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11 )

ChG_2|≡ChG_1 Rj

According to P7, P10, and rule 3, we derive the following

V3:

ChG_2|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺11 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11 )
ChG_2|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_1 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺1 1,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11 )|

According to P2, V2, V3, and rule 2, we derive the following
V4:
ChG_2|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅1 ,TK,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺11 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11 ),ChG_2|≡ChG_1~(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_1 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺11 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11 )
ChG_2|≡ChG_1|≡(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_1 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺11 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11 )

According to P11, P12, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V5:

ChG_2 |≡ChG_1| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11 ,ChG_2 |≡ ChG_1 |≡𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11
ChG_2|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11

According to M2:
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V6: ChG_1 (𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_2 , TK, MSK, TSChG21, RVChG21) D1
According to P3 and Rule 1, we derive the following
V7:
ChG_1 |≡ChG_2 D1 ChG_1 ,ChG_2 ⊲(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_2 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺21 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21 ) 𝐶ℎ𝐺_2 𝐷1 𝐶ℎ𝐺_1
𝐶ℎ𝐺_1 |≡𝐶ℎ𝐺_2 |∼ (𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_2 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑀𝑆𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺21 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21 )

According to P9, P16, and rule 3, we derive the following
ChG_1|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺21 and 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21 )
ChG_1|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_2 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺21 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21 )|

V8:

According to P4, V7, V8 and rule 2, we derive the following
V9:
ChG_1|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_2 ,𝑇𝑘,𝑀𝑆𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺21 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21),ChG_1|≡ChG_2~(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_2 ,𝑇𝑘,𝑀𝑆𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺21 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21 )
ChG_1|≡ChG_2|≡(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_2 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑀𝑆𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺21 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21 )

According to P17, P18, V9, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V10:

ChG_1 |≡ChG_2|⇒𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21 ,ChG_1 |≡ ChG_2 |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21
ChG_1|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺21

According to M3:
V11: ChG_2◃(ChGIDR_12,Tk,MSK, TSChG12, RVChG12 )
According to P5 and Rule 1, we derive the following
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V12:
ChG_2 ,ChG_2 ⊲(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,TK,MSK,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺12 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺12) ChG_1 𝑇3 ChG_2
ChG_2|≡ChG_1 |∼ (𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_1 𝑇𝐾,𝑀𝑆𝐾,,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺12 1,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺11 )

ChG_2|≡ChG_1 T3

According to P8, P13, and rule 3, we derive the following

V13:

ChG_2|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺12 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺12 )
ChG_2|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_1 ,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺12 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺12 )|

According to V12, V13, and rule 2, we derive the following
V14:
ChG_2|≡#(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅1 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑀𝑆𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺12 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺12),ChG_2|≡ChG_1~(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_1 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑀𝑆𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺12 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺12)
ChG_2|≡ChG_1|≡(𝐶ℎ𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅_1 ,𝑇𝐾,𝑀𝑆𝐾,𝑇𝑆𝐶ℎ𝐺12 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺12 )

According to P14, P15, V14, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V15:

ChG_2 |≡ChG_1| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺12 ,ChG_2 |≡ ChG_1 |≡𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺12
ChG_2|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝐶ℎ𝐺12

As ssk = H (RVChG11|| RVChG12 || RVChG21|| TK) and in combination with V4, V14 and P21
we can derive
ssk

V16: ChG_2|≡ChG_1|≡(ChG_2

ChG_1)

(Goal 1_1)

As ssk = H (RVChG11|| RVChG12 || RVChG21|| TK) and in combination with P22, P23, V5,
V15 and V16.
V17: ChG_2|≡ (ChG_1

ssk

ChG_2)

(Goal 1_2)

As ssk = H (RVChG11|| RVChG12 || RVChG21|| TK) and in combination with P19 and V9, we
can derive
ssk
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V18: ChG_1| ≡ ChG_2|≡ (ChG_1

ChG_1)

(Goal 1_3)

As ssk = H (RVChG1|| RVChG2 || RVPG1) and combining with P20, P24, V10, and V18.
ssk

V19: ChG_1|≡ (ChG_1

ChG_2)

(Goal 1_4)

Therefore, the above logic proves that the proposed protocol achieves the goals
1_1 to 1_4 successfully. Thus, we prove that the shared secret key ssk is trusted by both
ChG_1 and the ChG_2. Based on the above results, the achievement of goals 1_1 to 1_4
proves that the proposed protocol achieves mutual authentication, and the session key ssk
is securely shared between ChG_1 and ChG_2.
5.7.1.1.2.3

Protocol 3: mini-gateway _IoT node mutual authentication

5.7.1.1.2.3.1

Protocol 3 goals identification

Goal 1: Ci+1, Ri, and Ri+1 are well protected and believed by MG.
G1_1: MG believes that the N believes that the Ci+1, Ri, and Ri+1 are securely shared
parameters between N and MG.

Ri, Ri+1, Ci+1

MG| ≡ N | ≡ (N

MG)

G1_2: MG believes that Ci+1, Ri and Ri+1 are securely shared parameters between N and
MG.
Ri, Ri+1, Ci+1

MG| ≡ (N

MG)

Goal 2: The N and the MG want to establish a shared secret key (ssk) key that is
believed by each other.
264

G2_1: MG believes that the N believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter
between N and MG.
ssk

MG| ≡ N|≡ (N

MG)

G2_2: MG believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between N and MG.

ssk

MG|≡ (N

MG)

G2_3: N believes that the MG believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter
between N and MG.
ssk

N| ≡ MG | ≡ (N

MG)

G2_4: N believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between N and MG.

ssk

N| ≡ (N
5.7.1.1.2.3.2

MG)

Protocol 3 Messages Idealization

First, we transfer all transmitted messages into idealized form as follows:
M1: N
M2: MG
M 3: N
5.7.1.1.2.3.3

MG:(NIDR, S2, S3, TSN1, RVN1) OTT
N:(MGIDR, S1, S2, RVMG1, TSMG, C) OTT
MG:(NIDR, TSN2, RVN2, NOTP, NnewIDA) CHXi+1
Protocol 3 main assumptions
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The second step to be completed is to define some assumptions as the initiative
promises. The fundamental assumptions of the presented authentication scheme are as
follows:
P1: MG believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between N and MG
MG| ≡ (N

OTT

MG)

P2: MG believes N believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between N and MG.

OTT

MG | ≡ N| ≡ (N

MG)

P3: N believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between N and MG.
N| ≡ (N

OTT

MG)

P4: N believes MG believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between N and MG.

OTT

N | ≡ MG| ≡ (N

MG)

P5: MG believes that CHXi+1 is a secure shared parameter between N and MG.
MG| ≡ (N

CHXi+1

MG)

P6: MG believes N believes that CHXi+1 is a secure shared parameter between N and
MG.
CHXi+1
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MG | ≡ N| ≡ (N

MG)

P7: MG believes TSN1 is fresh.
MG| ≡ #(TSN1)
P8: MG believes TSN2 is fresh.
MG| ≡ #(TSN2)

P9: N believes TSMG1 is fresh.
N| ≡ #(TSMG1)
P10: MG believes RVN1 is fresh.
MG| ≡ #(RVN1)
P11: MG believes that N believes RVN1.
MG | ≡ N| ≡ RVN1
P12: MG believes that N has jurisdiction over RVN1. That is, N is an authority and
believes RVN1.
MG | ≡ N ⇒ RVN1
P13: MG believes RVN2 is fresh.
MG| ≡ #(RVN2)
P14: MG believes that N believes RVN2.
MG | ≡ N| ≡ RVN2
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P15: MG believes that N has jurisdiction over RVN2. That is, N is an authority and
believes RVN2.
MG | ≡ N ⇒ RVN2
P16: N believes RVMG1 is fresh.
N| ≡ #(RVMG1)
P17: N believes that MG believes RVMG1.
N | ≡ MG| ≡ RVMG1
P18: N believes that MG has jurisdiction over RVMG1. That is, MG is an authority and
believes RVMG1.
N | ≡ MG ⇒ RVMG1
P19: MG believes that N has jurisdiction over Ri
MG| ≡ N ⇒ Ri
P20: MG believes that N believes Ri
MG| ≡ N | ≡ Ri
P21: MG believes that N has a jurisdiction over Ri+1
MG| ≡ N ⇒ Ri+1
P22: MG believes that N believes Ri+1
MG| ≡ N | ≡ Ri+1
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P23: MG believes that N has a jurisdiction over Ci+1
MG| ≡ N ⇒ Ci+1
P24: MG believes that N believes Ci+1
MG| ≡ N | ≡ Ci+1
P25: MG believes N believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between N and MG
ssk

MG | ≡ N| ≡ (N

MG)

P26: N believes MG believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between N and MG
ssk

N | ≡ MG| ≡ (N
5.7.1.1.2.3.4

MG)

Protocol 3 analysis of the authentication protocol

We then prove that the proposed protocol achieves the security goals based on the
idealized form of the messages, assumptions, and BAN logic rules. The proposed
authentication protocol analysis is shown below to prove that the protocol achieves
mutual authentication between N and MG.
According to M1:
V1: IG ◃(NIDR, S2,S3,TSN1,RVN1 )OTP
According to P1 and Rule 1, we derive the following

V2:

𝑀𝐺|≡N

OTT

MG ,MG ⊲(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑆2 ,𝑆3 ,𝑇𝑆𝑁1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛1 ) 𝑁

𝑀𝐺|≡N |∼ ( (𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑆2 ,𝑆3 ,𝑇𝑆𝑁1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛1 )
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𝑂𝑇𝑇

𝑀𝐺

According to P7, P10, and rule 3, we derive the following
𝑀𝐺 |≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑁1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝑁1 )

V3:

𝑀𝐺|≡#|(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑆2 ,𝑆3 ,𝑇𝑆𝑁1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛1 )

According to V2, V3, and rule 2, we derive the following

V4:

𝑀𝐺 |≡#(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑆2 ,𝑆3 ,𝑇𝑆𝑁1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛1 ),MG|≡N~(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑆2 ,𝑆3 ,𝑇𝑆𝑁1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛1 )
𝑀𝐺 |≡N|≡(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑆2 ,𝑆3 ,𝑇𝑆𝑁1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛1 )

According to P11, P12, V4 and rule 4, we derive the following:
MG |≡N| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝑛1 ,MG |≡ N |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑛1
MG|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑛1

V5:

According to M2, we get
V6: N ◃ (MGIDR, S1, S2, RVMG1, TSMG, C) Y2
According to P3 Rule 1, we derive the following
𝑁|≡N OTT MG ,N ⊲(MG𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑇𝑆𝑀𝐺1, 𝑆1 ,𝑆2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1 ,C) 𝑁

V7:

𝑂𝑇𝑇

𝑀𝐺

𝑁|≡MG |∼ ( MG𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑇𝑆𝑀𝐺1, 𝑆1 ,𝑆2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1 ,C)

According to P9, P16 and rule 3, we derive the following

V8:

𝑁|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑀𝐺1,𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1 )
𝑁|≡#(MG𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑇𝑆𝑀𝐺1, 𝑆1 ,𝑆2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1 ,C)

According to V7, V8, and rule 2, we derive the following
V9:
𝑁|≡#(MG𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑇𝑆𝑀𝐺1, 𝑆1 ,𝑆2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1 ,C),N|≡MG~(MG𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑇𝑆𝑀𝐺1, 𝑆1 ,𝑆2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1 ,C)
𝑁|≡MG|≡(MG𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑇𝑆𝑀𝐺1, 𝑆1 ,𝑆2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1 ,C)
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According to P17, P18 and rule 4, we derive the following:
𝑁 |MG| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1 ,N |≡ MG |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1

V10:

𝑁|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑀𝐺1

According to M3:
V11 IG ◃(NIDR,TSN2,RVN2,OTPN, NnewIDA, Ci+1 ,Ri, Ri+1 )CHXi+1
According to P5 and Rule 1, we derive the following
V12:
𝑀𝐺|≡N CHXi+1 MG ,MG ⊲(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑃,𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐼𝐷𝐴,𝑇𝑆𝑁2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛2 , 𝑁 𝐶 𝑖+1 ,𝑅 𝑖 ,𝑅 𝑖+1 𝑀𝐺) 𝑁 𝐶𝐻𝑋𝑖+1 𝑀𝐺
𝑀𝐺|≡N |∼ ( (𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑃,𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐼𝐷𝐴,𝑇𝑆𝑁2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛2 , 𝑁 𝐶 𝑖+1 ,𝑅 𝑖 ,𝑅 𝑖+1 𝑀𝐺)

According to P8, P13 and rule 3, we derive the following
𝑀𝐺 |≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑁2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝑁2 )

V13:

𝑀𝐺|≡#|(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑃,𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐼𝐷𝐴,𝑇𝑆𝑁2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛2 ,𝑁 𝐶𝑖+1 ,𝑅𝑖 ,𝑅𝑖+1 𝑀𝐺)

According to V12, V13, and rule 2, we derive the following:
V14
𝑀𝐺|≡#(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑃,𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐼𝐷𝐴,𝑇𝑆𝑁2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛2 ,𝑁 𝐶 𝑖+1 ,𝑅 𝑖 ,𝑅𝑖+1 𝑀𝐺),MG|≡N~(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑃,𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐼𝐷𝐴,𝑇𝑆𝑁2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛2 𝑁 ,𝐶 𝑖+1 ,𝑅𝑖 ,𝑅𝑖+1 𝑀𝐺)
𝑀𝐺|≡N|≡(𝑁𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑃,𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐼𝐷𝐴,𝑇𝑆𝑁2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑛2 ,𝑁 𝐶 𝑖+1 ,𝑅 𝑖 ,𝑅 𝑖+1 𝑀𝐺)

According to P14, P15, P19, P20, P21, P22, P23, P24, V14, and rule 4, we derive the
following:

V15:

MG |≡N| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝑛2 ,𝐶𝑖+1 ,𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑖+1 ,MG |≡ N |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑛2 ,𝐶𝑖+1 ,𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑖+1
MG|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑛2 ,𝐶𝑖+1 ,𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑖+1

Based on V15, we can derive

Ci+1, Ri, Ri+1

V16: MG| ≡|N ≡ (N

MG)
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(Goal 1_1)

Based on P20, P22, P24, V15, and V16, we derive the following

Ci+1,Ri,Ri+1
V17: MG|≡ (N

MG)

(Goal 1_2)

As session key ssk = h ((RVN1|| RVN2 || RVMG1 || Ri) and in combination with V9, we
can derive
ssk

V18: N| ≡MG|≡ (N

MG)

(Goal 2_1)

As session key ssk = h ((RVN1|| RVN2 || RVMG1 || Ri) and combining with P26, V10 and
V18
ssk

V19: N|≡ (N

MG)

(Goal 2_2)

As session key ssk = h ((RVN1|| RVN2 || RVMG1 || Ri) and combining with V4 and V14,
we can derive
ssk

V20: IG ≡N|≡ (N

MG)

(Goal 2_3)

As session key ssk = h ((RVN1|| RVN2 || RVMG1 || Ri) and combining with P25, V5, V15,
and V20.
ssk

V21: MG|≡ (N

MG)

(Goal 2_4)

Hence, the above logic proves that the proposed protocol achieves Goals 1_1 1_2 and 2_1 - 2_4 successfully. In other words, the proposed protocol achieves mutual
authentication. Also, it has been proved that Ci+1, Ri, Ri+1, and ssk are securely shared
between the communicating parties.
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In summary, by achieving all the goals mentioned above, we demonstrate the
validity of the proposed protocols. We proved that the presented three protocols are
secure mechanisms to perform mutual authentication and secret key generation to secure
the communication between the involved parties.
5.7.1.2

Informal Security Analysis
This section examines that the proposed protocols are secure against well-known

security attacks and satisfy the main security properties. The security of the protocols is
explored against various known attacks. This section will provide brief descriptions of
different types of attacks against the smart poultry farming IoT systems. A description of
how the proposed protocols successfully resisted the well-known attacks and achieved
the proposed security properties will be presented.
5.7.1.2.1

Security Properties Assessment

The following section presents a detailed security analysis of the security
properties of the three proposed protocols. It demonstrates how the proposed protocols
satisfy the security requirements for mutual authentication and session key agreement and
resist various known attacks. Then, a comparison with other related schemes is presented.
5.7.1.2.1.1

Protocol 1: parent gateway-child gateway mutual authentication

5.7.1.2.1.1.1

Mutual authentication

During the mutual authentication process, PG and the ChG authenticate each
other by verifying the correctness of the X3, X5, Y2, and Y5. Also, the two sides verify the
freshness of the RVChG1, RVChG2, RVPG1 and generating the ssk. The ssk is generated by
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using the OTP that is known only to PG and the ChG, the nonce values RVChG1 and
RVChG2 generated by ChG, and the nonce value (RVPG1) generated by the PG. An
adversary can’t generate X1 = H (OTP || AuthP) without knowing the ChGIDR of ChG,
PGIDR of the PG, and OTP, which are considered secret shared parameters between ChG
and PG well as knowing Authp that is only known to ChG. Also, the adversary can’t
generate Yx = H (OTP || AuthC) without knowing the ChGIDR of ChG, PGIDR of the PG,
and OTP, which are considered secret shared parameters between ChG and PG well as
knowing Authc that is only known to PG. Furthermore,the adversary cannot verify X3 =
H (ChGIDR || TS ChG1 || RVChG1 || X1), Y2 = H(PGIDR || TSPG1 || RVPG1 || RVChG1 || Yx ), X5 =
H(ChGIDR || TSChG2 || RVChG2|| (RV’PG1 || Xcc), and Y5 = H (ChGIDR || TSPG2 || TK12|| TK13
||OTPX|| ChGIDAx| without knowing the PUF responses for both ChG and PG,OTP,
PGIDR,ChGIDR, RVChG1, RVChG2, and RVPG1. As a result, the proposed scheme can
achieve mutual authentication between PG and the ChG.
5.7.1.2.1.1.2

Session key agreement and forward /backward security

At the end of the mutual authentication phase, the shared secret key ssk is
established between ChG and the PG. The ssk is a combination of the OTP, RVChG1,
RVChG2, and RVPG1. The goal of the ssk is to protect all the communication between PG
and ChG. The ssk will be generated locally. The secrecy of the ssk depends on the
secrecy of OTP, RVChG1, RVChG2, and RVPG1. Because all those parameters are randomly
selected for every new authentication session, the disclosure of the ssk will not cause the
compromise of any future ssk. The forward/backward security property's objective is to
ensure that any past or future shared secret keys will not be affected when any ssk is
exposed. Even if an adversary obtains ssk of a session, he/she can’t compute any of the
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past and future shared secret keys by using the disclosed ssk because the ssk is protected
by the randomization of the OTP, RVChG1, RVChG2, and RVPG1. As a result, the proposed
scheme achieves the security of ssk.
5.7.1.2.1.1.3

Anonymity unlinkability, and untraceability properties

For fully protected ChG and PG privacy, strong anonymity with unlinkability is
required. In the proposed protocol, the ChG’s and PG’s real identities ChGIDR and PGIDR
are not transmitted during all phases in clear text format. Therefore, even if the adversary
eavesdrops on all communication messages, it is impossible to obtain real identities. In
addition, the new alias ID of the ChG node ChGnewIDA = h (ChGIDA. OTP). Because
OTP is fresh in each session, the attacker cannot link any two different ChGIDA’s to the
same ChG and cannot trace a given ChGIDA to ChGIDR’s messages. By using a new
ChGIDA for each authentication session, the adversary will not be able to decide whether
these authentication messages are from the same ChG or not. This means that ChG cannot
be linked to different sessions. Consequently, the proposed protocol provides anonymity
and unlinkability, and the adversary cannot trace the devices by intercepting messages.

5.7.1.2.1.1.4

Node stolen database attack

Due to the nature of the PUF, if an adversary can compromise a locally stored
database at one of the communicating parties, he/she will fail to prove himself/herself
because the PUF response can’t be replicated or predicted. Besides, the secret keys are
different every session, which overcomes the issue of having any secret key exposed.
Also, the lifetime of the ssk’s parameters is only one authentication session, and then they
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will be destroyed. Furthermore, the proposed protocol is resilient against any device's full
comptonization by employing node behavioral analysis where the node transaction,
including traffic type, timing, and frequency, will be monitored and cross-compared to
similar devices.
5.7.1.2.1.1.5

Brute force attack

The shared secret key ssk is generated locally by both the ChG node and the PG
using the random secret parameters OTP, RVChG1, RVChG2, and RVPG1. Because this ssk
depends on random parameters, the adversary cannot obtain it from the protocol. The
probability of guessing is so negligible that the adversary will fail to guess the shared
secret key's correct parameters, given that this ssk changes in every session.
5.7.1.2.1.1.6

Replay attack

The proposed protocol overcame the replay attack by using timestamps and nonce
values. The timestamp TS and the nonce value are generated by the sender node and then
inserted in the transmitted message in an encrypted format to ensure the adversary cannot
replace it. Furthermore, the OTP is used only one time to ensure security against replay
attacks. Hence, the protocol protects against the replay attack.

5.7.1.2.1.1.7

Eavesdropping attack

During the authentication phase, the adversary can intercept the messages
transmitted between PG and ChG_1. All the intercepted messages will be useless because
they are sent encrypted using the XOR and one-way hash function. For the attacker to
verify the received parameters, he/she needs to know the PUF responses, the real
276

identities of the communicating parties, and the OTP that are protected and out of the
adversary's reach. The only two parameters that are sent in clear text are the Alias
identities and session ID. The Alias identities and the session ID do not pose any threat
because this information is constructed from random parameters that change in every
session. The adversary will not link the message to a particular device because the
proposed protocol uses alias identities that vary in every session. Therefore, the proposed
protocol protects against eavesdropping attacks.
5.7.1.2.1.1.8

Impersonation attack

In this attack, when the intruder eavesdrops on the messages transmitted from
ChG to PG or vice versa, he/she can use the intercepted information for malicious
actions, such as impersonating the ChG device or the PG and sending fabricated
messages.
This attack will not succeed for several reasons. First, each device has an Alias ID
and Real ID. The real IDs are known only for the communicating parties. The Real IDs
will never be released in clear text format. The two sides will verify the real ID of each
other before proceeding with the authentication process. Furthermore, without the
knowledge of the OTP and the PUF response, the adversary will not be able to generate
any of the different authentication parameters to prove itself to the other side.
In the current protocol, if an attacker impersonates GhG and sends (ChG IDA ,
TSoneChG, X2, X3) or (ChGIDA , TSoneChG , X4, X5)which might be previously
eavesdropped during the transmission between GhG and PG, to PG. This attack will fail
for certain reasons. First, the temporary identity of GhGIDA changes in every session.
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Second, both X3 and X5 are protected using the message parameters' one-way hash
function, which includes the timestamp, OTP, and GhGIDR.
On the other side, if the attacker impersonates PG and sends (PGIDA, TSonePG1,
Y1, Y2) or (PGIDA, TSonePG2, Y3, Y4, Y5) which might be previously eavesdropped
during the transmission between ChG and PG, to ChG. This attack will fail because both
Y2 and Y5 are protected using the secret parameters' one-way hash function, which
includes the timestamp, OTP, and PGIDR. Finally, without the knowledge of the OTP,
RVChG1, RVChG2, and RVPG1, the attacker will not be able to generate the same SK. Thus,
the protocol protects against the impersonation attack.
5.7.1.2.1.1.9

Man-in-the-middle attack

As discussed in the replay attack, eavesdropping, and impersonation attacks, the
man-in-the-middle attack is defeated because the communication parties' real identities
and the secret parameters OTP and the PUF responses are unknown to the attacker.
Therefore, the man-in-the-middle attack is prevented.
5.7.1.2.1.2

Protocol 2: child gateway-child gateway mutual authentication

5.7.1.2.1.2.1

Mutual authentication

During the mutual authentication process, ChG_1 and ChG_2 authenticate each
other by verifying the correctness of the T2, T5, and D3. Also, the two sides verify the
freshness of the RVChG_11, RVChG_12, and RVChG_21 and generate the SK. The ssk is
generated by using the TK known only to ChG_1 and the ChG_2, the nonce values
RVChG_11 and RVChG_12 generated by ChG_1 nonce value (RVChG_21) generated by
the ChG_2. An adversary can’t generate T2, T5, and D3 without knowing the ChG1IDR,
ChG2IDR, TK, and MSK. Because the MSK is stored on each side in an encrypted format
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using the PUF response of that side as an encryption key, both ChG_1 and the ChG_2
need to compute their PUF responses to retrieve MSK. As a result, the proposed scheme
can achieve mutual authentication between ChG_1 and ChG_2.
5.7.1.2.1.2.2

Session key agreement and forward/backward security

After completing the mutual authentication phase, the shared secret key ssk is
established between ChG_1 and ChG_2. The ssk is a combination of the TK, RVChG11,
RVChG12, and RVChG21. The goal of the ssk is to protect all the communication between
ChG_1 and ChG_2. The ssk is generated locally. The secrecy of the ssk depends on the
secrecy of the TK, RVChG11, RVChG12, and RVChG21. Because all those parameters are
randomly generated for every new authentication session, the disclosure of the ssk will
not cause the compromise of any future ssk. Even if an adversary obtains ssk of a session,
he/she can’t compute any of the past or future shared secret keys by using the disclosed
ssk because the ssk is protected by the randomization of the TK, RVChG11, RVChG12, and
RVChG21. As a result, the proposed scheme achieves the security of ssk.
5.7.1.2.1.2.3

Anonymity unlinkability, and untraceability properties

For fully protected ChG_1 and ChG_2 privacy, strong anonymity with
unlinkability is required. In the proposed protocol, the ChG’s and ChG’s real identities
ChG_1IDR and ChG_2IDR are not transmitted during all phases in clear text format.
Therefore, even if the adversary eavesdrops on all communication messages, it is
impossible to obtain real identities. In addition, a new alias ID will be assigned to each
ChG for every authentication session as presented in protocol 1. By using a new ChGIDA
for each authentication session, the adversary will not be able to decide whether these
authentication messages are from the same ChG or not. This means that ChG cannot be
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linked to different sessions. Consequently, the proposed protocol provides anonymity and
unlinkability, and the adversary cannot trace the devices by intercepting messages.
5.7.1.2.1.2.4

Node stolen database attack

If the ChG_1 or the ChG_2 is hacked, the MSK is encrypted by the PUF response
of the ChG. For the adversary to retrieve the MSK, he/she needs to calculate the PUF
response, which is impossible due to the nature of the PUF that can’t be predicted or
replicated. From another perspective, the ssk is different every session, which overcomes
the issue of having any secret key exposed. Furthermore, the proposed protocol is
resilient against any device's full compromising by employing node behavioral analysis
where the node transaction, including traffic type, timing, and frequency, will be
monitored and cross-compared to similar devices.
5.7.1.2.1.2.5

Brute force attack

The shared secret key ssk is generated locally by both the ChG_1 node and the
ChG_2 using the random secret parameters TK, RVChG11, RVChG12, and RVChG21. Because
this ssk depends on random parameters, the adversary cannot obtain it from the protocol.
The probability of guessing is so negligible that the adversary will fail to guess the shared
secret key's correct parameters, given that this ssk changes in every session.
5.7.1.2.1.2.6

Replay attack

The proposed protocol overcame the replay attack by using timestamps and nonce
values. The timestamp TS and nonce values are generated by the sender node and then
inserted in the transmitted message so that it ensures the attacker cannot replace it. Before
trusting the received TS, the receiver verifies the TS's integrity by recalculating the
280

received hash value that includes secret parameters between the two communicating
parties. The attacker cannot reconstruct the hash value because he/she does not know the
TK, MSK, and the real identities of the communicating parties. Therefore, any replay
attack attempts will fail. Hence, the protocol protects against replay attack.
5.7.1.2.1.2.7

Eavesdropping attack

During the authentication phase, the adversary can intercept the messages
transmitted between ChG_1 and ChG_2. All the intercepted messages will be useless
because they are sent in an encrypted format using the XOR function and one-way hash
function. For the attacker to verify the received parameters, he/she needs to know the TK
and MSK, which are composed of random values and are protected and out of the
adversary's reach. The TK is changed every authentication session, and the PUF response
encrypts the MSK. The only two parameters that are sent in clear text are the Alias
identities and session ID. The Alias identities and the session ID do not pose any threat
because this information is constructed from random parameters that change in every
session. The adversary will not link the message to a particular device because the
proposed protocol uses alias identities that change in every session. Therefore, the
proposed protocol protects against eavesdropping attacks.
5.7.1.2.1.2.8

Impersonation attack

In this attack, when the intruder eavesdrops on the messages transmitted from
ChG_1 to ChG_2 or vice versa, he/she can use the intercepted information for malicious
actions, such as impersonating the ChG_1 device or the ChG_2 and sending fabricated
messages.
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This attack will not succeed for several reasons. First, each device has an Alias ID
and Real ID. The real IDs are known only for the communicating parties. The Real IDs
will never be released in clear text format. The two sides will verify the real ID of each
other before proceeding with the authentication process. Furthermore, without the
knowledge of the TK and the MSK, the adversary will not be able to generate any of the
authentication parameters to prove himself/herself to the other side.
In the current protocol, if an attacker impersonates GhG_1 and sends (ChGIDA,
TSChG_11, T1, T2) or (ChG_1IDA, SID, TSCHG_12, T4, T5), which might be previously
eavesdropped during the transmission between GhG_1 and ChG_2, to ChG_2, this attack
will fail for certain reasons. First, the temporary identity of GhGIDA changes in every
session. Second, for T1, T2, T4, and T5, the adversary will not be able to reconstruct
them without knowing the TK, MSK, the real identity of the receiving node, and its own
real identity.
On the other side, if the attacker impersonates GhG_2 and sends (ChG_2IDA, SID
,D2,

D3), which might be previously eavesdropped on during the transmission between

ChG_1 and ChG_2, to ChG_1, this attack will fail because D3 is protected using the oneway hash function of the message parameters. D2 message includes TK and RVChG, which
are different for every authentication session, and MSK that is encrypted by GhG_2 PUF
response. Finally, without knowing the TK, RVChG11, RVChG12, and RVCHG21, the attacker
will not be able to generate the same ssk. Thus, the protocol protects against the
impersonation attack.
5.7.1.2.1.2.9

Data modification attacks
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Assuming that M1 < ChGIDA1, TSChG_11, T1, T2 > has been tampered by an
adversary M1* < ChGIDA1*, TSChG_11*, T1*, T2* >. After receiving the message, the
adversary will first need to have TK and ChG_2IDR, which are secure parameters to
compute Rj <H (TK|| ChG_2IDR)> and T1< RVChG_11 ⊕ Rj>. Furthermore, without having
all secret parameters, the adversary will not be able to generate a legitimate T2 = H
<ChG_1IDR || TS ChG_11 || RVChG_11 ||Rj>, that is, if the message has been tampered, the
ChG_1 is considered to be illegal, and the session will be terminated immediately by the
ChG_2.
Now suppose the message M2 < ChG_2IDA, SID, TSChG12, D2, D3> has been
tampered with by an adversary and sent to V M2* < ChG_2IDA *, SID* , TSChG12*, D2*, D3*
>. After receiving the message, the adversary will first need to compute <D1 = H
(RVChG_11 ||MSK || TK)> and <D2 = RVChG_21 ⊕ D1> using TK, MSK, and the random
generated value received from ChG_1. Because each ChG_2 has a PUF chip and each
chip is unique, the adversary will not be able to replicate or predict the response(R) of the
real ChG_2. Consequently, the adversary will not be able to generate R and decrypt the
MSK to compute D1. Also, the TK is secret and is only known to the ChG_1 and ChG_2,
the adversary will not correctly calculate D1 and D2. Finally, without having all abovementioned secret parameters, the adversary will not be able to compute <D3 = H
(ChG_2IDR || TS ChG_21 || RVChG_21|| D1)> to pass the ChG_2 authentication.
As for the message M3 <ChG_1IDA, SID, TSCHG12, T4, T5)> suppose the message
M3 was tempered by an adversary. Because ChG_1 has a PUF chip and each chip is
unique, the adversary will not be able to replicate or predict the response(R) of the real
ChG_2. Consequently, the adversary will not be able to generate R and decrypt the MSK
283

to compute T3. Furthermore, also the TK is secret and is only known to the ChG_1 and
ChG_2; the adversary will not correctly calculate T3 and T4. Furthermore, the adversary
will not be able to construct a valid T5and send a legitimate message to ChG_2 that can
pass the authenticate verification. So, o after receiving the message M3* and verifying it,
ChG_2 will terminate the session with ChG_1. In summary, the proposed protocol can
resist all message modification attacks.
5.7.1.2.1.2.10 Man-in-the-middle attack
As discussed in the replay attack, eavesdropping, and impersonation attacks, the
man-in-the-middle attack is defeated because the communication parties' real identities
and the secret parameters TK and MSK are unknown to the attacker. Therefore, the manin-the-middle attack is prevented.
5.7.1.2.1.3

Protocol 3: mini-gateway _IoT node mutual authentication

5.7.1.2.1.3.1

Mutual authentication

N and the MG authenticate each other during the mutual authentication by
verifying the SN, Y3, and X4. An adversary cannot generate S1 = h (NIDR || MGIDR||| RMG)
without knowing the NIDR of N and the MGIDR of the MG and compute the PUF response
(RMG). Also, the adversary cannot verify S2 = h (S1 ||MGIDR) ⊕ GIDN and S3 = h ((S2||
MGIDR) ⊕TIDN without knowing the GIDN and TIDN. Furthermore, the adversary will not
be able to generate Y3 = H (MGIDR || TSMG1 || RVN1 || RVMG1 ||C||Y1) without having S1,
S2 OTT, MGIDR, || RVMG1 and RVN1. Also, the adversary cannot generate X4 without
having the R that can only be generated by N and having CHX, which is considered a
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secure parameter between N and MG. As a result, the proposed scheme can achieve
mutual authentication between N and MG.
5.7.1.2.1.3.2

Session key agreement and forward/backward security

After successfully completing the mutual authentication phase, the shared secret
key ssk is established between N and the MG. The ssk is a combination of RVN1, RVN2,
RVMG1, and Ri. The ssk will be generated locally. The secrecy of the ssk depends on the
secrecy of RVN1, RVN2, RVMG1, and Ri. Because all those parameters are randomly
selected for every new authentication session, the disclosed ssk will not cause the
compromise of any future ssk. Even if an adversary obtains the ssk of a session, he/she
can’t compute any of the past or future shared secret keys by using the disclosed ssk. The
ssk is protected by the uniqueness of the Ri where each CRP will be used only one time.
The corresponding responses can’t be replicated or predicted because they are unique for
each N because of the nature of the PUF. Second: the randomization of the RVN1, RVN2,
and RVMG1. As a result, the proposed scheme achieves the security of ssk.
5.7.1.2.1.3.3

Anonymity unlinkability and untraceability properties

Protecting the privacy of N requires strong anonymity with unlinkability. The N’s
real identity NIDR is not transmitted during all phases in clear text format in the
proposed protocol. Therefore, even if the adversary eavesdrops on all communication
messages, it is impossible to obtain the IoT node's real ID. In addition, the new alias ID
of the IoT node NIDA2 = h(NIDA1.RVMG). Because RVMG1 is fresh in each session, the
attacker cannot link any two different NIDA’s to the same N and cannot trace a given IoT
device to N’s messages. By using a new NIDA for each authentication session, the
adversary will not be able to decide whether these authentication messages are from the
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same N or not. This means that device N cannot be linked to different sessions.
Consequently, the proposed protocol provides anonymity and unlinkability, and the
adversary cannot trace the devices by intercepting messages.
5.7.1.2.1.3.4

Node stolen database attack

If any IoT node is compromised and the adversary can steal S1, S2, S3, NIDR,
CHX, and the OTT from the IoT node’s database to impersonate the IoT node, the fake
node will fail the CRP verification process. The proposed protocol is resilient against a
full compromising of the IoT node by employing node behavioral analysis where the
node transaction, including traffic type, timing, and frequency, will be monitored and
cross-compared to the previous data from the same virtual domain. Also, if an MG was
compromised and the adversary can steal its database, the adversary will fail to generate
RMG to compute S1 that is needed for N to authenticate the MG.
5.7.1.2.1.3.5

Brute force attack

The shared secret key ssk is generated locally by both the IoT node and the MG
using the random secret parameters RVN1, RVN2, RVMG1, and Ri. Because this ssk
depends on random parameters, the adversary cannot obtain it from the protocol. The
probability of guessing is so negligible that the adversary will fail to guess the shared
secret key's correct parameters, given that this ssk changes every session.
5.7.1.2.1.3.6

Replay attack

The sender node generates the timestamp TS and is then inserted in the
transmitted message to ensure the attacker cannot replace it. Before trusting the received
TS, the receiver verifies the TS's integrity by recalculating the received hash value that
includes secret parameters between the two communicating parties. Furthermore, Each
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CRP is used only one time to ensure security against replay attacks. Hence, the proposed
protocol protects against the replay attack
5.7.1.2.1.3.6

Eavesdropping attack

During the authentication phase, the adversary can intercept messages transmitted
between N and the MG. All the intercepted messages will be useless because they are
sent in an encrypted format using XOR and a one-way hash function. To verify the
received parameters, the attackers need to know the RMG, OTT, CHX, NIDR, MGIDR, and
Ri, which are composed of random values and are protected and out of the adversary's
reach. The only two parameters that are sent in clear text are the Alias identities and
session ID. the Alias identities and the session ID do not pose any threat because this
information is constructed from random parameters that change in every session. The
adversary will not be able to link the message to a particular device because the proposed
protocol uses alias identities that change in every session. Therefore, the proposed
protocol protects against eavesdropping attack.
5.7.1.2.1.3.7

Impersonation attack

In this attack, when the intruder eavesdrops on the messages transmitted from N
to MG or vice versa, he/she can use the intercepted information for malicious actions,
such as impersonating the IoT device or the MG and sending fabricated messages.

5.7.1.2.1.3.7.1

MG impersonation

This attack will not succeed for several reasons. First, Each MG has an Alias ID
and Real ID. The real ID is known only for IoT devices. The MG's Real ID will never be
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released in Clear Text format. The IoT device will verify the MG's Real ID before
proceeding with the authentication process. Second, the proposed protocol uses the Y3
value to authenticate the MG node. Without the knowledge of S1, S2 OTT, MGIDR,
RVMG1, and RVN1, the attacker cannot construct a valid Y3. To compute S1, the adversary
needs to have the PUF response RMG that the MG can only generate.
5.7.1.2.1.3.7.2

IoT node impersonation

To impersonate the IoT node, an adversary should intercept the messages
exchanged in the previous sessions. This attack will fail for numerous reasons. First, the
Alias ID of the IoT node changes every authentication session. Second, the fake IoT node
will not be able to generate legitimate responses because the PUF responses are unique
for each device. Third, X4 is protected using the one-way hash function of the message,
including CHX, Ri, and TS. Thus, the protocol protects against the impersonation attack.
From another perspective, even if the adversary succeeded in compromising an
IoT node, the adversary’s further attacks using the compromised node only affect the
communication related to that node. Because each IoT node has its own secret keys, the
adversary can’t derive other non-compromised IoT nodes’ keys without knowing those
nodes' random information. Therefore, further attacks will not affect other
communications. As a result, the proposed scheme is resistant to IoT node impersonation
attacks.
5.7.1.2.1.3.8

Data modification attacks

Assuming that M1 < NIDA, TSN1, X2, SN > has been tampered by an adversary
M1* < NIDA *, TSN1*, X2*, SN * >. After receiving the message, the adversary will first
need to have S2, S3, OTT, and NIDR, which are secure parameters to compute X1 <H (S2
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||S3) and X2< RVN1 ⊕ OTT>. Furthermore, without having all secret parameters, the
adversary will not be able to generate a legitimate SN = < H (N IDR||TSN1 || RVN1|| X1)>,
that is, if the message has been tampered, N is considered to be illegal, and the session
will be terminated immediately by the MG.
Now suppose the adversary needs to modify M2 <MGIDA, SID, TSMG1, Y2, C’, Y3 > to be
M2* < MGIDA *, SID*, TSMG1*, Y2*, C’*, Y3* >. After receiving the message, the adversary
will first need to compute <Y1 = H (S’1|| S’2) > and <Y2 = RVMG1 ⊕OTT> using S’1 S’2 and
OTT. To compute S1, the adversary needs to have the PUF response (RMG). Because the
MG has a PUF chip and each chip is unique, the adversary will not be able to replicate or
predict the response (RMG) of the real ChG_2. Consequently, the adversary will not be
able to generate R to compute S1. Also, the OTT is secret and is only known to the N and
MG, and the adversary will not correctly calculate Y1 and Y2. Finally, without having ll
above mentioned secret parameters, the adversary will not be able to compute <Y3 =
H(MGIDR || TSMG1 || RVN1 || RVMG1 ||C||Y1)> to pass the N authentication.
As for the message M3 < NIDA, TSN2, X3, Rx, X4)> suppose an adversary tempered
the message M3. Because N has a PUF chip and each chip is unique, the adversary will
not be able to replicate or predict the response (Ri) to compute CHX+1 of the real N.
Also, the OTT is secret and is only known to N and MG. Therefore, the adversary will
not correctly calculate X3 and Rx. Furthermore, the adversary will not be able to construct
a valid X4 and send a legitimate message to MG that can pass the authenticate
verification. So, o after receiving the message M3* and verifying it, MG will terminate
the session with N. In summary, the proposed protocol can resist all message
modification attacks.
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5.7.1.2.1.3.9

Man-in-the-middle attack

As discussed in the replay attack, eavesdropping, and impersonation attacks, the
man-in-the-middle attack is defeated because of the employment of the real identity of
IoT node NIDR, the timestamp TS, the one-way hash function, the nonce values generated
by both the IoT and MG, and the CRPs that are unknown to the attacker. Moreover, the
chained-hash value CHX is protected using a one-way hash function. Therefore, the manin-the-middle attack is prevented.
5.7.1.2.1.3.10 Modeling attacks
It is an attack where the adversary collects a large number of PUF CRPs and uses
a regression algorithm to build a model and predict responses for new challenges. All the
challenges and their corresponding responses are transferred in an encrypted format by
using a a one-way hash function. Therefore, the adversary will not be able to collect
enough useful CRPs to build a model and predict responses to new challenges.
5.7.1.2.1.3.11 Physical attack
Any attempt to tamper with the IoT device will change the PUF embedded chip's
behavior and, consequently, renders the PUF useless.
5.7.1.2.1.3.12 IoT Device Counterfeit/Cloning
The IoT device is authenticated through the use of the PUF. PUF responses are
treated as hardware fingerprints that cannot be duplicated or cloned. Therefore, by the
use of the PUF, IoT devices cannot be cloned.
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5.7.1.2.2

Comparison of Security Features

We compare the proposed MG-IoT protocol security features with other related
authentication and key agreement protocols [97,104,105,106,95]. Table 19 shows the
comparison results. The table indicates that the proposed protocol is secure against all the
imperative security threats and accomplishes diverse security features. The protocols
[104-105] used the IoT node real identity to exchange messages with the server, which is
against protecting the anonymity and the unlinkability of the IoT devices. Furthermore,
the researchers in [106] do not defend their protocol against the replay attack. Also, none
of the proposed protocols protects against IoT device counterfeiting, database stealing, or
physical attacks.
On the other side, the proposed Mg-IoT protocol supports multiple essential
security features: First, the proposed protocol does not require any secret key storage or
secret key sharing over the network. Second, all secret keys are computed locally on all
the communicating parties. Third, the mini-gateway and the IoT device use their one-time
alias identity for each authentication session in the proposed protocol. Therefore, it will
be difficult for an outside adversary to comprehend the activities of the IoT devices.
Fourth, the proposed protocol used the PUF to protect the IoT device against
counterfeiting and used the PUF responses as an encryption key to protect the device
database if the device got compromised. From table 19, we can conclude that the
proposed protocol in this chapter can support all the desired security properties, which are
essential for IoT devices' security.

291

Table 19: Security feature comparison of the proposed mini-gateway _IoT node protocol
with other related mutual authentication and key agreement schemes.
Security Property

[97]

[104]

[105]

[106]

[95]

Proposed
protocol

Resilience to IG the
Impersonation
Attack

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Resilience to IoT the
Impersonation
Attack

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Resilience to Replay
Attack

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Resilience to Device
Counterfeit

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Resilience to
Modeling Attack

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Yes

Anonymity and
Untraceability

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Resilience to
Physical attacks

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Resilience to
Database stealing
Mutual
Authentication

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5.7.2

Performance Analysis
In this section, we present a performance analysis of the proposed protocol. The

performance analysis evaluates the storage requirements. Also, we analyze the presented
protocol's overhead and efficiency in terms of computational complexity and
communication overhead and compare its computational complexity and communication
cost with the most relevant protocol in the literature proposed by [97], [104],[105], [106]
and [95].
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5.7.2.1 Storage requirements
Table 20: Storage cost of the proposed scheme
Node

Storage cost (in bits)

N

128+ 256 * 5 + 8 * 3 = 1432 b

MG

128*3+ 256 * 2 + 8 * 5 = 936 b

Table 20 presents the storage requirements for the proposed protocol. The
calculation considered only the authentication protocol between the IoT node and the
mini gateway. In the proposed protocol, each IoT node must store its real identity NIDR
alias identity NIDA, the real identity of the MGIDR, alias identity MGIDA, authentication
parameters S1, S2 and S3, Chained hash CHX,and one-time token OTT. We use SHA-1
and SHA-2 as two examples of hash function, and the output of SHA-1 is 160 bits and
SHA-2 is 256 bits. By applying these settings, we obtain |NIDA | = 128 bit. |S1 | = |S2 | =
|S3 | = |CHX| = |OTT| = 256 bits and |NIDR | = |MGIDR| = |MGIDA| = 8 bits.
On the other hand, MG is required to store the tuple NIDA, NIDR, MGIDA, MGIDR,
GIDN, TIDN, OTT, C and R. By applying these settings, we obtain |NIDA | = 128. |NIDR | =
|MGIDR| = |GIDN | = |MGIDA| |TIDN |=8 bits, |C| = |R| = 128 bits, and |CHX| = |OTP| = 256
bits.
5.7.2.2

Computational Complexity Analysis
We compare the computation cost of the proposed scheme with other related

schemes [97], [104],[105], [106] and [95]. We only focus on comparing the mutual
authentication phase between the MG and the IoT. Because the time for executing a
bitwise XOR operation is negligible, we do not consider XOR operations for
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computational cost analysis. To analyze the performance of the proposed protocol with
respect to other presented protocols in the literature, we conducted simulations of the
cryptographic operations using Dell Inspiron Laptop with Intel Core i7, dual-core 2.7
GHz CPU, and 8 GB RAM to act as the IG. we used a Raspberry Pi 4 Model B with 64bit quad-core cortex A-72 processor and 1 GB RAM to simulate an IoT device. The
simulations used PyCryptodome cryptographic and Fastecdsa libraries in Python. For
these results, we considered the 128-bit arbiter PUF for PUF operation. The fuzzy
extraction's execution time is almost the same as the ECC point multiplication and the
execution time for modular exponentiation is double the time of the execution of the ECC
point multiplication [58]. Table 21 presents the used notation and the execution time of
each operation.
Table 21: Execution time of the cryptographic operations
Operation

Computation Time on IoT

Computation Time
on MG

H: time for executing a one-way

0.002 ms

.001 ms

5 ms

4 ms

5 ms

4 ms

hash function
F: time for executing a fuzzy
extractor
EM: time for executing an ECC
point multiplication
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EXP: time for a modular

10 ms

8 ms

2.7 ms

1.5 ms

0.18 ms

.14 ms

0.18 ms

.14 ms

.12 ms

.12 ms

exponentiation
HMAC: time for executing the
HMAC
ENC: Time for Executing (AESCBC Encryption)
DEC: Time for executing (AESCBC Decryption)
PUF: Time for executing PUF (128bit Arbiter)

Table 22: Comparison of computation costs for the authentication phase of the proposed
scheme and other related schemes.
Entity

[97]

[104]

[105]

[106]

[95]

Proposed
Protocol
10Th +
2TPUF

7Th

1THMAC

3Th
+2TTSE +
TTSD

2TTP + 3Th

8Th

7*.002 =
.014 ms

1* 2.7 =
2.7ms

3*.002 +
.18*2
+.18 = .55
ms

8*.002 =
.016 ms

10 * .002
+.12 *2 =
.26 ms

MG

8Th

1THMAC

3Th
+TTSE +
2TTSD

2*5 +
3*.002 =
10.006
ms
2TTP + 3Th

8Th

13Th +
TPUF

Cost

8 *.001 =
.008 ms

1 * 1.5 =
1.5 ms

2* 4 +
3*.001=
8.003 ms

8 *.001 =
.008 ms

13*.001
+.1 = .13
ms

Total
Cost

.022 ms

4.2 ms

3*.001
+2*.14
+.14 = .45
ms
1 ms

18.009
ms

.024 ms

.39 ms

IoT

CosT
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Table 22 summarizes the computational cost comparison between the proposed
protocol and the other related protocols presented in the literature. The total run time of
the proposed protocol is .39 ms. When comparing the proposed protocol with other
related protocols, we found that the proposed protocol is more efficient than [104] that
used HMAC to complete the mutual authentication process, and [105] that used
symmetric encryption. Furthermore, the proposed proposal is more efficient than [106]
that used scaler multiplication. Although the proposed protocol's computable cost is
more than [97 and 95], the proposed protocol does not require any secret key storage and
is secure against database stealing. One of the main strengths of the proposed protocol is
securing the IoT devices from physical attacks and counterfeiting by employing the PUF
and the CHX.
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Table 22 and figures 76,77 and 78 summarize the computational complexity
comparison between the proposed protocol and the other related protocols presented in
the literature. Table 22 listed out the number of operations of each type for each protocol
considered. Figure 76 displays the number of authentication operations of each type that
are completed on the IoT side. Figure 77 depicts the number of authentication operations
of each type that are completed on the MG side. Figure 79 demonstrates the total number
of cryptographic operations of each type that are complete for each protocol. As depicted
from the table and the figures, the proposed protocol used more hash functions than most
of the other protocols to avoid computationally expensive cryptographic operations such
as ECC and HMAC and, at the same time, achieve the same security goals. The proposed
protocol is the only protocol that used PUF as a hardware fingerprint to secure the
devices from counterfeiting and avoid storing long-term security keys on the
communicating devices. The proposed protocol is the only one that used PUF on the MG
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side to protect the protocol from MG impersonation and secure the MG database to be
stolen in case the device is compromised.

Computational complexity in ms

[97]

[104]

[105]

[106]

[95]

Proposed Protocol

10.006

2.7
0.55

0.014

0.016

0.26

IoT

Figure 79: The IoT computational time across the different protocols

MG Computational Complexity in ms
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Proposed Protocol

8.003

1.5
0.008

0.45

0.008

0.13
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Figure 80: MG computational time across the different protocols
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[95]

Proposed Protocol
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4.2
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1

0.024

0.39

Total

Figure 81: Total computational time across the different protocols
Table 22 and figures 79, 80 and 81 demonstrate the cost comparison of the
authentication protocol with other similar protocols. Table 22 and figure 81 present the
total computational cost of each protocol. Figure 79 displays the computation cost of
each protocol for the IoT side, and figure 80 depicts the computational cost of each
protocol for the MG side. The results indicate that the proposed protocol has a lower
computational cost for the IoT side than [104,105, and 106]. Although the proposed
protocol is higher than [97 and 95], the proposed protocol is resilient against
impersonation attacks and does not require long-term secret key storage. The above
results prove that the proposed protocol is suitable for IoT resource-constrained devices.
From table 22 and figure 81, we observe that while [97], [104],[105],[106], and
[95] take approximately 0.022, 4.2, 1, 18.009, and 0.024 ms, the proposed protocol takes
only .39 ms. The protocol in [106] performs the worst due to the high number of ECC
point operations involved. Also, the protocol in [104] has a bad performance due to the
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use of HMAC, which is computationally expensive. Furthermore, protocol [105] has a
high computational cost due to multiple encryption and decryption calculations.
We can conclude that the proposed protocol has a higher security level than the
rest of the protocols. The proposed protocol achieved the main security goals of
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity besides accommodating IoT devices that are
diverse in their capabilities.
5.7.2.3

Communication cost analysis

The following section analyzes the communication cost of the proposed MG-IoT
protocol. To reduce network congestion and provide fast message transmission, the
communication costs of the protocol should be as low as possible. For the communication
cost analysis, we evaluate the communication cost in terms of the size of the message in
bits. Then, we compare the proposed protocol to the other related protocols. Table 23
presents a summary of the sizes of the message parameters. Table 24 lists the message
parameters that are communicated between the server and the IoT device, along with
their sizes.
Table 23: Size of the message parameters
Message Parameters

Size in Bits

ID of N [ [57], [62], [63]

128

ID of server [63]

8

SID [57], [62]

8

Nonces [61], [63]

128
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CRP (C, R) [61], [62]

128

HMAC [63]

256

Hash Function [57], [62]

256

Timestamp (TS) [63]

48

ECC [60], [59]

256

MAC [62]

256

•

Message 1: In the transmission (N → MG), N sends the tuple, NIDA, TSN1, X2, SN.
Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128 + 48 + 128+256 = 560 bits.

•

Message 2: In the transmission (MG 1→ N), IG sends the tuple, MGIDA, SID,
TSMG1, Y2, C’, Y3. Therefore, the size of this tuple is 8 +8 + 48 + 128+128+256 =
576 bits.

•

Message 3: In the transmission (N → MG), N sends the tuple, NIDA, SID. TSN2, X3,
RX, X4. Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128 + 8 + 48+128 +128+256+256 =
952. bits.
Table 24: Communication cost comparison (bits)
Message

[97]

[104]

[105]

[106]

[95]

Number

Proposed
scheme

M1: N→ S

640 bits

136 bits

136 bits

128 bits

560 bits

560 bits

M2: S→ N

512 bits

568 bits

296 bits

512 bits

560 bits

576 bits
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M3: N→S

128 bits

256 bits

672 bits

256 bits

304 bits

568 bits

M4: S→ N

------

------

536 bits

----

304 bits

---

M5: N→S

------

------

144 bits

----

---

Total

1280 bits

960 bits

2056 bit

896 bits

1728 bits

1824 bits

Table 24 presents the communication cost of the proposed protocol and the
comparison schemes. Four protocols have less communication cost than the proposal,
which are [97,104,106 and 95] with differences of 30%, 47%, 51% and 5% respectively.
The proposed protocol requires sending only three messages to achieve mutual
authentication, and they contain timestamps, XOR-ciphered random numbers, and hash
functions. Sending this information prevents attacks such as data modification, replay,
and impersonation [28]. The protocols that have less communication cost do not send all
this information, and some of them used real identities of the IoT nodes during the
communication process; consequently, they have been found vulnerable to some of the
attacks, as can be seen in the above-presented comparison. The proposed protocol has a
lower communication cost than [105] and a reasonable cost compared to [95]. Therefore,
even if the proposal is not the protocol with the lowest communication cost, it is suitable
for IIoT. At the same time, it achieves more security properties than the protocols with
less cost.
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5.8

Summary
This chapter presents a mutual authentication scheme for M2M communication in

IIoT. The proposed scheme introduces a mechanism for secure session key
establishment. the proposed scheme targets to have low computational complexity and
low computational cost to be suitable for resource-constrained IIoT devices. To achieve
the lightweight feature, the scheme is based on the lightweight operations XOR and hash
functions. The scheme provides confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, unlinkability, and
untraceability capabilities while achieving mutual authentication between the
communicating devices. The proposed scheme is assessed using both security and
performance analysis. The security analysis used both formal and informal techniques.
The formal evaluation employed used the BAN logic and AVISAP simulation to verify
the proposed protocol's security. The informal security analysis also showed that the
presented scheme is resistant to common attacks and satisfies the main security properties
such as confidentiality, integrity, mutual authentication, perfect forward and backward
secrecy. Furthermore, we evaluated the MG-IoT protocol's efficiency in terms of storage
requirements, communication cost, and computational complexity and compared it with
other related protocols. The results proved that the proposed protocol has a higher attack
resistance compared to the other protocols.
In summary, the presented protocol achieves the required low computational
complexity for resource-constrained IIoT devices. Furthermore, the proposed protocol's
high security and low computational complexity allow resource-constrained IIoT devices
to implement a security service, protect data privacy, and prevent attacks such as device
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impersonation, data modification, and man-in-the-middle attacks that can interrupt the
system operations.
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CHAPTER VI
THREE-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVACY
PRESERVATION SCHEME USING USER DEVICE
BIOMETRICS FOR IOV SYSTEM

With the rise of the smart city concept and the growing demands for smart
vehicles, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) emerged as new technology. IoV is an emerging
concept in intelligent transportation systems (ITS). IoV is considered an extension of the
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication network. IoV is connected in an adhoc
networking environment that employs each vehicle in the network as a node, called
Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET). The goal of IoV is to enhance the existing
capabilities of VANETs by integrating them with the Internet of Things (IoT). The
emergence of the IoV in the transportation system is related to several factors such as the
large network scale, compatibility with personal devices, the reliability of the Internet,
and the high-performance processing capabilities. The IoV will lead to the reduction of
accidents, levels of pollution, and traffic congestion. IoV is also essential for autonomous
vehicles because it will allow them to communicate with other vehicles surrounding them
instantaneously.
Despite the promising aspects of the IoV, it is subject to several security threats
because sensitive data is transmitted through an insecure channel in the IoV-based smart
city environment. It can be a rich environment for passive and active attacks where the
adversary can intercept, modify, or delete messages during the communication
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process. The driver needs to determine whether the received message is authentic or not.
In IoV, vehicles' authentication is crucial to achieve a trusted communication among the
communicating vehicles. However, most of the currently employed authentication
protocols in the IoV domain are based on asymmetric cryptography with a high
computational cost.
This chapter introduces an efficient and privacy-preserving IoV mutual
authentication and key agreement scheme. The presented protocol is called Three-Factor
Authentication and Privacy Preservation Scheme Using User and Device Biometrics for
IoV System. The proposed scheme enables the communicating devices to verify each
other’s identities and perform secure, anonymous authentication while the real identities
stay secret. It will also allow the communicating parties to locally generate shared secret
keys to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged data. The proposed
scheme utilizes PUF as a hardware security approach and the chained hash PUF concept.
The proposed scheme employs lightweight operations of XOR and a one-way hash
function; thus, the scheme does not significantly impact the device's computational and
battery resources. We evaluate the proposed scheme by using different measures, namely,
security and performance evaluation. The security evaluation will be both formal and
informal security evaluation. The formal analysis used the Burrows–Abadi–Needham
logic (BAN), the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
(AVISPA) toolkit.
Furthermore, the scheme efficiency is evaluated and compared with other related
schemes. Through the informal analysis, we will assess the proposed scheme against
well-known security attacks. Furthermore, we also validate that the proposed
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authentication mechanism is efficient in storage requirements, computational cost, and
communication overhead.
In Section 6.1, we first introduce the motivation of the work. Section 6.2 discusses
the security aspects of the IoV. Section 6.3 presents the security threats and potential
attacks in IoV communication. Section 6.4 presents the related work and the other
existing protocols. Section 6.5 demonstrates the network model and the security goals.
Section 6.6 presents the proposed protocols. Section 6.7 illustrates the protocol evaluation
process, and finally, section 6.8 summarizes the chapter.
6.1

Motivation
Every year, approximately 1.3 million people die, and more than 7 million people

are injured in around 8 million traffic accidents. People waste more than 90 billion hours
because of traffic problems (accidents and traffic jams), causing a loss of 2% of the
global gross domestic product, and vehicular travel generates 220 million metric tons of
carbon equivalent [116]. The cost of personal transportation in cars is about $3 trillion
per year in the United States, and 40% of this cost is related to crashes, parking, roads,
traffic services, and pollution [117]. The authors in [118] stated that the number of all
vehicles, whether commercial or passenger, used worldwide is more than one billion, and
it is expected by 2035 to be around 2 billion [119].
The technological advances in the last few years led to the emergence of "Smart
Cities". Improving road safety, traffic monitoring, and passengers' comfort are the main
goals of designing new intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) in smart cities. One of
the main goals of the Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is tackling the above-
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mentioned issues by providing smart mechanisms that are efficient, accessible, and
secure.
Modern vehicles need to integrate smart sensors, powerful computational units,
IP-based connectivity to the Internet and communicate with other vehicles and other
devices in the surrounding environment. According to [120], the implementation of the
IoV requires the integration of intelligent devices, capable processors with powerful
computing and communication capabilities, internal sensors, external sensors such as
cameras, location tracking, sensors to detect the physical, mental and emotional condition
of the driver, and actuators to take actions to create an intelligent system that can support
the needs of smart cities and the ITS.
IoV can be defined as a network of vehicles equipped with sensors, software, and
technologies that enable exchanging information between the car and its surroundings
through different communication media to connect and exchange data over the Internet
according to agreed standards. IoV is composed of three fundamental components: 1) the
inter-vehicular network; 2) the intravehicular network; and 3) vehicular mobile Internet
[121]. IoV supports six types of network communication, as presented in figure 82:
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V): An ad hoc communication enables each vehicle to contact its
neighbor vehicles directly. This type of communication is used to exchange information
about the speed and position of surrounding vehicles.
Vehicle-to-Roadside unit (V2R): An ad hoc communication facilitates exchanging
information between vehicles and roadside units (RSU). RSUs are used as data storage
servers. Unlike V2V, V2R allows long-distance communication. Besides, RSUs can act
as an intermediate hop between the vehicle and the destination.
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Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I): An ad hoc communication where the vehicle can
connect to the Internet to get different internet services.
Vehicle to Personal Devices (V2P): refers to the interaction between vehicles and
personal devices such as tablets and smartphones. Personal devices can be related to the
driver, passengers, cyclists, or pedestrians. This kind of communication can be used to
create awareness for vulnerable users, road users or connect the vehicle with other
devices to share files such as music or video streaming.
Vehicle-to-Sensor (V2S): this can also be called intra-vehicle communication. The main
goal of this type of communication is to monitor the vehicle's internal performance, such
as speed, tire pressure, and oil pressure, through the On-Board Units (OBUs).
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X): this communication allows the vehicle to communicate
with everything in the surrounding environment.

Figure 82: The IoV environment with five communication components
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Based on the above-mentioned different types of communication that the IoV
supports, IoV enables vehicles to connect to the Internet, constructing an interconnected
cluster of vehicles that can exchange data about traffic, road safety, and others [122].
Furthermore, IoV facilitates communication with drivers, passengers, pedestrians,
cyclists for entertainment and safety goals using different communication standards.
IoV will add individual, societal and environmental benefits as described below
[120]:
Individual Level: The implementation of IoV reduces the vehicle running cost by
lowering insurance rates, reducing operation costs, and minimizing the time spent in
traffic, which in turn will increase productivity and reduce fatal accidents
Societal Level: IoV supports the smart city evolution by lowering road operational costs,
reducing the number of accidents, and providing real-time traffic updates that can better
control congestion through traffic management and road network optimization.
Environmental Level: reducing traffic and controlling congestion through traffic
management will reduce the production of CO2, which will positively impact the green
environment.
Because IoV is one of the main components of the ITS, the security of the IoV is
an essential factor. The IoV domain vehicles are equipped with the onboard unit (OBU)
and application unit (AU) to communicate with the other vehicles. These units help
exchange messages between vehicles and infrastructure, such as Internet-based roadside
units (RSUs). The vehicles collect sensitive data about traffic jams, accidents, and
weather conditions. The collected data is sent to the nearest access points for further
action. This data can be transferred to other vehicles to avoid traffic jams and take an
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alternative route in severe road conditions or accidents. Because most of the IoV
ecosystem's communication is wireless, it is subject to different security risks. In IoV,
most of the channels the vehicles use for communication are not secure, and therefore,
the adversary can eavesdrop and tamper their messages.
On another perspective, transferring a driver's data to a trusted authority (TA) can
lead to a security threat such as data eavesdropping, data modification, or data fabrication
[123], which can negatively impact the driver's privacy, data confidentiality, and data
integrity. Therefore, a secure authentication protocol is essential for IoV to establish trust
in the system. Developing secure and efficient mutual authentication schemes and
establish trust are major challenges of an IoV domain. There is limited work on
developing lightweight mutual authentication protocols for the IoV domain. Most of the
available work depends on heavy cryptographical methodologies to authenticate and
secure the communication between the communicating parties. This chapter's main goals
are to (1) present a lightweight mutual authentication protocol for IoV that preserves user
privacy and (2) establish a mechanism to continually verify that the received data is
coming from the authenticated driver. The proposed authentication scheme should detect
and discover whenever someone else different from the authorized driver is driving the
car during the lifetime of the authentication session to maintain the same level of trust
among the authenticated entities and ensure the security of the IoV ecosystem.
6.2

Security aspects of IoV
According to [124], IoV integrates diverse devices, technologies, services, and

standards, which will increase the need to secure exchanged data and communication.
The authors in [125] argued that the heterogeneity of the IoV domain has many security
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vulnerabilities. The operation of vehicles in an open and vulnerable environment makes
the IoV vulnerable to cyberattacks and raises serious problems during V2V, V2I, V2R,
and V2P communication. An adversary can exploit existing vulnerabilities, eavesdrop,
manipulate, or delete vehicular data streams with destructive effects. Suppose the
adversary succeeds in taking control of the vehicle. In that case, he/she can control the
vehicle's brakes, heating system, or turning on or off the car, which in turn can present
significant harm to road safety, including driver, passenger, pedestrian, and road
infrastructure [126] and [127]. Therefore, it is a necessity to ensure security a high
priority for the IoV.
IoV has several security requirements that must be addressed, and security
solutions must be implemented to ensure user security and privacy. Table 25 presents the
main security requirements, the potential attacks that threaten each requirement, and the
mitigation techniques.
Table 25: IoV security requirements
The Security Requirement

The definition

Data Integrity

The sent and the received data are original
and have not to be modified or altered
[128]

Data Confidentiality

Data need to be protected to ensure the
secrecy of the data between the parties
participating in the IoV [129] and [130].
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Authentication

To ensure that communication is
occurring between the legitimate nodes.
The identities of the vehicles must be
verified [131] and [132]

Access Control

Vehicles must be able to only access data
and data they are eligible to gain access
to. Each participating node/vehicle has
been assigned different roles and
privileges to access the network [133].

Non-repudiation

It is preventing a vehicle from denying
sending data to another vehicle. [134].

Availability

It is ensuring that the system is always
available to service the vehicles and users.
Also, to ensure the ongoing
communication between the vehicles
under different conditions [132].

Anti-jamming

A technique that can be employed to
prevent malicious vehicles from sending
fake/interfering messages to the
surrounding vehicles to interrupt
communication among vehicles [135].
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Message Freshness

Enable the vehicle to verify that the
received messages are fresh and are not
replayed by an adversary.

Privacy

The vehicle's driving route driving is
related to people's privacy, and therefore
it must stay untraceable and get
compromised by unauthorized access
[136].

6.3

Security threats and attacks in IoV domain
IoV is exposed to different types of attacks and threats. To enhance the security of

IoV, it is vital to understand the existing attacks in IoV. In this section, several security
attacks in the IoV domain are discussed in the following section and presented in figure
83.
Sybill attack: The adversary creates some fake vehicles that use fake ids around the
victim vehicles and sends fake messages such as traffic jamming messages, wrong
directions, or false positions to misguide and deceive the surrounding innocent vehicles.
consequently, the whole network is disturbed, and it is risky for users' lives [123], [137],
and [138]
Denial of service (DoS) attack: This attack threatens the availability security
requirement. It aims to prevent legitimate and innocent users from using network
services and resources [122] by making them unavailable. It overloads the
communication channel so that no communication occurs among the authentic vehicles,
315

which is a severe problem. Communication is vital in safety applications because timely
information is required to avoid accidents [139]. The DoS attack can take different forms,
such as (1) Communication channel jamming, which will hinder users from the network
by jamming the communication channel. In this type of DoS attack, the adversary will
intentionally use a high-power transmitter to continuously transmit a signal at a higher
power level on the same channel frequency as the target. The target can be: (1)
communication between vehicles or between vehicles and RSUs; (2) Network
overloading where the adversary sends fake traffic to other vehicles or RSUs in the
network to keep the other node busy and prevent them from performing their tasks and
eventually the performance of the network is reduced; or (3) Packet dropping in which
the adversary makes the information unavailable to other nodes by dropping the packets
which carry essential information, so communication is affected.
Node impersonation attack This attack is a violation of authentication in a network. In
IoV domain, each vehicle has a unique identity to identify itself, and this unique identity
is useful in case of any unsafe situations. In a node impersonation attack, the adversary
may use the id of an authenticated node to send malicious messages to other nodes on the
network. In such a case, the innocent vehicles assume that a message is received from a
legitimate node; thus, confidential information is violated [139].
Man in the middle (MITM) attack: This attack violates data integrity and privacy goal.
In this attack, the adversary position himself/herself between the legitimate
communicating parties. As a result, the adversary may eavesdrop on their
communication, modify the sniffed message, or inject fake messages. At the same time,
two communicating parties assume that they are directly communicating with each other.
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Consequently, the message's integrity and authenticity are negatively impacted, and the
network security is compromised [123] and [133].
Replay attack: this type of attack repeatedly broadcasting the already sent message by
the adversary to deceive the other vehicles in the network by dropping the priority
messages from the queue. The system performance would be affected by frequent
replaying, and bandwidth cost also increases [136].
Brute force attack: session key/symmetric keys play a vital role in cryptographic
algorithms in securing the information. In this attack, the adversary tries all possible
combinations and already existed dictionaries to steal sensitive information such as
passwords. The attacker makes multiple attempts as the brute force approach takes time
in decoding the encrypted information [122].
Eavesdropping attack: In this attack, the attacker acts as a passive illegitimate listener to
the exchange message between the communicating parties to collect private, confidential
data of the drivers or the passenger to use it against their privacy without even letting
them know.
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Figure 83: Security threats and attacks in IoV domain
6.4

Related Work
Authenticating vehicles in the IoV domain is a security requirement that has been

studied by several researchers in conjunction with achieving other security requirements.
The authors in [140] present the possible vulnerabilities and threats of connected vehicles
from three different aspects. The first aspect is the vehicle itself that consists of three
main elements: electronic control units (ECUs), in-vehicle networks, and the gateway of
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standardized public communications such as 3G/4G, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. The second
aspect is the connection between the mobile device to the vehicle. The third aspect is the
communication technologies used by the vehicle to communicate with the surrounding
environment. Authors in [141] classified possible attacks of connected vehicles into
physical attacks such as physical damage of the vehicle, close-proximity attacks to
obfuscate sensor information and inject faulty data in ECUs within a range of
approximately 10 meters, and remote attacks, including accessing ECUs and sensors via
insecure communication paths over remote wireless access. The authors in [142]
explained that connected vehicles are more vulnerable to cyber threats than traditional
vehicles due to the communication between the connected vehicle and the surrounding
external environment and the increased internal communications among the system's
internal components.
The authors in [143] present a lightweight mutual authentication protocol for IoV
using cryptographic operations. The presented protocol enables a vehicle and a server to
establish a secret key to secure the ongoing communication while minimizing the
computational cost associated with the process through a trusted authority server. The
protocol consists of four main parties: the vehicle, the vehicle server, the trusted
authority, and the registration authority. The protocol proved to be secure against
impersonation attacks because the malicious vehicles cannot generate request messages
as it involves passing through the second mandatory phase. Furthermore, the protocol is
resilient against data modification, replay attacks, and password guessing attacks. On the
other hand, the protocol does not clarify how the trusted authority can identify the
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vehicles without using an ID. Also, the presented protocol uses a long-term secret key
during the authentication process, which can be retrieved using side-channel attacks.
Authors in [144] proposed an authentication scheme that focused on
authentication, privacy preservation, integrity, and non-repudiation. The researcher used
Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA). The authors in [145]
presented TESLA as a broadcast authentication scheme to provide V2V communication
using ECDSA to sign the first packet that is sent by each vehicle. Because ECDSA is
computationally expensive, the researchers in [144] used the Bloom filtering (B.)
technique as an alternative to ECDSA. In the presented protocol, the RSUs are
responsible for generating a group of pseudonyms for each vehicle. The vehicle rapidly
changes its pseudonyms in fixed time slots ensuring privacy. The vehicles are grouped
according to their similar characteristics like speed and location. The authentication of
the vehicle is verified against the BF value. Any new vehicle that initiates a
communication would request a BF value from the corresponding RSU and key from the
vehicle that it needs to communicate with. The proposed scheme can protect the system
against malicious nodes, preserve the user's privacy, and helps in reducing delay and
latency.
Author [146] presents an authentication scheme resistant to secret key
compromisation by presenting a key insulation concept. It has a Private Key Generation
(PKG) algorithm that generates a set of keys for both the vehicles and RSUs. They also
suggested adding to the vehicle an additional Tampered Proof Devices device (TPD) that
acts as a helper. They assume that the TPD is physically secure but computationally
limited, and its stored information can never be disclosed. The presented scheme is based
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on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The scheme has four phases. The first phase is the
initialization phase, where the PKG generates parameters of ECC. The PKG generates the
private keys and calculates the corresponding public keys of TPD and RSUs. The second
phase is the key generation phase, where the vehicles create their secret keys using the
public keys of OBU and TPD and some randomized parameters. The third phase is the
signing phase, where the OBU sends the signature to the RSU for verification. The fourth
step is verification, where the RSU verifies the received signature from the vehicle for
authentication. The proposed scheme is secure against various chosen plaintext attacks
and forgery attacks as its private key is of two parts: one part is with TPD, and the other
is with the vehicle itself. On the other side, it is computationally expensive due to the
generation of multiple private and public keys and the use of digital signatures.
The authors in [147] present a two-level authentication key exchange scheme
employing the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). During the first authentication level,
the cluster head (CH) vehicle is verified and authenticated by the CA. Then the
authenticated CH will be responsible for authenticating the vehicles within the cluster in
the second level of authentication. The protocol consists of four different phases. The
first phase is the pre-deployment of vehicles phase, where the CA assigns the vehicle the
needed authentication parameters that will be verified during the authentication phase.
The second phase is the cluster head verification, where the CA verifies and authenticates
the CH vehicle. The third phase is the authentication and key agreement of the vehicles.
During this phase, the cluster head verifies and authenticates the vehicles within the
cluster. After completing the authentication process, the CH establishes a session key for
their secure communications in the future. The last phase is Dynamic Vehicles Addition,
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where new vehicles can be dynamically added to the cluster. The presented protocol is
not clear how the CA and the CH identify the vehicles without receiving any vehicle ID.
Also, the proposed protocol is very computationally expensive due to the extensive use of
public cryptography and digital signature. Finally, the protocol depends on the CH to
verify and authenticate all the vehicles that are within the cluster. This design will
generate a significant overhead on the CH, and at the same time, it is vulnerable to a
single-point failure. Moreover, the cluster head will always be changing depending on
the vehicle speed and position; therefore, the CH will often be altered, reducing the
authentication session lifetime as the new CH will be elected and a new authentication
process will be conducted.
Authors in [148] introduced secure and efficient message authentication protocols
for IoV communication such as V2V, V2S, V2R, V2I, and V2P. The proposed protocol
consists of four phases: initial setup, registration, authentication, and communication.
The presented protocol cannot resist various security threats such as secret key
disclosure, MITM, and impersonation attacks and does not ensure authentication. The
adversary can conduct an impersonation attack because he/she can masquerade as a
legitimate vehicle. Also, the adversary can conduct a secret key disclosure attack by
being able to extract the secret credentials {Za, Ua, Wa} stored in a smart card. Then, the
adversary will be able to compute and retrieve the vehicle server's secret key KVS = Za
⊕ h(Ua||Wa), and random nonce pa = Aa ⊕ h (KVS ||T1). Consequently, the adversary
can execute a secret key disclosure attack by calculating Ce = De ⊕ KVS ⊕ pa and
masquerade as a legitimate vehicle and also can conduct a man-in-the-middle attack.
Finally, because the adversary can obtain the VS's secret key KVS and symmetric key
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between each entity. Then, the adversary can generate authentication request messages,
verify response messages, and achieve message authentication with other entities
successfully. Consequently, the proposed scheme does not ensure secure message
authentication.
The researchers in [149] present an efficient message authentication protocol for
IoV in a smart city environment, called IoV-SMAP. The proposed protocol consists of
three phases that are initialization, registration, and authentication. The vehicle server
registers all IoV entities in the communication system during the initialization phase and
generates a secret master key (KV). The proposed protocol does not present a technique
on how the IoV entities can verify the identities of each other. Therefore, the protocol
can be subject to an impersonation attack and also a man in a middle attack.
Furthermore, by impersonating and acting as a legitimate vehicle, the adversary
will be able to generate the session key between each entity. Then, the adversary can
generate authentication request messages, verify response messages, and successfully
achieve message authentication with other entities. Consequently, the proposed scheme
does not ensure secure message authentication. The proposed IoV-SMAP can resist
security drawbacks and provide user anonymity and mutual authentication.
The authors in [150] present a two-factor authentication and key agreement
protocol for IoV by combining a password with the PUF. The proposed protocol
preserves user's anonymity. The protocol consists of three parties: (1) the User (Ui) that
receives data from the vehicle sensors and statistical data from the data center;(2) the
Data Center (DC) that manages and stores data collected by vehicle sensors; (3) and the
Vehicle Secret Key (Vsk) that is located in the vehicle to collect data from the
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surrounding environment. The protocol consists of three phases that are system setup,
registration, login, and authentication. During the setup phase, the DC generates its own
public-private key pair (pk, sk) and publishes its pk to users and vehicles for encrypting
the subsequent messages. During the registration phase, both the user and the vehicle
sensor are registered to the DC. During the authentication phase, the DC authenticates
both the user and the vehicle and generates a session key with each of them. On the
proposed protocol, the user and the vehicle sensor do not authenticate the CD first before
sending the PUF responses, which can lead to DC impersonation. Because the vehicle
sensor generates its PUF challenge, there is no way to verify is the vehicle sensor is
original or counterfeited.
The authors in [151] propose a platform for secure data sharing and storage in
VANETs using blockchain. The proposed authentication scheme requires the vehicle to
prove its ID before sharing any data. One of the main weaknesses of the proposed
protocol is using blockchain that added overhead to the proposed protocol and did not
support its scalability. Similarly, the researchers in [152] and [153] introduced other
authentication and key management protocols that employ blockchain, which inherit the
same weaknesses as [151].
The authors in [154] present an efficient protocol for mutual authentication in the
IoV. The proposed protocol uses physical unclonable functions as part of the
authentication process. The researchers claim that the proposed protocol Protects against
physical and cloning attacks and preserves user's privacy. The proposed protocol consists
of three phases that are: Device registration, authentication, and CRP update. Each
vehicle needs to register itself with the trusted authority (TA) during the device
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registration phase before it can become a part of the IoV. During the authentication
phase, the vehicles are authenticated to the TA and the RSUs and generate a session key.
Once the authentication process is completed, the authenticated vehicle can communicate
with the RSUs using the session key. The third phase is the CRP update, where the TA
can update the CRPs of the vehicles. The proposed protocol preserves the user's privacy.
However, the proposed protocol does not support ensuring the device's originality before
completing the registration process.
The authors in [155] present a cloud-centric three-factor authentication and key
agreement protocol that integrates passwords, biometrics, and smart cards to ensure
secure access to both cloud and Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). At the end of the
authentication process, two session keys are negotiated. The first key is between the user
and AV to support secure remote control of the AV, and the second key is negotiated
between the mobile device and the cloud. The proposed protocol has three entities,
including the user, the vehicle, and the cloud. The protocol consists of 6 phases: system
setup, AV registration, user registration, user authentication, password, biometrics
change, and smart card revocation. During the setup phase, the cloud generates and
advertises the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) public parameters and generates an ID.
In the AV registration phase, the cloud generates and distributes a secret key for each
AV. In the user registration phase, the cloud issues a smart card storing the secret key to
each user. During the user authentication phase, the authentication mechanism is
employed to verify the user identity and build secure channels among the cloud, the AV,
and the user. Although the protocol achieves its security goals, it is computationally
expensive due to the extensive use of the ECC scaler multiplier and the Fuzzy extraction.
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Therefore, this protocol does not support the required system efficiency and does not
support system scalability. Furthermore, the protocol does not support physical security.
The authors in [156] present a physical unclonable function (PUF) based on threefactor authentication and key agreement protocol to ensure that the system is secure even
if the user devices or sensors are compromised. The researchers used password,
biometrics, and PUF as the three authentication parameters. The proposed protocol
combined the user characteristic through the use of biometric and the device
characteristic through the use of the PUF. The protocol consists of five stages: system
setup, registration, login and authentication, password update, and biometric update.
Although the proposed protocol is secure, it has several limitations: (1) it depends heavily
on scaler multiplier for ECC and fuzzy extractor, which are computationally expensive;
(2) although the proposed protocol used PUF as a hardware fingerprint, the proposed
protocol can't verify the originality of the devices and sensors before completing the
registration process which in turn does not protect the IoV ecosystem from the devices
counterfeiting; and (3) the lack of efficient computation negatively impact the scalability
of the proposed protocol.
The authors in [157] propose a lightweight and secure authentication and
attestation scheme for attesting vehicles on the roads. The presented protocol proposed a
security scheme using PUFs to perform a combined authentication and attestation
protocol for the IoV network. The Roadside Units initially authenticate the Vehicle
Onboard Units (OBUs) (RSUs), and then the attestation process is to be completed at the
edge servers. The authors state that they used PUFs for generating on-the-fly secret
information that can be used as part of the authentication process. The proposed protocol
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consists of five main entities: the vehicle Vi, the RSU Rj, the edge server ES, the IoV
cloud server IoV C, and the trusted authority TA. The RSUs are responsible for
authenticating the vehicles. The proposed protocol consists of the initialization phase,
Registration phase, Vehicle-RSU authentication phase, and Attestation phase. Although
the proposed protocol is lightweight, it has several limitations. First, it uses the same
pseudoID for both the vehicle and RSU in every authentication session. This, in turn, can
lead to vehicle traceability and linkability. Second, the same challenge and response are
used in every authentication session. If a hacker succeeded in retrieving the challenge and
the response, they could impersonate the vehicle. Third, the authentication session can't
be transferred from one RSU to another within the same cluster, limiting the protocol
scalability.
Many of the above-presented protocols share the same common limitations. First,
many suggested protocols used computationally expensive cryptographic operations that do
not support system scalability and, at the same time, do not support devices with limited
memory and computational capabilities. Second, most of the proposed protocols did not
focus on the ensure the authenticity of the communicating devices and secure the system
from integrating counterfeited devices. However, this is considered a significant concern in
the IoV domain. Third, many proposed protocols do not implement multiple authentication
levels, which is the core of the defense-in-depth concept. Fourth, in some of the presented
protocols, the researchers overlooked the devices' privacy, which, in response, does not
guarantee the anonymity and privacy of the IoT device and, at the same time, allows devices
traceability. Fifth, many of the proposed protocols require storing long-term secret keys that
can be retrieved using side-channel attacks. Sixth, some of the proposed protocols, such as
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[157], use the same CRP for every authentication session and store the CRP on the vehicle's
OBU. If the device is compromised, the adversary may obtain the CRP and impersonated
the vehicle.
The available literature shows the necessity of using multi-factor authentication to
implement the defense-in-depth concept. Also, it highlights the need for lightweight
authentication protocols that fit the limited resources devices and support the system
scalability. The proposed scheme in this chapter combines both the driver's biometric
parameters and the PUF as unique identifiers to authenticate the vehicle and the driver.
Using only one of the two mechanisms will lead to limitations in the presented scheme.
Using the driver's biometric only will authenticate the driver, but the vehicle's authenticity
will be questionable.
On the other hand, using only the PUF to authenticate the vehicle will authenticate
the vehicle but will not enable us to verify the authenticity of the driver. Therefore, we
propose combining both the vehicle and the driver biometric to implement a secure and
robust authentication protocol that facilitates building a root of trust among all the
communication parties. The proposed protocol will achieve three levels of authentication,
namely, V2V, V2I, U2I.
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6.5
Three-Factor Authentication and Privacy Preservation Scheme Using User
and Device Biometrics for IoV System Network Model and Security Goals
We present an IoV network model and introduce the security mechanisms and
components of the proposed scheme. Then, we will discuss the main security goals.
6.5.1

Network Model
Figure 84 presents the network model of the proposed scheme. We propose a

four-layer architecture consisting of 6 main entities: the driver (D), the Vehicle (V), RSU,
central RSU (CRSU), the vehicle owners cloud server (VOCS), and trusted authority
(TA). The vehicles and drivers are at the lowest layer. The vehicles and drivers are
connected wirelessly to the next layer, which consists of RSUs. The RSUs are connected
to a central RSU that is located in the third layer. This connection may be wired or
wireless. Finally, the CRSU is connected to both the service provider cloud server and the
trusted authority (TA.) through a wired connection. There are several types of
communication modes, such as Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure
(V2I), user to infrastructure (U2I).
The responsibility of the TA is to perform the registration of V, RSUs, CRSUs,
and the D prior to placement in the network. Each V has an OBU, which processes and
stores all vehicles' information [158]. Vehicles are also equipped with sensors that sense
and process surrounding information and send that information to the OBU of the vehicle
[159]. Each vehicle is connected with the Internet and can also send and receive data
using the Internet [160]. D-VOCS, RSU-CRSU, V-VOCS, and CRSU-TA
communications occur through the Internet. V2V and V-RSU communication also occur
through the Internet, but it is preferable to have dedicated short-range communications
(DSRC) [161].
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Figure 84: Proposed IoV network model
•

The Vehicle is equipped with sensors, ECUs and in-vehicle networks, and
onboard units (OBUs). The OBU is a device that is implanted in a vehicle, and it
is used to send and receive data to other OBUs or RSUs. Furthermore, a PUF chip
is embedded in the OBU and used as the vehicle fingerprint. By using OBUs,
vehicles can communicate with each other as well as with the RSUs. The
communication among them is based on the DSRC protocol [155]. Therefore, any
attempt to tamper or separate the PUF from the OBU renders the PUF useless
[162] and [163]
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•

The Driver: The system continuously monitors the driver's behavior to make sure
that he/she is the authorized driver on the vehicle and he/she is in good health
condition.

•

Roadside Unit (RSU): It is a stationary device located along the roads and at
intersections. RSU gathers information about the road traffic and broadcasts it to
the OBUs within the communication range. Also, an RSU can communicate with
other RSUs and the CRSU to exchange messages related to road traffic through a
secure channel.

•

Central RSU (CRSU): The CRSU is a device that is in charge of a group of
RSUs, and it is considered the intermediate communication channel between the
RSU and the T.A. The CRSU collects and aggregates the data from all its RSUs
and sends it to the T.A. for further analysis and storage.

•

Vehicle Owner Cloud Server: The VOCS is responsible for the vehicle's data
storage and data analysis and the driver's collected data. The VOCS is in charge
of registering the vehicle and the driver on the company level. The analyzed data
results will help the organization monitor the driver's health and behaviors and
allow the company to monitor the activities of the vehicle as an asset.

•

Trusted Authority (TA): The TA is responsible for data storage and data
analysis. The TA collects real-time traffic information, road conditions, and
environmental data from the CRSUs and analyzes them for situational awareness.
All vehicles, RSUs, and CRSUs, need to register with the TA. The TA is assumed
to be completely trustable, hard to compromise, and powerful. In addition, it has
sufficient computation and storage capacity.
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The proposed scheme consists of four main layers: the physical layer that consists
of the vehicles and the driver, the edge layer consists of the RSUs, the fog layer that
consists of the central RSUs, and the cloud layer that consists of the trusted authority
(TA), the Vehicle Owner Cloud Server (VOCS), and the PUF cloud. The Vehicle on
Layer I is equipped with different types of internal and external sensors collecting data in
real-time. This work focuses on sensors that collect real-time data from the vehicle
surrounding environment, such as radar, lidar, 360 camera, proximity sensors, and lane
tracking sensors. The collected data is sent to the designated ECUs units for further
processing and reporting. Data that has to be reported will be sent over by the appropriate
ECU to the OBU unit to be transmitted to the RSU. The OBU has an implanted PUF
chip that will be used during the authentication process. The driver's fingerprint will be
collected via the in-vehicle fingerprint scanner. Additionally, the driver's biometric
features such as EKG or ECG will be continuously collected by using a steering wheelbased sensor for real-time driver's verification.
The edge layer is a series of individual RSUs that are under the authority of a
single Central RSU. RSUs collect real-time data from the vehicle and acts as a relay
between the vehicle and the Central RSU. In addition, the RSU facilitates V2V
communication. Furthermore, when a vehicle moves to the proximity of a new RSU, to
verify the vehicle's authenticity, the most recently visited RSU will help the new RSU.
The fog layer houses the CRSUs, where the CRSU interconnect multiple
individual RSUs. The CRSU plays a major role in facilitating vehicle communication
that involves the following activities: (1) vehicle authentication; (2) handover between
neighbor RSUs; (3) maintain authentication session and parameters during the vehicle
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trips that may cross multiple RSUs. Furthermore, the CRSU will be in charge of data
cleaning, aggregation, analysis, and decision-making. The main goal of this distributed
architecture of the RSUs is to create a scalable architecture for vehicle systems that
exhibit flexible admission control and avoiding single-point failure. Additionally, it
enables the vehicle to be authenticated just once using its PUF when it is within the
CRSU range. This, in turn, reduces the expected latency and the computational
complexity of each new authentication session. The RSUs on the edge layer and CRSUs
on the fog layer participate in local decision-making such as reroute vehicles to reduce
traffic jams or avoid road constructions or predict the probability of accidents in a
specific area. Based on local decision-making, the alarm system gives a warning
message to the driver of that particular vehicle.
The cloud layer is generally virtualized in data centers and communicates with the
other layers using the Internet. The architecture presented in figure 84 has three clouds.
The first one is the cloud of the Vehicle Owner Cloud Server (VOCS.), where the
collected data from the vehicles and the drivers will be stored and analyzed to be utilized
as an organizational monitoring system. This stored data will be used to conduct further
analysis and mine knowledge to help the organization make better decisions regarding
their business. The VOSC is responsible for the registration of the vehicles. The VOCS is
in charge of generating the communicating credentials for the vehicles, such as alias
identities, OTP, and secret keys to be used during the authentication process. After
storing the generated credentials in the vehicle's memory, the vehicles can be deployed in
the field. The VOCS is also responsible for registering the driver and stores the template
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of his/her biometrics to be used during the authentication process. The driver can also
access the data of the deployed vehicles from the VOCS.
The second cloud is the cloud of the trusted authority (TA), where the collected
data that has been sent through the fog layer will be stored on Distributed File System
(DFS). This stored data will be used to conduct further analysis and to mine knowledge.
The TA is responsible for registering various network communicating entities, including
the vehicle, the RSU, and the CRSU. RSUs, CRSUs. TA collaborates in large-scale
decision-making, such as traffic conditions for a whole city. The TA is in charge of
generating the communicating credentials for the vehicles, such as alias identities, OTP,
and other authentication parameters. The third cloud is the PUF cloud, where the
manufacturers store the CRPs of the vehicles, RSUs, CRSUs, TA, and VOCS. The CRPs
will be used to authenticate the vehicle as well as ensure the authenticity of the devices to
protect the IoV ecosystem from integrating counterfeited devices.
The manufacturer assigns each vehicle a unique secret ID. The VOCS assigns the
vehicle and the driver unique alias IDs. Also, the TA assigns the vehicle an alias ID. The
Alias IDs will be changed every authentication session. The main goal of the alias ID is to
protect the vehicle and the driver's anonymity and ensure their untraceability.
The communication between any two entities is subject to both active and passive
attacks. In passive attacks, the adversary can eavesdrop on the communication. In active
attacks, the intruder may replay, modify, or delete specific communication messages. The
message header that contains the device Alias ID is sent in clear text while the payload is
sent in an encrypted format. The number of vehicles can vary throughout the lifetime of
the network. Because adding a new vehicle to the network is highly possible, the
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proposed protocol accommodates system scalability. The proposed scheme supports the
dynamic addition of vehicles to the IoV network without changing the network's security
states.
6.5.2

Driver biometric and vehicle biometric
Ensuring the security of the IoV ecosystems requires ongoing authentication of

the communicating entities and verification of the collected data from both the vehicle
and the driver to establish trust. An authentication mechanism is needed to ensure the
validity of the data before being used to analyze the collected data about the driver and
the vehicle surrounding environment. Furthermore, there is no proof that the collected
data is still related to the same driver during the authentication session once the driver got
authenticated. To ensure safety and security, the fleet vehicle in the IoV ecosystem
requires continuous monitoring of the driver. Therefore, the received data from the
driver need to be verified and validated continuously to ensure that it is coming from the
same driver during the whole authentication session [145] and [146]. The IoV system
needs to ensure that the driver's received data belongs to the authenticated driver and also
is obtained from the authenticated vehicle. This can be achieved by using user biometric
and vehicle biometric that the PUF represents.
6.5.2.1
6.5.2.1.1

Biometric authentication techniques
Driver's biometric authentication

During an authentication session, the verification process can be performed based
on one or more of the following three different factors: (1) something we know such as a
password or unique identification value; (2) something we have such as token or secret
keys; and (3) something we are such as biometric features like fingerprint, voice, face, or
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electrocardiography (ECG). Biometric authentication is considered a decisive
authentication factor compared to other authentication credentials because it is a unique
identifier for each human and cannot be transferred or replicated [164]. Authentication
mechanisms can be categorized as static and continuous authentication methods [165].
Static authentication can be treated as an initial authentication where the user can be
authenticated to the system. Still, there is no post-authentication monitoring technique to
ensure that the same user is initially authenticated [166].
On the other hand, continuous authentication mechanisms monitor a system
during the lifetime of the authentication session to verify and ensure that it is the same
user who accesses the system [167]. The proposed scheme employs both static and
continuous authentication of the driver to ensure the same driver during the whole
authentication session. In addition, the constant collection of the driver's biometric will
be an effective method to monitor the driver's health condition. The proposed scheme
will authenticate the driver using his/her biometric in the fingerprint format as the static
biometric feature and the driver's biometric in the ECG or EKG format as the continuous
biometric feature.

6.5.2.1.2
Vehicle biometric mechanism based on PUF and chained hash PUF
authentication
The PUF technique uses the hardware properties of the vehicle for unique
identification. The proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication by implementing a
challenge-response authentication mechanism. In the proposed scheme, during the
registration phase, both the vehicle and the TA hash the response of a PUF challenge and
the TA master secret key to produce a hashed value named CHX. Then, for all
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subsequent authentication sessions, the vehicle hashes the previously-stored chained
CHXx-1 along with the new Rx, to generate a new chained hash CHXx. The TA retrieves
the Rx value from its database and hash the retrieved R with the previously stored
chained CHXx-1. Then, it compares the resulting value (CHXx' = h (R'|| CHXx-1)) with
the received CHXx’. If it matches, it will authenticate the vehicle node. Once the
authentication is completed, the two communicating parties will store the CHXx in their
databases and use the CHXx-1 along with the exchanged random values to generate the
shared session key(ssk).
During the driver authentication, the hash value of the combination of the vehicle
Rx and the user static biometric will be calculated before being sent to the VOCS to
authenticate the driver. This process aims to secure the driver's privacy and ensure the
security of the biometric feature.
The proposed scheme chains the blocks of hashed response values together by
hashing the new PUF response value with previously generated chained hash PUF values
and the vehicle's real identity. Thus, my mechanism looks like a blockchain technology at
first glance, but it does not utilize blockchains. Because the PUF response value cannot
be predicted or replicated, the adversary can't predict the chained hash PUF value. The
chained hash PUF value is used to present a historical factor for authenticating the
vehicle and the driver. Employing the chained hash PUF mechanism and user biometric
technique ensures mutual authentication through a challenge-response scheme which is
essential in IoV ecosystem security. The two-way challenge/response authentication
technique allows the communicating parties to check the device’s authenticity and, at the
same time, enables the communicating parties to ensure that they are not communicating
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with a malicious node. The use of the PUF proves the device's identity and ensures its
originality. The use of the cumulative chained hash PUF value proves the ability of the
communicating parties to show proof of knowledge of past chained hash PUF value.
6.5.3

Security goals
Because security attacks on the vehicles in the IoV ecosystem may cause physical

damage and loss of human lives, security requirements became vital in the IoV domain.
Single-factor authentication is not sufficient to validate the security of the vehicles and
users in the IoV domain. A 3-factor authentication protocol is a promising alternative to
secure the IoV ecosystem. This chapter presents a three-factor authentication
schemewith the following goals:
1. Mutual authentication: The goal of mutual authentication is to ensure that the

communication is occurring only among the legitimate parties as well as ensuring
that only the legitimate parties have access to the vehicles, the RSU, VOCS, and
the TA. Therefore, the legitimate parties should be able to prove they are
who/what they claim.
2. Secret session key (ssk) perfect secrecy: the ssk of one session should not be

derived even if the adversary reveals the ssks of previous sessions.
3.

User/vehicle anonymity: the proposed scheme should be able to preserve
user/vehicle anonymity. The adversary must not identify the user's or vehicle's
real identity by capturing any communication message.

4. User /vehicle untraceability: the scheme should preserve user's and vehicle's

privacy and ensure that an adversary can't trace the user's actions and status as
well as vehicle location.
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5. Biometric privacy protection: The leakage of a user's biometric template can

cause serious privacy risks once being leaked. To preserve biometric privacy, no
biometric template will be saved in cleartext on the VOCS.
6. System scalability: the scheme should be scalable and be able to accommodate

the growing number of vehicles. This goal can be achieved by reducing the
communication overhead and reducing the number of times a vehicle needs to
authenticate to the RSUs.
7.

Low latency: Because the IoV is dynamic and the vehicle movement is so
frequent and fast, the proposed scheme needs to be efficient and not
computationally expensive. One way to achieve this goal is by reducing the
required data to complete the authentication process and employing lightweight
cryptosystems.

8. Counterfeiting and physical protection: This goal can be achieved by using the

PUF.

6.5.4

Network model assumptions

We make the following assumptions.
•

Every vehicle is equipped with a PUF.

•

The communication between a vehicle's OBU and PUF is considered secure.

•

Every vehicle is equipped with a fingerprint scanner.

•

Every vehicle is equipped with a smart steering wheel that can collect data about
the driver’s health.
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•

Every vehicle is equipped with a keypad for the driver to insert his username and
password.

•

The communication between the vehicle's OBU and the fingerprint scanner is
considered secure.

•

The communication between the vehicle's OBU and the smart steering wheel is
considered secure.

•

The communication between CRSU and TA is considered to be secure.

•

The communication between the RSUs and the CRSU is considered secure.

6.5.5

Threat model
Assume vehicle x sends an authentication request to the VOCS, an adversary S is

able to replay, eavesdrop, tamper, and inject packets sent by a vehicle or by the driver.
Moreover, S may gain physical access to vehicles and exploit physical attacks to retrieve
stored secret data. The following assumptions about security properties and adversary
abilities are made.
1. The used communication channel during the registration process is secure.
2. The one-way hash function is collision resistant.
3. The vehicle's OBU has protection against tampering.
4. Replay attack: An adversary can capture messages from old authentication sessions
and replay them in the current session.
5. Eavesdropping attack: the adversary can eavesdrop on the communication channel
between the vehicle and the infrastructure.
6. Message modification attack: the adversary can tamper with intercepted messages.
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7. Injection attack: the adversary can send counterfeit messages.
8. Impersonation attack: The adversary can pretend to be a legitimate vehicle or a driver
and sends a message to the infrastructure. Also, the adversary can impersonate the
infrastructure and sends a message to the vehicle.
9. Physical attack: the adversary can conduct a physical attack on vehicles to extract
stored secrets in memory. Any physical attack will tamper with the PUF and destroys it.
6.6
Proposed authentication scheme: Multi-Factor Authentication and Privacy
Preservation Scheme Using User and Device Biometrics for IoV System
Fleet vehicles are a special type of vehicle that may share their data with more
than one destination. On the road, the fleet vehicle is treated as any other regular vehicle
that can collect data from the surrounding environment to support the intelligent
transportation system. From another perspective, the fleet vehicles need to continuously
communicate their data and the drivers' data with the vehicle owning company as a
mechanism of fleet monitoring. This work focuses on authenticating the fleet vehicles in
the IoV ecosystem to the road infrastructure and authenticating both the vehicle and the
driver to the cloud server of the vehicle-owning company. The continuous growth of the
number of fleet vehicles on the road highlights the need to optimize the communication
tasks and the authentication process to reduce the consumed energy and support the
system scalability. According to [168], a fleet monitoring system adds several benefits to
businesses. First, it will allow businesses to collect real-time data about the driver's
behaviors for driver safety and build trust between the drivers and their managers to
increase drivers' retention. Second, the implementation of fleet monitoring allows
businesses to track the vehicle to be able to identify the vehicle location at a given time.
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Fleet tracking will provide businesses with real-time data about the vehicle operation that
can reduce the vehicle cost and help businesses make better decisions about new vehicle
acquisition. At the same time, an effective tracking system can ensure vehicle safety.
Third, it provides the businesses with a dynamic and accurate Electronic Logging Device
(ELD) compliant system to track the vehicle's hours of service to reduce the accidents
that fatigued drivers can cause.
This work proposes a lightweight mutual authentication and key agreement
scheme for communication between vehicle to road infrastructure and authentication and
key agreement between the vehicle and user to the VOCS. Furthermore, to reduce the
latency and support the system scalability, the proposed scheme will present how an RSU
can communicate and collaborate with other RSU under the same CRSU to verify the
legitimacy of a roaming vehicle's expedited authentication process. The proposed scheme
aims to build trust among all communication parities while reducing the computational
complexity and the computational cost, ensuring security and preserving privacy during
the authentication process and all subsequent communication, and supporting system
scalability.
The proposed scheme consists of four phases: the enrollment phase, registration
phase, mutual authentication phase, and key agreement phase. The enrollment phase will
be completed during manufacturing. The trusted authority (TA) will complete the
registration phase when the vehicle communicates with the road infrastructure. The vehicle
owner cloud server (VOCS) will complete the registration phase when the vehicle is
communicating with the owning company monitoring system. The mutual authentication
and the key agreement phases will be completed between V and TA, V and VOCS, and
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Driver and VOCS without any human involvement. Every two parties are responsible for
ensuring a secure, anonymous mutual authentication and key generation. V and TA, Driver
and VOCS, and V and VOCS are based on the client-server topology. The relationship
among the different vehicles is based on peer-to-peer topology. The mutual authentication
and the key generation phases are broken down into other sub-phases
5. The mutual authentication and key agreement between V and TA
6. The mutual authentication and key agreement between V and VOCS
7. The mutual authentication and key agreement between D and VOCS
The proposed scheme utilizes a one-way hash function, simple XOR function or
symmetric encryption between the communicating devices. Furthermore, both vehicles
and drivers use Alias IDs (pseudonyms) instead of using their real IDs during the
communication process. Alias IDs support the anonymity of senders' IDs, receivers' IDs,
and the sender-receiver relationship. The abstract notations used to describe the proposed
authentication scheme are listed in table 26. The scheme phases are presented below.
6.6.1

Enrollment Phase
The manufacturer will collect a set of CRPs for each vehicle, RSUs, CRSUs, and

the cloud servers during the enrollment phase. The manufacturer will test all the CRPs
under different temperature and voltage conditions and consider the aging effects to keep
only the error-free CRPs. Then, the manufacturer will load the CRPs of the vehicle, the
RSUs, the CRSUs and the servers to the cloud of their service providers. The service
provider container is part of the PUF architecture that is presented in chapter 2. The main
goals of PUF are to be used as the device biometric that is unique per device, protect the
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device from having counterfeited parts, and generate a relevant, unique key for the
device. The uniqueness of the generated key in the network would be guaranteed based
on the diversity and the manufacturing variations that generate the PUF. The generated
PUF responses will be used to generate the symmetric keys.
Table 26: Notations used in the scheme
Notation

Description

Trusted Authority

TA

Vehicle

Vi

Vehicle owner cloud server

VOCS

Driver

Di

VIDR

Vehicle Real ID

VIDA

Vehicle Alias ID

TAIDR

Trusted Authority Real ID

TAIDA

Trusted Authority Alias ID

VOCSIDR

Vehicle Owner Cloud Server Real ID

VOCSIDA

Vehicle Owner Cloud Server Alias ID

OTP

One Time password

OTT

One Time Token

MSK

Master Secret Key

PUF

Physical unclonable function

CHx

Chained hash PUF

C

Challenges

R

Response

VTA1

Authentication parameter between V and
TA

VCS1, VCS2

Authentication parameters between V and
VOCS
344

VTID

Vehicle Type ID

RV

Random values

Ui

Username

PUi

User password

FP

User’s fingerprint

BBU

User’s behavioral biometric

ZU1, ZU2

Authentication parameters between D and
VOCS

TS

Timestamp

H

Hash function

6.6.2
6.6.2.1

Registration Phase
Vehicle – TA registration process
Each vehicle needs to register itself with the TA before being deployed in the

field and be part of the IoV system. The TA can be a state-wide entity where all vehicles
need to be registered with this TA. The vehicle will send a registration request to the TA,
including its ID. Once the TA receives the registration request, it will complete multiple
tasks, as described in figures 85 and 86. First, the TA will assign alias IDs to each
vehicle. The alias ID will be a fake ID that the vehicle will use to communicate with
other communication parities in the IoV domain. Alias IDs will act as pseudonym IDs
and will be dynamically changed in every authentication. The goal of the Alias ID goal is
to protect and ensure the unlinkability and untraceability of the vehicle and to support the
anonymity of each vehicle in each session.
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Second, the TA will send the vehicle a PUF challenge to use the PUF function to
calculate the corresponding PUF response. The TA will use the PUF response as a seed to
calculate the chained hash PUF by calculating the hash value of the PUF response
concatenated with the secret vehicle ID. Third, TA will use the PUF function to generate
the PUF response (RTA) of its challenge (CTA). The challenge will be stored on the
memory of the TA, and the response will be calculated for every authentication session.
Fourth, TA will use a random number generator to generate a random value to be used as
one-time passwords (OTP) between V and the TA. There will be a unique OTP between
each vehicle and the TA. Finally, the TA will insert and store VIDR, TAIDR, VIDA, TAIDA,
OTP, and the CHXx, in the OBU of each vehicle.
Vehicle-TA Registration
Step1: The vehicle sends a registration request to the TA, including its ID (VIDR).
Step 2: The TA searches its database to check if the vehicle is registered. If it is not
registered, it sends a message to the vehicle, including a PUF challenge, so the response
can be used as a seed to create the chained hash PUF
Step 3: Once the vehicle receives the challenge, it will use the PUF function to calculate
the response and send it to the TA.
Step 4: Once the TA receives the response, it will verify the received response and
compares it with the retrieved one from the PUF cloud. After the successful verification,
the TA will generate a nonce (a) and will use the PUF function to generate the response
of its challenge and complete the following calculations:
1. Calculates the chained hash (CHXxi)= H (Rv || VIDR)
2. Generates an OTPVi
3. RTA = PUF(CTA)
4. Calculates an authentication parameter VTA1 = H (TAIDR || MSKTA || RTA|| VIDR).
The vehicle does not know the TAIDR, RTA, nor MSKTA.
5. Calculates an Alias ID for the vehicle VIDA = H (R1|| a || VIDR)
Finally, the TA stores the VIDR, VIDA, CTA, OTPVi. CHXxi and the vehicle stores on its
OBU the VIDA, OTPVi. CHXxi, VTA1.
Figure 85: The registration process between V and TA
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Vehicle

TA

VIDR, Generate a nonce a

VIDR
The VIDR is already registered?
If no, TA communicates with the PUF cloud
to retrieve a vehicle’s CRP.
Cv

Rv = PUF(Cv)

VIDR, Rv
1. Verify the PUF response, and if it is
correct, TA will complete the following
calculation:
2. Generate a nonce (a)
3. Generate the PUF response of its
challenge RTA= PUF(CTA)
4. VTA1 = H (TAIDR || MSKTA ||RTA|| VIDR)
5. Generates an OTPVi
6. CHXxi = H (Rv || VIDR)
7. VIDA = H (Rv|| a || VIDR)
Store: VIDR, VIDA, CTA, OTPVi. CHXxi
VIDA,OTPVi. CHXxi, VTA1

Store VIDA, TAIDA, OTPVi. CHXxi, VTA1

Figure 86: The Exchanged Messages between V and TA during the
6.6.2.2

Vehicle – Vehicle Owner Cloud Server (VOCS) registration process
Each vehicle needs to register itself with its VOCS before being deployed in the

field. The VOCS is the owning company cloud server that is in charge of authenticating
the vehicle and storing and analyzing the collected data from the vehicle. The vehicle will
send a registration request to the VOCS, including its real ID. Once the VOCS receives
the registration request, it will complete multiple as described in figure 87 and 88. First,
the VOCS will assign an alias ID to each vehicle. The alias ID will be a fake ID that the
vehicle will use to communicate with the VOCS. Alias IDs will act as pseudonym IDs
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and will be dynamically changed in every authentication. The goal of the Alias ID goal is
to protect and ensure the unlinkability and untraceability of the vehicle and to support the
anonymity of each vehicle in each session.
Second, VOCS will use a random number generator to generate a nonce (b) to be
used in generating the vehicle’s alias ID and a random value to be used as a one-time
token (OTT) between V and the VOCS. There will be a unique OTT between each
vehicle and the VOCS. Third, the VOCS will generate a PUF response (RCS) to its
challenge. Fourth, VOCS will use vehicle real ID, its real ID, the RVOCS, and its MSK to
generate authentication parameters using a one-way hash function XOR operations.
Finally, the VOCS will insert and store VIDR, VIDA, VOCSIDA, OTT, and authentication
parameters VCS1 and VCS2.
Vehicle-VOCS Registration
Step1: The vehicle will send a registration request to the VOSC, including its ID (VIDR).
Step 2: VOSC searches its database to check if the vehicle is registered. If not registered,
The VOCS will complete the following calculations:
1. Calculates an authentication parameter VCS1 = H (VOCSIDR || MSKCS || RCS||
VIDR). The vehicle does not know the VOCSIDR, RCS, nor the MSKCS.
2. The VOCS generates and assigns a VTIDN to each vehicle based on its type.
3. Calculates an authentication parameter VCS2 = H (VCS1 ||VTID). The vehicle does
not know the VTID. The VTID is only used to create VCS2. VTID is only stored on
the VOCS. The vehicle does not know anything about the VTID. Using the
VOCSIDR, RCS, the MSKCS, and VTID to generate the authentication parameters
makes it almost impossible for an adversary to identify the VTID of any vehicle or
to identify the VOCSIDR, RCS, or the MSKCS of the VOCS.
4. Generates a One-Time-Token OTTVi
5. Generates a nonce (b)
6. Calculates an Alias ID for the vehicle VIDA = H (b || VIDR).
Steps 3: Finally, the VOCS stores the VIDR, CCS, VIDA, OTTVi. VTID and the vehicle stores
on its OBU the VIDA, OTTVi, VCS1, VCS2
Figure 87: The registration process between V and VOCS
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Vehicle
VIDR

VOCS
VIDR
The VIDR,is already registered?
If no, VOCS generates the following parameters
1. VCS1 = H (VOCSIDR || MSKCS || VIDR|| Rcs)
2. VCS2 = H (VCS1 ||VTID)
3. Generates an OTTVi
4. Generate a nonce (b)
5. VIDA = H (b || VIDR)
Store: VIDR, VIDA, OTTVi.
VIDA, OTTVi, VCS1, VCS2

Store VIDA, OTTVi, VCS1, VCS2
Figure 88: The Exchanged Messages between V and VOCS during the
6.6.2.3

Driver - VOCS Registration
Each driver needs to register himself/herself with its VOCS before driving any

vehicle. The VOCS is the owning company cloud server that is in charge of
authenticating the driver and storing and analyzing the collected data from the driver.
During the registration process, the driver will complete the following tasks: (1) the
driver will select a username and a password using the vehicle's touch screen; (2) the
driver will use the vehicle fingerprint scanner to create a biometric template that will be
used for static authentication; and (3) For the continuous authentication, we propose to
use a built-in sensor in the vehicle steering wheel to collect the driver's ECG or EKG.
The driver's ECG or EKG features are extracted to create a biometric template, and it will
be used for the continuous authentication process. The driver computes the authentication
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parameter ZU1 = H (FPU || PUi). VOCS will generate the PUF response (RUCS) of its
challenge (CUCS) and computes the authentication parameter ZU2 = H (Zu1 || RUCS). VOCS
will store Ui and CUCS in clear text and the EID, BBUi, and ZU2 encrypted by the PUF
response (RUCS) into its database for later authentication. The registration process is
presented in figures 89 and 90.
Driver-VOCS Registration
Step1: The driver will complete the following tasks:
1. Generate a username (Ui) and password PUi) using the vehicle's touch screen.
2. Capture fingerprint features (FPUi) using a vehicle fingerprint scanner to create a
biometric template that will be used for static authentication
3. Capture the blood pressure or the ECG features (BBUi) using a built-in sensor in
the vehicle steering wheel to create a biometric template that will be used for
continuous authentication.
4. computes Zu1 = H (FPU || PUi)
Step 2: VOSC searches its database to check if the user is registered. If not registered,
the VOCS will:
1. Generate the PUF response of its challenge RUCS = PUF(CUcs).
2. Compute Zu2 = H (Zu1 || RUcs).
Store the Ui, and CUCS in cleartext. EID, ZU2, and BBUi in its database are
3.
encrypted by the PUF response for further comparison during the authentication
process.
Figure 89: The registration process between D and VOCS
Driver
Employee ID(EID)
The driver will complete the following tasks:
1. Generate a username (Ui)
2. Generate a password PUi)
3. Capture a fingerprint features (FPU)
4. Capture the EKG or the ECG features (BBUi)
5. Comptes Zu1 = H (FPU || PUi)
EID, Ui, ZU1 BBUi

VOCS

1. Generate a PUF response Rcs =
PUF(CUCSU)
2. Computes ZU2 = H (ZU1 || RUcs)
3. Stores: EID, Ui, BBUi, ZU2, CUCS

Figure 90: The exchanged messages between D and VOCS during the registration
process
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6.6.3

Mutual authentication phase
This phase will cover two different protocols. The first protocol is to achieve

mutual authentication between the vehicle and the TA. The second protocol is to achieve
mutual authentication among vehicle, driver, and the VOCS.
6.6.3.1
phases

Protocol 1: Vehicle-TA mutual authentication and key generation

Vehicle to TA mutual authentication process will be executed when a vehicle Vi
wants to send the data that it collects from the surrounding environment to the TA with
the help of the RSU as presented in figures 91 and 92 . However, the RSU can’t validate
the legitimacy of the Vi. Therefore, the RSU needs to interact with the TA to
authenticate the Vi.
V

TA

Generate: TSVi1, RVVi1
Compute:
X1 = RVVi1 ⊕ H(VTA1)
X2 = H (RVVi1 || VTA1 || TSVi1 || VIDR)
M1: (VIDA, TSVi1, X1, X2)
Check| TSRec_11Rec− TS’Vi1|< ∆T
Find: VIDA
Read: VIDR, OTP, CTA, MSKTA
Compute:
RTA = PUF(CTA)
VTA1’ = H (MSKTA || VIDR || RTA ||TAIDR)
RV’Vi1 = H (VTA1’) ⊕ X1
Verify: X2’ = H (RVVi1 || VTA1’ || TSVi1’|| VIDR)
Generate: TSTA1, RVTA1, SID
Retrieve: Vi CRP, CHXx
Computes:
Y1 = H (VTA1’ ||OTPVi)
Y2 = RVTA1 ⊕ Y1
C’ = H (CHXx|| RVTA1) ⊕ C
Y3 = H (C || TSTA1 || Y1 ||RVTA1 || RVVi1’)
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M2: (TAIDA, SID, TS TA1, Y2, C’, Y3)
Check: | TS Rec- TS’ TA1 |< ∆T
Compute:
Y1’ = H (VTA1’ ||OTPVi)
RVTA1’ = Y1 ⊕ Y2
C’X = C’ ⊕ H (H (CHXx|| RVTA1’)
Verify
Y3’ = H (C || TSTA1 || Y1’ ||RVTA1’ || RVVi1’)
Generate: TSVi2, RVVi2
Compute
Ri = PUF (C’X)
CHXx+1 = H (Ri || CHXx)
X3 = RVVi2 ⊕ H (RVTA1|| CHXx+1)
X4 = H (VIDR|| TSVi2|| RVVi2 || CHXx+1)
M3: (VIDA, SID, TSVi2, X3, X4)
Check: TSRec - TS’Vi2 |< ∆T
Compute:
CHAx+1’ = H (R’i || CHXx)
RV’vi2 = X3 ⊕ (RVTA1|| CHXx+1’)
Verify:
X4’ = H (VIDR|| TSVi2’|| RVVi2’ || CHXx+1’)
Generate: TSTA2, RVTA2
Compute
Y4 = H (RVVi2’|| Ri)
Y5 = RVTA2 ⊕ Y4
OTPnew = H (OTPnew-1|| RVTA2 || Ri)
VIDAnew = H (C|| VIDA)
Y6 = H (VIDR ||Y4|| TSTA2 || RVTA2 || OTPnew|| VIDAnew)

M4: (TAIDA, SiD TSTA2,

Y5, Y6)

Check: |TS’Rec− TSTA2 |< ∆T
Compute:
RV’TA2 = Y4 ⊕ H (RVVi2’|| Ri)
OTPnew’ = H (OTPnew-1|| RVTA2’ || Ri)
VIDAnew’ = H (C’X || VIDA)
Verify:
Y6’ = H (VIDR ||Y4’|| TSTA2 || RVTA2 || OTPnew’|| VIDAnew’)
Store (OOTPnew’,’VIDAnew’’)

Figure 91: V-TA mutual authentication process
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Algorithm 6: The mutual authentication between V and TA
Input:
V with real identity (VIDR), alias identityVIDA), TA alias identity (TAIDR),
Authentication parameters (VTA1), one-time password (OTPvi), and the chained
hash PUF (CHXxi)
TA with real identity (VIDR), alias identity (VIDA), TA real identity (TAIDR), TA
alias identity (TAIDR), PUF challenge (CTA), and one time password (OTP), and
the chained hash PUF (CHXxi).
Output:
Mutual authentication between the vehicle (N) and the Trusted Authority (TA)
Begin
1. V generates a random nonce RVvi1, a timestamp TSvi1, computes X1 = RVVi1 ⊕
H(VTA1) and X2 = H (RVVi1 || VTA1 || TSVi1 || VIDR).
2. V sends (VIDA, TSvi1, X1, X2) message to TA.
3.

If (TA finds VIDA in its repository)

4. then
5.

TA retrieves VIDR, OTP, and CTA that belongs to the VIDA from its repository to its
memory.
6. The TA passes the challenge CTA to its PUF function and generates a response
RTA.
7. TA calculates VTA1. Then the TA retrieves RVvi1 from XORing X1 and H(VTA1)
and finally calculates X2’ = H (RVVi1 || VTA1 || TSVi1 || VIDR).
8.
If (the calculated hash message in step 6 matches the hash message that was
sent in step 2)
9.
then
10.
The TA communicates with the Grand PUF node to retrieve a CRP of the Vi,
generates a timestamp TSTA1, generates a random nonce RVTA1, calculates Y1
= H (VTA1’ ||OTPVi), Y2 = RVTA1 ⊕ Y1 , C’ = H(CHXx|| RVTA1) ⊕ C, and
Y3 = H (C || TSTA1 || Y1 ||RVTA1 || RVVi1’)

11.
The TA sends TAIDA, SID, TSTA1, Y2, C’, Y3 to V.
12.
else
13.
Go to step 42.
14.
end if
15. else
16. Go to step 42.
17. end if
18. V verifies the time stamp, calculates Y1’ = H (VTA1’ ||OTPVi), retrieves RVTA1’
and C’X. V computes Y3’ = H (C || TSTA1 || Y1 ||RVTA1 || RVVi1’)
19. If (the calculated hash message in step 18 matches the hash message that was sent
in step 11)
20. then
21. The authenticity of the TA is verified
22. V generates a timestamp TSvi2 and a random nonce RVvi2. V computes Ri =
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PUF (C’X), CHXx+1 = H (Ri || CHXx), X3 = RVVi2 ⊕ H (RVTA1|| CHXx+1) and
X4 = H (VIDR|| TSVi2||RVVi2 || CHXx+1)
23. V sends VIDA, SID, TSvi2, X3, X4 to TA.
24. else
25. Go to step 42.
26. end if
27. The TA verifies the TSvi2, computes CHXx+1’ = H (R’i || CHXx), retrieves
RV’vi2 = X3 ⊕ (RVTA1|| CHXx+1’) and generates X4’ = H (VIDR|| TSVi2’|| RVVi2’ ||
CHXx+1’)
28. If (the calculated hash message in step 27 matches the hash message that was sent
in step 23
29. then
30. The authenticity of V is verified.
31. TA generates TSTA2 and RVTA2. Then TA computes Y4 = H (RVVi2’|| Ri), Y5 = RVTA2 ⊕ Y4,
OTPnew = H (OTPnew-1|| RVTA2 || Ri), VIDAnew = H (C|| VIDA1) and, Y6 = H (VIDR ||Y4|| TSTA2 || RVTA2 ||
OTPnew|| VIDAnew)
TA sends TAIDA, SiD TSTA2, Y5, Y6 to V.

32.
33. else
34. Go to step 42.
35. End if
36. V verifies the TSTA2, computes RV’TA2 = Y4 ⊕ H (RVVi2’|| Ri), OTPnew’ = H (OTPnew-1|| RVTA2’

|| Ri), VIDAnew’ = H (C’X || VIDA) and verifies Y6’ = H (VIDR ||Y4’|| TSTA2 || RVTA2 || OTPnew’|| VIDAnew’)

37. If (the calculated hash message in step 36 matches the hash message that was sent
in step 32
38. then
39. V stores the received data in its database
40. else
41. Go to step 42
42. Stop (terminates the connection).
43. End
Figure 92: Algorithm of the mutual authentication algorithm between V and TA
This scheme consists of the following steps:
6.6.3.1.1

Step 1: Interaction Request

6. Vi generates a new TSVi1 to avoid replay attacks
7. Vi selects a random parameter RVVi1 and then calculates X1
a. X1 = RVVi1 ⊕ H(VTA1)
8. Vi computes X2 = H (RVVi1 || VTA1 || TSVi1 || VIDR)
9. Vi sends the authentication request to the TA.
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The authentication request includes VIDA, TSVi1, X1, and X2, as shown in 6.1. The
timestamp presents information about when an event occurred, which makes this value
important.
Vi
6.6.3.1.2

TA Authentication-Req (VIDA, TSVi1, X1, X2)

(6.1)

Step 2: TA Response

Once the TA receives the authentication request, it will complete the following steps:
1. TA checks the validity of the received timestamp | TS’Rec− TS’Vi1 |< ∆T. TS’Rec is
the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the timestamp and
the time when the message is received is higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. TA retrieves from its database the VIDR that corresponds to its VIDA. If the TA did
not find the VIDA in its database, it would send a message to the vehicle to
complete the registration process.
3. Once the TA finds the VIDA, it will retrieve the CTA of the Vi.
4. TA computes RTA = PUF(CTA)
5. TA computes the VTA1’ = H (MSKTA || VIDR || RTA ||TAIDR)
6. TA computes the RV’Vi1 = H (VTA1’) ⊕ X1
7. TA computes X2’ = H (TS’Vi1 || RV’Vi1 || VIDR || VTA1’)
If the computed value of X2’ is equal to the received value, the TA accepts the
authentication request; otherwise, it will drop it as shown in figure 95.
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X2’ = H (TS’Vi1 || RV’Vi1 || VIDR || VTA1’)
If X2 = X2’ Then
The TA will accept the authentication request
Else
The TA will drop the authentication request
Figure 93: Evaluating the Vi Authentication Parameter
Once the TA accepts the authentication request, it will retrieve a Vi CRP from the
PUF cloud and generates a random value RVTA1 and time stamp TSTA1. Also, the TA
generates a session ID. The session ID aims to distinguish one session from the rest of
the running sessions simultaneously. The TA prepares and sends a connection response to
the Vi. The preparation process of the connection response message includes the
following steps:
1. TA retrieve a Vi CRP from the PUF cloud
2. TA generates a new TSTA1 to avoid replay attacks
3. TA calculates Y1
a. Y1 = H (VTA1’ ||OTPVi)
4. TA generates a random parameter RVTA1 and then calculates Y1
a. Y2 = RVTA1 ⊕ Y1
5. TA calculates C’
a. C’ = H (CHXx|| RVTA1) ⊕ C
6. TA calculates Y3 = H (C || TSTA1 || Y1 ||RVTA1 || RVVi1’)
7. TA generates a session ID(SID)
8. TA sends a connection response message
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The connection response includes TAIDA, session ID (SID), TSTA1, C’, Y2, and Y3, as
shown in 6.2. The timestamps present information about when an event occurred, which
makes this value important.
TA
6.6.3.1.3

Vi M2(TAIDA, SID, TSTA1, C’, Y2, Y3)

(6.2)

Step 3: TA authentication

Once the Vi receives M2, it will complete the following steps:
6. Vi checks the validity of the received timestamp |TSRec−TS’TA1 |< ∆T. TSRec
is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum
transmission delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the
timestamp and when the message is received is higher than the expected
maximum transmission delay.
7. Vi calculates Y1’ = H (VTA1’ ||OTPVi)
8. Vi calculates RVTA1’ = Y1 ⊕ Y2
9. Vi calculates the C’X = C’ ⊕ H (H (CHXx|| RVTA1’)
10. As presented in figure 94, Vi calculates Y3’ using a one-way hash function
and compares the generated Y3’ with the received Y3. If the two values are the
same, Vi will authenticate TA; otherwise, it will drop it.

Y3’ = H (C || TSTA1 || Y1’ ||RVTA1’ || RVVi1’)
If
Y3’ = Y3
Then
Then Vi will accept M2 and authenticate TA
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Else
Vi will drop M2

Figure 94: Evaluating the TA authentication parameter
Once Vi accepts the received message and authenticates TA, it will complete the
following steps
1. Vi will input the received challenge Cx’ to its PUF and obtains the response Ri.
2. Vi will retrieve the chained hash responses (CHXx) from its memory and calculate
the new value of the chained has responses (CHXx+1) as follows
a. CHXx+1 = H (Ri || CHXx)
3.

Vi generates a new TSVi2 to avoid replay attacks

4. Vi selects a random parameter RVVi2 and then calculates X3
a. X3 = RVVi2 ⊕ H (RVTA1|| CHXx+1)
5. Vi calculate X4
a. X4 = H (VIDR|| TSVi2|| RVVi2 || CHXx+1)
6. Vi sends the message to the TA
The message includes VIDA, SID, TSVi2, X3 and X4 as shown in 6.3.
Vi

6.6.3.1.4

TA (VIDA, TSVi2, X3, X4)

Step 4: Vi authentication

Once TA receives the message, it completes the following steps:
358

(6.3)

1. TA checks the validity of the received timestamp |TS’Rec− TS’vi2 |< ∆T. TS’Rec is
the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the timestamp and the
time when the message is received is higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. TA will retrieve the R’i and the CHXx from its databased and computes CHX’i+1
a.

CHXx+1’ = H (R’i || CHXx)

3. TA calculates the RV’vi2 = X3 ⊕ (RVTA1|| CHXx+1’)
4. TA calculates X4’ = H (VIDR|| TSVi2’|| RVVi2’ || CHXx+1’)
As presented in figure 95, TA calculates X4’ using a one-way hash function and
compares the generated X4’ with the received X4. If the two values are the same, TA
will authenticate Vi; otherwise, it will drop it.
X4’ = X4 = H (VIDR|| TSVi2’|| RVVi2’ || CHXx+1’)
If X4’ = X4Then
Then TA will authenticate the Vi.
Else
TA will drop the message
Figure 95: Evaluating the V authentication parameter
After authenticating the Vi, the TA will override the old CHXx with the new
chained hash responses value CHXx+1. Then the TA will generate a new OTP and the
new alias ID for the Vi and store them on its database.
1. TA generates a new timestamp TSTA2
2. TA calculates Y4
a. Y4 = H (RVVi2’|| Ri)
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3. TA selects a random parameter RVTA2 and then calculates Y5
a. Y5 = RVTA2 ⊕ Y4
4. TA computes OTPnew = H (OTPnew-1|| RVTA2 || Ri)
5. TA computes VIDAnew = H (C|| VIDA)
6. TA calculates Y6
a. Y6 = H (VIDR ||Y4|| TSTA2 || RVTA2 || OTPnew|| VIDAnew)
7. TA sends the message to the Vi. The message includes TAIDA, SID, TSTA2, Y5, and
Y6, as shown in 6.4.
TA
6.6.3.1.5

Vi (TAIDA, TSTA2, Y5, Y6)

(6.4)

Step 5: New Parameters Verification

Once Vi receives the message, it completes the following steps:
1. Vi checks the validity of the received timestamp |TS’Rec− TS’TA2 |< ∆T. TS’Rec is
the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the timestamp and the
time when the message is received is higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. Vi calculates the RV’TA2 = Y4 ⊕ H (RVVi2’|| Ri)
3. Vi computes OTPnew’ = H (OTPnew-1|| RVTA2’ || Ri)
4. Vi computes VIDAnew’ = H (C’X || VIDA)
5. Vi calculates Y6’
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a. Y6’ = H (VIDR ||Y4’|| TSTA2 || RVTA2 || OTPnew’|| VIDAnew’)
As presented in figure 96, Vi calculates Y6’ using a one-way hash function and
compares the generated Y6’ with the received Y6. If the two values are the same, Vi
will accept the message; otherwise, it will drop it.
Y6’ = Y6 = H (VIDR ||Y4’|| TSTA2 || RVTA2 || OTPnew’|| VIDAnew’)
If Y6’ = Y6 Then
Then Vi will accept the message.
Else
Vi will drop the message
Figure 96: TA -V Parameters Verification
After verifying and accepting the message, the Vi, will store the OTPnew, VIDAnew,
in its database for the next authentication session.
6.6.3.1.6

Key generation

Once the mutual authentication is completed, the two sides generate a shared
secret session key (ssk) using the technique they agreed upon during the authentication
phase. The two sides generate the ssk locally by hashing a combination of PUF response
and the generated random values as presented in 6.5. The uniqueness of the PUF
responses ensures the uniqueness of the generated ssk.
ssk= H (Ri || (RVvi1 || RVTA2 || RVvi2 || RV’TA1)

(6.5)

Then the TA will send the ssk of Vi to the CRSU through a secure channel. Once
the CRSU received the key it will share it will all its RSU to communicate with Vi. By
using the ssk, Vi can communicate with all RSUs that are within the same CRSU.
However, when Vi enters an area of another CRSU, it has to authenticate itself with the
TA again. Finally, the RSU that communicates with Vi will share the secret broadcast
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key (SKB) with it that Vi can use to communicate with other vehicles within the same
CRSU. The RSU will send the SKB to Vi encrypted by the ssk.
6.6.3.2

Protocol 2: Vehicle– Driver-Vehicle Owner Cloud Server (V-D-VOCS)
Authentication and Key Generation

This authentication phase consists of two phases. The first one handles the mutual
authentication process between a vehicle (Vi) and a vehicle owner cloud server (VOCS).
The second one focuses on the mutual authentication between the driver (Di) and the
VOCS where the vehicle acts as a relay between Di and VOCS. The first phase must be
completed first before starting on the second phase.
6.6.3.2.1
Phase one: Vehicle -Vehicle Owner Cloud Server Mutual
Authentication
As presented in figures 97 and 98, this process starts when Vi prepares an
authentication request message that will be sent to the VOCS. All vehicles of the same
type share a typeID (VTID). Each vehicle stores two authentication parameters that will
be used during the authentication process. Furthermore, all OBUs in the vehicles are
equipped with PUF chips that will be used to build a root of trust. Each vehicle knows its
Real and alias IDs, the alias ID of the VOCS, the OTT, and the two authentication
parameters. The steps involved in this process are listed below.
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V

VOCS

Generate: TSvi1, RVvi1
Compute:
VX1 = H (VCS2 || OTT)
VX2 = H(VX1) ⊕ RVVi1
VX3 = H (VIDR|| VCS1|| TSVi1 || RVVi1|| OTT)
M1: (VIDA, TSvi1, VX2, VX3)
Check:|TSRec− TS’vi1 |< ∆T
Find: VIDA
Read: VIDR, VTID, CCS, and OTT
Compute:
RCS = PUF(CCS)
VCS1 = H (VOCSIDR || MSKVOCS || VIDR|| Rcs).
VCS2 = H (VCS1 || VTID)
VX1’ = H (VCS2’ || OTT)
RV’Vi1 = VX2 ⊕ VX1’
Verify: VX3’ = H (VIDR|| VCS1’|| TSVi1’ || RVVi1’|| OTT)
Generate: TSCS1, RVCS1, SID
Computes:
CSY1 = H (VIDR|| VCS1’ || OTT)
CSY2 = H(CSY1) ⊕ RVCS1
CV = C ⊕ H (CSY1 || RVCS1)
CSY3 = H (VOCSIDR || CSY1|| TSCS1 || RVVi1 ||C || VCS1|| RVCS1)
M2: (VOCSIDA, SID, TSCS1, CSY2, CV, CSY3)
Check: |TS’Rec−TS’CS1 |< ∆T
Compute:
CSY1’ = H (VIDR|| VCS1’ || OTT)
RV’CS1 = H(CSY1) ⊕ CSY2
C’ = CV ⊕ H (RV’CS1 || CSY1’)
Verify
CSY3’ = H (VOCSIDR || CSY1’|| TSCS1’ || RVVi1 ||C’ || VCS1’|| RVCS1’)
Generate: TSvi2, RVvi2
Compute
Ri = PUF(C’)
Ci+1 = H (RV’CS1 || RVvi1)
Ri+1 = PUF (Ci+1)
VX4 = H (OTT|| RVCS1)
VX5= RVvi2 ⊕ H (VX4|| VIDR)
VX6 = H (VX4|| RVVi2) ⊕ Ri
VX7 = H (C’|| R’) ⊕ Ri+1
OTTnew = H (OTT|| RVVi2|| C)
VIDAnew = H (VIDA || C|| OTT)
VX8 = H (VX4 || RVVi2 || TSVi2 || Ri || Ci+1 || Ri+1 || OTTnew ||VIDAnew)
M3: (VIDA, SID,

TSVi2, VX5, VX6, VX7, VX8)
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Check: |TS’Rec− TS’vi2 |< ∆T
Read: R’i
Compute:
VX4’ = H (RVCS1 || OTT)
RV’VI2 = VX5’ ⊕ H (VX4’|| VIDR)
Ri’ = VX6’ ⊕ H (RVVi2|| VX4’)
Ci+1 = H (RV’CS1 || RVVi1)
Ri+1’ = VX7’ ⊕ H (C’|| Ri’)
OTTnew’ = H (OTT|| RVVi2|| C)
VIDAnew’ = H (VIDA || C|| OTT)
Verify:
VX8 = H (VX4 || RVVi2 || TSVi2 || Ri || Ci+1 || Ri+1 || OTTnew ||
VIDAnew)
Store: OTTnew, VIDAnew, C’i+1, Ri+1

Figure 97: V-VOCS Mutual Authentication Process
6.6.3.2.1.1

Step 1: Interaction request

1. Vi generates a new TSVi1 to avoid replay attacks
2. Vi computes VX1 = H (VCS2 || OTT)
3. Vi selects a random parameter RVVi1 and then calculates VX2
a. VX2 = VX1 ⊕ RVVi1
4. Vi computes VX3 = H (VIDR|| VCS1|| TSVi1 || RVVi1|| OTT)
5. Vi sends a authentication request message.
The authentication request includes VIDA, TSvV1, VX2, and VX3 as shown in 6.6.
Vi

VOCS Auth-Req (VIDA, TSVi1, VX2, VX3)

(6.6)

Algorithm 6:_Protocol 2_ Phase 1: The mutual authentication between V-VOCS
Input:
Vehicle with real identity (VIDR), alias identity (VIDA), VOCS real identity (VOCSIDR),
VOCS alias identity (VOCSIDR), Authentication parameters (VCS1, VCS2), and one time
token (OTT).
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VOCS with with real identity (VIDR), alias identity (VIDA), VOCS real identity
(VOCSIDR), VOCS alias identity (VOCSIDR), the vehicle type ID(VTID) Master secret
key (MSKcs), PUF challenge (CCS), and one-time token (OTT).
Output:
Mutual authentication between the vehicle (V) and the VOCS.
Begin
1. V generates a random nonce RVvi1, a timestamp TSvi1, computesVX2 =
H(VX1) ⊕ RVVi1 and VX3 = H (VIDR|| VCS1|| TSVi1 || RVVi1|| OTT)
2. V sends (VIDA, TSvi1, VX2, VX3) message to the VOCS.
3.

If (the VOCS finds VIDA in its repository).

4. then
5.
The VOCS retrieves VIDR, OTT, CCS, and VTID that belongs to the VIDA
from its repository to its memory. The VOCS passes the challenge CCS to its
PUF function and generates a
response RCS
The VOCS calculates VCS1’ and VCS2’. Then the VOCS computes VX1,
retrieves the RVvi1 from XORing VX2 ⊕ VX1’ and finally calculates VX3’
H (VIDR|| VCS1|| TSVi1 || RVVi1|| OTT)

6.

7.

If (the calculated hash message in step 7 matches the hash message that was
sent in step 2)
8.
then
9.
The VOCS communicates with the Grand PUF node to retrieve a CRP
of Vi, generates a timestamp TSCS1, generates a random nonce RVCS1,
calculates CSY1 = H (VIDR|| VCS1’ || OTT), CSY2 = H (CSY1) ⊕ RVCS1, CV = C ⊕ H (CSY1 ||
10.
11.

RVCS1), and CSY3 = H(VOCSIDR || CSY1|| TSCS1 || RVVi1 ||C || VCS1|| RVCS1).
The VOCS sends VOCSIDA, SID, TSCS1, CSY2, CV, CSY3 to Vi.

else
Go to step 29.

end if
12. else
Go to step 29.
end if
13. V verifies the time stamp, calculates CSY1’ to retrieves RVCS1’ and C’ from CV.
V generates CSY3’ H (VOCSIDR || CSY1|| TSCS1 || RVVi1 ||C || VCS1|| RVCS1).
14. If (the calculated hash message in step 14 matches the hash message that was
sent in step 11)
15. then
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The authenticity of the VOCS is verified
16. V generates a timestamp TSvi2 and a random nonce RVvi2. V computes Ri =
PUF(C’), Ci+1 = H (RV’CS1 || RVvi1), Ri+1 = PUF (Ci+1), VX4 = H (OTT|| RVCS1), VX5= RVvi2
⊕ H (VX4||VIDR) ,VX6 = H (VX4|| RVVi2) ⊕ Ri, VX7 = H (C’|| R’ ) ⊕ Ri+1, OTTnew =
H(OTT|| RVVi2|| C), IDAnew = H (VIDA || C|| OTT), VX8 = H (VX4 || RVVi2 || TSVi2 || Ri || Ci+1 || Ri+1
|| OTTnew || VIDAnew )

17. V sends VIDA, SID, TSVi2, VX5, VX6, VX7, VX8 to VOCS.
18. else
19. Go to step 29
20. end if
21. V verifies the time stamp TSvi2, calculates VX4’ to retrieves RViv2’, VX6, and VX7.
V generates VX8 = H (VX4 || RVVi2 || TSVi2 || Ri || Ci+1 || Ri+1 || OTTnew || VIDAnew )
22. If (the calculated hash message in step 22 matches the hash message that was
sent in step 18)
23. then
24. The authenticity of V is verified.
25. Mutual authentication between V and the VOCS is established.
26. else
27. Go to step 29
28. End if
29. Stop (terminates the connection).
End
Figure 98: The mutual authentication between V and the VOCS

6.6.3.2.1.2

Step 2: VOCS response

Once the VOCS receives the authentication request, it will complete the following steps:
1. VOCS checks the validity of the received timestamp |TSRec− TS’Vi1 |< ∆T. TSRec
is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the timestamp and
the time when the message is received is higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
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2. VOCS retrieves from its database the VIDR that corresponds to its VIDA. If the
VOCS did not find the NIDA in its database, it will ignore and drop the
authentication request.
Once the VOCS finds the VIDR, it will retrieve it along with the VTID, its PUF Challenge
that relates to this Vi and OTT of Vi.
1. VOCS generates the PUF response Rcs = PUF(Ccs)
2. VOCS generates VCS1 = H (VOCSIDR || MSKVOCS || VIDR|| Rcs).
3. VOCS generates VCS2 = H (VCS1 || VTID)
4. VOCS computes VX1’ = H (VCS2’ || OTT)
5. VOCS computes the RV’Vi1 = VX2 ⊕ VX1’
The VOCS uses the calculated VCS2, TS’Vi1, OTT, and the RV’Vi1 to generate
VX3’, a combination of VIDR, VCS3, TS’Vi1, OTT, and the RV’Vi1 using a one-way hash
function as shown in figure 99. If the computed value is equal to the received value, the
VOCS accepts the authentication request; otherwise, it will drop it.

VX3’ = H (VIDR|| VCS1’|| TSVi1’ || RVVi1’|| OTT)
If VX3 = VX3’ Then
The VOCS will accept the authentication request
Else
The VOCS will drop the connection request

Figure 99: Evaluating the Vi authentication request message
Once the VOCS accepts the message, it generates a timestamp and a random
value RVCS1. Also, the VOCS generates a session ID. The session ID aims to distinguish
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one session from the rest of the running sessions simultaneously. Furthermore, the VOCS
will retrieve a PUF CRP from the PUF cloud to authenticating the vehicle. The VOCS
prepares and sends an authentication response to the Vi. The preparation process of the
authentication response message includes the following steps:
1. VOCS generates a new TSCS1 to avoid replay attacks
2. VOCS calculates CSY1
a. CSY1 = H (VIDR|| VCS1’ || OTT)
3. VOCS selects a random parameter RVCS1 and then calculates CSY2
a. CSY2 = H(CSY1) ⊕ RVCS1
4. VOCS generates a session ID(SID)
5. CV = C ⊕ H (CSY1 || RVCS1)
6. VOCS calculates CSY3
7. CSY3 = H (VOCSIDR || CSY1|| TSCS1 || RVVi1 ||C || VCS1|| RVCS1)
8. VOCS sends an authentication response message
The connection response includes VOCSIDA, session ID(SID), TSCS1, CSY2, CV, and
CSY3, as shown in 6.7.
VOCS
6.6.3.2.1.3

Vi Auth-Res (VOCSIDA, SID, TSVi1, CSY2, CV, CSY3)

Step 3: VOCS authentication

Once Vi receives the authentication response, it completes the following steps:
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(6.7)

1. Vi checks the validity of the received timestamp |TS’Rec−TS’CS1 |< ∆T. TSRec is
the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the timestamp and the
time when the message is received is higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
2. Vi calculates CSY1’ = H (VIDR|| VCS1’ || OTT)
3. Vi calculates the RV’CS1 = H(CSY1) ⊕ CSY2
4. Vi calculates the C’ = CV’⊕ H (RV’CS1 || CSY1’)
5. As presented in figure 100, Vi calculates CSY3’ using a one-way hash function
and compares the generated CSY3’ with the received CSY3. If the two values are
the same, Vi will authenticate VOCS; otherwise, it will drop it.
CSY3’ = H (VOCSDR || CSY2’|| TSCS1’ || RVVi1’ ||C’ || VCS1’|| RVCS1’)
If CSY3’ = CSY3 Then
Then Vi will accept the authentication response and authenticate VOCS
Else
Vi will drop the authentication response
Figure 100: Evaluating the VOCS authentication parameter
Once Vi accepts the received message and authenticates VOCS, it will complete the
following steps
1. Vi will input the received challenge C’ to its PUF and obtains the response Ri.
a. Ri = PUF(C’)
2. Vi will compute the H (RV’CS1 || RVVi1) to generate a new challenge (Ci+1). Then
Vi will input the Ci+1 into a PUF function to obtains a new Ri+1 where:
a. Ci+1 = H (RV’CS1 || RVVi1)
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b. Ri+1 = PUF (Ci+1) to be used in the next authentication session.
3. Vi generates a new TSVi2 to avoid replay attacks
4. Vi calculates VX4 = H (OTT|| RVCS1)
5. Vi selects a random parameter RVVi2 and then calculates VX5
a. VX5= RVvi2 ⊕ H (VX4|| VIDR)
6. Vi calculates VX6
a. VX6 = H (VX4|| RVVi2) ⊕ Ri
7. Vi calculates VX7
a. VX7 = H (C’|| R’) ⊕ Ri+1
8. Vi will generate a new OTT(OTTnew)
OTTnew = H (OTT|| RVVi2|| C)
9. Vi will generate a new Alias ID (VIDAnew)
a. VIDAnew = H (VIDA || C|| OTT)
10. Vi calculates VX8
a. VX8 = H (VX4 || RVVi2 || TSVi2 || Ri || Ci+1 || Ri+1 || OTTnew || VIDAnew )
11. Vi sends the message to the VOCS
The message includes VIDA, TS’Vi2, VX5, VX6, VX7, and VX8 as shown in 6.8.
Vi
6.6.3.2.1.4

VOCS (VIDA, TSVi2, VX5, VX6, VX7, VX8)

Step 4: Vi authentication

Once VOCS receives the message, it completes the following steps:
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(6.8)

1. VOCS checks the validity of the received timestamp |TS’Rec− TS’Vi2 |< ∆T.
TS’Rec is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum
transmission delay. The message is dropped if the difference between the
timestamp and the time when the message is received is higher than the expected
maximum transmission delay.
2. VOCS calculates VX4’ = H (RVCS1 || OTT)
3. VOCS calculates the RV’VI2 = VX5’ ⊕ H (VX4’|| VIDR)
4. VOCS computes the Ri’ =VX6’ ⊕ H (RVVi2|| VX4’)
5. VOCS computes Ci+1 = H (RV’CS1 || RVVi1)
6. VOCS computes the Ri+1’ = VX7’ ⊕ H (C’|| Ri’)
7. VOCS Computes OTTnew’ = H (OTT|| RVVi2|| C)
8. VOCS computes VIDAnew’ = H (VIDA || C|| OTT)
9. VOCS compures VX8’ = H (VX4’ || RVVi2’ || TSVi2 || Ri’ || Ci+’1 || Ri+1’ || OTTnew’
|| VIDAnew’)
As presented in figure 101, VOCS calculates VX8’ using a one-way hash function and
compares the generated VX8’ with the received VX8. If the two values are the same,
VOCS will authenticate Vi; otherwise, it will drop it.
VX8’ = VX8 = H (VX4’ || RVVi2’ || TSVi2 || Ri’ || Ci+’1 || Ri+1’ || OTTnew’ || VIDAnew’)
If VX8’ = VX8
Then
Then VOCS will authenticate the Vi.
Else
VOCS will drop the connection response
Figure 101: Evaluate the Vi authentication parameter
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After authenticating the Vi, the VOCS will store the new CRP, OTTnew, and VIDAnew in
its database for the next authentication session.
6.6.3.2.1.5

Key generation

Once the mutual authentication is completed, the two sides will generate a shared
secret session key (ssk). The two sides will generate the ssk locally by combining the
PUF responses and the generated random values. The uniqueness of the PUF responses
ensures the uniqueness of the generated ssk.
ssk = H (R|| (RV’VI1|| RV’VI2 ||RVCS1))
6.6.3.2.2

Phase 2: Driver- Owner Cloud Server (VOCS) authentication

This sub-phase presents a mutual authentication process between a Driver (Di)
and a vehicle owner cloud server (VOCS). The two devices will complete mutual
authentication. The mutual authentication between Di and VOCS should be completed
after completing the mutual authentication between the vehicle and the VOCS. The
authentication between Di and VOCS will be completed through the vehicle, where it
will act as a relay between the two ends. All the exchanged messages will be encrypted
by the ssk between the vehicle and the VOCS. Also, the vehicle OTT and Ri will be used
to authenticate the driver to the VOCS. Using some of the vehicle parameters ensures that
the driver parameters are collected and sent through the authenticated vehicle.
As presented in figures 102 and 103, this phase starts when Vi prepares the
authentication request message on behalf of Di that will be sent to the VOCS. The steps
involved in this process are listed below.
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6.6.3.2.2.1

Step 1: Authentication request

1. Di will insert his/her username (Ui) and the password (PUi).
2. Di will use the vehicle’s fingerprint scanner to capture fingerprint biometric
characteristics (FP)
3. The Ui, PUi, Su, and the FP will send to the vehicle’s OBU through a secured
channel
Di

VOCS

Generate: TSvi1, RVvi1
Compute:
U1 = H (EID||Ri |VIDR||| OTT)
ZU1 = H(FP||PUi)
DV1 = ZU1 ⊕ U1
DV2 = H (VIDR ||TSvi1|| ZU1 || U1)

M1: (VIDA, {Ui, TSVi1, DV1, DV2}ssk)
Check:|TSRec− TS’vi1 |< ∆T
Find: VIDA Ui
Read: VIDR, CUCS, OTT, and Ri
Decrypt the message using the ssk
Compute:
RuCS = PUF(CuCS)
Read: EID, ZU2
Compute:
U1’ = H (EID ||VIDR||Ri || OTT)
ZU1’ = DV1⊕ U1’
ZU2’ = H (ZU1’ || RuCS)
Verify:
DV2’ = H (VIDR ||ZU1’ ||TSvi1’|| U1’)
Generate: TSCS1
Computes:
UVi = H (Ri|| TScs1|| ZU1|| OTT)

M2: (VOCSIDA, {TScs1 , UVi}ssk)

Figure 102: Di-VOCS mutual authentication process
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Algorithm 7_Protocol 2_Phase 2: The mutual authentication between D and the
VOCS
Input:
V with real identity (VIDR), alias identity (VIDA), VOCS real identity (VOCSIDR), VOCS
alias identity (VOCSIDR), one-time-token (OTT), PUF response (Ri), and Authentication
parameters (VCS1, VCS2)
VOCS with with real identity (VIDR), alias identity (VIDA), VOCS real identity (VOCSIDR),
VOCS alias identity (VOCSIDR), the vehicle type ID(VTID) Master secret key (MSKcs),
PUF challenge (CCS), and one time token (OTT)
Output:
Mutual authentication between Driver (Di) and the VOCS
Begin
1. D inserts the Employee ID(EID), username (Ui), password (PUi) and fingerprint (FP).
V generates a timestamp TSvi1 and random nonce RVvi1. V computes computes U1 = H
(EID||Ri |VIDR||| OTT), ZU1 = H(FP||PUi), DV1 = ZU1 ⊕ U1, DV2 = H (VIDR ||TSvi1|| ZU1 ||
U1)
2. V sends VIDA, {Ui, TSVi1, DV1, DV2}ssk to VOCS encrypted by the ssk between V and
VOCS.
3. If (the VOCS finds VIDA in its repository)
4. then
5. VOCS decrypts the message and retrieves the Ui. Then VOCS will retrieve the PUF
challenge that corresponds to the Ui and feed it to the PUF function. VOCS uses the
PUF response to decrypt the driverer’s data, including EID, ZU2, and BBUi, that are
stored on its database.
6.
The VOCS calculates U1’ and retrieves ZU1 from xoring U1 with DV1. Finally, VOCS
calculates DV2 = H (VIDR ||TSvi1|| ZU1 || U1)
7.
If (the calculated hash message in step 6 matches the hash message that was sent
In step 2)
8.
then
9.
The authenticity of the D is verified.
10.
VOCS communicates generates a timestamp TSCS1 and computes UVi = H (Ri||
TScs1||ZU1||OTT)
11.
VOCS sends (VOCSIDA, {TScs1, UVi}ssk) message encrypted by ssk to Vi

12. else
13.
Go to step 21.
14. end if
15. else
16. Go to step 21.
17. end if
18. V verifies the time stamp, decrypts the message using ssk and computes UVi’ = = H
(Ri|| TScs1|| ZU1|| OTT)
19. If (the calculated hash message in step 18 matches the hash message that was sent in
step 11) then
The authenticity of the VOCS is verified
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20. else
21. Stop (terminates the connection);
End
Figure 103: Mutual Authentication between D and VOCS
The Vi will complete the following steps:
1. Vi generates a new TSVi1 to avoid replay attacks
2. Vi computes U1
a. U1 = H (EID||Ri |VIDR||| OTT)
3. Vi computes ZU1
a. ZU1 = H(FP||PUi)
4. Vi computes DV1
a. DV1 = ZU1 ⊕ U1
5. Vi computes DV2
a. DV2 = H (VIDR ||TSvi1|| ZU1 || U1)
1. Vi sends an authentication request message encrypted by the ssk between Vi and
VOCS.
The authentication request includes VIDA, TSVi1, DV1, and DV2 as shown in 6.9.
Vi
6.6.3.2.2.2

VOCS Auth-Req (VIDA, {Ui, TSVi1, DV1, DV2}ssk )

(6.9)

Step 2: VOCS response

Once the VOCS receives the authentication request, it will complete the following steps:
1. VOCS decrypts the message using ssk
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2. VOCS retrieves from its database the VIDR that corresponds to its VIDA. If the
VOCS did not find the VIDA in its database, it will ignore and drop the
authentication request.
3. VOCS checks the validity of the received timestamp |TSRec− TS’Vi1 |< ∆T. TSRec
is the time when the message is received, and ∆T is the maximum transmission
delay. The message will be dropped if the difference between the timestamp and
the time when the message is received higher than the expected maximum
transmission delay.
4. Once the VOCS finds the VIDR, OTT and Ri of Vi
5. VOCS retrieves its PUF challenge (CuCS) and computes the corresponding PUF
response (RuCS) uses the RCS to decrypt and retrieve EID, ZU2
a. RuCS = PUF((CuCS)
6. VOCS computes U1’ = H (EID ||VIDR||Ri || OTT)
7. VOCS retrieves ZU1’
a. ZU1’ = DV1⊕ U1’
8. VOCS computes ZU2’ = H (ZU1’ || RuCS) and compares it with the stores ZU2
9. VOCS calculates DV2
b. DV2’ = H (VIDR ||ZU1’ ||TSvi1’|| U1’)
If the computed value is equal to the received value, as shown in figure 104, the VOCS
accepts the authentication request and authenticates the driver; otherwise, it will drop it.
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DV2’ = H (VIDR ||TSvi1’|| ZU1 || U1’)
If
DV2’ = DV2 Then
The VOCS will authenticate Di
Else
The VOCS will drop the authentication request
Figure 104: Evaluating the driver authentication parameter
Once the VOCS accepts the message, it generates a timestamp. The VOCS
prepares and sends an authentication response to the Vi. The preparation process of the
authentication response message includes the following steps:
1. VOCS generates a new TSCS1 to avoid replay attacks
2. VOCS generates UVi
3. UVi = H (Ri|| TScs1|| ZU1|| OTT)
4. VOCS sends an authentication response message
The authentication response includes VOCSIDA, UVi, and TSCS1 encrypted by the ssk, as
shown in 6.10.
VOCS

Vi Auth-Res (VOCSIDA, TScs1, UVi} ssk)

(6.10)

Once the Vi receives the authentication response message, it will verify the response, Vi
calculates UVi’. If the computed value is equal to the received value, as shown in figure
105, the Vi accepts the authentication response and ensures the authenticity of the VOCS.
UVi’ = H (Ri|| TScs1|| ZU1|| OTT)
If UVi = UVi’ Then
The VOCS will be verified
Else
The Vi will drop the authentication response
Figure 105: Evaluate the VOCS authentication response
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Once the authentication phase is completed, the process of continuous biometric
authentication will start. The vehicle will periodically collect the drivers’ BBUi using the
built-in sensor in the steering wheels and sends the driver’s BBUi as part of its data. Every
time the VOCS receives the driver’s BBUi, it will compare it against the stored BPi
template to ensure that he/she is the same driver, monitor their health condition, and
monitor the driver’s behaviors.
6.7

Evaluation Process
The following section presents a detailed security and performance analysis of the

proposed scheme and compares the analysis results with other related schemes presented
in the literature.
6.7.1

Security validation of the proposed scheme
In this section, we conduct both a formal and informal security analysis. The

formal evaluation uses two different approaches: First, we validate the proposed scheme
using the AVISPA tool to ensure that the proposed scheme is secure against active and
passive attacks such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. Second, we then
perform the logical verification using BAN logic to confirm that the authenticated
participants share the secret parameters securely in the proposed protocols. After
completing the formal evaluation, we examine the proposed protocols against the wellknown attacks and prove that the proposed protocols satisfy the main security properties.
6.7.1.1

Formal security evaluation

6.7.1.1.1

Simulation-based security verification using AVISPA
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The proposed protocols are simulated and tested using the AVISPA software, a
widely accepted tool for automatically validating the schemes’ security features. The
messages involved in the cryptography and security of the authentication process are
taken into consideration.
6.7.1.1.1.1

Protocol 1: V-TA mutual authentication

6.7.1.1.1.1.1 Simulation overview
The abstract notations used to describe the authentication scheme and the
corresponding AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions are presented in table 27.
Table 27: Abstract notation and AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions for
protocol specification
Notation

Description

TA

Trusted Authority

V

Vehicle

VIDR

VIDR

VIDA

VIDA

TAIDA

TAIDA

VTA1

VTA

RVvi1

Na

OTPvi

OTP
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TSvi1

TSoneV

RVTA1

Nb

C

Cone

CHXx

CHX

TSTA1

TSoneTA

Ri

Rone

CHXx+1

CHXnew

TSvi2

TStwoV

RVvi2

Naa

TSTA2

TStwoTA

RVTA2

Nbb

OTPnew

NOTP

VIDAnew

NnewIDA

⊕

XOR

H

H

The main goals of the simulation are as follows:
•

Goal 1: The secrecy_of secNa represents that RVvi1 is kept secret to (V, TA)
only.
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•

Goal 2: The secrecy_of secNaa represents that RVvi2 is kept secret to (V,
TA) only.

•

Goal 3: The secrecy_of secNb represents that RVTA1 is kept secret to ((V, TA)
only.

•

Goal 4: The secrecy_of secVTA represents that VTA1 is kept secret to (V, TA)
only.

•

Goal 5: The secrecy_of secCHX represents that CHXx is kept secret to ((V,
TA) only.

•

Goal 6: The secrecy_of secRone represents that Ri is kept secret to (V, TA)
only.

•

Goal 7: The secrecy_of secCone represents that C’ is kept secret to (V, TA)
only.

•

Goal 8: The secrecy_of secNOTP represents that OTPnew is kept secret to
(V, TA) only.

•

Goal 9: The secrecy_of secNnewIDA represents that VIDAnew is kept secret to
(V, TA) only.

•

Goal 10: The secrecy_of secVIDR represents that the VIDR is kept secret to
(V, TA) only.

•

Authentication Property 1: The authentication_on nb represents that TA
generates RVTA1. If V securely receives RVTA1 through a message, it
authenticates TA.
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•

Authentication Property 2: The authentication_on na represents that V
generates RVvi1. If TA securely receives RVvi1 through a message, it
authenticates V.

To achieve the goals mentioned above, we wrote the HLPSL script for the
protocol. The entities involved in the communication process are modeled as roles with
their message exchanges. There are four defined roles: that are: (1) role_V that is played
by the vehicle; (2) role _TA that is played by the trusted authority; (3) session, where the
session role and all its declarations are deﬁned, (4) and environment, which instantiates
all agents, variables, and functions.
As presented in Figure C_1 in Appendix C, the role of the vehicle is played by V.
V is aware of the Vi and TA agents in the protocol, and its alias identity and the TA alias
identity. Also, it is aware of its own real identity and the CHX that should be kept
secured. Furthermore, V is aware of the OTP that is generated by the TA, the VTA
authentication parameter, the hash function H (·) and the send/receive channels Snd/Rcv.
The (dy) notation indicates that the channels are following the Dolev-Yao model. The
keyword ‘Played_by V’ denotes that the role of the vehicle is played by agent V. All
employed local variables in this role are defined under the local section.
At the first state “state 2,” V receives a start message “Rcv(start)” as a signal to
begin the protocol run. V generates new random values (TSoneV and Na) and computes
Xone and Xtwo. The computation process of the Xone and Xtwo follows the presented
protocol description. V sends VIDA, TSoneV, Xone, and Xthree to the TA. At the second
transition, “State 4”, V receives the (TAIDA, SIDNIG, TSoneTA, Ytwo, CX and Ythree)
message from the TA. The computation of Ytwo, CX, and Ythree follows the description
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of our protocol. At this transition, if Ythree appears as expected by V and V correctly
verified nb, V authenticates TA. Then V generates a timestamp (TStwoV), new random
value (Naa), and computes CHxnew, Xthree, and Xfour. The computation process of
Xthree, Xfour, and CHxnew follows the presented protocol description. V sends VIDA,
TStwoV, Xthree, and Xfour to TA. At the third transition, “State 6”, V received the
(TAIDA, SIDNIG, TStwoTA, Yfive, and Ysix) from the TA. V calculates and verifies
the received new OTPnew, and NnewIDA by following the presented protocol's
description. After completing the verification process, Vstores its new alias ID and the
new OTP on its own memory for the next authentication session. The “end role” at the
end of the V role denotes the end of the role played by V.
Figure C_2 in Appendix C shows the role of the trusted authority played by TA.
The TA is aware of all agents in the protocol (V and TA), its alias and real identities
(TAIDA, TAIDR), the Alias and real identities (VIDA, VIDR) of the vehicle. TA knows
the OTP, the CHX, the hash function H (·), and the send/receive channels Snd/Rcv.
At the first transition, “State 1”, TA receives the (VIDA, TSoneV, Xone, and
Xtwo) message which was sent by V. TA uses the alias ID of V to retrieve its real ID, its
PUF challenge, the CHX, and OTP. TA uses the calculated VTA value to extract the V's
random generated value. Furthermore, TA uses V’s real identity, TSoneV, Na, and the
VTA to compute and verify the received Xtwo’. The computation and extraction of Na,
Xone, and Xtwo follow the presented scheme's description. Once the TA verifies Xtwo, it
generates a new value Nb and a TSoneT and computes Yone, Ytwo, CX and Ythree.
Then the TA sends to V (TAIDA, SIDNID, TSoneT, Ytwo, CX,Ythree). The
computation for Yone, Ytwo, CX, Ythree follows the description of the introduced
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scheme. t the second transition, “State 3”, TA received the (VIDA, SIDNIG, TStwoV,
Xthree, and Xfour) from the V. The computation of the Xthree and Xfour followed the
description of the presented protocol. At this transition, if Xfour is proved to be valid by
TA, TA will authenticate V. Consequently, the TA will generate a new alias ID for V and
a new OTP. The computations of NnewIDA and NOPT will follow the description of the
presented protocol. The TA will then send to V (TAIDA, SIDNIG, TStwoT, Yfive,Ysix
). The “end role” at the end of the TA role denotes the end of the role played by TA.
Figure C_3 in Appendix C shows the session role where all the two agents’ roles
are invoked, and all the session parameters are defined. Both the TA and V roles are
invoked with TA and V as agents, VIDA, VIDR, TAIDA, OTP, VTA, and CHX are
predefined as constants, H as the hash function, and SND1 and RCV1 as well as SND2
and RCV2 as the send and receive channels for V and TA. The “end role” at the end of
the session role indicates the end of this role.
Figure C_4 in Appendix C shows the environment role. In this role, one or more
sessions are instantiated. First, all constants are instantiated and defined. The constants, v,
and ta are instantiated as agents representing agents V and TA. The constants vida, vidr
,taida , otp,vta, and chx instantiates VIDA, VIDR, TAIDA, OTP,VTA, and CHX. The
function h instantiates the hash function H. The protocol identifiers are secVIDR,
secOTP, secNa, secNb,secNaa, secCone, secRone, secNOTP,secVIDAnew, secCHXnew,
secVTA, na, and nb are also instantiated and defined. In the intruder knowledge section,
all relevant values that the intruder is assumed to know before the execution are provided.
The attacker is assumed to know v and TA. He/ she is also assumed to know the hash h.
The session is instantiated with v, ta, vida, vidr, taida, otp, chx, vta, and h instances in the
384

composition section. The “end role” at the end of the environment role denotes the end of
this role.
Figure C_5 in Appendix C shows the simulation goals which are declared under
the “goal” keyword using the protocol identifiers declared as ‘protocol_id’. The simulator
is dictated to check the secrecy VIDR, OTP,Na,Nb,
VTA,Cone,Rone,CHXnew,Naa,NOTP, and VnewIDA at different states using
secrecy_of secVIDR’, ‘secrecy_of secOTP’, ‘secrecy_of secNa’, ‘secrecy_of secNb,
‘secrecy_of secVTA’, ‘secrecy_of secCone’, ‘secrecy_of secRone, secrecy_of
secCHXnew, ‘secrecy_of secNaa, ‘secrecy_of secNOTP’, and ‘secrecy_of
secNnewIDA’. The authentication is checked using ‘authentication_on na’ and
‘authentication_on nb’. The “end role” at the end of the goal section denotes the end of
this role.
6.7.1.1.1.1.2 Simulation results
The SPAN protocol simulation’s MSC corresponding to our HLPSL specification
is shown in Figure. 106.

Figure 106: Snapshot of the protocol simulation in AVISPA
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In AVISPA tool, the security properties such as authentication, integrity, and
secrecy are specified in a separate section. Therefore, when SPAN is executed, it verifies
if the protocol satisfies the specified properties. SPAN will generate the attack trace if an
attack is found and considers the protocol unsafe. The presented protocol's simulation
results are achieved by the OFMC back-end checker and the CL-AtSe back-end checker.
Figure 107 shows the CL-AtSe back-end checker report, which guarantees that the
protocol is SAFE and satisfies all the specified security goals. Figure 108 presents the
OFMC back-end checker report shows that the protocol is SAFE, thus meeting the
defined security goals. In summary, we can conclude that the proposed protocol is secure.

Figure 107: CL-AtSe Summary Report
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Figure 108: OFMC summary report
6.7.1.1.1.2
6.7.1.1.1.2.1
6.7.1.1.1.2.1.1

Protocol 2: Vehicle-Driver-VOCS authentication
Phase 1: Vehicle -VOCS mutual authentication
Simulation overview

The abstract notations used to describe the authentication process and the
corresponding AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions are presented in table 28.
Table 28: Abstract notation and AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions for
protocol specification
Notation

Description

VOCS

CS

Vi

Vehicle

VIDR

VIDR
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VOCSIDR

CSIDR

VOCSIDA

CSIDA

MSK

MSK

OTT

OTT

VTID

TID

RVvi1

Na

TSvi1

TSoneV

VCS1

VCS1

VCS2

VCS2

TSCS1

TSoneCS

RVCS1

Nb

C

Cone

CV

CV

SIDNIG

SID

TSvi2

TStwoV

RVvi2

Naa

Ri

Rone
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Ci+1

Ctwo

Ri+1

Rtwo

OTTnew

NOTT

VIDAnew

VnewIDA

⊕

XOR

H

H

The main goals of the simulation are as follows:
1. Goal 1: The secrecy_of secVIDR represents that the VIDR is permanently
kept secret, known to only (V, VOCS)
2. Goal 2: The secrecy_of secOTT represents that OTT is kept secret to (V, CS)
only.
3. Goal 3: The secrecy_of secVCS1 represents that VCS1 is kept secret to (V, CS)
only.
4. Goal 4: The secrecy_of secVCS2 represents that VCS2 is kept secret to (V, CS)
only.
5. Goal 5: The secrecy_of secNa represents that RVvi1 is kept secret to (V, CS)
only.
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6. Goal 6: The secrecy_of secNb represents that RVTA1 is kept secret to (V, CS)
only.
7. Goal 7: The secrecy_of secCone represents that C is kept secret to ((V, CS)
only.
8. Goal 8: The secrecy_of secRone represents that Ri is kept secret to ((V, CS)
only
9. Goal 9: The secrecy_of secRtwo represents that Ri+1 is kept secret to ((V,
CS) only.
10. Goal 10: The secrecy_of secNaa represents that RVvi2 is kept secret to (V,
CS) only.
11. Goal 11: The secrecy_of secNOTT represents that OTTnew is kept secret to
(V, CS) only.
12. Goal 12: The secrecy_of secVnewIDA represents that the secret key
secVIDAnew is permanently kept secret, known to only (V, CS).
13. Authentication Property 1: The authentication_on Nb represents that CS
generates Nb. If V securely receives Nb through a message, it authenticates
CS.
14. Authentication Property 2: The authentication_on Na represents that V
generates Na. If CS securely receives Na through a message, it authenticates
V.
To achieve the goals mentioned above, we wrote the HLPSL script for the
protocol. The entities involved in the communication process are modeled as roles with
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their message exchanges. There are four defined roles: that are: (1) role_V that is played
by the vehicle; (2) role _CS that is played by the vehicle owner cloud server; (3) session,
where the session role and all its declarations are deﬁned, (4) and environment, which
instantiates all agents, variables, and functions.
As presented in Figure C_6 in Appendix C, the role of the vehicle is played by V.
V is aware of the V and CS agents in the protocol, and its alias identity and the CS alias
identity. Also, it is aware of its own real identity VIDR real identity that should be kept
secured. Furthermore, V is aware of the VCS1, VCS2, OTT, the hash function H (·), and
the send/receive channels Snd/Rcv. The (dy) notation indicates that the channels are
following the Dolev-Yao model. The keyword ‘Played_by V’ denotes that the role of the
vehicle is played by agent V. All employed local variables in this role are defined under
the local section.
At the first state “state 2,” V receives a start message “Rcv(start)” as a signal to
begin the protocol run. V generates new random values (TSoneV and Na and computes
VXone and VXtwo. The computation process of the VXone and VXtwo follows the
presented protocol description. V sends VIDA, TSoneV, VXone, and VXtwo to the CS.
At the second transition, “State 4”, V receives the CSIDA, SIDNIG, TSoneCS,
Ytwo, CV and Ythree) message from the CS The computation of CSYtwo, CV, and
CSYthree follows the description of our protocol. At this transition, if the CSYthree
appears as expected by V and V correctly verified Nb, then V authenticates CS. Then V
generates new random values TStwoV and Naa. Also, V generates a new challenge
(Ctwo) and calculates its response (Rtwo), its new alias ID(VnewIDA), and a new
OTT(NOTT). The computations of Ctwo, Rtwo,VnewIDA, NOTT, VXfour,Vxfive,
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Vxsix, and Vxseven follow the description of the presented protocol. V sends (VIDA,
TStwoV, VXfour, VXfive, Vxsix, and Vxseven) to CS. The “end role” at the end of the
V role denotes the end of the role played by V.
Figure C_7 in Appendix C shows the role of the Vehicle owner cloud server
played by CS. The CS is aware of all agents in the protocol (V and CS), its alias and real
identities (CSIDA, CSIDR), the Alias and real identities (VIDA, VIDR) of the vehicle.
CS knows the OTT, the TID, the hash function H (·), and the send/receive channels
Snd/Rcv.
At the first transition, “State 1”, CS receives the (VIDA, TSoneV, VXone, and
VXtwo) message, which V. CS sent uses the alias ID of V to retrieve its real ID, TID, and
OTT and its own PUF challenge. CS uses the calculated VSC1 and VCS2 to extract the
V's random generated value. Also, CS uses V’s real identity, TSoneV, Na, OTT, and the
VCS1to compute and verify the received VXtwo’. The computation and extraction of Na,
TSoneV, and VXtwo follow the presented scheme's description. Once the CS verifies
VXtwo’, it generates a fresh value Nb and a TSoneCS and computes CSYone, CSYtwo,
CV, and CSYthree. Then the CS sends to V (CSIDA, SIDNID, TSoneCS, CSYtwo,
CV,CSYthree). The computation for CSYone, CSYtwo, CV, CSYthree follows the
description of the introduced scheme.
At the second transition, “State 3”, CS received the (VIDA, SIDING, TStwoV,
VXfour, VXfive, VXsix, and VXseven) message from the V. The computation of the
VXfour, VXfive, VXsix, and VXseven follows the description of the presented protocol.
At this transition, CS calculates and verifies the received new token (NOTT), New Alias
ID (VnewIDA), new challenge (Ctwo), and new response (Rtwo) by following the
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presented protocol's description. Suppose VXseven is proved to be valid by CS. In that
case, CS authenticates V. The “end role” at the end of the CS role denotes the end of the
role played by CS.
Figure C_8 in Appendix C shows the session role where the two agents’ roles are
invoked and defined all the session parameters. Both the CS and V roles are invoked with
CS and V as agents, VIDA, VIDR, CSIDA, VCS1, VCS2, OTT, and TID are predefined
as constants, H as the hash function, and SND1 and RCV1 as well as SND2 and RCV2 as
the send and receive channels for V and CS. The “end role” at the end of the session role
indicates the end of this role.
Figure C_9 in Appendix C shows the environment role. In this role, one or more
sessions are instantiated. First, all constants are instantiated and defined. The constants, v,
and cs are instantiated as agents representing agents V and CS. The constants vida, vidr,
csida ,vcs1,vcs2, otp, and tid instantiates VIDA, VIDR, CSIDA, VCS1,VCS2,OTT, and
TID, respectively. The function h instantiates the hash function H. The protocol
identifiers are secVIDR, , secOTT, secNa, secNb,secNaa, secCone, secRone, secRtwo,
secNaa, secNOTT,secVCS1, secVCS1, secVnewIDA, na and nb are also instantiated and
defined. In the intruder knowledge section, all relevant values that the intruder is assumed
to know before the execution are provided. The attacker is assumed to know v and cs. He/
she is also assumed to know the hash h. The session is instantiated with v, cs, vida, vidr,
csida, vcs1, vcs2, ott, tid, and h instances in the composition section. The “end role” at
the end of the environment role denotes the end of this role.
Figure C_10 in Appendix C shows the simulation goals, which are declared under
the “goal” keyword using the protocol identifiers declared as ‘protocol_id’. The simulator
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is dictated to check the secrecy VIDR, OTT,Na,VCS1,VCS2, Nb,
Cone,Rone,Rtwo,Naa,NOTT, and VnewIDA at different states using secrecy_of
secVIDR’, ‘secrecy_of secOTT’, ‘secrecy_of secNa’, ‘secrecy_of secVCS1’, ‘secrecy_of
secVCS2’, ‘secrecy_of secNb, ‘secrecy_of secCone’, ‘secrecy_of secRone, secrecy_of
secRtwo, ‘secrecy_of secNaa,‘secrecy_of secNOTT’, and ‘secrecy_of secVnewIDA’ .
The authentication is checked using ‘authentication_on na’ and ‘authentication_on nb’.
The “end role” at the end of the goal section denotes the end of this role.
6.7.1.1.1.2.1.2

Simulation results

The SPAN protocol simulation’s MSC corresponding to our HLPSL specification
is shown in figure 109.

Figure 109: Snapshot of the Protocol Simulation in AVISPA
In AVISPA tool, the security properties such as authentication, integrity, and
secrecy are specified in a separate section. Therefore, when SPAN is executed, it verifies
if the protocol satisfies the specified properties. SPAN will generate the attack trace if an
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attack is found, and it will consider the protocol unsafe. The presented protocol's
simulation results are achieved by the OFMC back-end checker and the CL-AtSe backend checker. Figure 110 shows the CL-AtSe back-end checker report, which guarantees
that the protocol is SAFE and satisfies all the specified security goals. Figure. 111
presents the OFMC back-end checker report shows that the protocol is SAFE, thus
meeting the defined security goals. In summary, we can conclude that the proposed
protocol is secure.
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Figure 110 : CL-AtSe summary report

Figure 111: OFMC summary report

6.7.1.1.1.2.2
6.7.1.1.1.2.2.1

Phase 2: Driver-VOCS Authentication
Simulation Overview

After completing the mutual authentication between the vehicle and the VOCS,
the driver’s authentication to the VOCS will be started. The vehicle will be used as the
communication medium between the driver and the VOCS. The abstract notations used to
describe the authentication protocol and the corresponding AVISPA HLPSL scripting
variables/functions are presented in table 29.
Table 29: D-VOCS abstract notation and AVISPA HLPSL scripting variables/functions
for protocol specification
VOCS

CS
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Vi

Vehicle

VIDR

VIDR

VOCSIDR

CSIDR

VOCSIDA

CSIDA

OTT

OTT

UI

Ui

PUi

PUI

Ssk

SK

VTID

TID

TSvi1

TSoneV

VCS1

VCS1

VCS2

VCS2

TSCS1

TSoneCS

Ri

Rone

⊕

XOR

H

H

The main goals of the simulation are as follows:
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1. Goal 1: The secrecy_of secVIDR represents that the VIDR is permanently
kept secret, known to only (V, CS)
2. Goal 2: The secrecy_of secOTT represents that OTT is kept secret to (V, CS)
only
3. Goal 3: The secrecy_of secRone represents that Ri is kept secret to ((V, CS)
only
4. Goal 4: The secrecy_of secSk represents that SKis kept secret to (V, CS)
only.
5. Goal 5: The secrecy_of secPUI represents that PUI is kept secret to (V, CS)
only.
6. Authentication Property 1: The authentication_on Uone represents that the
user generates Uone. If CS securely receives Uone through a message, it
authenticates U.
To achieve the goals mentioned above, we wrote the HLPSL script for the
protocol. The entities involved in the communication process are modeled as roles with
their message exchanges. There are four defined roles: that are: (1) role_V that is played
by the vehicle that represents the user; (2) role _CS that is played by the vehicle owner
cloud server; (3) session, where the session role and all its declarations are deﬁned, (4)
and environment, which instantiates all agents, variables, and functions.
As presented in figure C_11 in Appendix C, the role of the vehicle is played by V.
V is aware of the V and CS agents in the protocol, and its alias identity and the CS alias
identity. Also, it is aware of its own real identity VIDR that should be kept secured.
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Furthermore, V is aware of the VCS1, VCS2, OTT, UI, Rone, SIDIG, SK, the hash
function H (·), and the send/receive channels Snd/Rcv. The (dy) notation indicates that
the channels are following the Dolev-Yao model. The keyword ‘Played_by V’ denotes
that the role of the vehicle is played by agent V. All employed local variables in this role
are defined under the local section. At the first state “state 2,” V receives a start message
“Rcv(start)” as a signal to begin the protocol run. V generates a timestamp (TSoneV) and
computes Uone, ZUone,Utwo, and Uthree. The computation process of the Uone, ZUone,
Utwo, and Uthree follows the presented protocol description. V sends VIDA, Ui,
TSoneV, Utwo, and Uthree to the CS. At the second transition, “State 4”, V receives the
CSIDA, SIDNIG, TSoneCS, and UV) message from the CS. At this transition, if the UV
appears as expected by V and V correctly verified UV, this proves that the response came
from the real CS, and the user got successfully authenticated to the CS. The “end role” at
the end of the V role denotes the end of the role played by V.
Figure C_12 in Appendix C shows the role of the vehicle owner cloud server
played by CS. The CS is aware of all agents in the protocol (V and CS), its alias and real
identities (CSIDA, CSIDR), the Alias and real identities (VIDA, VIDR) of the vehicle.
CS knows the OTT, the TID, UI, Rone, SIDING, SK, the hash function H (·), and the
send/receive channels Snd/Rcv. The (dy) notation indicates that the channels are
following the Dolev-Yao model. The keyword ‘Played_by CS’ denotes that agent CS
plays the role of the vehicle owner cloud server. All employed local variables in this role
are defined under the local section. At the first transition, “State 1”, CS receives the
(VIDA, TSoneV, UI, Utwo, Uthree) message from V. At this transition, Uthree is proved
to be valid by CS, CS authenticates the user. Then, CS generates a fresh TSoneCS and
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computes Uv. Then the CS sends to V (CSIDA, SIDNID, {TSoneCS, UV}ssk). The
computation for Uv, follows the description of the introduced scheme. The “end role” at
the end of the CS role denotes the end of the role played by CS.
Figure C_13 in Appendix C shows the session role where the two agents’ roles
are invoked and defined all the session parameters. Both the CS and V roles are invoked
with CS and V as agents, CSIDA, VIDA, VIDR, CSIDR, VCS1, VCS2, OTT, UI, Rone,
SIDNIG, TID, and SK are predefined as constants, H as the hash function, and SND1 and
RCV1 as well as SND2 and RCV2 as the send and receive channels for V and CS. The
“end role” at the end of the session role indicates the end of this role.
Figure C_14 in Appendix C shows the environment role. In this role, one or more
sessions are instantiated. First, all constants are instantiated and defined. The constants, v,
and cs are instantiated as agents representing agents V and CS. The constants csida, vida,
vidr , csidr ,vcs1,vcs2, ott,ui, rone, siding, tid, and sk instantiates CSIDA,VIDA, VIDR,
CSIDR, VCS1,VCS2,OTT,UI,Rone, SIDNIG, TID, and SK, respectively. The function h
instantiates the hash function H. The protocol identifiers are secVIDR, secOTT, secRone,
secSK, secPUI, and uone are also instantiated and defined. In the intruder knowledge
section, all relevant values that the intruder is assumed to know before the execution are
provided. The attacker is assumed to know v and cs. He/ she is also assumed to know the
hash h. The session is instantiated with v, cs, csida, vida, vidr, csidr, vcs1, vcs2, ott, ui,
rone, siding, tid, sk, and h instances in the composition section. The “end role” at the end
of the environment role denotes the end of this role.
C_15 in Appendix C shows the simulation goals, which are declared under the
“goal” keyword using the protocol identifiers declared as ‘protocol_id’. The simulator is
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dictated to check the secrecy VIDR, OTT, Rone, SK, and PUI at different states using
secrecy_of secVIDR’, ‘secrecy_of secOTT’, ‘secrecy_of secRone’, ‘secrecy_of secSK’,
and ‘secrecy_of secPUI. The authentication is checked using ‘authentication_on uone’.
The “end role” at the end of the goal section denotes the end of this role.
6.7.1.1.1.2.2.2

Simulation Results

The SPAN protocol simulation’s MSC corresponding to the HLPSL specification
is shown in figure 112.

Figure 112: Snapshot of the protocol simulation in AVISPA
In AVISPA tool, the security properties such as authentication, integrity, and
secrecy are specified in a separate section. Therefore, when SPAN is executed, it verifies
if the protocol satisfies the specified properties. SPAN will generate the attack trace if an
attack is found, and it will consider the protocol unsafe. The presented protocol's
simulation results are achieved by the OFMC back-end checker and the CL-AtSe backend checker. Figure 113 shows the CL-AtSe back-end checker report, which guarantees
that the protocol is SAFE and satisfies all the specified security goals. Figure. 114
presents the OFMC back-end checker report shows that the protocol is SAFE, thus
meeting the defined security goals. In summary, we can conclude that the proposed
protocol is secure.
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Figure 113: CL-AtSe summary report

Figure 114: OFMC summary report
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6.7.1.1.2
6.7.1.1.2.1

Formal proof based on BAN logic
Protocol 1: V-TA authentication

In this section, we use BAN logic to verify the legitimacy of OTPnew and the
session key (ssk) that are shared between V and TA that communicate in the presented
protocol. To ensure the security of the proposed protocol under BAN logic, it needs to
satisfy security goals. The following section defines the main goals of the analysis of the
presented authentication scheme.
6.7.1.1.2.1.1

Goals identification

Goal 1: V and TA want to establish a shared secret key (ssk) that is believed by each
other.
G1_1: TA believes that the V believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter between
V and TA.
ssk

TA| ≡ V|≡ (V

TA)

G1_2: TA believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between V and TA.
TA|≡ (V

ssk

TA)

G1_3: V believes that TA believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter between V
and TA.
ssk

V| ≡ TA | ≡ (V

TA)
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G1_4: V believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter between V and TA.

ssk

V| ≡ (V

TA)

Goal 2: V and TA want to generate a one-time password (OTPnew) that is believed
by each other.
G2_1: TA believes that the V believes that the OTPnew is securely shared parameters
between V and TA.

OTPnew

TA| ≡ V | ≡ (V

VOCS)

G2_2: TA believes that OTPnew is securely shared parameter between V and TA.

OTPnew

TA| ≡ (V

TA)

G2_3: V believes that the TA believes that the OTPnew is securely shared parameters
between V and TA.

OTPnew

V| ≡ TA | ≡ (V

TA)
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G2_4: V believes that OTPnew is securely shared parameter between V and TA.

OTPnew

V| ≡ (V

6.7.1.1.2.1.2

TA)

Messages idealization

First, we transfer all transmitted messages into idealized form as follows.
M1: V

TA:(VIDR, TSv1, RVv1) VTA1

M2: TA
M 3: V

V:(RVTA1, TSTA1, OTPVi , C)Yone
TA:(VIDR, TSV2, RVV2, OTPVi , Ri) CHXi+1

M 4: TA

V:(VIDR, TSTA2, RVTA2) Yfour

6.7.1.1.2.1.3

Main assumptions

The second step is to define some assumptions as initiative promises. The
fundamental assumptions of the presented authentication scheme are as follows:

P1: TA believes that VTA is a secure shared parameter between V and TA
TA| ≡ (V

VTA

TA)

P2: TA believes V believes that VTA is a secure shared parameter between V and TA.

VTA

TA | ≡ V| ≡ (V

TA)
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P3: V believes that Yone is a secure shared parameter between V and TA
V| ≡ (V

Yone

TA)

P4: V believes TA believes that Yone is a secure shared parameter between V and TA.

Yonr

V | ≡ TA| ≡ (N

MG)

P5: TA believes that CHXi+1 is a secure shared parameter between V and TA
TA| ≡ (V

CHXi+1

TA)

P6: TA believes V believes that CHXi+1 is a secure shared parameter between V and TA.

CHXi+1

TA | ≡ V| ≡ (V

TA)

P7: V believes that Yfour is a secure shared parameter between V and TA
V| ≡ (V

Yfour

TA)

P8: V believes TA believes that Yfour is a secure shared parameter between V and TA.

Yfour

V | ≡ TA| ≡ (V

TA)

P9: TA believes RVV1 is fresh.
TA| ≡ #(RVV1)
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P10: TA believes that V believes RVV1.
TA | ≡ V| ≡ RVV1
P11: TA believes that V has jurisdiction over RVV1. That is, V is an authority and
believes RVV1.
TA | ≡ V ⇒ RVV1
P12: TA believes TSV1 is fresh.
TA| ≡ #(TSV1)
P13: TA believes RVV2 is fresh.
TA| ≡ #(RVV2)
P14: TA believes that V believes RVV2.
TA | ≡ V| ≡ RVV2
P15: TA believes that V has jurisdiction over RVV2. That is, V is an authority and
believes RVV2.
TA | ≡ V ⇒ RVV2
P16: TA believes TSV2 is fresh.
TA| ≡ #(TSV2)
P17: V believes RVTA1 is fresh.
V| ≡ #(RVTA1)
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P18: V believes that TA believes RVTA1.
V | ≡ TA| ≡ RVTA1
P19: V believes that TA has jurisdiction over RVTA1. That is, TA is an authority and
believes RVTA1.
V | ≡ TA ⇒ RVTA1
P20: V believes RVT2 is fresh.
V| ≡ #(RVTA2)
P21: V believes that TA believes RVTA2.
V | ≡ TA| ≡ RVTA2
P22: V believes that TA has jurisdiction over RVTA2. That is, TA is an authority and
believes RVTA2.
V | ≡ TA ⇒ RVTA2
P23: V believes TSTA1 is fresh.
V| ≡ #(TSTA1)
P24: V believes TSTA2 is fresh.
V| ≡ #(TSTA2)
P25: TA believes VIDR is a secure shared parameter between V and TA.

VIDR

TA | ≡ (V

TA)
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P26: TA believes V believes that VIDR is a secure shared parameter between V and TA.

VIDR

TA | ≡ V| ≡ (V

TA)

P27: TA believes that V believes Ri
TA| ≡ V | ≡ Ri
P28: TA believes that V has a jurisdiction over Ri
TA| ≡ V ⇒ Ri
P29: V believes TA believes that OTP is a secure shared parameter between V and TA.

OTP

V | ≡ TA| ≡ (V

MG)

P30: V believes that OTP is a secure shared parameter between V and TA
V| ≡ (V

OTP

TA)

P31: TA believes that OTP is a secure shared parameter between V and TA
TA| ≡ (V

OTP

TA)

P32: TA believes V believes that OTP is a secure shared parameter between V and TA.

OTP

TA | ≡ V|≡ (V

TA)
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P33: TA believes that CHXx+1 is a secure shared parameter between V and TA
TA| ≡ (V

CHXx+1

TA)

P34: TA believes V believes that CHXx is a secure shared parameter between V and TA.

CHXx+1

TA | ≡ V| ≡ (V

TA)

P35: TA believes V believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between V and TA
ssk

TA | ≡ V| ≡ (V

TA)

P36: V believes TA believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between V and TA
ssk

V | ≡ TA| ≡ (V

TA)

P37: TA believes V believes that OTPnew is a secure shared parameter between V and
TA
OTPnew

TA | ≡ V| ≡ (V

TA)

P38: V believes TA believes that OTPnew is a secure shared parameter between V and
TA

OTPnew

V | ≡ TA| ≡ (V
6.7.1.1.2.1.4

TA)

Analysis of the V-TA authentication protocol

We then prove that the proposed protocol achieves the security goals based on the
idealized form of the messages, assumptions, and BAN logic rules. The proposed
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authentication scheme analysis is shown below to prove that the protocol achieves mutual
authentication between V and TA.
According to M1:
V1: TA ◃:(VIDR, TSv1, RVv1) VTA1
According to P1, P25 and Rule 1, we derive the following

:

V2

𝑇𝐴|≡V VTA TA ,TA ⊲(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , ,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉1 ) 𝑉 𝑉𝑇𝐴 𝑇𝐴
𝑇𝐴|≡V |∼ ( (𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )
According to P9, P12, and rule 3, we derive the following

V3:

𝑇𝐴|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑉1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )
𝑇𝐴|≡#|(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )

According to P2, P26, V2, V3, and rule 2, we derive the following

𝑇𝐴|≡#(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , ,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉1 ),TA|≡V~(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 ,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )
𝑇𝐴|≡V|≡(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )

V4:

According to V4, P10, P11, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V5:

TA |≡V| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝑣1 ,TA |≡ V |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑣1
TA|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑣1

According to M2, we get
V6: V◃ (RVTA1, TSTA1, OTPVi, C) Yone
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According to P3, P 29 and Rule 1, we derive the following
V7:

𝑉|≡V Yone TA ,V ⊲(TS𝑇𝐴1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,V OTP TA,C) 𝑉

𝑌𝑜𝑛𝑒

𝑇𝐴

𝑉|≡TA |∼ ( TS𝑇𝐴1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,V OTP TA ,C)
According to P17, P23 and rule 3, we derive the following

V8:

𝑉|≡#(TS𝑇𝐴1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,)
𝑉|≡#(TS𝑇𝐴1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,V OTP TA,C)

According to P30, V7, V8, and rule 2, we derive the following
V9:
𝑉|≡#(TS𝑇𝐴1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,V OTP TA,C),V|≡TA~(TS𝑇𝐴1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,V OTP TA,C)
𝑉|≡TA|≡(TS𝑇𝐴1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,V OTP TA,C)

According to V9, P18, P19 and rule 4, we derive the following:

V10:

𝑉 |TA| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,V |≡ TA |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1
𝑉|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1

According to M3:
V11 TA ◃(VIDR, TSV2, RVV2, OTPVi ,Ri) CHXi+1
According to P5, P25, P27, P31 and Rule 1, we derive the following
V12:

𝑇𝐴|≡V CHXx+1 TA ,TA ⊲(VIDR,TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2 ,V Ri TA,V OTP TA) 𝑉 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑥+1 𝑇𝐴
𝑇𝐴|≡V |∼ ( VIDR, TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2 ,V Ri TA, V OTP TA)
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According to P13, P16, and rule 3, we derive the following
𝑇𝐴|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑉2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝑉2 )

V13:

𝑀𝑇𝐴|≡#|(VIDR,TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2 ,V Ri TA,V OTP TA )

According to P6, P26, P32, V12, V13, and rule 2, we derive the following
V14:
𝑇𝐴|≡#(TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2 ,V Ri TA,V OTP TA ),V|≡TA~(TS𝑇𝐴1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,V Ri TA,V OTP TA )
𝑇𝐴|≡V|≡(TS𝑇𝐴1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴1 ,V Ri TA,V OTP TA)

According to V14, P15, P28 and rule 4, we derive the following:

V15:

TA |≡V|⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝑣2 ,Ri TA |≡ V |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑣2 ,𝑅𝑖
TA|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑣2 ,𝑅𝑖

According to M4, we get
V16: V ◃(VIDR, TSTA2,RVTA2, OTPvi ) Yfour
According to P7, P29, and Rule 1, we derive the following
V17:

𝑇𝐴|≡V Yfour TA ,V ⊲(VIDR,TS𝑇𝐴2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2 , V OTP TA) 𝑉 𝑌𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑇𝐴
𝑉|≡TA |∼ ( VIDR,TS𝑇𝐴2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2 ,V OTP TA)
According to P20, P24 and rule 3, we derive the following

V18:

𝑉|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴2, 𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2, )
𝑉|≡#(VIDR,TS𝑇𝐴2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2 ,V OTP TA)
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According to P8, P30, V17, V18, and rule 2, we derive the following
V19:
𝑉|≡#(VIDR,TS𝑇𝐴2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2 ,V OTP TA),V|≡TA~(VIDR,TS𝑇𝐴2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2 ,V OTP TA)
𝑉|≡TA|≡(VIDR,TS𝑇𝐴2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2 ,V OTP TA)

According to V19, P21, P22 and rule 4, we derive the following:

V20:

𝑉 |TA| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2 ,V |≡ TA |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2
𝑉|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑇𝐴2

As session key ssk = H (Ri || (RVvi1|| RVTA2 ||RVvi2 || RV’TA1) and in combination with
P10, P14, V4 and V14, we can derive
ssk

V21: TA| ≡V |≡ (V

TA)

(Goal 1_1)

As session key ssk = H (Ri || (RVvi1|| RVTA2 ||RVvi2 || RV’TA1) and combining with P27,
P35 and V5, V15, V21
ssk

V22: TA|≡ (V

TA)

(Goal 1_2)

As session key ssk = H (Ri || (RVvi1|| RVTA2 ||RVvi2 || RV’TA1) and combining with P18,
P21, V9 and V19 we can derive
ssk

V23: V ≡TA|≡ (V

TA)

(Goal 1_3)

As session key ssk = H (Ri || (RVvi1|| RVTA2 ||RVvi2 || RV’TA1) and combining with P36,
V10, V20 and V23.
ssk

V24: V|≡ (V

TA)
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(Goal 1_4)

As OTPnew = H (OTP||RVTA2 || Ri) and in combination with P27, P31 and V14, we can
derive

OPTnew

V25: TA| ≡ V |≡ (V

TA)

(Goal 2_1)

As OTPnew = H (OTP||RVTA2 || Ri) and combining with P32, P37, and V15, PV25

OTPnew

V26: TA|≡ (V

TA)

(Goal 2_2)

As OTPnew = H (OTP||RVTA2 || Ri) and combining with P21, P29 and V19 we can derive

OTPnew

V27: V ≡TA|≡ (V

TA)

(Goal 2_3)

As OTPnew = H (OTP||RVTA2 || Ri) and combining with P30, P38, V20, and V27.

OTPnew

V28: V|≡ (V

TA)

(Goal 2_4)

Hence, the above logic proves that the proposed protocol successfully achieves
Goals 1.1 to 1.4 and 2.1 to 2.4. In other words, the proposed protocol achieves mutual
authentication and secure session key agreement between V and TA.
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6.7.1.1.2.2

Protocol 2: Vehicle- Driver-VOCS authentication

6.7.1.1.2.2.1

Phase 1: V-VOCS

In this section, we use BAN logic to verify the legitimacy of the session key (ssk),
Ri+1, and OTTnew that are shared between V and VOCS, which communicate in the
presented phase. To ensure the security of the proposed protocol under BAN logic, it
needs to satisfy a set of security goals. The following section defines the main goals of
the analysis of the presented authentication scheme.
6.7.1.1.2.2.1.1

Goals identification

Goal 1: Ri+1 is well protected and believed by VOCS.
G1_1: VOCS believes that the V believes that the Ri+1 is securely shared parameters
between V and VOCS.

Ri+1

VOCS| ≡ V | ≡ (V

VOCS)

G1_2: VOCS believes that Ri+1 is securely shared parameters between V and VOCS.
Ri+1

VOCS| ≡ (V

VOCS)

Goal 2: The V and the VOCS want to establish a One Time Token (OTT) key that
each other believes.

G2_1: VOCS believes that the V believes that the OTTNew is a securely shared
parameter between V and VOCS.

OTTnew
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VOCS| V|≡ (V

VOCS)

G2_2: VOCS believes that OTTnew is a securely shared parameter between V and
VOCS.
OTTnew

VOCS|≡ (V

VOCS)

G2_3: V believes that the VOCS believes that the OTTnew is a securely shared
parameter between V and VOCS.
OTTnew

V| ≡ VOCS | ≡ (V

VOCS)

G2_4: V believes that OTTnew is a securely shared parameter between V and VOCS.

OTTnew

V| ≡ (V

VOCS)

Goal 3: The V and the VOCS want to establish a shared secret key (ssk) that each
other believes.
G3_1: VOCS believes that the V believes the ssk is a securely shared parameter between
V and VOCS.
ssk

VOCS| ≡ V|≡ (V

VOCS)

G3_2: VOCS believes that sskis a securely shared parameter between V and VOCS.
VOCS|≡ (V

ssk

VOCS)

G3_3: V believes that the VOCS believes that the ssk is a securely shared parameter
between V and VOCS.
ssk
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V| ≡ VOCS | ≡ (V

VOCS)

G3_4: V believes that ssk is a securely shared parameter between V and VOCS.

ssk

V| ≡ (V
6.7.1.1.2.2.1.2

VOCS)

Messages idealization

First, we transferred all transmitted messages into idealized form as follows.
M1: V

VOCS:(VIDR, TSv1, RVv1, OTT, VCS1) VX1

M2: VOCS

V:( VIDR, RVTA1, TSTA1, C, OTT, VCS1) CSY1
VOCS:(VIDR, OTT, TSV2, RVV2, Ci+1 Ri, Ri+1) VXfour

M 3: V

6.7.1.1.2.2.1.3

Main assumptions

The second step to be completed is to define some assumptions as the initiative
promises. The fundamental assumptions of the presented authentication scheme are as
follows:
P1: VOCS believes that VX1 is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS
VOCS| ≡ (V

VX1

VOCS)

P2: VOCS believes V believes that VX1 is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.
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VX1

VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P3: V believes that CSY1 is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS
V| ≡ (V

CSY1

VOCS)

P4: V believes VOCS believes that CSY1 is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.

CSY1

V | ≡ VOCS| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P5: VOCS believes that VX4 is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS
VOCS| ≡ (V

VX4

VOCS)

P6: VOCS believes V believes that VX4 is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.

VX4

VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P7: VOCS believes RVV1 is fresh.
VOCS| ≡ #(RVV1)

P8: VOCS believes that V believes RVV1.
VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ RVV1
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P9: VOCS believes that V has jurisdiction over RVV1. That is, V is an authority and
believes RVV1.
VOCS | ≡ V ⇒ RVV1
P10: VOCS believes RVV2 is fresh.
VOCS| ≡ #(RVV2)
P11: VOCS believes that V believes RVV2.
VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ RVV2
P12: VOCS believes that V has jurisdiction over RVV2. That is, V is an authority and
believes RVV2.
VOCS | ≡ V ⇒ RVV2
P13: VOCS believes TSV1 is fresh.
VOCS| ≡ #(TSV1)
P14: VOCS believes TSV2 is fresh.
VOCS| ≡ #(TSV2)
P15: V believes RVVOCS1 is fresh.
V| ≡ #(RVVOCS1)

P16: V believes that VOCS believes RV VOCS1.
V | ≡ VOCS| ≡ RVVOCS1
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P17: V believes that VOCS has jurisdiction over RVVOCS1. That is, VOCS is an authority
and believes RVVOCS1.
V | ≡ VOCS ⇒ RVVOCS1
P18: V believes TSVOCS1 is fresh.
V| ≡ #(TSVOCS1)
P19: VOCS believes VIDR is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS.

VIDR

VOCS | ≡ (V

VOCS)

P20: VOCS believes V believes that VIDR is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.

VIDR

VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P21: VOCS believes that V believes Ri
VOCS| ≡ V | ≡ Ri
P22: VOCS believes that V has a jurisdiction over Ri
VOCS| ≡ V ⇒ Ri
P23: VOCS believes that V believes Ri+1
VOCS| ≡ V | ≡ Ri+1
P24: VOCS believes that V has a jurisdiction over Ri+1
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VOCS| ≡ V ⇒ Ri+1
P25: V believes that VOCS believes C
V| ≡ VOCS | ≡ C
P26: V believes that VOCS has a jurisdiction over C
VOCS| ≡ V ⇒ C
P27: V believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS
V| ≡ (V

OTT

VOCS)

P28: V believes VOCS believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.

OTT

V | ≡ VOCS| ≡

(V

VOCS)

P29: VOCS believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS
VOCS| ≡ (V

OTT

VOCS)

P30: VOCS believes V believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.

OTT

VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ (V

VOCS)
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P31: VOCS believes V believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS
ssk

VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P32: V believes VOCS believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS
ssk

V | ≡ VOCS| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P33: VOCS believes V believes that OTTnew is a secure shared parameter between V
and VOCS
OTTnew

VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P34: V believes VOCS believes that OTTnew is a secure shared parameter between V
and VOCS

OTTnew

V | ≡ VOCS| ≡ (V

6.7.1.1.2.2.1.4

VOCS)

Analysis of the authentication V-VOCS phase

We then prove that the proposed protocol achieves the security goals based on the
idealized form of the messages, assumptions, and BAN logic rules. The proposed
authentication protocol analysis is shown below to prove that the protocol achieves
mutual authentication between V and VOCS.
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According to M1:
V1: VOCS ◃:(:(VIDR, TSv1, RVv1, OTT, VCS1) VX1
According to P1, P19, P29, and Rule 1, we derive the following

:

V2

𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡V VX1 VOCS ,VOCS ⊲(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑉 𝑂𝑇𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 , 𝑉CS1, 𝑅𝑉𝑉1 ) 𝑉 𝑉𝑋1 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡V |∼ ( (𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑉 𝑂𝑇𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 , 𝑉CS1, 𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )

According to P7, P13, and rule 3, we derive the following

V3:

𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑉1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆 |≡#|(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑉 𝑂𝑇𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 , 𝑉CS1, 𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )

According to P2, P20, P30, V2, V3, and rule 2, we derive the following
V4:
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡#(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑉 𝑂𝑇𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 , 𝑉CS1, 𝑅𝑉𝑉1 ),VOCS|≡V~(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑉 𝑂𝑇𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 , 𝑉CS1, 𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡V|≡(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝑉 𝑂𝑇𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 , 𝑉CS1, 𝑅𝑉𝑉1 )

According to V4, P8, P9, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V5:

VOCS |≡V| ⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝑣1 ,VOCS |≡ V |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑣1
VOCS|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑣1

According to M2, we get
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V6: V◃(VIDR,RVCS1,TSCS1,C,OTT, VCS1)CSY1
According to P3, P27, and Rule 1, we derive the following
V7
𝑉|≡V CSYone VOCS ,V ⊲(TS𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆1 ,V OTT VOCS,𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,C) 𝑉 𝐶𝑆𝑌𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆
𝑉|≡VOCS |∼ ( TS𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆1 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆1 ,V OTT VOCS, 𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,C)

According to P15, P18 and rule 3, we derive the following

V8:

𝑉|≡#(TS𝐶𝑆1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,)
𝑉|≡#(TS𝐶𝑆1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,V OTT VOCS, 𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,C)

According to P4, P16, P25, P28, V7, V8, and rule 2, we derive the following
V9:
𝑉|≡#(TS𝐶𝑆1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,V OTT VOCS,C),V|≡VOCS~(TS𝐶𝑆1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,V OTT VOCS,C)
𝑉|≡VOCS|≡(TS𝐶𝑆1 ,𝑅𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,V OTT VOCS ,C)

According to V9, P17, P26 and rule 4, we derive the following:

V10:

𝑉 |VOCS|⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,C V |≡ VOCS|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,𝐶
𝑉|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝐶𝑆1 ,𝐶

According to M3:
V11 VOCS ◃(VIDR, OTT, TSV2, RVV2, Ri, Ri+1) VXfour
According to P5, P19, P29, and Rule 1, we derive the following
V12:
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡V VXfour VOCS ,VOCS ⊲(VIDR, V OTT VOCS,TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2 ,𝑅 1 ,𝑅 𝑖+1 ) 𝑉 VXfour 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡V |∼ ( VIDR, V OTT VOCS,TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2 ,𝑅 1 ,𝑅 𝑖+1 )
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According to P10, P14, and rule 3, we derive the following

V13:

𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑉2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑉𝑉2 )
𝑇𝐴|≡#|(VIDR, V OTT VOCS,TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2 ,𝑅 1 ,𝑅𝑖+1 )

According to P11, P20, P21, P23, P30, V12, V13, and rule 2, we derive the following
V14:
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡#(VIDR, V OTT VOCS,TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2 ,𝑅 1 ,𝑅𝑖+1 ),V|≡VOCS~(VIDR, V OTT VOCS,TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2 ,𝑅 1 ,𝑅𝑖+1 )
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡V|≡(VIDR, V OTT VOCS,TS𝑉2 ,𝑅𝑉𝑉2,𝑅 1 ,𝑅 𝑖+1 )

According to V14, P12, P22, P24, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V15:

VOCS |≡V|⇒ 𝑅𝑉𝑣2 ,𝑅1 ,𝑅𝑖+1 ,VOCS |≡ V |≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑣2 ,𝑅1 ,𝑅𝑖+1
VOCS|≡ 𝑅𝑉𝑣2,𝑅𝑉 ,𝑅1 ,𝑅𝑖+1
𝑣2

Based on P21, P23, V15, we can derive

Ri,Ri+1
V16: VOCS| ≡ | ≡ (V

VOCS) (Goal 1_1)

Based on P22, P24, V15, and V16, we derive the following

Ri,Ri+1
V17: VOCS|≡ (V

VOCS)

(Goal 1_2)

As session key ssk = H (Ri|| (RV’VI1|| RV’VI2 ||RVCS1) and in combination with V4 and
V14 we can derive
ssk

V18: VOCS| ≡V |≡ (V

VOCS)

426

(Goal 2_1)

As session key ssk= H (Ri|| (RV’VI1|| RV’VI2 ||RVCS1) and combining with P31, V18, and
Rule 4

ssk

V19: VOCS|≡ (V

VOCS)

(Goal 2_2)

As session key ssk = H (Ri|| (RV’VI1|| RV’VI2 ||RVCS1) and combining with V9 we can
derive

ssk

V20: V ≡VOCS|≡ (V

VOCS)

(Goal 2_3)

As session key SK H (Ri|| (RV’VI1|| RV’VI2 ||RVVOCS1) and combining with P32, V20, and
Rule 4.

V21: V|≡ (V

ssk

VOCS)

(Goal 2_4)

As OTTnew = H (OTT|| RVVi2|| C) and in combination with V4, V14 we can derive

OTTnew

V22: VOCS| ≡ V |≡ (V

VOCS)
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(Goal 3_1)

As OTTnew = H (OTT|| RVVi2|| C) and combining with P33, V22, and Rule 4, we can
drive

OTTnew

V23: VOCS|≡ (V

VOCS)

(Goal 3_2)

As OTTnew = H (OTT|| RVVi2|| C) and combining with V9 we can derive

OTTnew

V24: V |≡VOCS|≡ (V

TA)

(Goal 3_3)

As OTTnew = H (OTT|| RVVi2|| C) and combining with P34, V24, and Rule 4 we can
drive.

OTTnew

V25: V|≡ (V

VOCS)

(Goal 3_4)

The above logic proves that the proposed protocol achieves Goals 1.1 to 1.2, 2.1
to 2.4, and 3.1-3.4 successfully. In other words, the proposed protocol achieves mutual
authentication and secure session key agreement between V and VOCS. In summary, by
achieving all the goals mentioned above, we demonstrate the validity of our proposed
protocols. We proved that the presented three protocols are a secure mechanism to
achieve mutual authentication and secret key generation to secure the communication
between the involved parties.
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6.7.1.1.2.2.2

Phase 2: D-VOCS authentication

In this section, we use BAN logic to verify the legitimacy of the authentication
parameter ZU2 shared between driver and VOCS, which communicate in the presented
protocol. To ensure the security of the proposed protocol under BAN logic, it needs to
satisfy a set of security goals. The following section defines the main goals of the
analysis of the presented authentication scheme.
6.7.1.1.2.2.2.1

Goals identification

Goal 1: ZU1 is well protected and believed by Di and VOCS.
G1_1: VOCS believes that the Di believes that the ZU1 is a securely shared parameter
between Di and VOCS.
ZU1

VOCS| V and Di|≡ (Di

VOCS)

G1_2: VOCS believes that ZU1 is a securely shared parameter between Di and VOCS.
ZU1

VOCS|≡ (Di

VOCS)

G2_1: Di believes that the VOCS believes the UVi is a securely shared parameter
between Di and VOCS.
UVi

Di| VOCS |≡ (Di

VOCS)

G2_2: Di believes that UVi is a securely shared parameter between Di and VOCS.
UVi

Di|≡ (Di
6.7.1.1.2.2.2.2

VOCS)

Messages idealization

First, we transferred all transmitted messages into idealized forms as follows:
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ZU1

M1: Di

VOCS: ({VIDR, TSvi, Ri,OTT, FP, PUi, Di

VOCS})ssk

UVi

M1: VOCS

Di: ({TSCS1, Di

VOCS})ssk

6.7.1.1.2.2.2.3

Main assumption

The second step is to define some assumptions as initiative promises. The fundamental
assumptions of the presented authentication scheme is as follows:
P1: VOCS believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS
VOCS| ≡ (V

ssk

VOCS)

P2: VOCS believes V believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.

ssk

VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P3: V believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS
V| ≡ (V

ssk

VOCS)

P4: V believes VOCS believes that ssk is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.

ssk
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V | ≡ V| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P5: VOCS believes TSV1 is fresh.
VOCS| ≡ #(TSV1)
P6: V believes TSCS1 is fresh.
V| ≡ #(TSCS1)
P7: VOCS believes that Di believes ZU1
VOCS| ≡ Di | ≡ ZU1
P8: VOCS believes that Di has a jurisdiction over ZU1
VOCS| ≡ Di ⇒ ZU1
P9: Di believes that VOCS believes UVi
Di| ≡ VOCS | ≡ UVi
P10: Di believes that VOCS has a jurisdiction over UVi
Di| ≡ VOCS ⇒ UVi

P11: VOCS believes VIDR is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS.

VIDR

VOCS | ≡ (V

VOCS)
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P12: VOCS believes V believes that VIDR is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.

VIDR

VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P13: VOCS believes that Di believes FP
VOCS| ≡ Di | ≡ FP
P14: VOCS believes that Di has a jurisdiction over FP
VOCS| ≡ Di ⇒ FP
P15: VOCS believes that Di believes PUi
VOCS| ≡ Di | ≡ PUi
P16: VOCS believes that Di has a jurisdiction over PUi
VOCS| ≡ Di ⇒ PUi
P17: VOCS believes that V believes Ri
VOCS| ≡ V | ≡ Ri
P18: VOCS believes that V has a jurisdiction over Ri
VOCS| ≡ V ⇒ Ri
P19: VOCS believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS
V| ≡ (V

OTT

VOCS)
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P20: VOCS believes V believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between V and
VOCS.

OTT

V | ≡ VOCS| ≡ (V

VOCS)

P21: V believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS
VOCS| ≡ (V

OTT

VOCS)

P22: V believes V believes that OTT is a secure shared parameter between V and VOCS.

OTT

VOCS | ≡ V| ≡ (V
6.7.1.1.2.2.2.4

VOCS)

Analysis of D-VOCS authentication phase

The third step is to start analyzing the authentication scheme to prove that the
proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication between Di and VOCS.
According to M1:

ZU1

V1: VOCS◃({VIDR, TSvi, U1, FP, PUi, Di

VOCS})ssk

According to P1, and Rule 1, we derive the following

V2

:

𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡V 𝑠𝑠𝑘 VOCS ,VOCS ⊲(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝐷𝑖 𝑍𝑈1 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,Ri,OTT,FP,PUi) 𝑉 𝑠𝑠𝑘 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡V |∼ ( (𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝐷𝑖 𝑍𝑈1 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,Ri,OTT,FP,PUi)
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According to P5 and rule 3, we derive the following

V3:

𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡#(𝑇𝑆𝑉1 )
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆 |≡#|(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝐷𝑖 𝑍𝑈1 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,Ri,OTT,FP,PUi)

According to P2, P7,P12,P13,P15,P17,P20, V2,V3, and rule 2, we derive the following
V4:
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡#(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝐷𝑖 𝑍𝑈1 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,Ri,OTT,FP,PUi),VOCS|≡V and Di~(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝐷𝑖 𝑍𝑈1 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,Ri,OTT,FP,PUi)
𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆|≡V and Di|≡(𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑅 , 𝐷𝑖 𝑍𝑈1 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆,𝑇𝑆𝑉1 ,Ri,OTT,FP,PUi)

According to P18, V4 and rule 4, we derive the following:

V5:

VOCS |≡V| ⇒ 𝑅𝑖 ,VOCS |≡ V |≡ Ri
VOCS|≡ Ri

According to P8, P13, P16, V4 and rule 4, we derive the following:

V6:

VOCS |≡Di|⇒ 𝑍𝑈1 ,𝐹𝑃,𝑃𝑈𝑖 VOCS |≡ V |≡ 𝑍𝑈1 ,𝐹𝑃,𝑃𝑈𝑖
VOCS|≡ 𝑍𝑈1 ,𝐹𝑃,𝑃𝑈𝑖

According to M2, we get
UVi

V7: V ◃({TSCS1, Di

VOCS})ssk

According to P3, and Rule 1, we derive the following
𝑉|≡V 𝑠𝑠𝑘 VOCS ,V ⊲(TS𝐶𝑆1 ,VOCS 𝑈𝑉𝑖 Di) 𝑉 𝑠𝑠𝑘 𝑉𝑂𝐶𝑆
𝑉|≡VOCS |∼ (TS𝐶𝑆1 ,VOCS 𝑈𝑉𝑖 Di)

V8

According to P6 and rule 3, we derive the following
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V9:

𝑉|≡#(TS𝐶𝑆1 )
𝑉|≡#(TS𝐶𝑆1 ,VOCS 𝑈𝑉𝑖 Di)

According to P4, P9 and rule 2, we derive the following
V10:
𝑉|≡#(TS𝐶𝑆1 ,VOCS 𝑈𝑉𝑖 Di),V|≡VOCS~TS𝐶𝑆1 ,VOCS 𝑈𝑉𝑖 Di)
𝑉|≡VOCS|≡(TS𝐶𝑆1 ,VOCS 𝑈𝑉𝑖 Di)

According to V10, P10, and rule 4, we derive the following:

V11:

𝑉 |VOCS|⇒ 𝑈𝑉𝑖 ,V |≡ VOCS|≡ 𝑈𝑉𝑖
𝑉|≡ 𝑈𝑉𝑖

Based on P7, V4, we can derive

ZU1

V12: VOCS|≡ V |≡ (V

VOCS) (Goal 1_1)

Based on P8, V5, V6 and V12, we derive the following

ZU1

V13: VOCS|≡ (V and Di

VOCS)

(Goal 1_2)

Based on P9, V10, we can der
UVi

V14: V|≡ VOCS |≡ (V

VOCS) (Goal 2_1)

Based on P10, V11, and V14, we derive the following

UVi

V15: V|≡ (V

VOCS)
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(Goal 2_1)

The above logic proves that the proposed protocol achieves Goals 1.1 to 1.2 and
2.1 to 2.2 successfully. In other words, the proposed protocol achieves mutual
authentication between Di and VOCS. In summary, by achieving all the goals mentioned
above, we demonstrate the validity of the proposed protocol.
6.7.1.2

Informal security analysis

6.7.1.2.1

Security properties assessment

The following section presents a detailed security analysis of the security
properties of the proposed scheme. It demonstrates how the proposed scheme satisfies the
security requirements for mutual authentication, session key agreement and resists
various kinds of known attacks. Then, a comparison with other related schemes is
presented.
6.7.1.2.1.1

Protocol 1: V- TA mutual authentication

6.7.1.2.1.1.1

Mutual authentication

V and TA authenticate each other during the mutual authentication by generating
and verifying the correctness X2, X4Y3, Y6, and generating the ssk. An adversary can’t
generate VTA = H (TAIDR || MSKTA || VIDR||RTA) without knowing the VIDR of V, the
TAIDR, MSKTA of the TA and the PUF response (RTA) of the TA. Furthermore, the
adversary will not be able to generate X2 without having VTA, RVVi1 VTA1, and VIDR and
can’t generate X4 without having VIDR, RVVi2 and CHXxi+1. The generation of CHXxi+1
requires the generation of the PUF response (Ri) that can be generated only by V.
Additionally, the adversary cannot generate Y3 without having C, Y1, RVTA1, and RVVi1’.
Y1 consists of both VTA1’ and OTPVi. Furthermore, the adversary can’t generate Y6
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without having RVTA2, Ri, RVvi2, C, and OTPVi. In summary, VTA1’, OTPVi, CHXxi are
considered secured parameters between V and TA. Ri is a value that can only be
generated by V and RTA can only be generated by the TA. As a result, the proposed
scheme can achieve mutual authentication between V and TA.
6.7.1.2.1.1.2

Session key agreement and forward/backward security

After completing the mutual authentication phase, V and the TA establish the
shared secret key ssk. The ssk is a combination of RVVi1, RVVi2, RVTA1, and Ri. The ssk
will be generated locally ssk = H (RVVi1 || RVVi2 || RVTA1 ||Ri). The secrecy of the ssk
depends on the secrecy of RVVi1, RVVi2, RVTA1, and Ri. Because all those parameters are
randomly selected for every new authentication session, the disclosed ssk will not cause
the compromise of any future ssk. The forward/backward security property's objective is
to ensure that any past or future shared secret keys will not be affected when any ssk is
exposed. Even if an adversary obtains ssk of a session, he/she can’t compute any of the
past. Future shared secret keys by using the disclosed ssk because the ssk is protected by:
first, the uniqueness of the Ri where each CRP will be used only one time. The
corresponding responses can’t be replicated or predicted because they are unique for each
V because of the nature of the PUF. Second: the randomization of the RVVi1, RVVi2, and
RVTA1. As a result, the proposed scheme achieves the security of ssk.
6.7.1.2.1.1.3

Anonymity unlinkability and untraceability properties

Anonymity is of paramount importance to the IoVs. The identities of the vehicles
need to be hidden to avoid profiling. For fully protected V privacy, strong anonymity
with unlinkability is required. The V’s real identity VIDR is not transmitted during all
phases in clear text format in the proposed protocol. Therefore, even if the adversary
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eavesdrops on all communication messages, it is impossible to obtain the real identity of
Vi. In addition, the new alias ID of the vehicle VIDAnew = H (C|| VIDA) cannot be
regenerated without knowledge of C. Moreover, because C is fresh in each session, the
attacker cannot link any two different VIDAnew’s to the same Vi. By using a new VIDAnew
for each authentication session, the adversary will not be able to decide whether these
authentication messages are from the same Vi or not. This means that Vi cannot be linked
to different sessions. Consequently, the proposed protocol provides anonymity and
unlinkability, and the adversary cannot trace the vehicles by intercepting messages.
6.7.1.2.1.1.4

Database attack

Suppose any Vi or the TA is compromised, and the adversary can steal VTA,
VIDR CHX, and the OTP from the Vi’s or the TA’s database to impersonate the vehicle
or the TA. In that case, the fake vehicle or the fake TA will fail the CRP verification
process.
6.7.1.2.1.1.5

Brute force attack

The shared secret key ssk is generated locally by both the vehicle and the TA
using the random secret parameters RVN1, RVN2, RVMG1, and Ri. Because this ssk
depends on random parameters, the adversary cannot obtain it from the protocol. The
probability of guessing is so negligible that the adversary will fail to guess the shared
secret key's correct parameters, given that this ssk changes in every session.
6.7.1.2.1.1.6

Replay attack

To avoid the replay attack where an adversary tries to delay or repeat previously
transmitted packets, the proposed protocol uses fresh nonce values and TS each time in
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each message during the authentication process. The sender node generates the timestamp
TS and then inserts the transmitted message in an encrypted format to ensure the attacker
cannot replace it. Before trusting the freshness of the message, the receiver first verifies
the timeliness of the timestamp. If the set threshold ΔT is exceeded, the receiver will
reject the request and terminate the current session. If it is within ΔT, the receiver will
calculate the verification message based on the received timestamp and the other message
parameters to verify if it is equal to the received message. If they are not equal, the
receiver will still reject the current session request. Therefore, if an adversary replays an
intercepted message from the previous session, the other party will detect that the
message is outdated and immediately terminate the session. Therefore, the protocol can
be protected from replay. On another side, each CRP of the V is used only one time to
ensure security against replay attacks. Hence, the proposed protocol protects against the
replay attack
6.7.1.2.1.1.6

Eavesdropping attack

During the authentication phase, the adversary can intercept messages transmitted
between Vi and the TA. All the intercepted messages will be useless because they are
sent in an encrypted format using XOR and a one-way hash function. For the attacker to
verify the received parameters, he/she needs to know the OTP, CHX, VTA, VIDR, TAIDR,
MSKTA, RTA, and Ri, which are either composed of random values or are protected and
out of the adversary's reach. The only two parameters that are sent in clear text are the
Alias identities and session ID. The Alias identities and the session ID do not pose any
threat because this information is constructed from random parameters that change in
every session. The adversary will not be able to link the message to a particular device
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because the proposed protocol uses alias identities that change in every session.
Therefore, the proposed protocol protects against eavesdropping attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.1.7

Impersonation attack

In this attack, when the intruder eavesdrops on the messages transmitted from Vi
to TA or vice versa, he/she can use the intercepted information for malicious actions,
such as impersonating the vehicle or the TA and sending fabricated messages.
6.7.1.2.1.1.7.1 TA impersonation
According to the authentication phase in the proposed protocol, if an adversary
wants to impersonate to be the TA, he/she needs to construct a message M2 <TAIDA, SID,
TSTA1, C’, Y2, Y3>. To construct this message, the adversary needs to have MSKTA, VIDR,
RTA, TAIDR, and the OTPvi, which are considered to be well protected, and the adversary
can’t compute the PUF response (RTA) of the TA. Also, for the adversary to construct M4
< TAIDA, TSTA2, Y5, Y6>, he/she needs to be aware of the values of Ri,CHXx, and the
CHXx+1, which are well protected too. Therefore, the message sent by the adversary
cannot pass the verification of V, so the vehicle will immediately terminate the session
with the TA. Consequently, the proposed protocol can resist TA impersonation attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.1.7.2 Vehicle impersonation
To impersonate the vehicle, an adversary should intercept the messages
exchanged in the previous sessions. This attack will fail for numerous reasons. First, the
Alias ID of the vehicle changes every authentication session. Second, due to PUF that is
built into the vehicle and the characteristics of PUF, the adversary will not be able to
generate legitimate responses. Because the PUF responses are unique for each device,
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the adversary will not be able to replicate the response even if he/she has the challenge.
Third, if an adversary wants to impersonate the vehicle, he/she needs to construct a
message M1<VIDA, TSVi, X1, X2>. In order to construct M1, the adversary needs to know
VTA1, and the VIDR, which are considered secured parameters and never be transmitted in
clear text format. Also, for the adversary to construct M3 < VIDA, TSVi2, X4, X5>., he/she
needs to have R, ChX, and the CHX+1, which are well-protected. Furthermore, the
message is sent in an encrypted format using The Xor function and the one-way hash
function of the message. Finally, the adversary cannot derive the secret values RVvi1,
RVvi2, RVTA1, RVTA2 to calculate the session key. Thus, our protocol protects against the
impersonation attack.
From another perspective, even if the adversary succeeded in compromising a
vehicle, the adversary’s further attacks using the compromised vehicle only affect the
communication related to that vehicle. Because each vehicle has its own secret key, the
adversary can’t derive other non-compromised vehicles’ keys without knowing those
vehicles' random information. Therefore, further attacks will not affect other
communications. As a result, the proposed scheme is resistant to vehicle impersonation
attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.1.8

Man-in-the-middle attack

Assuming that M1 < VIDA, TSVi1, X1, and X2 > has been tampered by an adversary
M1* < VIDA*, TSVi1*, X1*, X2*>. After receiving the message, the adversary will first need
to have VTA1, which is a secure parameter and requires the PUF response (RTA) of the TA
to compute X1. Also, the adversary needs the VTA1 and VIDR the to calculate X2 < H
(VIDR || RVvi1 || VTA1|| TSVi1) >. Without all secret parameters, the adversary will not
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generate a legitimate X2; if the message has been tampered with, the vehicle is considered
illegal, and the TA will terminate the session immediately.
Suppose the message M2 < TAIDA, SID, TSTA1, C’, Y2, Y3 > has been tampered
with an adversary and sent to V M2* < TAIDA*, SID*, TSTA1*, C’*, Y2*, Y3 *>. After
receiving the message, the adversary will first need to compute VTA1< H (MSKTA || VIDR ||
TAIDR|| RTA > using its master secret key, the vehicle's real identity of the trusted
authority, and the PUF response of the TA. Because these four parameters are secret and
are only known to the TA, the adversary will not be able to correctly calculate VTA.
Consequently, it will be impossible to calculate the valid Y3 to pass the vehicle
verification.
As for the message M3 < VIDA, TSVi2, X3, X4 > suppose an adversary tempered the
message M3. Because each vehicle has a PUF chip and each chip is unique, the adversary
will not be able to replicate or predict the response (Ri) of the real vehicle. Consequently,
the adversary will not generate R and calculate the Chained hash PUF (CHXx+1).
Therefore, the adversary will not be able to construct a generate X3 and X4 and send a
legitimate message to the TA that can pass the TA’s vehicle authenticate. So, o after
receiving the message M3* and verifying it, TA will terminate the session with the
vehicle. Finally, assume M4 < TAIDA, TSTA2, Y5, Y6 > was tempered by an adversary M4*
< TAIDA*, TSTA2*, Y5*, Y6 *>. Because the adversary does have Ri, he/she will not be able
to construct Y4. In summary, the proposed protocol can resist all message modification
attacks. The proposed protocol can resist all message modification attacks.
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6.7.1.2.1.1.9

Modeling attacks

It is an attack where the adversary collects a large number PUF CRPs and uses a
regression algorithm to build a model and predict responses for new challenges. All the
challenges and the responses are transferred in an encrypted format by using a one-way
hash function. Therefore, the adversary will not be able to collect enough useful CRPs to
build a model and predict responses to new challenges.
6.7.1.2.1.1.10 Physical attack
According to the characteristics of PUF, any change or damage on the device with
built-in PUF will render the PUF useless. Therefore, the physical attacks cannot obtain
any useful information. We can conclude that the proposed protocol can ensure the
physical security of the system.
6.7.1.2.1.1.11 Device counterfeit/cloning
Both the TA and vehicle are authenticated using the PUF. PUF responses are
treated as hardware fingerprints that cannot be duplicated or cloned. Therefore, using the
PUF, the vehicle and the TA cannot be cloned.
6.7.1.2.1.1.12 Session key agreement
After confirming the identity of both the vehicle and the TA, each side will
generate the session key ssk = H (Ri || RVvi1 || RVTA2’ || (RVvi2 || RV’TA1). In summary,
the session key between V and TA is established in the proposed protocol.
6.7.1.2.1.2

Protocol 2: Vehicle-Driver-VOCS authentication

6.7.1.2.1.2.1

Phase 1: V- VOCS mutual authentication
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6.7.1.2.1.2.1.1

Mutual authentication

V and the VOCS authenticate each other during the mutual authentication by
generating verifying the correctness VX3, VX8, CSY3. An adversary cannot prepare the
authentication request message without having VCS1and VCS2 that are known only by the
vehicle. Therefore, the adversary will not generate VX3 without having VIDR, VCS1,
OTTvi, which are considered secure parameters. The adversary also cannot generate VX8
without having Ri that can be generated only by V. Additionally, the adversary cannot
generate CSY3 without computing VCS1 = H (VOCSIDR || MSKVOCS || VIDR||RCS) and
VCS2= H (VCS1 || VTID) because VOCSIDR, MSKVOCS, and VTID are only known to the
VOCS. The RCS can only be generated by the VOCS. In summary, VCS2 and VCS2 are
considered secure parameters that are only known by the vehicle and need to be
computed by the VOCS. OTT is regarded as a secure parameter between V and VOCS.
Ri and Ri+1 are values that V can only generate. RCS is a value that can be generated only
by VOCS. As a result, the proposed scheme can achieve mutual authentication between
V and VOCS.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.2

Session key agreement and forward/backward security

After completing the mutual authentication phase, the shared secret key ssk is
established between V and the VOCS. The ssk is a combination of RVVi1, RVVi2, RVCS1,
and Ri. The ssk will be generated locally ssk = H (RVVi1 || RVVi2 || RVCS1 ||Ri). The
secrecy of the ssk depends on the secrecy of RVVi1, RVVi2, RVCS1, and Ri. Because all
those parameters are randomly selected for every new authentication session, the
disclosed ssk will not cause the compromise of any future ssk. The forward/backward
security property's objective is to ensure that any past or future shared secret keys will not
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be affected when any ssk is exposed. Even if an adversary obtains ssk of a session, he/she
cannot compute any of the past or future shared secret keys. The ssk keys are protected
by: (1) uniqueness of the Ri where each CRP will be used only one time, and (2) the
randomization of RVVi1, RVVi2, and RVVOCS1. As a result, the proposed scheme achieves
the security of ssk.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.3

Anonymity unlinkability, and untraceability properties

Anonymity is essential to protect user privacy and security. The identities of the
vehicles need to be hidden to avoid profiling. For fully protected V privacy, strong
anonymity with unlinkability is required. In the proposed protocol, the V’s real identity
VIDR is not transmitted during all phases in clear text format. Therefore, even if the
adversary eavesdrops on all communication messages, it is impossible to obtain the real
identity of Vi. In addition, the new alias ID of the vehicle VIDAnew = H (VIDA || C|| OTT).
Moreover, because C and OTT are fresh in each session, the attacker cannot link any two
different VIDAnew’s to the same Vi. By using a new VIDAnew for each authentication
session, the adversary will not be able to decide whether these authentication messages
are from the same Vi or not. This means that Vi cannot be linked to different sessions.
Consequently, the proposed protocol provides anonymity and unlinkability, and the
adversary cannot trace the vehicles by intercepting messages.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.4

Session key security

The shared secret key ssk is generated locally by both the vehicle and the VOCS
using the random secret parameters RVV1, RVV2, RVCS1, and Ri where ssk = H (RVV1||
RVV2|| RVCS1|| Ri). Because the ssk depends on random parameters, the adversary cannot
obtain it from the protocol because the four random parameters are transferred in an
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encrypted format. Also, the Ri cannot be predicted or replicated because it is unique per
PUF chip. The probability of guessing it is so negligible that the adversary will fail to
guess the shared secret key's correct parameters, given that this ssk changes in every
session. Thus, the proposed protocol is secure to session key disclosure attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.5

Replay attack

During the replay attack, the adversary may attempt to delay or repeat previously
transmitted authentication messages; the proposed protocol uses fresh nonce values and
TS each time in each message during the authentication process. The sender node
generates the timestamp TS and is then inserted in the transmitted message to ensure the
attacker cannot replace it. Before trusting the freshness of the message, the receiver first
verifies the timeliness of the timestamp. If the set threshold ΔT is exceeded, the receiver
will reject the request and terminate the current session. If it is within ΔT, the receiver
will calculate the verification message based on the received timestamp and the other
message parameters to verify if it is equal to the received message. If they are not equal,
the receiver will still reject the current session request. Therefore, if an adversary replays
an intercepted message from the previous session, the other party will detect that the
message is outdated and immediately terminate the session. Therefore, the protocol is
protected from replay. On another side, each CRP is used only one time to ensure
security against replay attacks. Hence, the protocol is protected against replay attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.6

Eavesdropping attack

During the authentication phase, the adversary can intercept messages transmitted
between Vi and the VOCS. All the intercepted messages will be useless because they are
sent in an encrypted format using XOR and a one-way hash function. For the attacker to
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verify the received parameters, he/she needs to know the OTT, VCS1, VCS2, VIDR,
VOCSIDR, MSKVOCS, Ri, RCS, and C that are either composed of random values or are
protected and out of the adversary's reach. The only two parameters that are sent in clear
text are the Alias identities and session ID. The Alias identities and the session ID do not
pose any threat because this information is constructed from random parameters that
change in every session. The adversary will not be able to link the message to a particular
device because the proposed protocol uses alias identities that change in every session.
Therefore, the proposed protocol protects against eavesdropping attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.7

Impersonation attack

In this attack, the adversary eavesdrops on the messages transmitted from Vi to
VOCS or vice versa, he/she can use the intercepted information and attempts to
masquerade to conduct malicious actions, such as impersonating the vehicle or the VOCS
and sending fabricated messages.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.7.1

VOCS impersonation

According to the authentication phase in the proposed protocol, if an adversary
wants to impersonate to be the VOCS, he/she needs to construct a message M2 <
VOCSIDA, SID, TSVi1, CSY2, CV, CSY3>. The adversary needs to have MSKVOCS,
VIDR, VTID, and the OTT, which are well-protected to construct this message. Also, due
to PUF that is built into the VOCS and the characteristics of PUF, the adversary will not
be able to generate a legitimate RCS response. Therefore, the message sent by the
adversary cannot pass the verification of V, so the vehicle will immediately terminate the
session with the VOCS. Consequently, the proposed protocol can resist VOCS
impersonation attacks.
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6.7.1.2.1.2.1.7.2

Vehicle impersonation

To impersonate the vehicle, an adversary should intercept the messages
exchanged in the previous sessions. This attack will fail for numerous reasons. First, the
Alias ID of the vehicle changes every authentication session. Second, due to PUF that is
built into the vehicle and the characteristics of PUF, the adversary will not be able to
generate legitimate responses. Because the PUF responses are unique for each device,
the adversary will not be able to replicate the response even if he/she has the challenge.
Third, if an adversary wants to impersonate the vehicle, he/she needs to construct a
message M1 < VIDA, TSVi1, VX2, VX3 >. To construct M1, the adversary needs to have
VCS1, VCS2, VIDR, and OTT well-protected. Also, M3 < VIDA, TSVi2, VX5, VX6, VX7,
VX8>. To construct this message, the adversary needs to have Ri. The adversary will not
be able to generate Ri due to the PUF characteristics. Furthermore, all messages are sent
in an encrypted format using the XOR function and the one-way hash function. Thus, our
protocol protects against the impersonation attack.
From another perspective, even if the adversary succeeded in compromising a
vehicle, the adversary’s further attacks using the compromised vehicle only affect the
communication related to that vehicle. Because each vehicle has its own secret keys, the
adversary can’t derive other non-compromised vehicles’ keys without knowing those
vehicles' random information. Therefore, further attacks will not affect other
communications. As a result, the proposed scheme is resistant to vehicle impersonation
attacks.
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6.7.1.2.1.2.1.8

Data modification attacks

Assuming that M1 < VIDA, TSVi1, VX2, VX3 > has been tampered by an adversary
M1* < VIDA*, TSVi1*, VX2*, VX3* >. After receiving the message, the adversary will first
need to have VCS1, VCS2, and OTTP, which are secure parameters to compute VX1 < H
(VCS2 || OTT)> and VX2 < VX1 ⊕ RVVi1>. Furthermore, without having all secret
parameters, the adversary will not be able to generate a legitimate VX3 < H (VIDR|| VCS1||
TSVi1 || RVVi1|| OTT)) >. If the message has been tampered with, the vehicle is considered
illegal, and the session will be terminated immediately by the VOCS.
Now suppose the message M2 < VOCSIDA, SID, TSVOCS1, CSY2, CV, CSY3> has
been tampered by an adversary and sent to V M2* < VOCSIDA*, SID*, TSVOCS*, CSY2*,
CV*, CSY3* >. After receiving the message, the adversary will first need to compute VCS1
< H (VOCSIDR || MSKVOCS || VIDR||RCS > and VCS2 <H (VCS1 || VTID > using its master
secret key (MSKVOCS), the real identity of the vehicle (VIDR), the real identity of the
VOCS (VOCSIDR), the PUF response of VOCS(RCS), and the vehicle type ID(VTID).
Because these parameters are secret and are only known to the VOCS, the adversary will
not correctly calculate VCS1 and VCS2. Also, the adversary will not be able to generate RCS
and to get OTT. Consequently, it will be impossible to calculate a valid CV. Finally,
without having all the above-mentioned secret parameters, the adversary will not
compute CSY3 to pass the vehicle verification.
As for the message M3 < VIDA, TSVi2, VX5, VX6, VX7, VX8> suppose the message
M3 was tampered with by an adversary. Because each vehicle has a PUF chip and each
chip is unique, the adversary will not be able to replicate or predict the response (Ri) of
the real vehicle. Consequently, the adversary will not be able to generate R and compute
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VX4. Therefore, the adversary will not be able to construct a valid VX8 and send a
legitimate message to the VOCS that can pass the VOCS’s vehicle authenticate. So, after
receiving the message M3* and verifying it, VOCS will terminate the session with the
vehicle. In summary, the proposed protocol can resist all message modification attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.9

Modeling attacks

It is an attack where the adversary collects a large number PUF CRPs and uses a
regression algorithm to build a model and predict responses for new challenges. All the
challenges and the responses are transferred in an encrypted format by using a one-way
hash function. Therefore, the adversary will not collect enough useful CRPs to build a
model and predict responses to new challenges.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.10

Physical attack

According to the characteristics of PUF, any change or damage on the device with
built-in PUF will render the PUF useless. Therefore, the physical attacks cannot obtain
any useful information. We can conclude that the proposed protocol can ensure the
physical security of the system.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.11

Device counterfeit/cloning

Both the vehicle and the VOCS are authenticated using the PUF. PUF responses
are treated as hardware fingerprints that cannot be duplicated or cloned. Therefore, by
the use of the PUF, the vehicle and the VOCS cannot be cloned.
6.7.1.2.1.2.1.12

Session key agreement

At the end of the authentication phase, after confirming the identity of both the
vehicle and the VOCS, each side will generate the session key ssk =H (Ri|| RVvi1
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RVCS1||RVvi2) In summary, the session keys between V and VOCS is established in the
proposed protocol.

6.7.1.2.1.2.2
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.1

Phase 2: Driver -VOCS mutual authentication
Mutual authentication

After completing the mutual authentication between V and VOCS completed, the
mutual authentication between the user (U) and the VOCS will be started with the help of
the V. User’s authentication will use a three-factor authentication process by using the
user’s password and biometrics combined with the PUF of V. U and the VOCS
authenticate each other during the mutual authentication by verifying the correctness DV3
and UVi. U will insert his/her username and password using the vehicle’s touch screen
and his/her fingerprint using the vehicle’s fingerprint scanner. The collected data will be
sent to the vehicle OBU through a secure channel. V will generate a timestamp,
calculates U1< (H (EID||Ri ||VIDR|| OTT)>, and computes ZU1<H (FP|| PUi>. Then, V
calculates DV1 and DV2. Then, V uses its shared secret key with the VOCS (ssk) to
encrypt the identity and the verification message before sending it to the VOCS.
Once the VOCS receives the message, it will use the ssk to decrypt the received
message. Then, VOCS will use the user ID and the vehicle ID to retrieve Ri, OTT, and
VIDR from its database, thereby calculating the verification message DV2* =< H (VIDR
||TSvi1|| ZU1 || U1)> to authenticate U’s identity. Only the party with the secret values can
retrieve ZU1 from Dv1. Once the VOCS verify and authenticate the user, it will compute
UVi < H (Ri|| TSVocs1|| ZU1|| OTT)> and encrypt the verification message using its ssk
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with the vehicle. When the vehicle receives the message, it will decrypt it using ssk and
calculate the verification message UVi* < H (Ri|| TSVocs1|| ZU1|| OTT)> to authenticate
VOCS’s identity. So, by verifying the correctness of UVi*, U can confirm the identity of
VOCS. Thus, U and VOCS complete the mutual authentication.
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.2

Resisting offline password guessing attacks

The password in the proposed protocol is included in ZU1 = H (FP|| PUi) and DV1
= ZU1 ⊕ U1. U1< (H (EID||Ri || VIDR||OTT)>. The EID is a fixed secret parameter stored
on the VOCS. The OTT is a secret parameter that is dynamically changing every
authentication session. Furthermore, Ri, which is a PUF response, cannot be obtained
and can’t be predicted by the adversary due to the unique nature of PUF. Consequently,
U1 cannot be calculated to complete the rest of the computation process.
Moreover, the DV2 is protected by the ssk between the vehicle and the VOCS. In
summary, the user’s password has two shields of protection through the xor function and
is encrypted by the ssk. Therefore, the adversary cannot guess the password of the user.
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.3

Anonymity unlinkability, and untraceability properties

Anonymity is essential to protect user privacy and security. The identity of the
user needs to be hidden to avoid profiling. The proposed protocol implements strong
anonymity with unlinkability to protect user’s privacy. The user's real identity (EID) is
transferred in hash and encrypted format using the ssk. Therefore, even if the adversary
eavesdrops on all communication messages, it is impossible to obtain the user's EID or
any other related data. Consequently, the proposed protocol provides anonymity and
unlinkability, and the adversary cannot trace the user by intercepting messages.
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6.7.1.2.1.2.2.4

Replay attack

The proposed protocol uses fresh values and TS each time in each message during
the authentication process. The vehicle generates the timestamp TS and is then inserted in
the transmitted message to ensure the adversary cannot replace it. Before trusting the
freshness of the message, the receiver first verifies the timeliness of the timestamp. If the
set threshold ΔT is exceeded, the receiver will reject the request and terminate the current
session. If it is within ΔT, the receiver will calculate the verification message based on
the received timestamp and the other message parameters to verify if it is equal to the
received message. If they are not equal, the receiver will still reject the current session
request. Therefore, if an adversary replays an intercepted message from the previous
session, the other party will detect that the message is outdated and immediately
terminate the session. Therefore, the protocol is protected from replay. On another side,
each CRP and OTT are used only one time to ensure security against replay attacks.
Hence, our protocol protects against replay attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.5

Eavesdropping attack

During the authentication phase, the adversary can intercept messages transmitted
between Vi and the VOCS. All the intercepted messages will be useless because all of
them are sent in an encrypted format using the shared secret key (ssk) between Vi and the
VOCS. For the attacker to decrypt the message, he/she needs to guess the ssk that is fresh
for every authentication session and is assumed to be protected and out of the adversary's
reach. The only two parameters that are sent in clear text are the Alias identities and
session ID. The Alias identities and the session ID do not pose any threat because this
information is constructed from random parameters that change in every session. The
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adversary will not be able to link the message to a particular user or vehicle because the
proposed protocol uses alias identities that change in every session. Therefore, the
proposed protocol protects against eavesdropping attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.6

Impersonation attack

In this attack, the adversary eavesdrops on the messages transmitted from Vi to
VOCS or vice versa. He/she can use the intercepted information and attempts to
masquerade to conduct malicious actions, such as impersonating the user, vehicle, or the
VOCS and sending fabricated messages.
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.6.1

Driver impersonation

According to the authentication phase, if the adversary wants to impersonate to be
the user (U), he/she needs to construct a message M1 =< VIDA, UI, {TSVi1, DV1, DV2} ssk >
to pass the VOCS’s verification. The proposed protocol does not require storing a user’s
data either on a user's personal device or the vehicle. Because the adversary can’t get the
user’s biometric or the user’s password from the user side and can’t get the Ri, OTT, or
the VIDR from the vehicle side, he/she will not be able to construct a valid U1 = < H
(EID||Ri || VIDR||OTT)>, DV1 = < ZU1 ⊕ U1>, and DV2 < H (VIDR || TSvi1|| ZU1 || U1)>.
Additionally, the adversary will not be able to predict the ssk that will be used to encrypt
the user’s authentication request message. Therefore, the adversary cannot impersonate
the user.
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.6.2

VOCS impersonation

According to the authentication phase in the proposed protocol, if an adversary
wants to impersonate to be the VOCS, he/she needs to construct a message M2 <
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(VOCSIDA, TSVocs1, UVi} ssk) >. To construct this message, the adversary needs to have
OTT, TSCS1, ZU1, and Ri, which are considered to be well protected. Also, the adversary
needs to generate the PUF response (RCS), which is considered to be impossible due to
the nature of the PUF that can’t be replicated or predicted. Furthermore, the adversary
needs to know the ssk to encrypt the message before sending it out. Therefore, the
message sent by the adversary cannot pass the verification of the user’s vehicle, so the
vehicle will immediately terminate the user’s authentication session with the VOCS.
Consequently, the proposed protocol can resist VOCS impersonation attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.6.3

Vehicle impersonation

Due to the PUF nature, the adversary can’t obtain the response or even knows the
“challenge” that the vehicle received from the VOCS during their authentication process.
Also, if the adversary wants to impersonate the vehicle, he/she needs to know the OTT,
the VIDR, and the ssk to encrypt the message before sending it to the VOCS. In fact, the
adversary cannot derive the secret values, the session key (ssk) shared with Vi cannot be
generated, nor can message M1 < VIDA, UI, {TSVi1, DV1, DV2} ssk > be generated validly to
communicate with VOCS. The protocol can resist impersonation attacks from the
vehicle.
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.7

Data modification attacks

Assuming that M1 < VIDA, UI, {TSVi1, DV1, DV2} ssk > has been tampered with an
adversary M1* < VIDA*, UI* {, TSVi1*, DV1*, DV2*} ssk >. After receiving the message, the
adversary will first need to have the ssk to decrypt the message. Also, the adversary needs
to know the OTT, Ri, EID, and the VIDR, which are considered secure parameters to
compute U1 < H (EID||VIDR || Ri || OTT)>. Additionally, the adversary needs to have the
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user’s username, password, RCS, and fingerprint to construct ZU1 and DV1. Furthermore,
without having all secret parameters, the adversary will not be able to generate a
legitimate DV2 < H (VIDR || TSvi1|| ZU1 || U1)>> that is, if the message has tampered with,
the vehicle is considered to be illegal. The session will be terminated immediately by the
VOCS.
Now suppose the message M2 < VOCSIDA, SID*, TSVocs1, UVi} ssk > has been
tampered with an adversary and sent to V M2* < VOCSIDA*, SID* , TSVocs1* , UVi*}ssk* >.
After receiving the message, the adversary will first need to have ssk to decrypt the
message. The ssk is assumed to be protected and secure. Then the adversary needs to
compute U1 < H (EID||VIDR || Ri || OTT)> Because these parameters are secret and are
only known to VOCS and the vehicle, the adversary will not correctly calculate U1. Also,
it is impossible to replicate the user’s fingerprint. Finally, without having all the abovementioned secret parameters, the adversary will not be able to compute UVi to pass the
vehicle verification. In summary, the proposed protocol can resist all message
modification attacks.
6.7.1.2.1.2.2.8

Biometric privacy protection

In the proposed protocol, the user biometric samples are processed on the cloud
side. There is no user biometric data stored or maintained on any user-related device or
on the vehicle. The biometric templates of the continuous biometric are stored on the
VOCS encrypted by ZU1. The user biometric is transferred in encrypted format using
both the xor function and the ssk between the Vi and the VOCS. This information does
not endanger biometric privacy, even if it is leaked. Therefore, the proposed protocol
supports biometric privacy protection.
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6.7.1.2.1.2.2.9

Three-factor security

The proposed protocol employs three factors to achieve user authentication of the
user: biometric, password, and PUF response. Additionally, the proposed protocol
employs continuous biometric authentication that is considered another layer of ongoing
user authentication.
6.7.1.2.2

Comparison of security features

This section compares the proposed scheme security features with other related
authentication schemes from the literature [156],[155],[154],[150], and [157] Table 30
summarizes the comparison results of the proposed protocol with existing works against
the imperative security threats and accomplishes diverse security features. From table 30,
we can observe that the presented schemes in the literature satisfy most of the security
properties. However, none of them protects against vehicle sensors counterfeiting. All of
them depend on using CRPs that are generated outside the manufacturing process, so it
does not provide any means to verify the originality of the sensors. Also, protocol [150]
use the same alias ID for both the vehicle and RSU in every authentication session. This,
in turn, can lead to vehicle traceability and linkability.
Furthermore, most of the proposed protocols [156, 155, 150, 157] implement
computationally expensive cryptographic solutions such as elliptic curve cryptographic
system (ECC) and fuzzy extractors to satisfy the security properties. Furthermore, the
protocols [156,155, 150] depend on mobile devices and smart cards to authenticate users.
The use of smart cards makes the user’s sensitive data subject to being stolen or subject
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to physical attacks that can corrupt the whole system. Moreover, none of the presented
protocols introduced using continuous biometrics to regularly verify the user’s identity to
establish ongoing trust and ensure that the received data is coming from the same user
initially authenticated.
Table 30: Security feature comparison of the proposed scheme with other related mutual
authentication and key agreement schemes.
Security
Property

Proposed
V-TA

Proposed
V-DVOCS

[156]

[155]

[154]

[150]

[157]

Mutual
Authenticatio
n

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Replay attack

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Perfect
forward/back
ward secrecy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Anonymity
and
untraceability

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Resisting
offline
password
guessing
attacks

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NA

Yes

NA

Resisting Data Yes
Modification
attacks

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Resilience
Yes
against
TA/VOCS
impersonation
attacks

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Resilience
against

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes
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vehicle
impersonation
attacks
Resilience
Yes
against User
impersonation
attacks

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NA

NA

Physical and
cloning
attacks

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Biometric
privacy
protection

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Na

Na

Resisting
Vehicle
counterfeiting

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Session key
agreement

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

As presented in table 30, the proposed scheme supports all the essential security
features: First, the proposed scheme does not require any secret key storage or secret key
sharing over the network. Second, all secret keys are computed locally on all the
communicating parties. Third, in the proposed scheme, the vehicles use their one-time
alias identity for each authentication session. Therefore, it will be difficult for an outside
adversary to comprehend the activities of the vehicle. Fourth, the proposed scheme uses
the PUF to protect the vehicles and VOCS against counterfeiting. Fifth, the proposed
scheme uses both static and continuous biometric for user authentication to ensure that
the received data belongs to the correct driver during the entire session.
From table 30, we can conclude that the proposed scheme can support all the
desired security properties, which are essential for IoV ecosystem security.
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6.7.2

Performance Analysis
In this section, we present a performance analysis of the proposed scheme. The

performance analysis evaluates the storage requirements. Also, we analyze the presented
scheme's overhead and efficiency in terms of computational complexity and
communication cost and compare its computational complexity and communication cost
with the most relevant protocols in the literature proposed by [150], [154], [155] [156],
and [157].
6.7.2.1

Storage requirements

Table 31: Storage cost of our scheme
Node

Storage cost (in bits)

V

128 + 8 * 3 +256 * 6= 1688 b

TA

128 * 2 + 3 * 8 +2 * 256 = 792 b

VOCS

128 * 3 + 8 * 5 + 160 + 256 * 2 = 1096 b

In the proposed scheme, each vehicle must store its real identity VIDR alias
identity VIDA, alias identities of VOCSIDA and TAIDA, authentication parameters VTA1,
VCS1, and VCS23, Chained hash CHX, one-time password OTP, and one-time token
(OTT). We use SHA-1 and SHA-2 as two examples of hash function, and the output of
SHA-1 is 128 or 160 bits and SHA-2 is 256 bits. By applying these settings, we obtain
|VIDA | = 128, |VOCSIDA| = |TAIDA| = | VIDR | = 8 bits, and |OTP| = |OTT| = | VTA1 | = VCS1
| = | VCS2 | CHX = 256 bits. Meanwhile, TA is required to store the tuple VIDA, VIDR,
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TAIDA, TAIDR, OTP, and CHX. By applying these settings, we obtain |VIDA | = 128 bits,
|TAIDA| = | VIDR | = | TAIDR | = 8 bits, |OTP| = |CHX| = 256 bits, and CTA=128 bit. Finally,
VOCS is required to store the tuple VIDA, VIDR, VOCSIDA, VOCSIDR, EID, TID, Ui, OTT,
ZU2 and,BPUi.

By applying these settings, we obtain |VIDA |= |Ui| = 128 bits, |VOCSIDA| =

|VOCSIDR| =| VIDR |= |EID| = |TID | = 8 bits, |BPUi| = 160 bits, Ccs = 128 bits, and |OTT| = |
ZU2| = 256 bits.
6.7.2.2

Computational complexity analysis
We compare the computation cost of the proposed scheme with other related

schemes [150], [154], [155], [156], and [157]. we do not consider XOR operations for
computational cost analysis because the time for executing a bitwise XOR operation is
negligible. To analyze the performance of the proposed scheme with respect to other
presented protocols in the literature, we conduct simulations of the cryptographic
operations using dedicated hardware device including laptop computer and Raspberry Pi.
Dell Inspiron Laptop with Intel Core i7, dual-core 2.7 GHz CPU, and 8 GB RAM to act
as the server. We used a Raspberry Pi 4 Model B with 64-bit quad-core cortex A-72
processor and 1 GB RAM to simulate the vehicle. We used PyCrytodome cryptographic
and Fastecdsa libraries in Python 3.6. For these results, we considered the 128-bit arbiter
PUF for PUF operation. The fuzzy extraction's execution time is almost the same as the
ECC point multiplication and the execution time for modular exponentiation is double the
time of the execution of the ECC point multiplication [58]. Table 32 presents the used
notation and the execution time of each operation.

461

Table 32: Execution Time of the cryptographic operations
Operation

Computation Time on IoT

Computation Time
on server

H: time for executing a one-way

0.002 ms

.001ms

5 ms

4 ms

5 ms

4 ms

5.5 ms

5 ms

10 ms

8 ms

2.7 ms

1.5 ms

0.18 ms

.14 ms

0.18 ms

.14 ms

hash function SHA (256)
F: time for executing a fuzzy
extractor
EM: time for executing an ECC
point multiplication
EA: time for executing an ECC
point addition
EXP: time for a modular
exponentiation
HMAC: time for executing the
HMAC
ENC: Time for Executing (AESCBC Encryption)
DEC: Time for executing (AESCBC Decryption)
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PUF: Time for executing PUF (128-

.12 ms

.12 ms

bit Arbiter)

Table 33: Comparison of computation costs for the authentication phase of the proposed
scheme and other related schemes
Entity

[150]

[154]

[155]

[156]

Vehicle

2TPUF +
13Th +
2TF +
1TENC +
1TDEC +
1TEM

2Th +
1TENC

4Th +
1TENC

1TPUF +
12Th
+1TEM

1TEM+
1TEA
+2Th

12Th +
1TPUF

14Th + 2TPUF

Cost

2*.06 +
13*.002
+2*5+1*.
18+1*

2*.002 +
1*.18 =
.182 ms

4*.002
+1*.18 =
.188 ms

1*.06+12
*.002+1*
5=

1* 5 +
1*5.5
+2*.002=
10.50 ms

12*.002
+.06 = .086
ms

14 * .002
+.06 *2 =
.148 ms

19Th
+1TEM

1TEM+
1TEA
+2Th

13Th +
1TPUF

20Th + 2TPUF
+ 1TSE + 1TSD

19 *.001
+1*4=
4.019 ms

1 * 4 + 1*
5+
2*.001 =
9.002 ms

13*.001
+.06= .073
ms

20*.001 +
.06 *2
+.14+.14 =
.42 ms

5.08 ms

[157]

Proposed
[V-TA]

Proposed
[V-DVOCS]

.18 +
1*10 =
20.51 ms

Server

9Th + 2TF
+ 1TENC +
1TDEC +
2TEM

4Th + +
2TENC +
1TDEC

Cost

9 *.001
+2*4+1*

4 *.001 +
2 *.14 +
1*.14=
.424 ms

.14+1*.14
+2*8 =
24.89 ms

5TEM +
1TEA+
1TENC +
1TDEC +
12Th
5*4 + 1*5
+ 1*.14+
1*.14
+12*.001
= 25.29
ms

User

---------

---------

5TEM +
1TEA+
1TENC +
9Th

1TPUF +
13Th
+2TEM
+1TENC

-------

---------

3Th +1TENC +
1TDEC

Cost

---------

--------

5*5 +
1*5.5 +
1*.18+

1*.06 +
13*.002
+2*5+1*

-------

--------

.002*3 + .18
+ .18= .37
ms
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Total
Cost

44.80

.606 ms

9*.002 =
30.70 ms

.18=
10.27 ms

56.18 ms

19.37 MS

19.50 ms

.159ms

.94 ms

ms

Table 33 summarizes the computational complexity cost comparison between the
proposed scheme and the other related vehicular networks schemes presented in the
literature. The total run time of the V-TA scheme is .159 ms and the run time of V-DVOCS is .94 ms. The results of the proposed scheme with other related protocols indicate
that the V-TA protocol is more efficient than the other protocols. The run time of the VD-VOCS is higher than [154] because it involves the authentication of the driver. The
protocol in [155] performs the worst because it makes use of multiple ECC point
multiplication and point addition which are computationally heavy. The proposed
scheme is more efficient than [150] that used scalar multiplication and asymmetric
encryption. Also, protocols [155],[156], and [157] used ECC, which increased the run
time. The main strengths of my proposed scheme are the avoidance of using long-term
secret keys and securing the communicating devices from physical attacks and
counterfeiting by employing the PUF and the chained hash PUF.
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Figure 118: Comparison of the total number of crypto operations across the schemes
Figure 115 displays the number of authentication operations of each type that are
completed on the V side. Figure 116 depicts the number of authentication operations of
each type that are completed on the server-side. Figure 117 depicts the number of
authentication operations of each type that are completed on the user side. Figure 118
demonstrates the total number of authentication operations of each type that are complete
466

for each scheme. As depicted from the table and the figures, our proposed scheme used
more hash functions than most of the other schemes to avoid computationally expensive
cryptographic operations such as ECC and HMAC and, at the same time, achieve the
same security goals. The proposed scheme is the only protocol that used PUF as a
hardware fingerprint on the server-side to secure the devices from counterfeiting and use
the PUF response as an encryption key to avoiding storing long-term security keys on the
communicating devices. Furthermore, using PUF on the server-side can protect the
scheme from server impersonation and secure the server database to be stolen if the
device got compromised.

V COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY IN MS

Figure 119: V computational time across the different schemes
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Figure 122: Total computational time across the different schemes
Figures 119, 120, 121, and 122 demonstrate the cost comparison of my
authentication scheme with other similar schemes. Figure 122 presents the total
computational cost of each scheme. Figure 119 displays the computation cost of each
scheme for the V side, figure 120 depicts the computational cost of each scheme for the
server-side, and figure 121 depicts the computational cost of each scheme for the user
side. The results indicate that the V-TA and V-D-VOCS protocols have a lower
computational cost for the V side compared to the rest of the protocols. On the serverside, although the V-D-VOCS protocol has almost the same computational cost as [154],
our proposed protocol includes user authentication. Also, it preserves both the driver and
the vehicle privacy by using different alias IDs for every authentication session. The VD-VOCS protocol has the lowest computational cost on the user side because it depends
on the hash function and the PUF instead of expensive cryptographic approaches such as
ECC and modular exponentiation. The above results prove that the proposed scheme is
suitable for IoV domain.
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We can conclude that the proposed scheme has a higher security level than the
rest of the protocols. The proposed scheme achieves the main security goals of
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity besides accommodating IoV devices that are
diverse in their capabilities.
6.7.2.3

Communicational Cost

The following section analyzes the communication cost of the proposed scheme.
To reduce network congestion and to provide fast message transmission, the
communication cost of the scheme should be as low as possible. For the communication
cost analysis, we evaluate the communication cost in terms of the size of the message in
bits. Then, we compared our proposed scheme to the other related schemes. Table 34
presents a summary of the sizes of the message parameters. Table 35 lists the message
parameters that are communicated among the communicating parties, along with their
sizes.
Table 34: Main parameters of the messages and their sizes in bits
Message Parameters

Size in Bits

ID of N [ [57], [62], [63]

128

ID of server [63]

8

SID [57], [62]

8

Nonce [61], [63]

128

CRP (C, R) [61], [62]

128

470

HMAC [63]

256

Hash Function [57], [62]

256

Timestamp (TS) [63]

48

ECC [60], [59]

256

MAC [62]

256

V-TA protocol
•

Message 1: In the transmission (V → TA), V sends the tuple, VIDA, TSvi1, X1, X2
Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128 + 48 + 128+256 = 560. bits.

•

Message 2: In the transmission (TA → V), TA sends the tuple, TAIDA, SID, TS TA1,
Y2, C’, Y3. Therefore, the size of this tuple is 8 +8 + 48 + 128+128+256 = 576
bits.

•

Message 3: In the transmission (V → TA), V sends the tuple, VIDA, SID. TSVI2, X3,
X4. Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128 + 8 + 48+128 +256 = 568 bits.

•

Message 4: In the transmission (TA → V), TA sends the tuple, TAIDA, SiD TSTA2,
Y5, Y6. Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128 + 8 + 48+128 +256 = 568. bits.

V-D-VOCS protocol
•

Message 1: In the transmission (V → VOCS), V sends the tuple, VIDA, TSvi1, VX2,
VX3.

•

Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128 + 48 + 128+256 = 560. bits.

Message 2: In the transmission (VOCS → V), TA sends the tuple, VOCSIDA, SID,
TSCS1, CSY2, CV, CSY3 Therefore, the size of this tuple is 8 +8 + 48 +
128+128+256 = 576 bits.
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•

Message 3: In the transmission (V → VOCS), V sends the tuple, VIDA, TSVi2,
VX5, VX6, VX7, VX8. Therefore, the size of this tuple is 128+48+ 128+
128+128+256 = 816. bits.

Table 35: Communication cost comparison (bits)
Message

[150]

[154]

[155]

[156]

[157]

Number

V-TA

V-D-

Proposed

VOCS

scheme

Proposed
scheme

M1:

384 bits

256 bits

512 bits

1072 bits

816 bits

560 bits

560 bits

M2:

384 bits

512 bits

384 bits

1072 bits

816 bits

576 bits

576 bits

M3:

384 bits

392 bits

384 bits

816 bits

768 bits

568 bits

824 bits

M4:

512 bits

384 bits

768 bits

816 bits

----

448 bits

256 bits

M5:

-------

392 bits

----

---

M6:

-------

512 bits

M7:

-------

256 bits

Total

1664

2704

2048

3776

1792

2152

2352

bits

bits

bits

bits

bits

bits

bits

136 bits

The total communication costs of [150], [154], [155],[156], and [157] are
1664,2704,2048,3776, and 1792 bits, respectively. The total communication cost of the
proposed V-TA protocol is 2152 and 2352 for V-D-VOCS scheme. My two proposed
protocols are less than [154 and 156]. My proposed protocols have lower communication
472

cost and, at the same time, achieved all the required security goals. Also, the proposed
schemes have proper communication cost compared to [150], [155], and [157]. The VTA protocol requires sending only four messages to achieve mutual authentication. The
messages contain timestamps, XOR functions, ciphered random numbers, and hash
functions that prevent attacks such as data modification, replay, and impersonation. The
V-D-VOCS protocol requires three messages to achieve mutual authentication between
the vehicle and the VOCS and two messages to achieve mutual authentication between
the driver and the VOCS. Even if the protocols of my proposed scheme are not the
protocols with the lowest communication cost, they have a reasonable cost for IoV, and at
the same time, they achieve more security properties than the protocols with less cost.
6.8

Summary
In this chapter, we designed a “Multi-Factor Authentication, and Privacy

Preservation Protocol Using Biometrics and Chained Hash PUF for IoV’’ to solve
security threats of the existing authentication schemes. The protocol enables a lightweight
mutual authentication and an establishment of secret keys, which can be used to secure
the exchanged messages between the communicating parties. The lightweight and the
privacy-preserving properties are ensured as they are the essential characteristics of
dynamic entities. Those properties are achieved through the use of PUF, chained hash
PUF, hash functions, and XOR operations. The proposed protocol is lightweight with a
lower computation cost and execution time compared with the competitive schemes. We
completed an in-depth security analysis against different strong adversarial attacks and
found that the proposed protocol is resistant to these types of attacks. The lightweight
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nature allows easy implementation of the protocol in different entities of the IoV domain
such as the vehicle’s OBU, RSUs, infrastructure and sensors.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1

Conclusion
The Internet of Things (IoT) plays an essential role in all aspects of our daily

lives. It benefits different fields, including smart homes, healthcare, smart cities,
agriculture and others. The IoT consists of billions of connected devices over the internet
that are able to gather and exchange data using IoT nodes and controllers.
Adversaries are shifting their attention from traditional computers to IoT devices
for malignant activities like exposing smart homeowner private information and/or to
launch botnet attacks. Therefore, it is very critical to move fast to address the rising
security and privacy concerns in IoT systems before severe disasters happen. Similar to
traditional networks, the security of IoT networks depends mainly on how properly the
authentication process is done and on how user’s privacy is preserved. However, the IoT
infrastructure faces challenges in implementing and operating strong authentication
schemes because of the resource constrained nature of the IoT devices that have limited
computational and storage capabilities.
The first contribution of this work is the introduction of PUF Hierarchal
Distributed Architecture (PHDA). The main goals of PHDA are to support system
scalability and to protect the system’s devices from being counterfeited. The PHDA acts
as a device name resolution to store and retrieve the Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs) of
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the IoT devices. PHDA stores the PUF data using a 3-tier architecture employing a
simple naming scheme.
The second contribution of this work is the introduction of lightweight mutual
authentication and privacy preservation protocol using PUF for smart home network
model. The proposed protocol is based on using PUF as a hardware fingerprint to
authenticate the communicating devices. Also, another aspect of the securing the system
depends on employing network segregation based on the IoT device type to mitigate the
threats. Moreover, the security and privacy preservation of the proposed protocol is
implemented using dynamic identities and temporary secret session keys that change in
every session and are exchanged in an unlinkable and untraceable manner.
The third contribution is the introduction of multi-layer distributed lightweight
mutual authentication using chained hash PUF scheme for IIoT. A smart poultry farm is
introduced as a network model. The design of the proposed scheme fits the dynamic and
distributed cyber-physical nature of the poultry farms to ensure the system's security. The
proposed scheme enables a M2M communication, which provides the chance for devices
inside the IIoT network to do data offloading and allows the IoT devices that are away
from their gateways to get authenticated and communicate with their gateways through
other IoT devices. Access control solution is integrated to support smart poultry farms'
dynamic nature. Therefore, an automated access control model based on virtual domain
segregation of IoT network and device type is introduced. Also, the chained hash PUF
value is used to create a type of tracking system between the IoT node and its gateway.
The proposed scheme proves that it provides confidentiality, integrity, anonymity,
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unlinkability, and untraceability properties while achieving mutual authentication
between the communicating devices.
The fourth contribution of this work is the presentation of three factor mutual
authentication and Privacy Preservation Scheme using user and device biometrics scheme
for IoV System. The proposed scheme employed user’s biometric to achieve static and
continuous driver’s authentication process to ensure that the received data belongs to
correct driver and identifies the fabricated data. The proposed scheme introduces
employing central RSUs (CRSUs) between the RSUs and the TA to reduce the number of
times a vehicle needs to authenticate with the RSUs. Furthermore, the proposed scheme
uses PUFs and chained hash PUF to perform authentication via a challenge-response
mechanism. The proposed scheme can perform authentication and establish a shared
secret session key without the need to store any long-term keys on the vehicle’s OBU.
The results prove that the proposed scheme is not only secure against different types of
attacks but is also efficient enough for IoV.
The PUF as a hardware security mechanism is used for key authentication and for
encrypting the data on the server side where the key can be generated on the fly and does
not need be stored. The two main advantages of this approach are: (1) the elimination of
the need to store long term secret keys; and (2) the hardness of predicting the keys due of
the unclonable and unpredictable nature derived from the PUFs. Also, the three proposed
schemes eliminate the need for key exchanges between device and the server over the
network because the devices generate the key locally using the securely shared random
values and the PUF challenges and responses.
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Additionally, through an intensive formal and informal security analysis of our
protocols using the BAN logic and AVISPA tool, the results indicate that the proposed
schemes are resilient against well- known attacks. The proposed schemes achieved the
key security properties such anonymity, unlinkability, untracability and system scalability
with a limited performance overhead. Also, we conduct performance analysis to evaluate
the computational complexity and the computational cost and compare them with other
proposed protocols in the literature. The results prove that the proposed schemes are in
general more efficient than recently proposed protocols.
7.2

Future Work
We plan to extend the proposed scheme titled “Lightweight Privacy Preservation

and Mutual Authentication Scheme for Smart Homes Using Physical Unclonable
Functions”, to authenticate mobile devices and users. Also, We plan to extend the
proposed scheme to account for node-to-node connectivity that can take place within the
same virtual domain (intradomain) or across different domains(interdomains).
Furthermore, our extended study will explore vulnerabilities resulted from the new form
of connectivity that involves node-to-node communication.
For the second scheme titled “M2M Distributed Multi-Layer Lightweight Mutual
Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme Using Chained Hash PUF in Industrial IoT
System”, we plan to enable an IoT device in one home network to communicate with an
IoT device in another home network regardless of the underlying communication
protocols. Also, we plan to extend the proposed scheme to facilitate in farm and cross
farm authentication and communication between the IoT sensors on one side and the
farmer/operators on the other side by examining the kind of operations the
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farmer/operator need to complete that may require single level or multiple level access
control based on the risk factor associated with the operation. Furthermore, in many
farms the animals have sensors embedded, which require appropriate authorized access.
These wearable and health monitoring devices are attached to livestock and collect
sensitive data, which can be used by adversaries to control the animal or to send false
data about the animal. we plan to investigate how to conduct continuous authentication
between the animal and the control unit in order to implement an ongoing verification of
the animals and to identify the fabricated data.
For the third scheme titled “Three-Factor Authentication and Privacy Preservation
Scheme Using User and Device Biometrics for IoV System”, we plan to extend the work
to implement machine learning based IDS to detect fake messages that are sent by
authenticated malicious vehicles to alert authorities to revoke the shared secret keys and
alert other vehicles. Also, we plan to explore more vehicular networking attacks and
analyze them with the proposed scheme.
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APPENDIX A
role role_N
(N:agent,G:agent,T:text,X:text,Y:text,NIDA:text,NIDR:text,IGIDR:text,IGIDA:text,GX:text,O
TP:text, H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel
(dy))
played_by N
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoneN:text,TStwoN:text,
None:hash(text.text),
TSoneIG:text,TStwoIG:text,
SIDNIG:text,Pn:text,Pg:text,
Rone:text,Rtwo:text,
Cone:text,Ctwo:text,
Gtwo:hash(message.text.text.text.text),
Nthree:hash(text.text.text.message.message),
SN:hash(message.text.text.text),
SSK:hash(text.text.text.text.text),
NOTP:hash(text.text.text),
NnewIDA:hash(text.text.text),
Gone:hash(text.text.message),
Na:text,Nb:text,NBB:text,Naa:text,
Gthree:hash(text.text.message.text),Ntwo:text,
IG_pub:public_key
init
State:= 2
transition
1. State= 2 /\ RCV(start)
=|> State' :=4
/\ TSoneN' :=new()
/\ Na' := new()
/\ None':= H(Y.OTP)
/\ Ntwo' := xor(Na',None')
/\ SN' :=H(None'.NIDR.TSoneN'.Na')
/\ SND(NIDA.TSoneN'.xor(Na',None').H(None'.NIDR.TSoneN'.Na'))
/\ secret(NIDR,secNIDR,{N,G})
494

/\ secret(OTP,secOTP,{N,G})
/\ secret(Na,secNa,{N,G})
2. State= 4 /\
RCV(IGIDA.SIDNIG'.TSoneIG'.xor(Gone',Cone').{Nb'.Gtwo'}_Rone')
=|> State' :=6
/\ TStwoN' :=new()
/\ Naa' :=new()
/\ Pn' :=new()
/\ NnewIDA' := H(NIDA.Rone.Cone)
/\ NOTP' := H(OTP.Cone'.TStwoN')
/\ Nthree' := H(Naa'.TStwoN'.Nb'.NOTP'.NnewIDA')
/\ SND(NIDA.SIDNIG.TStwoN'.{Naa'.exp(GX,Pn').Nthree'}_Rone')
/\ secret(Naa,secNaa,{N,G})
/\ request(N,G,na,Na)
/\ secret(NOTP,secNOTP,{G,N})
/\ witness(N,G,nb,Nb')
end role
Figure A_1: HLPSL code for role IoT Node played by N
role role_G
(G:agent,N:agent,IGIDA:text,NIDA:text,NIDR:text,IGIDR:text,GX:text,OTP:text,CG:text,I
G_pub:public_key,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by G
def=
local
State:nat,
T:text,X:text,Y:text,
TSoneN:text,TStwoN:text,
TSoneIG:text,TStwoIG:text,
SIDNIG:text,Pn:text,Pg:text,
Rone:text,Rtwo:text,
Cone:text,Ctwo:text,
Gtwo:hash(message.text.text.text.text),
Nthree:hash(text.text.text.message.message),
SNG:hash(message.text.text.text),
Ssk:hash(text.text.text.text.text),
NOTP:hash(text.text.text),
NnewIDA:hash(text.text.text),
Gone:hash(text.text.message),
Na:text,Nb:text,NAA:text,NB:text,Naa:text,CX:text,
Gthree:hash(text.text.message.text),
TG:hash(text.text.text),
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RG:text,Ntwo:text,None:hash(text.text)
Init
State:= 1
transition
1. State=1
/\RCV(NIDA.TSoneN'.xor(Na',None').SNG')
=|> State' :=3
/\ Nb':= new()
/\ TSoneIG' :=new()
/\ SIDNIG' := new()
/\ RG' := new()
/\ Rone' :=new()
/\ TG' := H(RG'.NIDR.IGIDR)
/\ Gone' := H(OTP.Na'.TG')
/\ Cone' :=new()
/\ CX' := xor(Gone',Cone')
/\ Gtwo' :=H(Gone'.Cone'.TSoneIG'.Nb'.IGIDR)
/\ SND(IGIDA.SIDNIG'.TSoneIG'.xor(Gone',Cone').
{Nb'.H(Gone'.Cone'.TSoneIG'.Nb'.IGIDR)}_Rone')
/\ secret(IGIDR,secIGIDR,{G,N})
/\ secret(OTP,secOTP,{G,N})
/\ secret(Nb,secNb,{G,N})
/\ secret(Rone,secRone,{G,N})
/\ secret(Cone,secCone,{G,N})
/\ secret(RG,secRG,{G,N})
/\ witness(G,N,na,Na')

2. State=3 /\
RCV(NIDA.SIDNIG.TStwoN'.{Naa'.exp(GX,Pn').Nthree'}_Rone)
=|> State' :=5
/\request(G,N,nb,Nb)
end role
Figure A_2: HLPSL code for role Intelligent Gateway played by IG
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role session(N:agent,G:agent,T:text,X:text,Y:text,NIDA:text,IGIDA:text,NIDR:text,
IGIDR:text,GX:text,OTP:text,CG:text,IG_pub:public_key,
H:hash_func)
def=
local
SND2,RCV2,SND1,RCV1:channel(dy)
composition
role_G(G,N,IGIDA,NIDA,NIDR,IGIDR,GX,OTP,CG,IG_pub,H,SND2,RCV2)
role_N(N,G,T,X,Y,NIDA,NIDR,IGIDR,IGIDA,GX,OTP,H,SND1,RCV1)/\
end role
Figure A_3: HLPSL code for role session
role environment()
def=
const
n:agent,g:agent,t:text,x:text,y:text,nida:text,igida:text,nidr:text,igidr:text,gx:text,otp:tex
t,cg:text,ig_pub:public_key,h:hash_func,secNIDR, secOTP, secNa, secIGIDR, secNb,
secRone, secCone,secNaa,secNOTP,secRG,na,nb:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge = {n,g,gx,h,ig_pub}
composition
session(n,g,t,x,y,nida,igida,nidr,igidr,gx,otp,cg,ig_pub,h)
end role
Figure A_4: HLPSL code for role environment
Goal
secrecy_of secNIDR
secrecy_of secOTP
secrecy_of secNa
secrecy_of secNb
secrecy_of secIGIDR
secrecy_of secRone
secrecy_of secCone
secrecy_of secNaa
secrecy_of secNOTP
secrecy_of secRG
authentication_on na
authentication_on nb
end goal
FigureA_5: HLPSL code for goal
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APPENDIX B
role
role_C(C:agent,P:agent,PIDA:text,CIDA:text,PIDR:text,CIDR:text,OTP:text,MSK:tex
t,CPC:text,PAU:text,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by C
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoneC:text,TStwoC:text,
TSoneP:text,TStwoP:text,
RVCone:text,RVCtwo:text,RVPone:text,
YxP:hash(text.text.text),
Xone:text,
Xtwo: hash(text.text.text.message),
Xthree:text,
Xfour: hash(text.text.text.message),
Yonex:text,
Ytwox: hash(text.text.text.message),
Ythree:text,
Yfour:text,
YPx:hash(text.text.text.text.message.message),
TKone:text,TKtwo:text,
OTPnew:hash(text.text),
CIDAnew:hash(text.text),
Xc:hash(text.text),
Yx:hash(text.text),
Xcc:hash(text.text),CAU:text
init
State:= 2
transition
1. State= 2 /\ RCV(start)
=|> State' :=4 /\ TSoneC' :=new()
/\ RVCone' := new()
/\ Xc' := H(OTP.PAU)
/\ Xone' := xor(RVCone',H(OTP.PAU))
/\ Xtwo' := H(CIDR.TSoneC'.RVCone'.Xc')
/\SND(CIDA.TSoneC'.xor(RVCone',H(OTP.PAU)).
H(CIDR.TSoneC'.RVCone'.H (OTP.PAU)))
/\secret(CIDR,secCIDR,{C,P})
/\secret(OTP,secOTP,{C,P})
/\secret(RVCone,secRVCone,{C,P})
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2. State= 4 /\
RCV(PIDA.TSoneP'.xor(H(OTP.CAU'),RVPone').Ytwox')=|>
State' :=6
/\ TStwoC' :=new()
/\ RVCtwo' :=new()
/\ Xcc' := H(RVPone'.OTP)
/\ Xthree' := xor(RVCtwo',H(RVPone'.OTP))
/\ Xfour' := H(CIDR.TStwoC'.RVCtwo'.Xcc')
/\ SND(CIDA.TStwoC'.xor(RVCtwo',H(RVPone'.OTP)).
H(CIDR.TStwoC'.RVCtwo'.H(RVPone'.OTP)))
/\ request(C,P,rvcone,RVCone)
/\witness(C,P,rvpone,RVPone')
/\ secret(RVCtwo,secRVCTwo,{C,P})
1. State= 6 /\
RCV(PIDA.TStwoP'.xor(TKone',OTP).xor(TKtwo',TKone').YPx')=|>
State' :=8
end role
Figure B_1: HLPSL code for role Child Gateway Node played by C
role role_P
(P:agent,C:agent,PIDA:text,CIDA:text,PIDR:text,CIDR:text,OTP:text,MSK:text,CPP:t
ext,CAU:text,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by P
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoneC:text,TStwoC:text,
TSoneP:text,TStwoP:text,
RVCone:text,RVCtwo:text,RVPone:text,
YxP:hash(text.text.text),
Xone:text,
XtwoP: hash(text.text.text.message),
XthreeP:text,
XfourP:hash(text.text.text.message),
Yone:text,
Ytwo: hash(text.text.text.message),
Ythree:text,
Yfour:text,
YP:hash(text.text.text.text.message.message),
TKone:text,TKtwo:text,
OTPnew:hash(text.text),
CIDAnew:hash(text.text),
Xc:hash(text.text),
Yx:hash(text.text),PAU:text,
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Sk:hash(text.text.text.message)

init
State:= 1
transition
1. State=1
/\RCV(CIDA.TSoneC'.xor(RVCone',H(OTP.PAU')).XtwoP')
=|> State' :=3
/\ TSoneP' :=new()
/\ RVPone':= new()
/\ Yx':= H(OTP.CAU)
/\ Yone' := xor(H(OTP.CAU),RVPone')
/\ Ytwo' := H(PIDR.TSoneP'.RVPone'.Yx')
/\
SND(PIDA.TSoneP'.xor(H(OTP.CAU),RVPone').H(PIDR.TSoneP'.RVPone'.
H(OTP.CAU)))
/\ secret(PIDR,secPIDR,{P,C})
/\ secret(OTP,secOTP,{P,C})
/\ secret(RVPone,secRVPone,{P,C})
/\ witness(P,C,rvcone,RVCone')
2. State= 3 /\
RCV(CIDA.TStwoC'.xor(RVCtwo',H(RVPone.OTP)).XfourP')
=|> State' :=5
/\ TStwoP' :=new()
/\ TKone' := new()
/\ TKtwo' := new()
/\ Ythree' := xor(TKone',OTP)
/\ Yfour' := xor(TKtwo',TKone')
/\ OTPnew' := H(OTP.RVCtwo')
/\ CIDAnew' := H(CIDA.OTP)
/\ YP' :=
H(PIDR.TStwoP'.TKone'.TKtwo'.OTPnew'.CIDAnew')
/\
SND(PIDA.TStwoP'.xor(TKone',OTP).xor(TKtwo',TKone').
H(PIDR.TStwoP'.TKone'.TKtwo'.H(OTP.RVCtwo').H (CIDA.OTP)))
/\request(P,C,rvpone,RVPone)
/\secret(TKone,secTKone,{P,C})
/\secret(TKtwo,secTKtwo,{P,C})
/\secret(OTPnew,secOTPnew,{P,C})
/\secret(CIDAnew,secCIDAnew,{P,C})
/\secret(YxP,secYxP,{P,C})
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end role
Figure B_2: HLPSL code for role Parent Gateway played by P
role
session(C:agent,P:agent,CIDA:text,PIDA:text,CIDR:text,PIDR:text,OTP:text,MSK:tex
t,CPC:text,PAU:text,CPP:text,CAU:text,H:hash_func)
def=
local
SND2,RCV2,SND1,RCV1:channel(dy)
composition
role_C(C,P,PIDA,CIDA,PIDR,CIDR,OTP,MSK,CPC,PAU,H,SND1,RCV1)/\
role_P(P,C,PIDA,CIDA,PIDR,CIDR,OTP,MSK,CPP,CAU,H,SND2,RCV2)
end role
Figure B_3: HLPSL code for role session
role environment()
def=
const
c:agent,p:agent,cida:text,pida:text,cidr:text,pidr:text,otp:text,msk:text,cpp:text,cau:text,
cpc:text,pau:text,h:hash_func, secCIDR,
secOTP,secRVCone,secRVCTwo,secPIDR,secRVPone,secTKone,secTKtwo,secOTPn
ew,secCIDAnew,secYxP,rvcone,rvpone:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge = {c,p,h}
composition
session(c,p,cida,pida,cidr,pidr,otp,msk,cpp,cau,cpc,pau,h)
end role
Figure B_4 HLPSL code for role environment
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Goal
secrecy_of secCIDR
secrecy_of secOTP
secrecy_of secRVCone
secrecy_of secRVPone
secrecy_of secPIDR
secrecy_of secRVCTwo
secrecy_of secTKone
secrecy_of secTKtwo
secrecy_of secOTPnew
secrecy_of secCIDAnew
authentication_on rvcone
authentication_on rvpone
end goal
Figure B_5: HLPSL code for goal
role
role_Cone(Cone:agent,Ctwo:agent,ConeIDA:text,CtwoIDA:text,ConeIDR:text,CtwoI
DR:text,TK:text,MSK:text,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by Cone
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoCone:text,TStCone:text,
TSoCtwo:text,TStCtwo:text,
RCone:text,RCtwo:text,RCCone:text,RCCTwo:text,
Tone:text,Tfour:text,
Ttwo: hash(text.text.text.message),
Tthree: hash(text.text.text),
Tfive: hash(text.text.text.message),
Dtwo:text,
Dthreex: hash(text.text.text.message),
Done: hash(text.text.text),
Rj:hash(text.text),
Sk:hash(text.text.text.text)
init
State:= 2
transition
1. State= 2 /\ RCV(start)
=|> State' :=4 /\ TSoCone' :=new()
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/\ Rj' := H(TK.CtwoIDR)
/\ RCone' := new()
/\ Tone' := xor(RCone',Rj')
/\ Ttwo' := H(ConeIDR.TSoCone'.RCone'.Rj')

/\SND(CtwoIDA.xor(RCone',Rj').H(ConeIDR.TSoCone'.RCone'.
H(ConeIDR.TSoCone'.RCone'.H(TK.CtwoIDR))))
/\secret(ConeIDR,secConeIDR,{Cone,Ctwo})
/\secret(MSK,secMSK,{Cone,Ctwo})
/\secret(TK,secTK,{Cone,Ctwo})
/\secret(RCone,secRCone,{Cone,Ctwo})
2. State= 4 /\
RCV(CtwoIDA.xor(H(RCone'.MSK.ConeIDR),RCCone').Dthreex')=|>
State' :=6
/\ TStCone' :=new()
/\ RCtwo' :=new()
/\ Tthree' := H(TK.MSK.RCCone')
/\ Tfour' := xor(RCtwo',H(TK.MSK.RCCone'))
/\ Tfive' :=
H(ConeIDR.TStCone'.RCtwo'.H(TK.MSK.RCCone'))
/\ request(Cone,Ctwo,rcone,RCone)
/\ SND(ConeIDA.xor(RCtwo',H(TK.MSK.RCCone')).
H(ConeIDR.TStCone'.RCtwo'.H(TK.MSK.RCCone')))
/\ secret(RCtwo,secRCtwo,{Ctwo,Cone})
/\witness(Cone,Ctwo,rccone,RCCone')
end role
Figure B_6: HLPSL code for role first child gateway played by Cone
role role_Ctwo
(Cone:agent,Ctwo:agent,ConeIDA:text,CtwoIDA:text,ConeIDR:text,CtwoIDR:text,TK
:text,MSK:text,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by Ctwo
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoCone:text,TStCone:text,
TSoCtwo:text,TStCtwo:text,
RCone:text,RCtwo:text,RCCone:text,RCCTwo:text,
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Tone:text,Tfour:text,
Tthree: hash(text.text.text),
Ttwox: hash(text.text.text.message),
Tfive: hash(text.text.text.message),
Dtwo:text,
Dthree: hash(text.text.text.message),
Done:hash(text.text.text),
Rj:hash(text.text),
Sk:hash(text.text.text.text)

init
State:= 1
transition
1. State=1
/\RCV(CtwoIDA.xor(RCone',Rj').Ttwox')
=|> State' :=3
/\ TSoCtwo' :=new()
/\ Done' := H(RCone'.MSK.ConeIDR)
/\ RCCone':= new()
/\ Dtwo' := xor(Done',RCCone')
/\ Dthree' := H(CtwoIDR.TSoCtwo'.RCCone'.
H(RCone'.MSK.ConeIDR))
/\ SND(CtwoIDA.xor(H(RCone'.MSK.ConeIDR),RCCone')
.H(CtwoIDR.TSoCtwo'.RCCone'.H(RCone'.MSK.ConeIDR)))
/\secret(CtwoIDR,secCtwoIDR,{Ctwo,Cone})
/\secret(MSK,secMSK,{Ctwo,Cone})
/\secret(RCCone,secRCCone,{Ctwo,Cone})
/\witness(Ctwo,Cone,rcone,RCone')
2. State=3 /\ RCV(ConeIDA.xor(RCtwo',H(TK.MSK.RCCone')).Tfive')
=|> State' :=5
/\ request(Ctwo,Cone,rccone,RCCone)
end role
Figure B_7: HLPSL code for role second child gateway played by Ctwo
role
session(Cone:agent,Ctwo:agent,ConeIDA:text,CtwoIDA:text,ConeIDR:text,CtwoIDR:
text,TK:text,MSK:text,H:hash_func)
def=
local
SND2, RCV2, SND1, RCV1: channel(dy)
composition
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role_Cone(Cone,Ctwo,ConeIDA,CtwoIDA,ConeIDR,CtwoIDR,TK,MSK,H,S
ND1,RCV1)/\
role_Ctwo(Cone,Ctwo,ConeIDA,CtwoIDA,ConeIDR,CtwoIDR,TK,MSK,H,S
ND2,RCV2)
end role
Figure B_8: HLPSL code for role session
role environment()
def=
const
cone:agent,ctwo:agent,coneida:text,ctwoida:text,coneidr:text,ctwoidr:text,tk:text,msk:t
ext,h:hash_func,
secConeIDR,secMSK,secTK,secRCone,secRCCone,secCtwoIDR,secRCtwo,rc
cone,rcone:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge = {cone,ctwo,h}
composition
session(cone,ctwo,coneida,ctwoida,coneidr,ctwoidr,tk,msk,h)
end role
Figure B_9: HLPSL code for role environment
Goal
secrecy_of secConeIDR
secrecy_of secMSK
secrecy_of secRCone
secrecy_of secRCtwo
secrecy_of secTK
secrecy_of secRCCone
secrecy_of secCtwoIDR
authentication_on rcone
authentication_on rccone
end goal
Figure B_10: HLPSL code for security goals
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role role_N
(N:agent,MG:agent,T:text,X:text,Y:text,NIDA:text,NIDR:text,MGIDR:text,MGIDA:te
xt,CHX:text,OTT:text,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel
(dy))
played_by N
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoneN:text,TStwoN:text,
Xone:hash(text.text),
TSoneMG:text,TStwoMG:text,RX:text,
SIDNIG:text,
Rone:text,Rtwo:text,
Cone:text,Ctwo:text,CMG:text,
CHXnew:hash(text.text),
SN:hash(message.text.text.text),
Yone:hash(text.text),
Ythreex:hash(message.text.text.text.text),
NOTT:hash(text.text.text),
NnewIDA:hash(text.text.text),
Xfour:hash(text.text.text.message.message.message.message.text.text),
Na:text,Nb:text,Xtwo:text,Naa:text,Xthree:text,
Ytwo:text
init
State:= 2
transition
1. State= 2 /\ RCV(start)
=|> State' :=4 /\ TSoneN' :=new()
/\ Na' := new()
/\ Xone':= H(X.Y)
/\ Xtwo' := xor(Na',OTT)
/\ SN' :=H(H(X.Y).NIDR.TSoneN'.Na')
/\
SND(NIDA.TSoneN'.xor(Na',H(X.Y)).H(H(X.Y).NIDR.TSoneN'.Na'))
/\ secret(NIDR,secNIDR,{N,MG})
/\ secret(OTT,secOTT,{N,MG})
/\ secret(Na,secNa,{N,MG})
/\ secret(X,secX,{N,MG})
/\ secret(Y,secY,{N,MG})
2. State= 4 /\ RCV(MGIDA.SIDNIG'.TSoneMG'.xor(Nb',OTT)
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.xor(Cone',Nb').TSoneMG'.Ythreex')
=|> State' :=6
/\ TStwoN' :=new()
/\ Rone' := new()
/\ CHXnew' := H(CHX.Rone')
/\ Ctwo' := H(Na.Nb')
/\ Rtwo':=new()
/\ Naa':=new()
/\ Xthree':=xor(Naa',CHXnew')
/\ RX' :=xor(Rtwo',H(Nb'.CHXnew'))
/\ NOTT' := H(OTT.Cone'.Rone')
/\ NnewIDA' := H(NIDA.Nb')
/\Xfour' := H(NIDR.TStwoN'.Rone'.H(CHX.Rone')
.H(OTT.Cone'.Rone').H(NIDA.Nb').H(Na.Nb').Rtwo'.Naa')
/\SND(NIDA.SIDNIG'.TStwoN'.xor(Naa',H(CHX.Rone'))
.xor(Rtwo',H(Nb'.H(CHX.Rone'))).Xfour')
/\secret(Rone,secRone,{N,MG})
/\secret(CHXnew,secCHXnew,{N,MG})
/\secret(Naa,secNaa,{N,MG})
/\secret(Rtwo,secRtwo,{N,MG})
/\secret(NOTT,secNOTT,{N,MG})
/\secret(NnewIDA,secNnewIDA,{N,MG})
/\request(N,MG,na,Na)
/\witness(N,MG,nb,Nb')
end role
Figure B_11: HLPSL code for role IoT Node played by N
role role_MG
MG:agent,N:agent,MGIDA:text,NIDA:text,NIDR:text,MGIDR:text,CHX:text,OTT:te
xt,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by MG
def=
local
State:nat,
T:text,X:text,Y:text,RX:text,
TSoneN:text,TStwoN:text,
TSoneMG:text,TStwoMG:text,
SIDNIG:text,
Rone:text,Rtwo:text,
Cone:text,Ctwo:text,CMG:text,
CHXnew:hash(text.text),
Ythree:hash(message.text.text.text.text),
SNG: hash(message.text.text.text),
Yone:hash(text.text),
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NOTT:hash(text.text.text),
NnewIDA:hash(text.text.text),
Xfour:hash(text.text.text.message.message.message.message.text.text),
Na:text,Nb:text,Naa:text,Xthree:text,
Ytwo:text
init
State:= 1
transition
1. State=1
/\RCV(NIDA.TSoneN'.xor(Na',OTT).SNG')
=|> State' :=3
/\ Yone' :=H(T.X)
/\ Nb':= new()
/\ Ytwo' :=xor(Nb',OTT)
/\ TSoneMG' :=new()
/\ Cone' := new()
/\ CMG' :=xor(Cone',Nb')
/\ Ythree' := H(H(T.X).TSoneMG'.Nb'.Na'.Cone')
/\ SIDNIG' := new()
/\
SND(MGIDA.SIDNIG'.TSoneMG'.xor(Nb',OTT).xor(Cone',Nb').TSoneMG'.H(H
(T.X).TSoneMG'.Nb'.Na'.Cone'))
/\secret(MGIDR,secMGIDR,{MG,N})
/\secret(OTT,secOTT,{MG,N})
/\secret(Nb,secNb,{MG,N})
/\secret(Cone,secCone,{MG,N})
/\witness(MG,N,na,Na')
1. State=3
/\ RCV(NIDA.SIDNIG.TStwoN'.xor(Naa',H(CHX.Rone'))
.xor(Rtwo',H(Nb.H(CHX.Rone'))).H
(NIDR.TStwoN'.Rone'.H(CHX.Rone')
.H(OTT.Cone.Rone').H(NIDA.Nb).H(Na.Nb).Rtwo'.Naa'))
=|> State' :=5
/\request(MG,N,nb,Nb)
end role
Figure B_12: HLPSL code for mini-gateway node played by MG
role
session(N:agent,MG:agent,T:text,X:text,Y:text,NIDA:text,MGIDA:text,NIDR:text,M
GIDR:text,CHX:text,OTT:text,H:hash_func)
def=
local
SND2,RCV2,SND1,RCV1:channel(dy)
composition
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role_N(N,MG,T,X,Y,NIDA,NIDR,MGIDR,MGIDA,CHX,OTT,H,SND1,RCV
1)/\
role_MG(MG,N,MGIDA,NIDA,NIDR,MGIDR,CHX,OTT,H,SND2,RCV2)
end role
Figure B_13. HLPSL code for role session
role environment()
def=
const
n:agent,mg:agent,t:text,x:text,y:text,nida:text,mgida:text,nidr:text,mgidr:text,chx:text,o
tt:text,h:hash_func,
secNIDR, secOTT, secNa,secX,
secY,secMGIDR,secNb,secCone,secRone,secCHXnew,secNaa,secRtwo,secNOTT,sec
NnewIDA,na,nb:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge = {n,mg,h}
composition
session(n,mg,t,x,y,nida,mgida,nidr,mgidr,chx,ott,h)
end role
Figure B_14: HLPSL code for role environment
Goal
secrecy_of secNIDR
secrecy_of secOTT
secrecy_of secNa
secrecy_of secX
secrecy_of secY
secrecy_of secNb
secrecy_of secMGIDR
secrecy_of secCone
secrecy_of secRone
secrecy_of secCHXnew
secrecy_of secNaa
secrecy_of secRtwo
secrecy_of secNOTT
secrecy_of secNnewIDA
authentication_on na
authentication_on nb
509

end goal
Figure B_15: HLPSL code for goal
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APPENDIX C
role
role_V(TA:agent,V:agent,TAIDA:text,VIDA:text,VIDR:text,VTA:text,CHX:text,OTP
:text,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by V
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoneV:text,TStwoV:text,
TSoneTA:text,TStwoTA:text,RX:text,
SIDNIG:text,
Rone:text,
Cone:text,Ctwo:text,CMG:text,
CHXnew:hash(text.text),
Xtwo:hash(text.text.text.text.text),
Yone:hash(text.text.text),
Ythreex:hash(message.text.text.text.text),
NOTP:hash(text.text.text),
NnewIDA:hash(text.text),
Xthree:text,
Xfour:hash(text.text.text.text.text.message),
Na:text,Nb:text,Xone:text,Naa:text,Nbb:text
init
State:= 2
transition
1. State= 2 /\ RCV(start)
=|> State' :=4 /\ TSoneV' :=new()
/\ Na' :=new()
/\ Xone' :=xor(Na',H(VTA))
/\ Xtwo' :=H(VIDR.TSoneV'.Na'.OTP.VTA)
/\ SND(VIDA.TSoneV'.xor(Na',H(VTA))
.H(VIDR.TSoneV'.Na'.OTP.VTA))
/\ secret(VIDR,secVIDR,{V,TA})
/\ secret(OTP,secOTP,{V,TA})
/\ secret(Na,secNa,{V,TA})
/\ secret(VTA,secVTA,{V,TA})
2. State= 4 /\ RCV(TAIDA.SIDNIG'.xor(Nb',H(VTA.OTP.Na')).
xor(Cone',H(Nb'.CHX)).TSoneTA'.Ythreex')=|>
State' :=6
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/\ TStwoV' :=new()
/\ Rone' := new()
/\ CHXnew' := H(CHX.Rone')
/\ Naa':=new()
/\ Xthree':=xor(Naa',H(Nb'.CHXnew'))
/\Xfour' := H(VIDR.TStwoV'.Rone'.Naa'.
xor(Naa',H(Nb'.CHXnew')).H(CHX.Rone'))
/\SND(VIDA.SIDNIG'.TStwoV'.xor(Naa',H(Nb'.CHXnew'))
.H(VIDR.TStwoV'.Rone'.Naa'.xor(Naa',H(Nb'.CHXnew'))
.H(CHX.Rone')))
/\secret(Rone,secRone,{V,TA})
/\secret(CHXnew,secCHXnew,{V,TA})
/\secret(Naa,secNaa,{V,TA})
/\request(V,TA,na,Na)
/\witness(V,TA,nb,Nb')
3. State= 6 /\ RCV(TAIDA.SIDNIG.xor(Nbb',H(Naa'.Rone')).
H(TStwoTA'.xor(Nbb',H(Naa'.Rone'))
.H(OTP.Nbb'.Rone').H(Cone'.VIDA)))
=|> State' :=8
end role
Figure C_1: HLPSL code for role Vin T_VA authentication protocol
role role_TA
(TA:agent,V:agent,TAIDA:text,VIDA:text,VIDR:text,VTA:text,CHX:text,OTP:text,H:
hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by TA
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoneV:text,TStwoV:text,
TSoneTA:text,TStwoTA:text,
SIDNIG:text,
Rone:text,
Cone:text,CMG:text,
CHXnew:hash(text.text),
Yfour:hash(text.text),
Ysix:hash(text.text.message.message),
Yone:hash(text.text.text),
NOTP:hash(text.text.text),
NnewIDA:hash(text.text),
Na:text,Nb:text,Naa:text,Nbb:text,
Ytwo:text,
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Ythree:hash(message.text.text.text.text),
Yfive:text,
State:= 1
transition
1. State=1
/\RCV(VIDA.TSoneV'.xor(Na',H(VTA)).
H(VIDR.TSoneV'.Na'.OTP.VTA))
=|> State' :=3
/\ TSoneTA' :=new()
/\ Nb':= new()
/\ Yone' := H(VTA.OTP.Na')
/\ Ytwo' := xor(Nb',H(VTA.OTP.Na'))
/\ Cone' := new()
/\ CMG' := xor(H(Nb'.CHX),Cone')
/\ Ythree' := H(H(VTA.OTP.Na').TSoneTA'.Nb'.Cone'.Na')
/\ SIDNIG' := new()
/\ SND(TAIDA.SIDNIG'.xor(Nb',H(VTA.OTP.Na'))
.xor(Cone',H(Nb'.CHX)).TSoneTA'.H(H(VTA.OTP.Na').
TSoneTA'.Nb'.Cone'.Na'))
/\secret(OTP,secOTP,{TA,V})
/\secret(Nb,secNb,{TA,V})
/\secret(Cone,secCone,{TA,V})
/\witness(TA,V,na,Na')
2. State=3 /\ RCV(VIDA.SIDNIG.TStwoV'
.xor(Naa',H(Nb'.CHXnew')).H(VIDR.TStwoV'.Rone'.Naa'
.xor(Naa',H(Nb'.CHXnew')).H(CHX.Rone')))
=|> State' :=5
/\ TStwoTA' :=new()
/\ Nbb' := new()
/\Yfour' := H(Naa'.Rone')
/\Yfive' := xor(Nbb',H(Naa'.Rone'))
/\NOTP' := H(OTP.Nbb'.Rone')
/\NnewIDA' := H(Cone.VIDA)
/\Ysix' := H(TStwoTA'.xor(Nbb',H(Naa'.Rone'))
.H(OTP.Nbb'.Rone').H(Cone.VIDA)
.H(H(CHX.Rone').Na.Nb.Naa'.Nbb'))
/\SND(TAIDA.SIDNIG.xor(Nbb',H(Naa'.Rone'))
.H(TStwoTA'.xor(Nbb',H(Naa'.Rone'))
.H(OTP.Nbb'.Rone').H(Cone.VIDA)))
/\request(TA,V,nb,Nb)
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/\secret(NOTP,secNOTP,{V,TA})
/\secret(NnewIDA,secNnewIDA,{V,TA})
end role
Figure C-2: HLPSL code for role TA
role
session(V:agent,TA:agent,VIDA:text,TAIDA:text,VIDR:text,VTA:text,CHX:text,OTP
:text,H:hash_func)
def=
local
SND2,RCV2,SND1,RCV1:channel(dy)
composition
role_V(TA,V,TAIDA,VIDA,VIDR,VTA,CHX,OTP,H,SND1,RCV1)/\
role_TA(TA,V,TAIDA,VIDA,VIDR,VTA,CHX,OTP,H,SND2,RCV2)
end role
Figure C_3. HLPSL code for role session
role environment()
def=
const
v:agent,ta:agent,vida:text,taida:text,vidr:text,vta:text,chx:text,otp:text,h:hash_func,
secVIDR,secOTP,secNa,secX,secNb,secCone,secRone,secCHXnew,secNaa,se
cNOTP,secVTA,secNnewIDA,na,nb:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge = {v,ta,h}
composition
session(v,ta,vida,taida,vidr,vta,chx,otp,h)
end role
Figure C_4. HLPSL code for role environment
.Goal
secrecy_of secVIDR
secrecy_of secOTP
secrecy_of secNa
secrecy_of secVTA
secrecy_of secNb
secrecy_of secCone
secrecy_of secRone
secrecy_of secCHXnew
secrecy_of secNaa
secrecy_of secNOTP
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secrecy_of secNnewIDA
authentication_on na
authentication_on nb
end goal
Figure C_5: HLPSL code for goal
role role_V(CS:
agent,V:agent,CSIDA:text,VIDA:text,VIDR:text,VCS1:text,VCS2:text,OTT:text,H:ha
sh_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by V
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoneV:text,TStwoV:text,
VXtwo:hash(text.text.text.text.text),
TSoneCS:text,TStwoCS:text,RX:text,
SIDNIG:text,
Rone:text,Rtwo:text,
Cone:text,Ctwo:text,
VXthree:hash(text.text),
Yone:hash(text.text.text),
Ythreex:hash(message.text.text.text.text),
NOTT:hash(text.text.text),
VnewIDA:hash(text.text.text),
VXfour:text,
VXfive:text,VXsix:text,
VXseven:hash(message.text.text.text.text.message.message.message),
XCSYfive:hash(text.message.message.message),
Na:text,Nb:text,Xone:text,Naa:text,
VXone:text,
Sk:hash(text.text.text.text.text)
init
State:= 2
transition
1. State= 2 /\ RCV(start)
=|> State' :=4 /\ TSoneV' :=new()
/\ Na' :=new()
/\ VXone' :=xor(Na',H(VCS2.OTT))
/\ VXtwo' :=H(VIDR.TSoneV'.Na'.OTT.VCS1)
/\ SND(VIDA.TSoneV'.xor(Na',H(VCS2.OTT)).
H(VIDR.TSoneV'.Na'.OTT.VCS1))
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/\ secret(VIDR,secVIDR,{V,CS})
/\ secret(OTT,secOTT,{V,CS})
/\ secret(Na,secNa,{V,CS})
/\ secret(VCS1,secVCS1,{V,CS})
/\ secret(VCS2,secVCS2,{V,CS})
2. State= 4 /\ RCV(CSIDA.SIDNIG'.xor(Nb',H(VCS1.OTT))
.xor(Cone',H(Nb'.H(VCS1.OTT))).TSoneCS'.H(VIDR.H
(VCS1.OTT).TSoneCS'.Nb'.Cone'.Na'))
=|> State' :=6
/\ TStwoV' :=new()
/\ Rone' := new()
/\ Ctwo' := H(Na'.Nb')
/\ Rtwo':=new()
/\ Naa':=new()
/\ VXthree' := H(OTT.Nb')
/\ VXfour':=xor(Naa',H(H(OTT.Nb').VIDR))
/\VXfive' :=xor(Rone',H(H(OTT.Nb').Naa'))
/\VXsix' := xor(Rtwo',H(Rone'.Cone'))
/\NOTT' := H(OTT.Naa'.Nb')
/\VnewIDA' := H(Cone'.VIDA.OTT)
/\VXseven' := H(H(OTT.Nb').
TStwoV'.Rone'.Naa'.Rtwo'.
H(Na'.Nb').H(OTT.Naa'.Nb').
H(Cone'.VIDA.OTT))
/\ SND(VIDA.SIDNIG.TStwoV'
.xor(Naa',H(H(OTT.Nb').VIDR))
.xor(Rone',H(H(OTT.Nb').Naa')).xor(Rtwo',H
(Rone'.Cone')).H(H(OTT.Nb').
TStwoV'.Rone'.Naa'.Rtwo'.H(Na'.Nb').H(OTT.Naa'.Nb').H
(Cone'.VIDA.OTT)))
/\secret(Rone,secRone,{V,CS})
/\secret(Rtwo,secRtwo,{V,CS})
/\secret(Naa,secNaa,{V,CS})
/\secret(NOTT,secNOTT,{V,CS})
/\secret(VnewIDA,secVnewIDA,{V,CS})
/\request(V,CS,na,Na)
/\witness(V,CS,nb,Nb')
end role
Figure C_6: HLPSL code for V in V-VOCS authentication protocol

516

role role_CS
(CS:agent,V:agent,CSIDA:text,VIDA:text,VIDR:text,OTT:text,TID:text,H:hash_func,
SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by CS
def=
local
State:nat,
VCS1:text,VCS2:text,
TSoneV:text,TStwoV:text,
TSoneCS:text,
SIDNIG:text,
Rone:text,Rtwo:text,
Cone:text,CV:text,
CSYone:hash(text.text),
CSYtwo:text,
CSYthree:hash(text.message.text.text.text.text),
NOTT:hash(text.text.text),
VnewIDA:hash(text.text.text),
Na:text,Nb:text,Naa:text

init
State:= 1
transition
1. State=1
/\RCV(VIDA.TSoneV'
.xor(Na',H(VCS2'.OTT)).H(VIDR.TSoneV'.Na'.OTT.VCS1'))
=|> State' :=3
/\ TSoneCS' := new()
/\ Nb':= new()
/\ CSYone' :=H(VCS1'.OTT)
/\ CSYtwo' :=xor(Nb',H(VCS1'.OTT))
/\ Cone' :=new()
/\ CV' :=xor(Cone',H(Nb'.H(VCS1'.OTT)))
/\ CSYthree' :=
H(VIDR.H(VCS1'.OTT).TSoneCS'.Nb'.Cone'.Na')
/\ SIDNIG' := new()
/\ SND(CSIDA.SIDNIG'.xor(Nb',H(VCS1'.OTT))
.xor(Cone',H(Nb'.H(VCS1'.OTT))).TSoneCS'
.H(VIDR.H(VCS1'.OTT).TSoneCS'.Nb'.Cone'.Na'))
/\secret(OTT,secOTT,{CS,V})
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/\secret(Nb,secNb,{CS,V})
/\secret(Cone,secCone,{CS,V})
/\witness(CS,V,na,Na')
2. State=3 /\ RCV(VIDA.SIDNIG.TStwoV'
.xor(Naa',H(H(OTT.Nb').VIDR))
.xor(Rone',H(H(OTT.Nb).Naa'))
.xor(Rtwo',H(Rone'.Cone')).H(H(OTT.Nb').TStwoV'
.Rone'.Naa'.Rtwo'.H(Na'.Nb').H(OTT.Naa'.Nb')
.H(Cone'.VIDA.OTT)))
=|> State' :=5
end role
Figure C_7: HLPSL code for V
role
session(V:agent,CS:agent,CSIDA:text,VIDA:text,VIDR:text,VCS1:text,VCS2:text,OT
T:text,TID:text,H:hash_func)
def=
local
SND2,RCV2,SND1,RCV1:channel(dy)
composition
role_V(CS,V,CSIDA,VIDA,VIDR,VCS1,VCS2,OTT,H,SND1,RCV1)/\
role_CS(CS,V,CSIDA,VIDA,VIDR,OTT,TID,H,SND2,RCV2)
end role
Figure C_8: HLPSL code for session
role environment()
def=
const
v:agent,cs:agent,csida:text,vida:text,vidr:text,vcs1:text,vcs2:text,ott:text,tid:text,h:hash
_func,
secVIDR,secOTT,secNa,secNb,secCone,secRone,secRtwo,secNaa,secNOTT,se
cVCS1,secVCS2,secVnewIDA,na,nb:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge = {v,cs,h}
composition
session(v,cs,csida,vida,vidr,vcs1,vcs2,ott,tid,h)
end role
Figure C_9: HLPSL code for environment
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Goal
secrecy_of secVIDR
secrecy_of secOTT
secrecy_of secNa
secrecy_of secVCS1
secrecy_of secVCS2
secrecy_of secNb
secrecy_of secCone
secrecy_of secRone
secrecy_of secRtwo
secrecy_of secNaa
secrecy_of secNOTT
secrecy_of secVnewIDA
authentication_on na
authentication_on nb
end goal
Figure C_10: HLPSL code for goals

role
role_U(CS:agent,V:agent,CSIDA:text,VIDA:text,VIDR:text,VCS1:text,VCS2:text,OT
T:text,UI:text,Rone:text,SIDNIG:text,Sk:symmetric_key,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:chan
nel(dy))
played_by V
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoneV:text,
Uone:hash(text.text.text),
Utwo:text,
Uthree:hash(text.message.message.text),
TSoneCS:text,
PUI:text,FP:text,
ZUone:hash(text.text),
Uv:hash(text.text.text.message)
init
State:= 2
transition
1. State= 2 /\ RCV(start)
=|> State' :=4
/\ TSoneV' :=new()
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/\ Uone' :=H(VIDR.Rone.OTT)
/\ FP' :=new()
/\ PUI' :=new()
/\ ZUone' :=H(FP'.PUI')
/\ Utwo' := xor(Uone',ZUone)
/\ Uthree' := H(VIDR.Uone'.ZUone'.TSoneV')
/\ SND(VIDA.TSoneV'.UI.
{xor(Uone',ZUone').
H(VIDR.Uone'.ZUone'.TSoneV')}_Sk)
/\ secret(VIDR,secVIDR,{V,CS})
/\ secret(OTT,secOTT,{V,CS})
/\ secret (PUI,secPUI,{V,CS})
/\ witness(V,CS,uone,Uone')
2. State= 4 /\ RCV(CSIDA.SIDNIG.TSoneCS'.{Uv'}_Sk)
=|> State' :=6
end role
Figure C_11: HLPSL code for V
role role_CS
(CS:agent,V:agent,CSIDA:text,VIDA:text,VIDR:text,VCS1:text,VCS2:text,OTT:text,
UI:text,Rone:text,SIDNIG:text,Sk:symmetric_key,H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy
))
played_by CS
def=
local
State:nat,
TSoneV:text,
TSoneCS:text,
Uone:hash(text.text.text),
ZUone:hash(text.text),ZUthree:text,
Uv:hash(text.text.text.message),
PUI:text
init
State:= 1
transition
1. State=1
/\RCV(VIDA.TSoneV'.UI. {xor(Uone',ZUone').
H(VIDR.Uone'.ZUone'.TSoneV')}_Sk)
=|> State' :=3
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/\ TSoneCS' := new()
/\ Uv' := H(TSoneCS'.Rone.OTT.ZUone')
/\ SND(CSIDA.SIDNIG.TSoneCS'.
{H(TSoneCS'.Rone.OTT.ZUone')}_Sk)
/\request(CS,V,uone,Uone')

end role
Figure C_12: HLPSL code for CS

role
session(V:agent,CS:agent,CSIDA:text,VIDA:text,VIDR:text,VCS1:text,VCS2:text,OT
T:text,UI:text,Rone:text,SIDNIG:text, Sk:symmetric_key ,H:hash_func)
def=
local
SND2, RCV2, SND1, RCV1: channel (dy)
composition
role_V(CS,V,CSIDA,VIDA,VIDR,VCS1,VCS2,OTT,UI,Rone,SIDNIG,Sk,
H,SND1,RCV1)/\
role_CS (CS, V, CSIDA, VIDA, VIDR, VCS1, VCS2, OTT, UI, Rone,
SIDNIG, Sk, H, SND2, RCV2)
end role
Figure C_13: HLPSL code for session
role environment()
def=
const
v:agent,cs:agent,csida:text,vida:text,vidr:text,vcs1:text,vcs2:text,ott:text,ui:text,rone:te
xt,sidnig:text,sk:symmetric_key,h:hash_func,secVIDR,secOTT,secRone,secSk,secPUI,
uone:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge = {v,cs,h}
composition
session(v, cs,csida,vida,vidr,vcs1,vcs2,ott,ui,rone,sidnig,sk,h)
end role
Figure C-14: HLPSL code for environment
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Goal
secrecy_of secVIDR
secrecy_of secOTT
secrecy_of secRone
secrecy_of secSk
secrecy_of secPUI
authentication_on uone
end goal
Figure C_15: HLPSL code for goals
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Leaning Environments in Online Courses. Journal of Systemics,
Cybernetics and Informatics

•

2008, Mansour, S., & El-Said, M. Multi-Player Role Playing
Games: A Link between Fun and Learning. The International
Journal of Learning, 15 (11) 229-240

•

2008, Mansour, S & El-Said, M. The Relationship between
Educational Serious Games, Gender, and Students’ Social
Interaction. WSEAS Transactions on Computers, 7(6)640-649.

•

2008, Mansour, S., El-Said, M., & Nandigam, J. (2008). An
Empirical Study to Measure Students Learning Performance Using
Serious Games. The 12th International Conference on Computer
Games: AI, Animation, Mobile, Interactive Multimedia & Serious
Games

•

2008, Mansour, S., Rude-Parkins, C., & Bennett, L. (2008). How the
Use of Second Life Affects E-Learners’ Perceptions of Social
Interaction in Online Courses. Proceedings of the 6th International
Conference on Education and Information Systems, Technologies
and Applications (EISTA). Orlando, Florida

•

2008, Mansour, S., & El-Said, M. (2008). The Impact of MultiPlayers Serious Games on the Social Interaction among Online
Students versus Face-to-Face Students. Proceedings of the 7th
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International conference on Advances on Applied Computer and
Applied Computational Science (WSEAS), Hangzhou, China
•

•

2007, S. Mansour, M. El-Said, C. Rude-Parkins, & J. Nandigam. The
Interactive Effect of Avatar Visual Fidelity and Behavioral Fidelity
in the Collaborative Virtual Reality Environment on the Perception
of Social Interaction, WSEAS Transactions on Communications, 8
(5) 1501-1509.
2006, Mansour, S., El-Said, M., Rude-Parkins, C., & Nandigam, J.
(2006). The Interactive Effect of Avatar Visual Fidelity and
Behavioral Fidelity in the Collaborative Virtual Reality Environment
on the Perception of Social Interaction. Proceedings of the 10th
International conference of World Scientific and Engineering
Academy and Society (WSEAS). Athens, Greece.

•

2006, Mansour, S., Rude-Parkins, C., & El-Said, M. The Effect of the
Type of Communication Medium on Learners’ Perceptions of Social
Interaction in E-Learning. In E. Pearson & P. Bohman (Eds.),
Proceedings of the 17th World Conference on Educational
Multimedia, Hypermedia & Telecommunications (ED-MEDIA)
2006 ((pp. 1274-1281), Orlando, Florida.

•

2005, Mansour, S., Rude-Parkins, C., & El-Said M. The Relationship
between the Avatar’s Behavioral Fidelity and Social Interaction in
3d Collaborative Learning-Based Games. Proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on Computer Games: AI and Mobile
Systems (CGAIM 2005), Angoulem, France.

•

2005, El-Said, M. & Mansour, S. A Hybrid Anthropomorphism
Model To Enhance The Social Presence In 3D Virtual Multi-Players
Games. Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on
Computer Games: AI and Mobile Systems (CGAIM 2005),
Louisville, KY.

•

2019, CyberGen (will be submitted on Oct 25, 2019) (Joint
collaboration with Bhuse, V, El-Said, M., Kalafut, A., Wang, X

•

2018, Grand Valley State University Cyber Range Hub Site
Initiative", Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC),
$259,800.00, (Joint collaboration with Leidig, P., El-Said, M.,
Kalafut, A., Bhuse, V. Wang, X (we did not submit it)

•

2016, XRY Complete Digital Forensic Kit” Sponsored by the
MSAB Incorporated, (Mobile Forensic Trial Kit - worth $7,990.00
provided by MSAB Corporate). (Joint collaboration with El-Said,
M.)

GRANTS
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•

2016, Digital Forensics for Mobile Devices. Sponsored by CSCE,
Grand Valley State University, $400.00.

•

2013, A Novel Approach in the Delivery of Occupational Safety and
Health Training for the Beverage Industry”. MIOSHA (Michigan
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Funded $45,000.00.
(Joint collaboration with Huizen, D.)

•

2010, Using Second Life for Developing Interactive Games to Teach
Computer Science Programming Skills. $1,980.00 ((funded by the
FTLC Grand Valley State Univ).

•

2009, Web Based Mobile Learning environment (M-WEBLearning). 5,274.00 (funded by the FTLC Grand Valley State Univ)

•

2008, Immersive Education: using Second life to teach computing
and information systems, 4,274.00 (funded by the FTLC Grand
Valley State Univ) (Joint collaboration with Nandigam, J)

•

2008, Proactive Intrusion Detection System (IDS) using Baseline
Recording, Analysis and Real time Monitoring $4,912.50 (funded by
the FTLC Grand Valley State Univ) (Joint collaboration with ElSaid, M)

•

2006, Learning by Doing: An Adapted Teaching Philosophy in the
Wireless Courses, $1750 (funded by the FTLC, Grand Valley State
Univ) (Joint collaboration with El- Said, M).

•

2006, Building an Interactive Collaborative Virtual Reality Teaching
Environment, $2970 (funded by FTLC-Grand Valley State Univ)
(Joint collaboration with El- Said, M.).

•

2005, Building an Interactive Constructivist Approach in Teaching
the Next Generation of Autonomic Mobile Computing Networks,
$1560 (funded by FTLC-Grand Valley State Univ) (Joint
collaboration with Prof. El- Said,M.).

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Reviewer for Conferences and Journals
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

10th International Conference on Society and Information
Technologies: ICSIT 2019
Complex Adaptive Systems conference 2018
8th International Conference on Society and Information
Technologies: ICSIT 2017
SIGITE/RIIT, 2016
7th International Conference on Society and Information
Technologies: ICSIT 2016
International Conference on Society and Information Technologies:
ICSIT 2015
The 19th International Computer Games Conference, AI, Animation,
Interactive Multimedia, Virtual Worlds and Serious Games,
(CGAMES 2014), Louisville, Kentucky. - International Conference
on Society and Information Technologies: ICSIT 2014
member of the ISTE SIG 1-to-1 Computing,2013
International Conference on Society and Information Technologies:
ICSIT 2013
International Conference on Society and Information Technologies:
ICSIT 2012
International Conference on Society and Information Technologies:
ICSIT 2011 o International Conference on Engineering and MetaEngineering: ICEME 2011
The 17th International Computer Games Conference: AI, Interactive
Multimedia, Virtual Worlds and Serious Games (CGAMES'12)
International Conference on Engineering and Meta-Engineering:
ICIME 2010
The 3rd International Multi-Conference on Engineering and
Technological Innovation (IMETI 2010)
International Conference on Society and Information Technologies:
ICSIT 2010
Journal of Computer Assisted Learning
The International Journal of Learning

Professional Society Memberships
•
•

Internet of Things, West Michigan (IoTWM), Member, Grand
Rapids, MI, USA, (2017 - Present)
West Michigan Cyber Security Consortium, Board Member, Grand
Rapids, MI, USA, (2017 - Present).

ADVISING and MENTORING STUDENTS’ PROJECTS
•

Honors Senior Project: Investigating the Sense of Belonging Among Various Super
Smash Bros. Gaming Communities
o The goal of this research project was to analyze the perception of individuals
within the Melee, Project M, and Smash 4 communities to see if there is any
variation in the sense of belonging in each community and if so, why?

•

Data Parsing
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o

This project was developed for the Little Sprouts pre-kindergarten schools as a
collaboration with Take Flight Enterprises, LLC. The specific procedure was part of
an overhaul of the schools’ current records. The project work involves the following
tasks: opening an Excel data file, importing the output file from the WebGUI, and
running a parsing procedure.

•

Production Capacity
o This project focused on developing a simulation a tool that can be used in a realworld industry setting. The simulation tool calculates how much capacity is needed
in the upcoming periods of the machine’s running time window as well as it shows
how much that machine’s capacity will cost. One of the main features of this project
was how to figure out the product’s unit price, which depends on several factors such
as: industry average price, industry average quantity sold, production capacity,
beginning inventory, and ending inventory.

•

Improving Mental Math: The Method Behind the Program –
o The main objective of the game was to test the basic mental math skills of students.
The program is allowing the teacher to set the range of numbers to be included in the
test, the amount of questions, and a time limit. Then they would be able to administer
the test to the class and monitor the results. Based on those results, the teacher could
cater any review needed changed. The program allows the students to log in, save and
send their scores to their teachers. This would allow the teacher to establish trends in
the individual students score. With this, the teacher could then work on a specific range
for each student and instead of using one quiz, each student could work on their own
personalized quiz.A pilot study was conducted at Central Grand Rapids High School
(CHS). Based on the students’ input, the student changed some aspects of the project.
The teacher in CHS decided to adopt and use the game in their classes.

•

Fractions Are Our Friends
o This game was designed to teach fractions to elementary school students. In
order to validate the impact of the game on helping students to get a better
understanding of the fraction concepts.
o A crossover experimental design was used to conduct the experiment
o The experiment was designed to answer the following questions:
▪ Does the use of a game as a teaching tool impact the students’ learning?
▪ What is the impact of providing students with instant feedback on
motivating students to answer the questions correctly?
▪ Is there a relationship between the format of delivering the quiz (
paper/game) and the students’ inspiration to take the quiz?
▪ What is the impact of using educational serious games on motivating
students from low socioeconomically status and low performance level
in math to learn mathematical complex concepts?
SERVICE
o

Grand Valley State University
•

Women in Computing
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o

• GVSU Engineering Engineer Day
• Revise the required courses for the IS and IT minor programs.
The Pennsylvania State University
•
•
•

o

Spring 2004, Committee for internationalizing the curriculum.
Fall 2003-Spring 2004, Committee on Diversity.
Fall 2003-Spring 2004, Consultant for the design and development
of online statistics courses for the School of Nursing.

The Housing and Residence Life Department, University of Louisville
•
•
•
•
•
•

Spring 2003, Resident Director Search Committee.
Spring 2003, Student Life Awards Committee.
Fall 2002, Assistant Director For Administrative Services Search
Committee.
Fall 2002, Associate Director for Facilities Search Committee.
Spring 2002, Director Search Committee.
Spring 2001-Spring 2003, Annual Resident Assistants Retreat
Planning Committee.
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